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A SELECTION  
FROM THE  
INDIAN DESPATCHES, MEMORANDA, &c.  
OF THE  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON

*S. J. OWEN*

London

HENRY FROWDE



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A SELECTION  
FROM THE  
DESPATCHES, MEMORANDA, AND  
OTHER PAPERS,  
RELATING TO  
INDIA  
OF FIELD-MARSHAL  
THE  
DUKE OF WELLINGTON, K.G.

EDITED BY  
SIDNEY J. OWEN, M.A.

*Reader in Law and History, and Tutor at Christ Church  
Reader in Indian History in the University of Oxford  
Formerly Professor of History in the Elphinstone College, Bombay*

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY, MAPS AND PLANS

'Truth-lover was our English Duke;  
Whatever record leap to light,  
He never shall be shamed.'

Oxford  
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

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## P R E F A C E.

THE Duke of Wellington's Despatches have long taken their place as the finest and most valuable literature of the kind in our language. Their strong and various claims to such a position are obvious and unquestionable. The appearance of the first series, for which the public was indebted to the indefatigable labours of the lamented Colonel Gurwood, produced, as the late Lord Ellesmere pointed out,<sup>1</sup> a remarkable impression, both at home and abroad; and for ever set at rest all doubts as to the originality of the writer's military genius, and the greatness of his intellectual and moral nature. The Despatches have long been not only a familiar text-book to soldiers, statesmen, and historians, but a favourite subject of study with the general reader. Thus, I have known many instances of busy professional men, who have preferred to occupy their brief leisure with such reading, rather than with works more conventionally called popular. The unrivalled interest of the

• <sup>1</sup> 'I do not think that till his own Despatches were published, for which the world is under large obligation to their editor, Colonel Gurwood, his qualities and talents were duly appreciated, by those, at least, who had not been his followers in war, or to whom his politics were not congenial. Politics ran high in those days. For years after he had returned to civil life, I am convinced that he was considered a very ordinary man by many, themselves of no ordinary capacity. There was a prevalent notion that even in war his successes had been due to the advice of subordinates, and men were cited as his advisers who would have been the first to ridicule the supposition, had they heard of it; for they knew better than any that no commander ever trusted more exclusively to his own resources. These hallucinations disappeared at once on the publication of these Despatches, which illustrate so unostentatiously and so clearly, so much better than any history, the wonderful qualities of the writer. The simplicity,



events with which these Despatches are concerned, the momentous and decisive part played by the Duke throughout the great transactions which they describe so simply yet so vividly, the noble and attractive character of the writer, which is so fully and so unaffectedly disclosed in the correspondence, and the admirably clear and vigorous style, sufficiently account for such a preference.

But besides the indiscriminate readers of the Despatches as a whole, there is good reason to think that very many persons who, in this busy age, have neither leisure nor inclination for so long a course of study as is presented in Colonel Gurwood's thirteen volumes, would yet gladly avail themselves of the opportunity of perusing, in a compendious form, the more interesting and important documents. Such an idea no doubt suggested the Selection published by the original Editor in a single volume.

The case, however, in favour of such an abridgement, is now

the strong sense, the varied resources of his mind, the patience, the forbearance, the indulgence of his temper, his assiduity, his capacity for labour—all leavened by his sense of duty—are all there, in nervous English, under his own seal and signature. Political opponents were candid enough to acknowledge the impression they derived from the perusal. I have heard that one of these, of great eminence, was requested by a Russian general, then on a visit to England, to recommend him an English work for the study of our language, and that he replied, "I can recommend you nothing better than the Despatches, just published, of the Duke of Wellington."—Lord Ellesmere's *Lecture on the Life and Character of the Duke of Wellington*. London: Murray, 1852, pp 44, 45.

The following remarks on the Despatches, by a Belgian writer, are interesting on more than one account. M. Jules Maurel says:—

'There are but few amongst the privileged men who have staked the destinies of nations on the battlefield, who have the right to appear before posterity (evidence in hand), and to say—This was my starting place; that was the goal at which I aimed; and that was the place that I actually reached; here also you see the paths by which I reached it. I do not forget what I owe to fortune, which has invariably a great share in every success; but this is what I have done to diminish this share. These were my dreams, those were my projects, and those my plans; you see the means at my disposal, my victories, and the causes of my victories. Judge and pronounce your verdict.

'Such a discourse has a theatrical manner about it that clashes with the character of Wellington. Yet it contains the exact summary of his military life. He might have

much stronger than it was when that volume appeared. His Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, has since re-inforced the first series by so copious an additional instalment, that the number of volumes is now trebled; although twenty years of a life so persistently characterised by literary activity remain to be accounted for.

Nor is this the only, nor indeed the chief reason for a new attempt to condense the essence of one portion of this vast collection into a small space. Wellington, on the great stage of the world, played many parts; and, as a writer, deals accordingly with very different departments of the history of his age. And these, however closely connected, it is not only possible, but usual, to study more or less separately. Thus, the Duke's early laurels were culled, and his literary activity was developed, in a field which is only too apt to be considered a world apart from the meridian of his later fame; and which is, in fact, so extensive and intricate a region, and so peculiar in its special features, that it both deserves and requires to be treated, in the first instance at least, as a distinct province

spoken after this fashion without distressing his friends, without shocking his enemies, and without disguising one tittle of the truth. But he adopted a wiser course. He hath bequeathed to history the substance of his Despatches, his General Orders, his plans and his reports, his memoranda of events, his official and his private letters, from the first to the last day of his holding a command. He has classified all this matter in a strict chronological order; he has not withdrawn a line; nor has he added a syllable of comment or of reflection, of accusation or of justification. A considerable number of these letters are written in French; and these letters contain many happy thoughts and expressions, but their style is very incorrect. Nothing was more easy than to *retouch* them without altering the fundamental sense, and even without affecting the bearing of the sentiment. Yet Wellington invariably refused to do this. He had written these badly rounded periods, and he did not think himself entitled to suppress or disguise them. He kept them thirty years in his portfolio, and he drew them forth in the same state as he had placed them there. He would not spare himself a single solecism or barbarism. He wished to be what he was and nothing more. His literary honesty can match that of his public and private life. What he wrote badly he has left badly written; it will be one of his peccadillos, if too great honesty be such, but it will be a crowning testimony of that fanatical love of truth, and of that inflexible horror of falsehood, that were the rule of his whole life.' *Wellington. His character,—his actions,—and his writings.* London: Murray, 1853, pp. 50, 51.

of enquiry : although the intelligent student quickly discerns, that Anglo-Indian history is still an integral and indispensable portion of the general history of the British Empire.

Moreover, Wellington's career in India was coeval with his eldest brother's eventful administration as Governor-General ; and it is impossible to estimate that administration fairly and exactly, either as a whole, or in its details, without constant reference to the Duke's contemporary correspondence and memoranda, which throw a broad and bright light upon almost every part of the subject. To Colonel Gurwood's three volumes of Wellington Papers, penned in India, have since been added four entire Supplementary volumes, of the same date, besides detached letters, &c., relating to the same subject though written subsequently, and interspersed in the two later series, edited by the present Duke.

Again, Colonel Gurwood's Indian Selections were arranged simply in chronological order, with no classification according to the various topics of which they treat, nor any general account of their import, nor discussion of their bearings upon the policy of the Governor-General. Nor were they accompanied by Maps and Plans, an indispensable assistance in following the Duke's military operations, and his minute and circumstantial comments on the course of the war elsewhere than where he was principally responsible or directly concerned, as well as on the territorial demarcations and re-arrangements of a time, when the political geography of India may be said to have varied almost from day to day, and to have been completely transformed in the course of Wellesley's period of office.

And besides their entire omission of so much valuable matter that has since been published, the Indian Selections were prefixed to those relating to the great European war, of which Wellington was the hero, and which tended to throw his career in the East comparatively into the shade. Thus the ordinary reader, whose interest in Indian affairs is apt to be languid, and

easily diverted, is tempted to 'skip' the Oriental prelude : while the Indian specialist is encumbered with a goodly array of documents which, however important on other accounts, are irrelevant to his immediate purpose.

While lecturing at Oxford, for the purposes of the Honour School of History, upon what is there technically called 'The Indian Special Subject ;'<sup>1</sup> and subsequently, in preparing for the press a Selection of Marquess Wellesley's Indian Despatches ; I was much impressed with the desirableness of collecting, in a separate form, the pith of the Duke's correspondence, and his principal official Despatches and Memoranda, on a larger scale than Colonel Gurwood's plan embraced, and with the necessary additions from the Supplementary Despatches.

While the carrying out of this, or rather of a part<sup>2</sup> of this design, was requisite for the local purpose ; the intrinsic interest of the general subject, and of the separate documents, seemed likely to make such a collection, if properly executed, more generally acceptable ; and I ventured to hope that it might be useful both on its own account, and as a clue to the Despatches *in extenso*, and an incitement to their study by outsiders. Especially as the Duke's papers not only cover the same period as his brother's, but in discussing the topics of the time, often illustrate also earlier history ; anticipate and account for many later administrative difficulties ; and sometimes enter upon what are still unsolved and anxious problems. if not burning questions.

Moreover, the two later series present an entirely new and very important source of interest and instruction ; which no Selection, however compendious, ought now to ignore. Wellington's connexion with our greatest and most perplexing

<sup>1</sup> This includes the history of British India in detail, and from original sources, between the years 1784 and 1806.

<sup>2</sup> The Military Appendix, and the papers relating to events subsequent to the year 1806, do not come within the scope of the Indian Special Subject, as studied at Oxford, and periodically offered (I may add) for examination at Cooper's Hill College.

Dependency was by no means limited to the eight years which he passed on its soil; and in one or other capacity, either as a Minister of the Crown, as Commander-in-Chief, or as the British Nestor, he continued throughout his long life to take a strong interest in its affairs;<sup>1</sup> to tender advice concerning them at important crises; and to interpose with authority, both official and personal, in its military regulation. The evidence of this interest, and the records of this advice and interposition, abound in the Supplementary Despatches. And as they deal with questions which turned up, from time to time, for nearly thirty years after the Duke left India, and approach already so near to our own day; they are even more important, in an immediately practical point of view, than the earlier papers. This new and prominent feature, therefore, ought clearly to be exhibited also in the abridgment.

If any further justification of the present attempt be required, it may be added, that while the increasing attention to Indian subjects makes it most desirable that the public mind should be instructed by solid information, and determined by the voice of authority, rather than led astray by casual and untrustworthy statements, crude speculation, and irresponsible suggestions; there are few matters of present controversy relating to India which are not either directly or indirectly illustrated, and at least cleared for solution in their historical and more general aspects, by the Wellington papers, and some of them by the documents inserted in this volume.

The favourable notices, in this country and in India, of the

<sup>1</sup> 'The accuracy of the Duke's memory was in no instance more conspicuous than in everything which related to India. The details of its territorial divisions and nomenclature—which are the despair of the students of its history—were to the last engraved on his tenacious recollection. I remember well his reading to me, with much emphasis, a memorandum which he had just prepared for the use of the Government at one of the most critical periods of the fortunes of our Indian empire, on the subject of its defence. It embraced all three Presidencies, and was full of geographical details. It had been written, as he told me, without reference to a map or a gazetteer.'—Lord Ellesmere, *ut supra*, pp. 20, 21.

Selection from Marquess Wellesley's Despatches have stimulated me to make the best acknowledgment I can, by sparing no pains in the prosecution of the present undertaking. But it has proved more difficult and laborious than I at first anticipated. Far more even than on the former occasion, the responsibility of choosing such documents as should occupy a single volume only has been felt to be a delicate and anxious one. For the majority of Marquess Wellesley's more important Despatches were necessarily printed entire, as they are strictly official communications, intended to furnish a consecutive narrative of events for the information and judgment of the authorities in England; or a complete argument on behalf of an original and disputable policy; or again, a mutually related body of instructions to the Governor-General's agents for the detailed execution of his measures. Thus they have an organic unity; and each part is indispensable in order to convey a just sense either of the sequence and general drift of occurrences, or of an entire plan of action, or again, of the converging and cumulative force of the writer's arguments. And to mutilate the document is to make it, if not unintelligible, at least fragmentary as a narrative, indefinite as a record of orders, or inconsequent in its reasoning. But a large proportion of Wellington's Despatches consists of private correspondence; in which his thoughtful and discursive mind pours itself out on several subjects in the same letter; or surveys the same subject from different points of view; and frequently sums up, in a few pregnant sentences, the results of that survey, or of previous or subsequent discussions. At the same time, so well articulated are his compositions as a whole, and so coherent, clean-cut, and well-finished in their separate sections, that it is both obvious and easy to detach fragments complete in themselves, as well as valuable for the concise elucidation of a particular topic, or of some special aspect of a large and complicated question. Yet, though this is an advantage in so far as it facilitates the separation of extracts

from the body of the document ; that circumstance is counter-balanced, I had almost said overbalanced, by the abundance of rich material that thus offers itself, where the author writes on the whole so copiously, yet so pithily and so weightily in each case, and thus pleads so powerfully against exclusion. The scissors must be handled freely : but the operation is inevitably attended by many and serious misgivings. Thus it will be observed that the bulk of the present volume consists not of complete papers, but of extracts. Nothing could better shew the logical mind of the writer, and his faculty of distributing and working out his subject methodically, than the fact, that when his letters are thus broken up into fragments, the detached parts are not only perfectly intelligible, but lose, as it seems to me, little or nothing of their individual significance and force.<sup>1</sup> It is for others to judge how far I have succeeded in re-combining them into an orderly, instructive, and fairly representative whole.

To this end, I have classified them under distinct heads ; though it is obviously impossible to avoid occasional repetition (when views already explained in one connexion are to be enforced afresh in another,) or the relegation of a paper to a section which is not the only, or, as some may think, the most suitable one in which it might be placed. I have also, as before, added a running summary along the tops of the pages. But instead of the short note of the contents of each paper, which was prefixed in the Wellesley Selection, an analysis, fuller in substance, though as terse in wording as seemed compatible with comprehensiveness, has been given ; and this, repeated collectively in the classified Synopsis, will, it is hoped, supply a ready means of reference to the text. It is intended, in fact, as an analytical Index. And as the critical reader may wish to compare the extracts with the complete documents ; and as, moreover, this

book is designed not to supersede, but to serve as an introduction and a key to the miscellaneous contents of the voluminous original; I have appended, in the Synopsis, references to *all* the Editions of the Despatches in which the selected papers occur.

The elaborate refutation of Lord Castlereagh's strictures on the Treaty of Bassein has been omitted, partly on account of its length, where space was so sorely needed; but chiefly because, having been incorporated by Mr. Martin in his Edition of the Wellesley Despatches, it was inserted in my own Selection from those papers. Moreover, the Memorandum which forms the Introduction both to that volume and to this gives the Duke's view of the same subject more concisely.

In the preliminary Essay I have endeavoured to trace distinctly and consecutively Wellington's share, both as an adviser and an agent, in the great drama occasioned by his brother's enterprising foreign policy, and which wrought such extensive and permanent changes in the political condition of India, and in the relations of the Company to the native States. From first to last it will be seen, that even when Wellington was not a prominent actor on the public stage, he was not the less potent as a confidential adviser, a diplomatic mediator, or a skilful organizer and director of forces that were to be wielded by others. His information and his counsels enabled the Governor-General to shape his early course with a precision, a confidence, and an adaptation to the circumstances of the case, which would otherwise have been almost incompatible with his recent arrival in the country. And though Colonel Wellesley occupied a subordinate station in the army, he was throughout the animating spirit of the Mysore expedition; so much so, indeed, that a recent French historian of repute<sup>1</sup> actually ascribes the conquest

<sup>1</sup> In his *Histoire du XIX<sup>e</sup> Siècle* (vol. ii. p. 315) M. Michelet, making no mention of General Harris, says:—'Tippoo, non secouru par nous, n'en eut pas moins d'abord un avantage sur le jeune colonel Wellington.' And again (p. 317), 'Wellington fut



of Tippoo to him. The success of the Governor-General's experiment of restoring the Hindoo Kingdom in a portion of the conquered territory was, in a great measure, due to his professional ability and zeal as Commandant of Seringapatam, and to his salutary ascendancy over the mind of the Rajah's Minister. The previously indomitable Malabar Coast and its adjacencies were subdued and settled partly by his personal exertions, partly under his orders, and by Poorneah's adoption of his suggestions. A Memorandum drawn up by him was the starting-point of the Governor-General's military reforms in Oude. The projected capture of the French islands, which was prevented by the Admiral's scruples, he recommended soon after his brother's arrival, as well as other precautions against the revival of French power in India. At every stage of the prolonged Mahratta entanglement, his wisdom in the Cabinet is as notable, as his military capacity in preparing the equipments, devising the plan, and conducting the operations of the campaign in the Dekkan; and subsequently in suggesting and commenting upon the disposition and movements of the British forces in the war against Holkar, in which he was not personally

obligé de brusquer l'attaque, n'ayant de vivres que pour huit jours.' He seems to be unconscious of the existence of the Commander-in-Chief; though, in connexion with the Mahratta War, he does refer to Lake, or as he calls him in a note 'Lacke.'

The whole account of the period is a strange medley of inaccuracies, gratuitous assumptions, and injurious imputations against our countrymen,—at which an Englishman may afford to smile; though not without regret that the last utterances of so brilliant a writer should be disfigured by such a melancholy caricature of a great epoch.

It may be well to illustrate the peculiarities just mentioned. M. Michelet conjectures that the Wellesleys were of Spanish extraction (which the Dean of Windsor has kindly assured me is absolutely untrue); and asserts that both the Governor-General and the Duke were educated by 'l'archevêque Cornewallis, frère du vice-roi des Indes.' He says of the ruler of Mysore, 'Tippoo n'eut qu'un défaut, l'orgueil, la haine et le mépris des idolâtres, chrétiens et indiens brahmaniques.' The signal of Tippoo's ruin was, he says, given by 'un petit sultan que Tippoo croyait sûr, who betrayed the passage of the Ghats to the Bombay army. If this means anything, it must refer to the Rajah of Coorg. And if so, it is unnecessary to specify how many blunders it includes in a few words. His idea of the 'Peishwaw' is that he was 'chef de religion des Mahrattes;' I suppose, because he was a Brahmin and Head of the Confederacy (though a nominal subject of the non-Brahmin Rajah of Satara).

engaged. The weak points in the Governor-General's policy, or rather in the one-sided application of that policy, and the serious consequences to be apprehended from the non-fulfilment, by the allied Native States, of conditions indispensable to their own well-being and the success of Lord Wellesley's great scheme of pacification, he discerns with prophetic sagacity, and expounds with unanswerable force, and with every variety of illustration. And when his brother, for a time, swerves into too exacting a line towards the conquered confederates, his urgent remonstrances and sombre predictions are quickly justified by the reiterated disturbances and mortifying failures which, though partially redeemed by a new career of victory, cast a dark shade over the close of an administration otherwise so successful and so splendid.

In other cases the Governor-General sought and obtained his brother's advice respecting threatened dangers, which his own ingenuity actually averted. Thus, the anticipated renewal of Zemann Shah's invasion, which the memory of the Paniput campaign, the Shah's haughty language and avowedly ambitious pretensions, and the critical state of our relations with Tippoo and the Mahrattas, had invested with exaggerated terrors, was

The Anglo-Indian religious establishment is as accurately appreciated as the Mahratta religious polity. Thus it is said:—'*L'Église indienne qui relève de Cantorbéry est la plus riche du monde.*' After explaining the danger of M. Raymond's corps to the English interests, M. Michelet adds:—'*Tout à coup, Raymond meurt. Cette mort fut sans doute un miracle accordé aux prières du parti anglais.*' Does he—or does he not—mean to insinuate that Raymond was assassinated at English instigation? Of the young Rajah of Mysore he says:—'*L'enfant avait trois ans. Par une bizarre hypocrisie, on lui donna un sérail, pour faire croire qu'on voulait que cette dynastie se perpétuât.*' The whole account of the '*Culte de la mort*,' and of the disinterested and beneficent Thugs reads like an elaborate *j'eu d'esprit*, as in the following passage:—'*Comme le médecin a droit à un honoraire du malade qu'il a guéri, le thug croyait avoir le droit de se porter héritier du mort. Mais souvent il lui laissait ce qu'il portait, se contentant du mérite d'avoir fait une bonne action.*' Lastly, the following observation is worthy of Voltaire himself, who rarely tossed off a historical generalization in neater words, or with a more sublime disregard of dull particulars:—'*Les Anglais sont d'autant plus discrets sur l'Inde, que c'est pour tant de familles une affaire d'intérêt personnel. Pour se dispenser de mentir ils ne disent absolument rien.*'

staved off by Wellesley's diplomacy. But had this failed, he was fore-armed for its repulse by a plan with which Wellington had supplied him, and which shews that the subject had been very carefully considered.

Again, from the same quarter he was provided with facts and arguments in support of his demand for the maintenance of an adequate military force; when the home authorities were bent on reducing the Indian army to a dangerously low limit. And Wellington perhaps suggested to him, certainly confirmed him in, the bold course of encouraging private trade, and thus preparing the way for the abolition of the Company's commercial monopoly.

Nor was it only on questions of general policy that the great soldier came in aid of the great statesman. Wellesley, however public-spirited and magnanimous, was at the same time a man of very sensitive feelings; and keenly resented the illiberal and unworthy treatment which he experienced at the hands of his employers. And when to this was added the half-hearted support of the King's Ministers; and he began to hesitate between the claims of his unfulfilled programme of public usefulness, and a sense of comparative political impotence, and endangered self-respect; he had, at each stage of the painful struggle, the full benefit of his brother's sympathetic, upright, and judicious counsels.

Lastly, Sir Arthur, on his return home, was indefatigable in vindicating the Governor-General's character, and pleading his cause, both in public and in private; and, on the whole, it may be said, that he fully redeemed the promise which he had given<sup>1</sup> at the opening of Lord Mornington's administration.

In developing, in the introductory Essay, the interesting subject which has been here sketched, it seemed desirable to add a certain amount of collateral information; and occasionally

<sup>1</sup> See page 524.

to take a short review of the general antecedents of important matters which come under Wellington's cognizance, and on which he pronounces an opinion evidently based on historical considerations. Thus, it is hoped, the distinctive features and stirring controversies of the time, and the merits and historical position of the entire administration, may be more readily and accurately appreciated by the general reader. Where the brothers differed in opinion, it was necessary to endeavour to shew, both textually and by remarks of my own, not only the nature and extent of the divergence, but how it came about, and even which of them appears to have been in the right. But in general I have been more anxious to collect and summarise Wellington's views, than to obtrude my own.

In a Survey of Marquess Wellesley's administration, prefixed to the Selections, an attempt was made to explain and estimate the chief features of his policy. But the Survey was not—and was not meant to be—a narrative. For a more continuous as well as a critical account of the administration, full enough for the purposes of the general reader, recourse may be had to a recent Article in the *Edinburgh Review* (No. 303), which might, with advantage, be reprinted separately, as it is well adapted to supply a popular want.

Anglo-Indian history is full of perplexity to those who are not acquainted with the great revolutions of the century immediately preceding the establishment of the British Power. The experience of this fact induced me, some years ago, to deliver a course of lectures introductory to Anglo-Indian history; the substance of which was published under the title of *India on the Eve of the British Conquest* (London: Allen & Co., 1872). To this, and to Mr. H. G. Keene's *Fall of the Moghul Empire*,<sup>1</sup> which carries on the story of the imperial fortunes, or rather misfortunes,

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<sup>1</sup> The same author has since published a most lively, and at the same time a most judicious account of the earlier so-called Moghul emperors.—*The Turks in India* (London: Allen & Co., 1879).

from the battle of Paniput to Wellesley's date, I venture again to refer those who may wish for information on the subject in a simpler form than that which Mr. Elphinstone has given to his standard but rather intricate narrative, or for the explanation of events omitted by him.<sup>1</sup>

It remains to mention an obligation which is not the less felt, because I know not how adequately to acknowledge it. His Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, most generously permitted me, without any restriction, to use all his illustrious father's papers already published, together with the historical Map of India herein inserted. Such a permission could not but be regarded as a very serious trust. And my earnest endeavour has been to discharge that trust faithfully, and to the best of my ability, however inadequately. Not the less because, apart from personal obligation, these impressive memorials of the mighty dead cry aloud for careful and reverent handling. They are the noblest and most imperishable monuments of their author's fame; and are thoroughly typical of one of the world's greatest men, and one of England's wisest and truest-hearted citizens.

<sup>1</sup> Thus Mr. Elphinstone's History closes at the battle of Paniput; and he gives no account of Hyder Ali. It seems to have been his original intention to continue the work. But the destruction of his papers in the attack on the Residency, at the opening of the last Mahratta War, was perhaps connected with the abandonment of this design.

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## ERRATA.

- Page 159, No. 77. *After the summary insert 'Extract.'*  
„ 169, line 5. *After 'countryman' read [countrymen?]*  
„ 248, „ 13. *For 'Madras' read 'Bombay'*  
„ 410, „ 11. *For 'aliences' read 'aliences'*  
„ 419, „ 7. *For 'writes' read 'has written'*  
„ 424, „ 25. *For 'inuendos' read 'innuendos'*  
„ 487, „ 29. *For 'trade' read 'and Indian trades'*  
„ 547, „ 26. *For 'Marauders' read 'marauders'*  
„ 557, lines 22 and 23 *should be transposed.*  
„ 585, line 34. *For 323. read 323 a.*  
„ 631, line 32. *For 'Mouron' read 'Meuron'*

# WELLINGTON IN INDIA<sup>1</sup>.

(BY THE EDITOR.)

## INTRODUCTION.

THIS paper deserves particular attention on several accounts. Although it omits all mention of several important items of Lord Wellesley's administration, it was well adapted to serve the purpose for which it was originally written. Its object was to explain and vindicate what in Anglo-Indian official language would be called the foreign policy of the Governor-General. Thus the College question, the encouragement afforded to private trade, even the organization of the Secretariat, and the separate constitution of the Adawlut Courts, are naturally excluded. And although the embarrassed state of the finances, and the Company's impaired credit, on Lord Mornington's accession to office, are prominently referred to, Wellesley's defence against the charge of profligate and ruinous expenditure is reserved for Parliamentary handling; and was undertaken by Sir Arthur in a vigorous speech, published by Colonel Gurwood. But why is nothing said of the war against Holkar? Perhaps its discussion was felt to be premature. Perhaps the writer preferred to make strong points, and so leave the matter, rather than weaken the general effect by a closing reference to half-completed events, which must involve the admission of at least temporary disaster and apparent collapse. Probably he was loth to defend even his brother at the cost of exposing the personal failings and professional mismanagement of the Commander-in-Chief in India, and that Commander the gallant and generous, though headstrong and rather puzzle-headed Lake. Or, again, he may have preferred that Wellesley, on his speedily expected return, should tell his own tale of this unfortunate complication. Nor, lastly, am I quite clear, for reasons which will be assigned later, that Sir Arthur was prepared to acquit his brother of the heavy responsibility of having, though with the best intentions, indirectly precipitated an untimely and unnecessary war. Another conspicuous omission is indicated in the following words: 'In this review of the measures of the Marquis

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this paper, the Editor's Selection from the Indian Despatches of Marquess Wellesley is referred to as *Wellesley Selections*.



Wellesley's government, it is not intended to detail the movements or the actions of the different armies.' Thus a reader, unacquainted with the general subject, would fail to gain from this document any idea of much which is distinctively associated with the great name of Wellesley. But, considering the part played by the writer in India, not the least notable, and a very characteristic circumstance, is his rigid and systematic effacing of himself. The march of the British troops on Poona, and the occupation of that city, are mentioned impersonally. Once, and once only, it is said :—'The commander in the Deccan wrote, &c.'; and the success of the war is ascribed to various true causes, but nothing is said of the General. Such abstemiousness was, of course, quite proper. But would many men have practised it? Would the conqueror of Sind, who was fond of taking lessons from 'the Great Master' (as he calls the Duke), have been so reticent? But here, as ever, Wellington attended strictly to the business before him; and did it thoroughly, because he did not allow himself to be distracted by personal considerations.

To represent, exactly though tersely, the unpromising aspect of the political world of India, on Lord Mornington's arrival in the country; to describe and justify the remedial processes conceived and adopted by the Governor-General; to exhibit the orderly and majestic march of his policy, as it successively braced up our own energies, revived our alliances, struck down our enemies, extended our influence for good, and incidentally our dominions; removed inveterate evils; guarded against the recurrence of serious dangers; and laid wide and deep the strong foundations of good government, such as had never hitherto existed, or been thought possible, in such a state of society; to disclose the natural connexion of one measure with another, so that the whole administration seemed but a series of graduated upheavals from chaos to cosmos; to remove prejudices and answer objections, not by fine phrases and special pleading, but by a well-marshalled array of indisputable and massive facts:—such appears to have been his aim; and in this he has certainly succeeded.

The style of the paper is as notable as its substance. Easy and unpretending, it inspires confidence like an unstudied colloquial narrative. There is no mannerism, to disturb the attention, or revolt the taste; no rhetoric, to awaken suspicion, and excite critical antagonism; no verbal redundancy to check the onward flow into the reader's mind of the closely-packed matter. From first to last, the subject seems to unroll itself with the distinctness of a diversified landscape, viewed from a commanding position, on a clear day. And these circumstances surely betoken literary ability of a high order. To disentangle the really material issues in so vast and complicated a controversy; to note the

essential points simply and forcibly ; to avoid overstating administrative difficulties ; to throw no verbal veil over awkward facts ; to reproduce faithfully the transitory aspects of politics, and the actual circumstances which determined each move in the anxious and eventful game ; to avoid the equivocal advantages of later colouring ; to do adequate justice, but only justice, to the high-minded though high-handed and adventurous line of the Governor-General ; to bring out each topic in sufficient relief, but to maintain the just proportions of the parts ; and to make the whole blend harmoniously in one distinct and general view ; to vindicate, without exaggeration or extenuation, the unity, prudence, justice, and beneficence of a policy so extensive in its range, and so diversified in its circumstantial applications ; and, finally, to convey the impression, that throughout we have been listening to a plain, unvarnished tale of events, evolving themselves successively in their proper course :—such a feat is assuredly no small literary achievement. And is this an untrue description of the paper before us ?

But it may be objected by a cynical critic, Wellington was Wellesley's brother, and, of course, a very clever man. He would naturally make out the best case he could for the Governor-General. And he was shrewd enough to be aware, that the more calmly and simply he wrote, the more credit was likely to be attached to his statements. *Ars est celare artem*. Was not his *naïveté* calculated ? Did he not write on the understanding, that his studiously 'unadorned eloquence' was more likely to enlist attention, and steal into the convictions of his readers, than the 'lofty and commanding eloquence,' the exhaustive, and what he himself calls the 'too ingenious' reasoning of his Academic brother ? Especially as his own intimate connexion with the measures which he had undertaken to interpret made his confident assertion of facts to a great extent authoritative, and almost conclusive ? It may be replied : undoubtedly the last circumstance gave Wellington the strongest right to speak, and to be listened to with confidence, undiminished by the captious objection that he was too much interested to speak dispassionately. No one who knew him could be entitled to suspect him of falsifying or distorting facts. And the truth is, that the style and tone of the paper are homogeneous with those of his general Despatches, 'documents (in Charlotte Brontë's phrase<sup>1</sup>) written by Modesty to the dictation of Truth,' and of his other compositions throughout his long literary career ; and have been, once for all, adverted to on that very account. But, moreover, whoever will take the trouble to examine the Selections in this volume will be convinced that the views expounded in this paper are, in

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<sup>1</sup> *Shirley*, p. 138, Ed. 1874.

the main<sup>1</sup>, a short and honest summary of those which the writer had entertained and expressed at each crisis, as it occurred; and which he had shared with or communicated to his brother. While the Wellesley Selections, by the present Editor, will in turn prove, that the Governor-General had all along announced and acted on them. And this, it may be added, makes the paper so appropriate an Introduction to both volumes.

Another curious circumstance, which gives an additional interest to it is, that it occasionally illustrates the writer's immediate contact with Mahratta affairs, by the mention of important facts which will be vainly sought in the voluminous communications of the Governor-General. Thus, for instance, that Sindia's minister was the Peishwa's *derwan*; which fact made Sindia's affectation of ignorance as to the conclusion and character of the Treaty of Bassein the more incredible and absurd. Also, that Sindia's minister, in the first instance, not only courted British intervention for the restoration of the Peishwa, but undertook to guarantee part of the cost of that measure. And whereas Lord Wellesley's repeated statement that Holkar, in the battle of Poona, defeated the united armies of the Peishwa and Sindia, has led to the constant misconception that Sindia was present, with a large part of his forces, on that occasion; Wellington here states the fact correctly, namely that Sindia, continuing in Hindostan, had sent only an insignificant detachment southwards, which was actually routed, in concert with Baji Rao's tumultuary levies. This is the more important, inasmuch as the Governor-General habitually laid far too much stress on the reverse as a direct blow to Sindia's military power; however completely it did subvert his influence over the Peishwa, and his political authority at Poona.

## I. MYSORE.

### 1. WAR WITH TIPPoo.

Though Wellington's Indian reputation is popularly connected almost entirely with the Mahratta War, it may be doubted whether the successful result of the operations against Tippoo was not really, though less obviously, as much due to him as the break up of the Mahratta confederacy. In the political crisis which precedes the war, the Governor-General consults him, and attaches just weight to his advice. Cornwallis had once already overcome the long-standing difficulties which had obstructed our conquest of Mysore. But Tippoo had been reprieved; and the old problem, under altered conditions, amply exercised the care and skill with which it was handled, both in the general plan, and in detail, by Colonel Wellesley. Little less important was his

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<sup>1</sup> The exceptions to this statement will be noticed and authenticated in the sequel.

personal influence with the Governor and officials of Fort St. George ; whereby the danger of a factious opposition to the Governor-General's measures was prevented ; the administrative machine adjusted to the arduous and urgent work of preparation ; and the way smoothed for a mutual good understanding on Lord Mornington's arrival at Madras. Meanwhile, the personal activity of Colonel Wellesley in organizing the departments of the army for the campaign, will be understood from his own statements in the text. Among his brother officers also, it is obvious that he was well employed in keeping up a good tone, counteracting the tendency to make light of the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, and in fact supplying, as far as possible, the want of a master mind at the head of the army. It has often been asked, why Harris appointed Colonel Wellesley to command in Seringapatam, after the storm ? The Duke of Wellington's own account of the matter will be found in the Appendix. But besides what he says, is it not probable, that in the antecedents and course of the campaign, Harris had learned to appreciate the governing capacity of the man, and to be grateful for the steady and respectful support which his subordinate had given him in his difficulties ?

The efficiency of the Nizam's contingent in this campaign was not a little due to the stimulating and controlling authority of Colonel Wellesley ; and more remotely, to his timely exposition of the dangerous state of our old ally's affairs on the eve of the war, and the suggestions for their improvement which the Governor-General at once adopted, and which were carried out with perfect success. The battle of Mallavelly displayed, on a small scale, some of the great military qualities, which were destined later to decide the fate of the world ; and the attack on the Sultanpettah position, though unavoidably unsuccessful in the first instance, contributed materially to advance the work of the siege. The prompt restoration of order in the city, and the confidence displayed by the inhabitants in returning to their homes, and resuming their ordinary avocations, spoke well for the selection of the Commandant. And the short but active and brilliant operations against Dhoondiah Waugh averted a really formidable danger ; considering the unsettled state of a country teeming with all the elements of military disorder, and bordering on the Peishwa's territories, where Sindia, full of restless ambition and jealousy of our unexpectedly rapid success, would have been very ready to take advantage of a plausible pretext for embroiling us in new troubles. The partition and settlement of Mysore, in their mature form, were the work of the Governor-General. But Colonel Wellesley was an active member of the Commission, which carried out those great measures with laudable promptitude. And besides other useful suggestions, the importance of retaining Seringapatam in our own hands, and of repair-

ing and keeping up its fortifications, was so elaborately and powerfully urged by the Colonel, that, remembering how useful a military base that city proved not only in the Dhoondiah Waugh campaign, but later in the Mahratta war; the success both of the Mysore arrangement, and of the Governor-General's Mahratta policy, may be in a great measure ascribed to the adoption of this comprehensively conceived and closely reasoned view. Thus, however unobtrusive in some cases at the time, the influence of Wellington is now indisputable and conspicuous at every stage of the conquest and settlement of Mysore.

## 2 AND 3. ANGLO-HINDOO MYSORE.

The contrast is very striking between Anglo-Hindoo Mysore, in the days of Wellesley, and every other native State. The documents inserted in this volume will enable the reader readily to appreciate the fact, and to understand its causes. The introductory paper clearly explains the fundamental deficiencies and practical solecisms of the older subsidiary alliance system; and how, personal errors on the part of our rulers both in India and at home being added to the general account, we had been landed at last, on Wellington's arrival, in a sort of political quagmire. It explains, also, though more concisely than the Governor-General in his elaborate Minute of Aug. 12, 1798 (See *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 11-57), how comprehensively Lord Mornington reviewed the situation, and how strenuously he devoted himself to the task of improving it, and extricating us from a labyrinth of dangers which threatened the very existence of our Empire. The fatal effects of Sir John Shore's inaction, in the case of the Nizam, were promptly and brilliantly counteracted; and our relations with him were placed upon an excellent footing, and step by step improved, until they assumed the appearance of extreme cordiality and a real unity of interests. The irremediable evils of native misrule in the Carnatic and in Tanjore were redressed, by converting those regions into British Provinces. The rather arbitrary attempt to annex Oude failed; but the military frontier there was rectified; the Vizier's dangerous martial rabble reduced; the area of long-standing anarchy narrowed; and an unmistakeable warning was given to the Nawab to set his house in order at last, lest worse should befall him. The Peishwa, in the fullness of time, accepted the regulating trammels which he had so long and so resolutely evaded; and the Governor-General flattered himself, that his control over that slippery Potentate, and through him over the whole Mahratta Confederacy, was thenceforth assured. Nor did the difficulties which he experienced from the outset in this case prevent his ardent mind from anticipating that the

defeat of Sindia and the Borslay would enable him not only to dominate, but to reform their governments, in accordance with his cherished scheme. The Guikwar was already our decided ally, though his administrative feebleness and his poverty impeded our operations in the Holkar war, and gave our authority over him too much the appearance, for the time at least, of a burdensome rather than a profitable connexion. The adventurer Holkar, whose fortune (in his own words) was on the saddle of his horse, illegitimate both in a natural and political sense, was to be obliterated as a ruler. In the Governor-General's phrase, he was not one of the regular Powers of India. And the defection to him of the Rajah of Bhurtpore was instantly met by a decree that the Rajah should be deposed, and his dominions annexed, as the penalty of his faithlessness. The Rajput States were to be protected, so as to impose an additional barrier against the revival of Sindia's power in Hindostan.

Such was the Governor-General's extensive scheme of Indian pacification and political re-organization. It is needless here to specify how much of this remained for the time unaccomplished. It will, however, be necessary presently to consider Wellington's testimony as to the working of his brother's system in the cases of the Nizam, the Peishwa, and Sindia. This is the more necessary from the desponding and, at first sight, almost unaccountable picture presented by Lord Cornwallis in some of his last Despatches.<sup>1</sup> Though his statement is obviously over-coloured, the attentive reader of Wellington's correspondence will be at no loss to understand the amount of truth which underlies it, and its apparent inconsistency with the general impression conveyed by Lord Wellesley's glowing description of the results of his measures.

Meanwhile let us turn to the more pleasing subject of Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. It was a fortunate circumstance that, so early in his career, the Governor-General had an opportunity of setting up a model Hindoo State, the pure result of conquest, unaffected by previous diplomatic conditions, owing its very existence to the spontaneous benevolence of the British Power, determined from the first, in the fashion of its life, by the stipulations and restrictions imposed by the victor in the charter of its constitution, avowedly dependent upon British support, naturally antagonistic to the anti-English traditions of the Mahometan dynasty, and

<sup>1</sup> Thus, e. g. he says, 'The states who are most intimately connected with us, such as the Peshwa and the Nizam, are reduced to the most forlorn condition ;—these Powers possess no funds or troops on whom they can depend ;—anarchy and disaffection prevail universally throughout their dominions, and—unless the British Residents exercised a power and an ascendancy that they ought not to exert, those Governments would be immediately dissolved.' See *Wellesley Selections*, p. 803.

actually united with us in interest and in the consciousness that our friends and foes were the same as its own; or rather, that we were its only sincere friends and protectors against the otherwise overwhelming chances of its speedy destruction by the more independent and powerful States in its neighbourhood. There might be danger of a want of internal vitality. But there was no reason to fear systematic obstruction, treachery, or the unmanageable and suicidal inaptitude, which had degraded and destroyed the Arcot State, and made Oude proverbial for misgovernment. The minority of the Rajah postponed some serious difficulties. Under the government of Tippoo and his father, the people, both great and small, had been trained to implicit obedience; and the blighting influence of Mahratta anarchy and spoliation had been favourably contrasted by the cruel and capricious, yet comparatively orderly and fostering tyranny of the Sultan. Thus the elements of national wealth and prosperity did not require creating; though they had hitherto been too exclusively employed in maintaining a disproportionately large army, in constructing fortifications, and in other military purposes. The re-employment of Poorneah was a most judicious step. An able Brahmin accountant, an experienced minister of finance under Tippoo, clear-sighted in his plans for the improvement of the country, and active and persevering in carrying them out; jealous of the honour and qualified independance of the State, but not incapable of appreciating and working cordially with such men as the Resident and Colonel Wellesley; a good man of business, and one who inspired confidence in so severe a judge of native character as the Colonel<sup>1</sup>:—such a man was certainly very happily adapted to promote the success of so delicate, and, at that time, so novel an experiment. But Wellington's authority and example were also most important, not to say indispensable ingredients in the full cup of triumph quaffed by the Governor-General in his capacity of king-maker. It is impossible, in a few paragraphs, to do full justice to Wellington's administrative merits, as they are exhibited incidentally and unostentatiously in the long array of letters, on a curious variety of subjects, which flowed from his ever active brain and ready pen, in the course of his duty as Commandant of Seringapatam, and military guardian of the resuscitated State. But the specimens of his official and private correspondence here given will, it is hoped, sufficiently indicate the spirit in which he ruled, and the principles which guided his conduct. He is, in the best sense, an *amicus curiæ* to the *dewan*; sustaining him by his sympathy; counselling him in his difficulties; carefully refraining

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 535.

not only from harsh dictation, but from untimely and excessive interference ; making much of the native authorities ; rebuking the insolence, and sternly repressing the licentious tendencies of the English officers, and teaching them to respect the civil power ; cordially approving, and handsomely acknowledging Poorneah's ability, rectitude, punctual fidelity to the stipulations of the alliance, and successful conduct of public affairs ; and parting with him at last, on the best terms, with a few seasonable and impressive words of good advice, and with the gift of a portrait, which must often, in after times, have inspired in his old coadjutor sentiments akin to those with which the veteran sepoy, in earlier days, were wont to salute the picture of Sir Eyre Coote. Fortunate indeed was the Governor-General to possess at once two such instruments for the working out of his favourite problem !

Besides one or two more summary references to the prosperous state of Mysore, there will be found in the Appendix a detailed and interesting account of Poorneah's system and its good results, submitted to the Governor-General on the eve of the writer's return to England. The general condition of the native States with which we had been previously connected had, as a rule, been most unsatisfactory. The government had been equally improvident of its own interests, of its obligations to the Company, and of the welfare of its subjects. Little care had been taken either to maintain internal order, to guard against foreign aggression, or to rule, in any sense, paternally. The appliances of civilization had been allowed to go to ruin, and the natural resources of the country had been progressively impaired. Thus the revenue had dwindled more and more ; and what was realized had been lavished on courtly luxury, vicious indulgence on the part of the ruler and his sycophants, and in maintaining a wretchedly disciplined and equipped body of troops, who, systematically kept in arrears of pay (Orme says) from fear of their deserting, had been useless against the enemy, formidable to their employers, and had preyed on the population, and aggravated the general poverty and misery. The corruptly appointed ministers and collectors had impartially plundered both the people and the ruler. And the subsidiary claims of the Company had been either allowed to accumulate unsatisfied, or had been satisfied only by a ruinous plan of mortgaging the revenue to money lenders, who by their rapacity still further blighted agriculture ; kept their creditor in an ignominious thralldom ; and tended to commit him more and more to courses, which were sure to end in a serious quarrel between him and the English Government. Although this picture is a too familiar one to the reader of early Anglo-Indian history, it seems well to recal it, in order to do full justice, by the contrast, to Poorneah's management.



The flourishing condition of the Sultan's dominions, compared to other native territories, had surprised the English at the time of the conquest. Seringapatam had on that occasion been plundered. But the shortness of the war, the directness of the march of the invaders on the capital, and the rapid pacification of the country, had averted the devastation which might otherwise have ensued. Dhoondiah was soon driven out of the Mysore territory. And the troubles that followed were mostly beyond the boundaries of the new State, or at least, of its better cultivated districts. Thus the sword was sheathed, or rather energetically employed in guarding the fruits of industry; new and peaceful settlers were invited to enter the country; and the *deewan's* liberal expenditure on public works, and remission of land tax on emergencies, promoted agriculture so effectually, that Wellington describes the country as a garden. An increasing revenue was realized without oppression, a stated proportion of which was set apart annually, to meet the extraordinary demands which the British Government, under the Treaty, was entitled to make. Wellington does not even think it necessary to mention, that the ordinary payments to the Company were regularly defrayed. But he does, elsewhere, object to Poorneah's voluntary proposal of going beyond the terms of the Treaty, in contributing to the cost of the Mahratta War. The prosperity and elasticity of the resources of Mysore were also strikingly exhibited in the ease and completeness with which Wellington's large applications for stores and transport were satisfied both at that crisis, and when he had been in the field against Dhoondiah. Lastly, Mysore was in a condition to export much corn to the Malabar Coast, for supplying the wants of Bombay and Poonah.

Equally notable is the fact, that we hear of no extortion, injustice, or misgovernment of any kind, on the part of this remarkable ex-minister of the truculent Sultan. Wellington rejoiced at the spectacle of Mysorean prosperity. But he rejoiced with trembling. For too well he knew that it was due to a singularly favourable conjuncture of circumstances; and with prophetic insight he earnestly deprecated the interference of the Madras officials in its management; and insisted that it ought to be placed, like the Rajput States in our own day, under the immediate authority of the Governor-General, through an agent to be sent from Bengal.

The minority of the Rajah, as I have already said, postponed some serious difficulties, and allowed free scope to the minister's abilities.

Internal order was maintained by a military organization well suited to the special character and circumstances of the people. In the first place, while in the regular army the cavalry service attracted the higher class of native gentlemen, Tippoo's veteran battalions were re-embodied, commanded by the *sirdars* of the State, and punctually paid, on the same

scale as the Company's sepoys. Thus one great danger of disturbance was removed; and a force was provided for the defence of the State, and for co-operation with the English, which, as Wellington strongly and repeatedly testifies, was found most useful in the stress of the Mahratta War. Next, a considerable body of *peons*, or irregular infantry, was permanently entertained, for important garrison duty, state escort, and attendance on government officials. Of these troops it is said, 'they are select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are considered to be entirely trustworthy.'

The population was not likely to suffer at the hands of such men, vigilantly supervised. But thirdly, as Mysore had been, under Mahometan sway, one vast camp, there was much ground for fearing that the bulk of the people, so long associated with war, in one way or another, would be loth to settle down to peaceful occupations, and might by their turbulence seriously endanger the stability of the new rule. This was skilfully guarded against by another institution. 'The ancient military force of the country,' as distinguished from the mere cultivators and artificers, under the name of Candachar *peons*, were embodied in very large numbers in the first instance (though gradually reduced when the new government became more settled), as a local militia, with a small constant pay, 'half in money, and half in lands,' from their respective villages; but with an additional stipend, apparently from the State, when called out in Mysore, and *batta*, or extra service allowance, if ordered out of the country. Each military family contributed one of its members to the corps; and might relieve him, at discretion, by another. The Candachar *peons* were also cultivators; and their ordinary duty was to garrison the village fort, and act as police in their own immediate district. Such well considered guarantees of order speak for themselves. Wellington gives the whole credit of the arrangement to the *devan*; but it was in all probability a good deal due to his own suggestions.

## II. DHOONDIAH WAUGH.

Wellington's campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh was his first enterprise as an independent commander in the field. The importance of the service, both at the time and afterwards, was very great. Indeed, as I have already intimated, while the prompt and complete reduction of this dangerous adventurer was essential to the successful establishment of the Mysore government; the working out of the Governor-General's Mahratta policy, on which the issues of his whole administration mainly turned, was greatly facilitated by it. That campaign proved Wellington's fitness for the practical conduct of Indian warfare; and thereby both

suggested and justified his selection for the delicate task of restoring the Peishwa, and assuming the management of the diplomatic and military operations in the Dekkan. It enabled him to bring to the test of successful experiment many of his favourite and well-pondered ideas on the strategical and tactical requirements of a field of action similar in some respects, but on the whole more dissimilar, to a European theatre of war. It brought him into intimate relations with the country, the authorities, the chiefs, the troops, the people, that it was so essential for him to understand thoroughly, when the great crisis, which he thus early foresaw, should at last arrive. It strongly impressed on his mind the salutary consideration of the importance of Seringapatam as a military base for operations in the North. It inspired the minor Mahratta feudatories with confidence in his star; and what was equally essential, cemented a cordial and lasting friendship between him and many of the 'Southern Jaghire-dars,' whose co-operation was of primary consequence to the accomplishment of the first great object, the replacing of the Peishwa on the *musnud*, with the acquiescence of his immediate dependents. And it converted one who might easily have become an instrument in the hands of Sindia for disturbing the Mysore Settlement, and involving us in premature hostilities with the Peishwa and his people, into an indirect means of daunting Sindia at the time, and of ultimately depriving him of his dangerous ascendancy in the South, and crushing his power altogether. Thus in this case, as throughout his whole career, Wellington forged each link of his course so patiently and solidly, that it became a strong security for the indefinite lengthening of the chain.

Though it was not surprising that the Commandant of Seringapatam, the responsible military authority in Mysore, and so careful an observer of the events of Indian history, should at once appreciate the importance of suppressing Dhoondiah; yet Wellington's determination to do the work himself; his anticipation that it might have to be done on a great scale; the deliberate and methodical course of his advance; his careful exposition of his plan to Colonel Stevenson; his happy device of *courseing* an enemy, whom circumstances made it almost impossible to overtake in a direct run, and catching him in his doublings; the vigour which brought him within reach of the game when he was believed to be at a safe distance; and the summary and complete catastrophe, are all characteristic, and in accordance with his precepts and conduct on similar occasions. Until Mysore is quiet, he is no more inclined to go to Batavia, than later, in spite of Massena's taunts, he was to quit Torres Vedras, and compromise the security of Portugal, and other still more extensive interests. 'How great a matter a little fire kindleth,' in such a combustible atmosphere as that of India, he knew full well, and insists upon frequently and

forcibly, as on occasion of the second outbreak in Wynaad, at the opening of the war with Holkar, and after the failure of the assaults on Bhurt-pore. And the most expeditious march he ever made (see p. 548) was in pursuit of a body of *looties*, whose impunity might soon have rekindled the warlike fire, that was still smouldering in so many native breasts. His admirable and exhaustive account of Monson's disaster illustrates throughout the serious consequences apt to result from the neglect of such precautions as he took in this campaign, and which made it so rapidly successful, that, as in other cases, the *preliminary* merits of the chief performer are apt to be overlooked, and the catching of the hare to be assumed as a matter of course. And whereas we shall have to observe later, how clearly Wellington foresaw and predicted the great development of the Pindari system, in consequence of the neglect of those safeguards and prompt measures against marauders, which he provided as far as he could; it is worth while to observe here, that what I have ventured to call his plan of coursing Dhoondiah, was pursued over much of the same ground in the case of the Peishwa after the battle of Kirkee; and ended in his being caught, to continue the comparison, on his form, and compelled to surrender to Malcolm. Wellington again practised much the same tactics against the Bullum Rajah, who however experienced a sterner fate, being hanged without scruple, as 'the King of the World' would probably have been, had he fallen alive into the hands of his pursuer. The victor's care for Dhoondiah's son gives a pleasing touch of sentiment to the closing scene of a contest, which to a fastidious mind might seem rather an ignoble occupation for the future antagonist of Napoleon. But it was because he did not despise the day of small things; because he gleaned knowledge from every available quarter, and was ever ready to apply it to new uses<sup>1</sup>, that he learnt, after subduing barbarism in its native haunts, to overthrow revived barbarism, in the guise of Cæsarism, in Europe.

### III. THE MALABAR COAST.

The papers collected under this head illustrate what may be called, except to the readers of the Duke's Supplementary Despatches, an unknown chapter of Anglo-Indian history. The standard narratives of the period to which they relate give no account of it. Mill does not notice it. Wilks unfortunately brings his admirable history to a close at the fall of Seringapatam. Colonel Gurwood, intent on matters of greater

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<sup>1</sup> Thus e.g. having read his Cæsar carefully, he proceeded to construct basket boats for the crossing of rivers.

and more general interest, suppressed, with two exceptions, the documents here selected, and which relate to what, in Wellington's own words, may be called these little wars of a great country. But the thanks of the public are certainly due to the noble Editor of the Supplementary Despatches, for no longer withholding a series of papers which, however subordinate in immediate importance to those which deal with the more celebrated events of the time, and however obscure occasionally for want of a systematic narrative of the occurrences which elicited them, yet throw much light on Wellington's judgment and activity in his southern command; and upon the measures which he pursued or recommended for the settlement of the most inaccessible and turbulent country ever subjected to our direct or indirect authority in India.

In the present case, the difficulty of selection has been greater than usual. It was indispensable to confine the extracts to such proportions as were compatible with the dimensions of a single volume, which attempts to include what is most important in the long array of Wellington's Indian papers. But it was not easy to do this without presenting the chosen materials in a more than ordinarily fragmentary form. If both Editor and reader are thus placed at some disadvantage, it is hoped that what here appears will exhibit clearly enough, as well as from a new point of view, the same spectacle of conscientious and untiring intelligence which meets us in every part of the great Duke's military career.

The interest attaching to the Malabar Coast, south of Goa, and its conterminous regions on and around the Ghats, was great and various. Among its crowd of historical associations, it may be enough now to mention that Gama had landed on its shore, and opened the European era of Indian history. The physical characteristics of the country were remarkable and impressive;—its indented coast, its precipitous, *nullah*-scored, and towering mountain-chain, its deep, dark gorges, its magnificent forests of tall trees and dense underwood, its luxuriant and varied flora, stimulated by the terrific monsoon deluge, its furious torrents in the rainy season, and the grand perspective of sea and shore and wild woodland, disclosed from its majestic elevations. The people had always, within historical memory, been as strange and wild as the country they inhabited. A curious *colluvies gentium* had gathered along the coast, the result of long intercourse with the West; though, as in Ireland, the uncouthness of the surroundings seemed to have exerted a transforming influence on the settlers, and to have converted their descendants into very irregular types of their respective races. Inland, the Nairs and Moplahs, the former Hindoos, the latter of alleged Arabian origin, and Mussulmans in faith, but both very unlike their co-religionists elsewhere, were the most prominent and influential classes;

and, like the Druses and Maronites in the Lebanon, had long been pitted against each other in traditional hostility, though ready enough to make common cause against all who would deprive them of the freedom of the forest. Chiefs they had, but mostly of the polygar class, rude and turbulent rulers over followers of the same stamp. The village system, which elsewhere, amid a state of general warfare, had often maintained some trace of order and fostered peaceful industry, was here made conducive to perpetual strife. The single village was virtually a fortress; and the union of several for the purpose of common defence converted the whole into a strongly though roughly entrenched camp. There was little cultivation in the forest region; and besides plundering their more peaceable neighbours, these wild men of the woods supplied their simple wants by bartering the spontaneous productions of their country for rice and other commodities at the European factories, and other towns along the coast. Yet, by a singular caprice of nature, in the midst of this primeval wild, and with no advantages of training, arose a chief who in intelligence, frankness, generosity, and delicacy, would have put to shame many of the fine gentlemen of more civilized climes. Such, however his characteristics are to be accounted for, was the Rajah of Coorg, who impressed Wellington so favourably, and of whom many remarkable stories are recorded. But the Pyche Rajah in Wynaad, and the Rajah of Bullum in the North, were men of a very different stamp, and more closely resembled the robber chieftains of the Rhine in the days of Rudolph of Hapsburg.

It may be desirable to say a few words on the later fortunes of this wild region, before it came under English control. It had been overrun and annexed by Hyder a few years after he had become supreme in Mysore, and on the eve of his first war with the Company. He used it chiefly as a recruiting-ground for his *chela* battalions, which he raised by a forced conscription in his own dominions, and by kidnapping the subjects of his neighbours. But, unlike Bednore which he conquered once for all, it baffled even his military skill, activity, and resolution. Its inhabitants rose in frequent and obstinate rebellion against him; and he never succeeded in effectually pacifying them. Again and again he made fierce raids into the country, left terrible monuments of his vengeance, and established military posts; but only to experience renewed resistance, and fatal proofs of the determined spirit of independence which glowed in the hearts of the desperate *jungle-wallahs*. Twice the English attacked him on this coast, relying on the sympathy in their favour which a common hatred was likely to excite. On the first occasion Hyder expelled them summarily in ignominious rout; but he did not live to repeat the process on the second invasion. Tippoo was at once more cruel and still more

unsuccessful in his dealings with the people of these regions. To political tyranny, and military severity, he added a systematic and wholesale religious persecution of the Nairs. The Peace of Mangalore had delivered him, for the time, from English interposition. But he could not subdue a people who, aided by their local advantages, had proved too strong for his father. And when he again became involved in war with the Company, his weakness in this part of his dominions was soon revealed. The coast was rapidly reduced by Hartley. Above the hills, the Rajah of Coorg, who had escaped from a Mysorean dungeon, became a serious thorn in Tippoo's side, and an useful ally to Cornwallis. And as the war proceeded, extensive desertions occurred among the Malabar *chelas*; and in the confusion of the night attack on the lines covering Seringapatam, 10,000 of them escaped with arms in their hands, and many of them with their families (whom the Sultan's suspicious tyranny had detained as hostages for the fidelity of their relatives), and returned to their secluded haunts in the Western forests. At the Peace, the Province of Malabar Proper was ceded to the British; and Cornwallis extorted from the reluctant and vindictive Sultan the independence of the Rajah of Coorg. The disputed district of Wynaad was restored to Tippoo shortly before the final war; but it fell again into our hands on the conquest, together with Canara, which the Mauritius embassy had at once determined Lord Mornington to demand. Thus politically we were now established along the whole length of the Malabar Coast, from Goa to Cochin.

But, though our zealous confederates in destroying the tyranny under which they had so long groaned, the people of its new domain were little disposed to brook the dominion of the Company, however mild in comparison with the iron bondage of Hyder, and the ferocious and indiscriminate rigour of his son. Except at the coast stations, the Company's authority in the country was, for some time, little more than nominal, as may be inferred from Wellington's language. In Malabar Proper, though it had been longest in our hands, property and life were still very insecure; and were made the more so by the proximity of Wynaad, the focus of sedition and a mere robber den, presided over by the redoubtable and inaccessible Pyche Rajah. Canara, a recent acquisition, and within range of the Bullum Rajah's influence and incursions, was not likely to prove less troublesome. From the Coorg Rajah personally we had nothing to fear, and much to hope. But his hold over his subjects was precarious, at least when it ran counter to their predatory disposition. And though Bullum was included in the new Kingdom of Mysore, and Poorneah was most anxious to tranquillize it; this could only be done under Wellington's auspices, and with the aid of British troops. Thus

the Commandant of Seringapatam, in addition to his other cares, was called upon to solve a knotty problem in the West.

He addressed himself to the task with his usual sagacity, thoroughness, and careful consideration of the special circumstances of the case. His plan differed essentially from Hyder's rough and ready expedients, and was fundamentally opposed to Tippoo's merciless and exasperating attempts at terrorism. It was not less vigorous, and far more systematic and definitive than the former; and was guided by a principle precisely the reverse of that which dictated the latter. Its object was to hunt out resistance, follow it up, step by step, in every direction, and completely prostrate it everywhere, in the first instance; next to occupy permanently such positions, and to lay the country so entirely open to our troops, as would secure the military command of every part of it; bring our power promptly to bear wherever it was required; and thus check any symptoms of renewed disorder before it could gather to a head, or diffuse its baneful influence elsewhere. Lastly he proposed, while continuing the pursuit of the Pyche Rajah, summarily executing obstinate rebels, and disarming the people generally, to apply lenitives to the chronic maladies of the community, by establishing a mild and just civil government; by convincing those whom he had vanquished, not only that he was in a condition to vanquish them again if necessary, but that their immediate interest lay in submitting to the moderate requisitions of the British Power, securing exemption from the mutual wrongs and general anarchy that had so long afflicted and impoverished them, and enjoying rights and privileges which would indefinitely improve their social condition, but which were incompatible with the continuance of their lawless habits. Thus by well-concerted and actively-conducted military measures at first, by the prompt chastisement of turbulent individuals and instigators of disaffection when the war should have ceased, and by a vigilant, righteous, and beneficent administration, he hoped to dominate their spirits as well as their bodies, to conciliate them, and to plant the fruitful seeds of a civilization, which was as yet to them an utterly unknown Gospel.

Such was the general outline of his scheme. And if its success was more tardy and qualified than might have been hoped, rather than confidently expected, it certainly was not his fault. The almost insuperable difficulties presented by the geographical character of the upper country, and the active hostility of its irreconcilable chief; together with the remissness and want of cordiality among the subordinate British officers, the capricious temper and inveterately evil tendencies of the Nairs—'gentlemen, and probably the idlest of that character,'—and latterly, the confidence imparted to the disaffected by the Mahratta defi-



ance of the British Government, must be taken into account. As Holkar broke out desperately even after Sindia and the Rajah of Berar had been so suddenly and completely crushed ; so, when Wellington marched against the Mahrattas, Malabar, as well as Wynaad, was again in commotion, although he had previously subdued it so thoroughly. But not the less was the scheme of conquest and pacification judicious, and effectual in the end in both cases, except so far as the errors of others limited its application. And the best proof of its merits is, that under all the disadvantages of the situation, Wellington accomplished, in the course of a few months, much more than Hyder had effected, or indeed attempted, throughout his reign. For the first time in history, the dense jungles were made accessible ; small bodies of troops could now traverse, without fear of being cut off, districts where formerly 'armies whole had sunk ;' and could readily join or co-operate with similar corps, acting on adjacent lines of new road. And whereas Hyder's 'block-houses' had been isolated, beleaguered, and sometimes overwhelmed by the wily and tumultuous insurgents, whom even his long arm was unable to reach, when the monsoon aggravated the constant obstacles to the march of his troops ; Wellington's well-selected and well-supplied posts were both stronger in themselves, better able to support each other, and within hail of a relieving force, which his roads brought within easy distance at all times of the year. Thus even while the Pyche Rajah continued at large, and before the people were disarmed, tranquillity, and an approach to civilized life altogether unprecedented in such a country, prevailed for some time. And when a casual occurrence interrupted this fair prospect, Wellington wrote :—

'I hear that the insurrection is by no means pleasing to the majority of the inhabitants, and that the common cry is for you [the civil magistrate] to return' (p. 150).

So much progress had already been made in realising even that part of his plan which might have seemed least hopeful, or feasible only after a long lapse of time.

As to the road-cutting, it is worth mention, that one of the greatest generals of mediæval India, Sultan Ala-u-din, had, according to a contemporary and credible Mussulman historian, conquered the Mewattie wilds in the same way ; after its inhabitants had long kept the capital itself in terror by their bold raids into the open country, and even to the gates of Delhi. Also that Wellington, who had been a military student at Angers, and was not likely to fail in gathering lessons from the war in La Vendée, was perhaps the more impressed with the necessity of opening such wide roads, and guarding well the flanks of the parties which traversed them (as he so repeatedly directs), from his per-

ception of the fatal results which had attended the neglect of similar precautions by the Republican generals.

Energetic and determined as he was in prosecuting military measures, and unsparing in the chastisement of red-handed rebellion, Wellington's antipathy to martial law, and strong faith in the ameliorating efficacy of civil institutions, are here fully brought out. He sets his face as a flint against the request to 'allow the full operation of martial law' in Malabar and Canara; and disclaims in the most comprehensive terms all sympathy with so crude a form of personal government as the will of the General. When his decided opinion has been, to a certain extent, overruled, he deeply regrets the temporary necessity of suspending the civil administration; and reconciles himself to it only by the consideration that such a step was essential in order to carry out the disarming of the people: this done, he looks forward with complacency to the re-establishment and salutary action of the ordinary magistrature. He argues that this is not only a more respectable and trustworthy machinery for keeping the country quiet than the military *régime*; but, in spite of its alleged costliness, a cheaper expedient in the end, because it is more likely to supersede the necessity of repeated military operations. And he strenuously exculpates the Collector from the charge of having by his harshness driven the inhabitants to revolt. He does indeed advise him to assess Wynaad more lightly; and offers to bear him out, if he is afraid of seeming by so doing to condemn himself for his previous arrangements. But this is on account of the peculiar character of the district, which is 'no object to the Company as one from which revenue is to be drawn. It is essential to us to hold it as a military position, which awes the whole of the province of Malabar.' Thus he implies no censure of Macleod, much less any misgiving as to the preferableness of civil administration to martial law. When the troubles recommence in the upland region, he is most urgent with this officer, who though a soldier was engaged in civil functions, that he should instantly 'take a trip to Wynaad,' as the surest and only effectual way of nipping the evil in the bud. And so convinced is he of this, that though he contemplates marching in person to suppress it, he plainly states that he will not 'go in' unaccompanied by the civil authorities. It may be added that his directions to the officer who proposed to demolish indiscriminately the deserted villages in the disaffected country shew the same civic spirit, which is also pointedly, and sometimes amusingly, manifested in other military awards and directions, inserted in the Appendix<sup>1</sup>. Equally significant is his desire to quarter as few troops as possible in the scene of the insurrection; and

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<sup>1</sup> See e. g. Nos. 334, 343, 364, 366, 367, 373, 375, 377, 378.

quite consistent with this general desire, his later request for a reinforcement, not that he may let loose upon the people the horrors of war, but as a 'moral demonstration,' lest the idea that we are fully occupied with the Mahrattas should promote the rising, and so paralyse the civil government. To the same effect the Proclamation issued in Wynaad may be cited.

The case of the Rajah of Bullum and his peculiarly strong country afforded a crucial test of the efficacy of Wellington's method of establishing order in the backwoods. The Company's maritime provinces had suffered much from the incursions and malign influence of this determined aggressor; and he and his people utterly set at naught the authority of their nominal Sovereign, the Rajah of Mysore. But after a while, he was driven out of the lower country, and intrenched himself within his own territory at Arakeery, a district which is graphically described by Wellington, who fully explains both its natural and artificial advantages for resistance. Here then the chace became hot; and the English commander proceeded to apply his various means of constraint. *Bouche va toujours* was ever in his thoughts; and he promptly takes steps to cut off all supplies to his enemy from Canara and Coorg, and to foil his attempts to forage nearer home. In concert with Poorneah, to whose ability and zeal, and the activity of his soldiers, he bears high testimony, he surrounds the devoted district with a *cordon* of troops; planting also reinforcements below the Ghats, cutting no less than three roads through the passes from Canara, and another right through the heart of Bullum itself. He maintains a strong post in the immediate neighbourhood of the Rajah's quarters, and others at suitable places, especially where they command the passes. Poorneah's troops, meanwhile, explore and occupy Bullum in all directions, and station themselves in the accessible villages. As their success, backed by the progress of the Company's arms, becomes more certain, Poorneah, by Wellington's advice, proposes an accommodation to the people—as distinct from their chief; on condition of their demolishing their defences, surrendering their arms, and substantially recognizing the sovereignty of Mysore by paying their arrears of revenue. To this they consent, and the fulfilment of the terms goes on apace, but not without the stimulus and precaution of securing the head-men, the former leaders of sedition, detaining them as hostages, and impressing them with the edifying spectacle of the public execution of the most guilty. Thus, deserted by the bulk of his subjects, and straitened for provisions, the unfortunate Rajah is fain to change his quarters once more; and with a daily diminishing number of attendants, flies to the inaccessible jungles that clothe the Western slopes of the mountains. Here he is beset and watched, as before, on all sides; and

at last, like *Cœur de Lion*, his quest of food betrays his lurking-place, and he is captured by a party of dismounted horsemen. But his fate is more summary than that of the great Crusader. And what Wellington, with grim jocularly, calls his 'suspension' closes the sylvan tragedy, strikes terror into his people, facilitates the settlement of his country, and attests the accuracy of his conqueror's judgment.

Not the least of Wellington's anxieties, it will be observed, was lest the public service should suffer from the differences of opinion, misunderstandings, or misrepresentations that prevailed among his subordinates, and which tended to make them unsympathetic, if not antagonistic. To this circumstance we are indebted for the memorable testimony which he has recorded in favour of Cornwallis, as specially skilful in discerning the merits of public officers, and habitually happy in the choice of his instruments. Not less interesting is his advice to Macleod, which prophetically describes so exactly his own attitude, when defamation was busy with his name during the earlier years of the Peninsular War. Such manly counsels must have cheered and fortified at the time the mind to which they were addressed; and how vividly must the desponding Collector have recalled them in after years, if he survived to witness their exemplification by his whilome monitor!

#### IV. THE NIZAM.

Lord Mornington, soon after his arrival in India, embodied in the Minute<sup>1</sup> already referred to his views on the dangerous crisis which had been provoked by Tippoo's restless and vindictive intrigues, culminating in the mission to the Mauritius. In this celebrated document the Governor-General took a comprehensive survey of the condition of the Native Powers, and of our relations with them; and vindicated a line of action with reference to the Subahdar of the Dekkan, which was adopted with complete success, so far as its immediate objects were concerned. By the Treaty then concluded, Nizam Ally was assured that the ultra-abstemious policy of Shore was definitively abandoned, and that the English meant to stand his fast friends. And, in return, he was disposed to co-operate cordially against the Sultan. His Prime Minister was favourable to us. With some gentle pressure, the French battalions were quietly broken up; the officers were deported to Europe; a large proportion of the sepoys entered our service; an efficient subsidiary force, under our own control, was organized, which was to be supplemented by a contingent of the Nizam's own troops; and in the Mysore war he rendered us much more substantial aid than he had given to Cornwallis.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 11-57.

How much this was due to Wellington's personal influence, and official authority in the Nizam's camp, will be readily estimated by observing his activity in arranging the other preliminaries of the campaign. But it is also worth while to remark, that our feeble ally's military condition had suggested ideas to Wellington, which are freely reproduced in the Governor-General's Minute. Wellesley has been accused of overrating the danger threatened by the French corps in the service of the Native Princes. If he did so in this case and at this time, his military brother certainly misled him; although it will appear that after the Mahratta war the latter modified his view on the general question. 'The existence,' says Wellington, 'even for a short time of such a power as Raymond—may be fairly stated as almost incompatible with the existence of the British power in the Carnatic.' That Raymond's force must be dissolved, and the Frenchmen removed; that even Englishmen—adventurers as they must be—could not safely be allowed to repeat Raymond's experiment; that we must provide, and the Nizam defray the cost of, the troops which are to defend him and his dominions from external enemies:—all this Wellington asserts; and the Governor-General repeats and acts upon it. Yet, on the other hand, no less notable is the contrast between Wellington's suggestions, and the Governor-General's subsidiary alliance system, in its mature form; especially after the Treaty of 1800, which professed permanently to identify the Nizam's interests with our own, and actually turned him into a thoroughly dependent, though an uneasy and troublesome vassal. In Wellington's conception, at this stage, the military association is assumed to be far looser, and more conditional, not to say occasional. To prevent the payment of the subsidiary troops from falling into arrear, the Nizam is, on the older plan, to appropriate to that object the revenues of certain districts. But these are to be collected by the commanding officer, who is to account for them to the English Government. The districts themselves are not to be assigned to the Company, lest it should be drawn into a war in their defence (this seems not very consistent with the object of the arrangement); and that the revenues may not be absorbed in the general system of the Company's finance, and so imperil in a new way the maintenance of the troops. This proposal was ignored by the Governor-General, and indeed did not fit into his scheme. But it will appear hereafter that Wellington was sensitive on the point; and that when the cry was raised in England for diminishing the Anglo-Indian army, he laid great stress on the fact, that large territories having been ceded outright for the keeping up of the subsidiary forces, it was not only expedient but simply just, that a much larger army should be retained than the arbitrary assumptions

of the Directors had led them to prescribe. In the present paper he is calculating what is required for the protection of the Nizam's dominions against foreign foes. But when he considers later the necessity of preserving internal tranquillity, he shews clearly, repeatedly, and with great force, how much the Governor-General's Treaties, or rather their imperfect execution, had left to be desired. While Wellesley plumed himself upon having rescued the Subahdar from the French first, and from the Mahrattas afterwards, and on having induced him to contribute largely to the marshalling of a force, which was available for the general defence and pacification of India; Wellington, with local experience, saw too clearly that the Native State, as a governing machine, was in the worst possible working order. It had long been badly administered. And, since Wellesley had taken it in hand, it had learned to lean too exclusively on the English Power. It had paid heavily to be protected by that Power; and it interpreted this claim very liberally, as exempting itself from the obligation of maintaining internal order by its own servants and soldiers. It had practically abandoned the sword, without which no ruler, especially in India, could be a terror to evil doers. It had still, certainly, a *quasi* feudal array of Jaghiredars and their followers. But such levies were ill-adapted to secure permanent tranquillity.

The authority of the Government was openly and constantly defied by active freebooters, and required a very different force for its vindication. Failing this, either the State must fall to pieces, or the subsidiary troops must be doubled, the fortresses be placed in British hands, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered.

This subject must be taken up again later. But one or two remarks connected with it may not be out of place here. 1. There is, at first sight, as the passage quoted above from the Cornwallis correspondence<sup>1</sup> will show, a startling contradiction between Wellesley's estimate of the favourable results of the subsidiary alliance system, and the melancholy picture of imbecility and disorder in the allied States presented by his successor. Though it may be said generally, that the out-going Governor-General was perhaps almost as much disposed to give a rose-tinted representation of the state of affairs, as Cornwallis was inclined to paint them in the darkest hues, still Wellington's correspondence proves that the contradiction was really less complete than it seems on the surface; and that the difference arose not a little from the point of view in which the troubled scene was surveyed. Wellesley's eager and commanding vision ranged at a glance from the past to the future. Cornwallis was absorbed and overwhelmed by the

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<sup>1</sup> See p. xxiii, note.

spectacle immediately presented to his failing sight. Wellesley commemorated the destruction of the vast armaments that had so long oppressed the country, turned a great part of it into a desert, and perpetually menaced the very existence of our power; and he proudly announced the establishment of a system, which, when the strife was over, should guarantee our pacific ascendancy, and the progressive development of the hitherto latent or wasted resources of the native States, under our inspiring and beneficent guidance. He may have discounted somewhat too liberally his hopes of the future. But he was fully justified in entertaining them, and in pointing out the tendency of general causes to realise them. Cornwallis unfortunately arrived when the strife was *not* over, in the midst of the confusion caused by the Holkar war, and before Wellesley had had leisure to attend to the internal regulation of the States more immediately involved in the previous hostilities. Even had this not been the case, the inherent weakness and vices of those States, and the diplomatic restrictions which limited his right of interference, must have made the task of inducing them to fulfil their duties, and place their so-called independent establishments upon a proper footing, a slow and arduous one. Thus Cornwallis's picture reflects partly the inveterate evils of previous misgovernment, partly the exhausting effects of the desperate crisis through which India had been passing, partly the still inchoate elements of a period of transition to better times. Wellington is the connecting link between the two statesmen, and the interpreter, and to a certain extent the reconciler, of their discordant utterances. While he justifies, in the main, his brother's foreign policy, in its more general or imperial aspect, he enables us to understand how unpromising and even disastrous it must have seemed, at the moment, to the ultra-pacific and ultra-economical Cornwallis, when he regarded only the actual condition of the Nizam's or the Peishwa's internal or municipal government.

2. Perhaps even *he* might have taken some comfort, had he considered carefully the state of Mysore, and read Wellington's report upon it. I have already said that circumstances were peculiarly favourable for the establishment of good government there. Still it had actually been established. And, apart from the subsidiary force, the Rajah's military system presented an excellent specimen of what might be accomplished, under British auspices, in a Native State, and a model for imitation elsewhere. And the objection, that it was the greater preponderance of English power there which had brought about this exceptionally favourable state of matters, would come with a bad grace from those who complained of Wellesley's officious interference with the affairs, and destruction of the independence, of our allies.

3. Wellington admitted the evil as fully as Cornwallis himself. Writing as late as Jan. 10, 1804, he describes the state of the Nizam's country as 'chaos itself' (p. 184). But he was more hopeful of a remedy. 'The state,' he says, 'must have troops paid by the public revenues, through the medium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jaghiredars.' In the same letter he suggests that our Treaty relations with the Subahdar would justify the Resident in insisting upon the requisite reform, as a condition precedent to the cession to him of his allotted share of the conquests from the Mahrattas. The Nizam was already bound to co-operate with a contingent of his own troops. To stipulate that this should be fully kept up, or rather increased after the peace, and should be paid by the Treasury, not by assignments to jaghiredars, and should be in all cases directly in the service of the government, and not consist, as did the infantry, of retainers of the feudatories, was indispensable, but was also feasible. To meet the increased cost of these reforms additional revenue would be required. The most obvious and only available internal resource appeared to be the resumption of the jaghires. But Wellington shews that this would be an objectionable expedient, and holds that, with proper management, the Nizam's acquisitions in Berar will furnish the requisite funds.

A propos of this attempt to improve the terms of the connexion between the Company and the Nizam, and thus to serve the interests of both parties, it is not uninteresting to have a contemporary and independent criticism on that connexion, from a native statesman and subject of our ally. Meer Allum's peculiar position at the time may have made him regard the arrangement with a rather prejudiced eye. But it is evident that Wellington attached importance to his remarks, and he seems to have taken some hints from them.

The veteran sovereign whose wily and chequered career was co-eval with the rise of our Indian Empire, died at the opening of the Mahratta War. But his successor, along with his territories and Treaty obligations, inherited much of his treacherous and unscrupulous disposition. He constrained even Sir George Barlow to depart from his stereotyped policy of non-intervention. And there is a strong family likeness in the unsatisfactory circumstances noticeable in the conduct of both, after the conclusion of the English alliance, which was supposed to associate their interests so strictly with our own. Thus Wellington is convinced that Nizam Ally was in collusion with Holkar, when that adventurer played his great part in the Dekkan. The sly trick by which it was attempted to entrap the English Government into bearing half the expense of subsidizing Meer Khan, and the difficulties raised in the execution of the Treaty of Peace, though experienced directly from subordinates, were no



doubt encouraged by the sovereign. But however symptomatic of a faithless temper, such acts sink into insignificance in comparison with the conduct of the Nizam and his people during the Mahratta War. It is the more important to observe the strong expressions of Wellington on this occasion, amounting to a declaration that the principal object of the campaign was in a fair way to be compromised, because Wellesley's lordly disclaimer of the Nizam's *right* to share the conquests, on the ground that he had forfeited all such claim by failing to fulfil his part of the compact, might otherwise appear rather in the light of a 'too ingenious' after-thought. Some excuse may perhaps be made for the non-admission of the English into Dowlutabad, when Bussy's treacherous occupation of that famous stronghold is remembered. But as Wellington does not exaggerate when he states that the war was for the defence of the Nizam; and as, in his very careful and detailed reply to Castlereagh's strictures on the Bassein Treaty<sup>1</sup>, the argument turns mainly on the necessity of making this defence good, at all hazards; it must have seemed the very irony of fate, that we should be thwarted in this operation by the very Prince whom we were befriending; and that Wellesley's general policy should be liable to be stultified by the dry bones, which he had undertaken to vivify, rising up in sullen recalcitrance and silent judgment against him. Wellesley has described admirably the advantages of the intimate alliance with Nizam-ul-Mulk's successor. But the transmuted Subahdar of the Dekkan could not forget his lofty lineage and august pretensions, nor fail to writhe uneasily in the toils in which British policy had enmeshed him. And Wellington's revelations of the inconveniences to which we were exposed by our haughty but helpless dependent are necessary to enable us to balance the political account.

## V. MAHRATTAS.

### 1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

That, after Wellington's successful restoration of the Peishwa had pointed him out for the conduct of the ensuing campaign, he commanded the Dekkan army in the field against Sindia and the Rajah of Berar; that he distinguished himself greatly in this service, and in fighting the battle of Assye shewed that the most cautious of generals could be bold, even to rashness, when the occasion required it, are familiar facts to the tiro in Anglo-Indian history. He may also remember, that the *coup de tonnerre* of Assye was soon followed by the rapid and final rout

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 273-298.

of Argaum; that what the victor's military genius had accomplished, his diplomatic address, firmness, and moderation followed up, by the conclusion of the two Treaties of Deogaum and Surje Angengaum, which restored peace on equitable terms. And even the cursory reader of the Wellesley Despatches is not unlikely to have been impressed by another example of Wellington's intimate knowledge and versatile handling of Mahratta politics, which Mr. Montgomery Martin inserted in his Appendix, and the present Editor in his *Wellesley Selections* (pp. 273-298), and which, in a recent and able paper in the *Edinburgh Review* (No. 303, p. 41) is described as 'an exhaustive and convincing refutation of the argument contained in Lord Castlereagh's Minute'—impugning the terms of the Governor-General's Treaty with the Peishwa.

But far as all this goes to establish Wellington's claim to a very close connexion with his brother's Mahratta policy; the papers before us prove, that his influence on the moulding and working out of that policy, both as a formal adviser, an agent, and an independent critic, was much greater and more general than less authentic and detailed sources of information would lead us to imagine.

According to the principles laid down in the Governor-General's Minute of August 12, 1798, it was essential to give renewed effect to the Triple Alliance which had resulted in the signal defeat of Tippoo a few years before; and to secure the co-operation of the Peishwa in overaweing or, if necessary, making war upon him. But Sindia's ascendancy at Poona made this impossible. An impatient politician, or an ambitious soldier, especially if conscious of military capacity, might have been inclined to insist, that the Sultan's active hostility being proved, and the Peishwa being bound to assist us against him, Sindia's contravention of our just claim for aid itself amounted to an act—or rather a course—of hostility, and made it allowable for us to coerce him into the adoption of a less obstructive line. And the more so, as he was shrewdly suspected of being in positive league with our enemy. Not so Wellington. He regards the question as an English citizen, strictly bound by the authority of Parliament. To take up arms for the purpose of rescuing the Peishwa from Sindia's tutelage, would violate both the spirit and the letter of the Act of Parliament. And though Sindia's actual alliance with Tippoo would fully justify us in attacking him, that alliance 'must not be a mere surmise.' Thus, long after Tippoo's rapid overthrow had baffled Dowlut Rao's calculations, he continued with impunity to thwart the Governor-General's persevering attempts to ante-date the Treaty of Bassein; and Wellington had to complain, that both the suppression of Dhoondiah, and the tranquilization of the Peishwa's southern dominions, and consequently the

security of our own frontier, were seriously impeded by his sinister influence. Though from an early period he assumed, that our armed intervention at Poona would ultimately become necessary, and regarded with unfeigned anxiety the formidable power of Sindia; he was equally anxious to be well-prepared for the crisis when it should arrive, and to guard against the renewed temptations to premature action, which both Sindia's and the Peishwa's disinclination to the alliance on the one hand, and the Governor-General's impatience on the other, were continually occasioning. Thus he recommends, that the family of our old coadjutor, Pursheram Bhow, should be reconciled to the Peishwa, and restored to their possessions, so as to form both a check on Sindia's encroachments southward, and a friendly medium for us, on approaching the future scene of hostilities. Thus also, he is at first anxious that Sindia should be constrained to leave Poona, and return to Hindostan; although, when the truth dawns gradually on him, that Baji Rao is by no means simply the mouthpiece of his domineering subject, but is himself decidedly averse to the Governor-General's proposed arrangement, he is less inclined, for the present, to press this step. So too, he gives timely intimation that when we interpose, it must be with a commanding force, so as to prove that we are in earnest, and thus fix at once the wavering disposition of the southern jaghiredars. And the Memorandum on military operations in the Mahratta country—at once so comprehensive and so minute—shews how closely he has scanned the expected theatre of war, and how methodically he has digested the information acquired in the course of the campaign against Dhoondiah. But on the other hand, he is as much averse as ever to breaking the law, and providing either for our own security, or for the alleged welfare of India at large, by doing evil that good may come, and violating obvious principles of natural equity, in the pursuit of problematical advantages. His language on this subject is really remarkable, not least (many may think) in its applicability to a recent and not very dissimilar combination of political circumstances. After concluding that 'hostility on our part might be thought a breach of the laws for the government of this empire,' he proceeds:—

'But not only might it be considered in that light, but as an act of great political injustice. In fact, one country has no right to commence a war upon another because at some time or other that other may form an alliance with its enemy prejudicial to its interests, and because it refuses to draw closer the terms of its alliance with the country which proposes it. The question of peace or war is not, and cannot be, only the probability of success, but must depend upon other circumstances, and in this country must depend upon the prospect of being attacked by the power with which it is proposed to go to war. These general principles are certain.' (pp. 202, 3.)

And he suggests that the withdrawal of his own army from the Peishwa's

country will be likely to counteract Baji Rao's inclination to throw himself into the hands of the French, in order to curb our influence.

But it was not only on grounds of legality and justice that he deprecated a hasty resort to force. His intuitive insight into native character, and his sagacity in anticipating the probable course which such capricious tempers would be apt to pursue, have been noticed by the historian of the Mahrattas. And he began very early to mistrust the Peishwa, and to beware of making any forward movement to help him, at the risk of being afterwards disavowed by Baji Rao. This mistrust gradually ripened into a full conviction of that Prince's faithlessness to the alliance, after it had been concluded, and later into an assurance of his personal antipathy to Wellington himself, an antipathy easy to understand, and quite mutual.

Considering the use afterwards made of Amrut Rao by Holkar, it is worth notice that, in October 1800, Wellington is inclined to be guided by the opinion of Amrut 'and the Peishwa's friends,' in determining when he is 'to begin to act.' Circumstances changed; and the crisis came about in a manner altogether unexpected. But Wellington did, after all, turn Amrut Rao to good account; and in the Appendix will be found a curious chapter of secret history penned long afterwards, which explains this matter, and will demand attention in its proper place.

## 2. FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY TO THE RUPTURE WITH THE CONFEDERATES.

The Treaty of Bassein was, even in its immediate consequences, the most momentous compact ever concluded by the Anglo-Indian Government. Like the earlier Treaty with the Nizam, it degraded the Peishwa from an independent Prince to a vassal of the Company. It broke up for ever the loose and jarring, but still, in some sense, real political confederacy, or as it perhaps ought rather to be called 'family compact' between that Prince and its other members; two of whom, the Bonslay and the Guikwar, belonged to the official hierarchy established by Sivaji; the other two, Sindia and Holkar, had risen to power subsequently, as the Peishwa's lieutenants in Malwa; though in the course of a generation they had come to rival, and had eventually overshadowed, their patron and master. Again, the treaty of Bassein completed the diplomatic *cordon* whereby the Nizam, whose security was essential to our own, was fenced off from the ever imminent aggressions of the Mahrattas, acting in the name of their head. For it constituted the British Government the arbiter of all differences between him and his traditional foes. It further justified the Governor-General, from his own point of view, in regulating, to an almost unlimited extent, the political relations of the

Mahrattas themselves; while the command of the Peishwa's country, which it secured to us, greatly facilitated our control over their military movements.

And as these consequences were sufficiently obvious, and sufficiently unpalatable both to Baji Rao himself, and to the three greater Mahratta Chiefs, they one and all entered their hearty protest against it, though in different ways, and with different results. The Peishwa had no sooner concluded the alliance, and begun to realise his position—as that of the horse in his fabled contest with the stag, than he began to repent of it, and to pursue that course of secret obstruction and restless chicanery, which eventually led to his dethronement, the formal abolition of his office, and the annexation of his territories. Sindia and the Rajah of Berar sulked, grumbled, blustered, and shuffled, until the tempest of a war which they had provoked swept them from the field, placed them at our mercy, at their expense added a large part of India to our dominions, placed the imperial city at our disposal, and consigned to our hands the custody of the Emperor himself. Holkar, unwarned by their fate, followed their example, and was not less signally routed; but was rescued by the intervention of a *Deus ex machina* in the person of Sir George Barlow. And stoutly as the new Governor-General strove to roll back the tide of time, and to dispute the inexorable logic of facts, it soon became apparent that, for good or for evil, the remoter consequences of the Treaty of Bassein were unavoidable; that, in our case, not to advance was to recede; that the Mahrattas must once for all learn to recognize their fallen fortunes, and respect the greatness to which their hostility had exalted us; that the Peishwaship, the symbol of an extinct political system, must be suppressed; and the defensive alliance scheme, having served its turn, must be replaced by the definitive and avowed supremacy of the Company over friends and former foes alike.

Thus it is hardly too much to say, that while previously to the conclusion of the Treaty of Bassein there existed a British Empire *in* India, that Treaty, by its direct or indirect operation, gave the Company the Empire *of* India. Cornwallis himself had spoken of the Directors as collectively Emperors; and had removed one great obstacle to their universal supremacy by breaking the power of Tippoo, and stripping him of one half of his dominions. But Cornwallis still regarded, and aimed at maintaining, the Company as one among several independent sovereigns; though the innate superiority of his countrymen's, and especially of his own character over that of their native rivals tended to make him, as the representative of British rule in the Peninsula, *primus inter pares*. He was not indeed so ignorant of the temper of the Indian Princes, or so wanting in discernment of the moving springs of their activity, as to con-

template the possibility of effecting a stable political equilibrium, by the establishment of a balance of power, with the general concurrence and sincere co-operation of such Potentates. But he no doubt hoped, that while the military efficiency of the Company, so strikingly displayed in his Mysore war, and its reputation, so greatly enhanced on that occasion, would shield both us and our allies from wanton attack; our cordial defensive alliance with the Nizam and the Peishwa, the moderation which he had shewn in sparing Tippoo, when he might have destroyed him, the spectacle of our growing prosperity from the cultivation of the arts of peace, and the personal and official influence of himself and his successors, might gradually wean over the Indian rulers to a better mind, and a stronger mutual disposition to live and let live. Failing this, he was prepared to let them prey on each other; while the British Government, quietly reposing on its laurels, and improving its administration, but not unprepared for war, would naturally grow stronger; as its ambitious and anarchic competitors would, by an opposite course, proportionally decline; if not, at last, spontaneously succumb to our superior force, moral authority, and regulative capacity. Such, so far as he faced the problem of the remote future, was perhaps the rather vague hope, or the dream, of this excellent and enlightened, but gentle, cautious, and scrupulous statesman.

Lord Mornington's mind was cast in a different mould. Constitutionally imperial, profound and far-sighted in his conception of the conditions of political order and social well-being, conscious of great powers of organization, confident in his own judgment, when duly informed by an indefatigable examination of experts in their several departments, dauntless in accepting responsibility, unwearying in his endeavours to bend circumstances to his will, fertile in expedients, sagacious in anticipating and providing for the shifting combinations of political elements, and master of a style so lofty, high-principled, argumentative, and exhaustive, that it tends to silence opposition, even when it fails to carry conviction, and that the eager advocate assumes with no bad grace the attitude of the deliberate and impartial judge:—such a man was, in no case, likely to rest satisfied with Cornwallis's modest estimate of a Governor-General's proper part in the international politics of India. And although both the wishes of his employers, the embarrassed state of the Company's finances at his accession, and the Parliamentary prohibition not only of offensive measures, but even of new defensive alliances except in extreme and rigidly defined cases, presented the most serious obstacles to an enterprising policy; yet the serious emergency—as he has so fully explained in his great Minute—certainly called for special precautions; and impelled him to devise his ingenious subsidiary alliance system,

which besides reducing the Sultan to order, in one way or other, was intended, without violating the Act of Parliament, to assure the permanent predominance of the British Power over the native States, to exclude the French from their dominions, to pacify the country, and to extend, as far as possible, the blessing of better government to its miserable inhabitants. That Tippoo was not the man to acquiesce without a struggle in such a system, could not reasonably be doubted. But his hostility led to its immediate acceptance by the Nizam, and to its establishment in the revived Hindoo Kingdom of Mysore. Nor can Lord Mornington have seriously believed that the Peishwa would voluntarily accede to it. But he hoped much both from his fears and his cupidity. With Sindia, however, at his elbow, Baji Rao was not to be bribed into compliance by a share of the Sultan's spoils, nor charmed over by the Governor-General's diplomatic blandishments, nor coerced by the terror of threats which, though unuttered, his lively and timorous imagination was quite capable of reading between the lines of the persevering and rather peremptory correspondence. Even in his extremity, Baji Rao yielded—*ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ*. And what had been really gained by the transaction? Would the Governor-General be thereby enabled to dominate not only the Peishwa, but the whole Mahratta League? Or was it simply, in Wellington's words, 'a Treaty with a cipher?' Events only could determine. I have elsewhere<sup>1</sup> endeavoured to estimate fairly this very difficult question. I will now try to collect the most important indications of Wellington's sentiments on the same subject, as they were thrown out freely and fully in his correspondence at the period comprised in this Section. His systematic vindication of the Treaty, in answer to Lord Castlereagh's objections, was of course more cautiously worded, as became a formal apology.

It is evident that he did not regard the Peishwa's tardy and constrained assent to the Treaty with the complacency and eagerness which the Governor-General testified, by signing its fundamental stipulations on the same day that he received them. He knew too well Baji Rao's character, his treatment of the southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments they entertained towards him. Nor had he much faith in the *quasi* feudal lineaments detected in the Mahratta 'constitution' by the Governor-General, according to whom the greater Chiefs as feudatories owed allegiance to the Peishwa as over-lord. Nor did the assumption appear to him a very practical one, that the Peishwa was their sovereign, they simply his subjects; or that he was the head, they the subordinate members of the body politic; so that, when the Peishwa had been put in leading strings, the rest ought to have followed suit,

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c.*, pp. xviii—xxx.

as a matter of course; given in their respective adhesions to the subsidiary alliance system, and thus become doubly dependent on the English Power. His strong common sense reminded him too forcibly of the facts, that useful as the assumption of the Peishwa's supremacy over these Chiefs might be in putting them in the wrong in an argument, or in getting up a case for adjudication in England, the Peishwa had long been a puppet in their hands; that the despised and outlawed Holkar had just dethroned him, and set up an anti-Peishwa; that Sindia had long comported himself as an independent Prince; and in spite of the rout of one of his detachments at Poona, was still dominant at Delhi and over a large part of Hindostan, and was by far the most powerful native ruler in India; while the Rajah of Berar, though weaker in a military sense, had not only acted independently, but by his alleged relationship to Sivaji had a reserved claim to the allegiance of the whole Mahratta people. In the face of these facts the Governor-General's plausible theory of the Peishwa's feudal, hegemonic, or sovereign authority resolved itself into a cobweb tissue; and Wellington notices it only to disparage it. Indeed, he goes further. He finds in the Treaty itself a virtual recognition of the past independence of the so-called feudatories or rebels, by its sanction of their encroachments upon their putative sovereign or lord paramount. For he maintains that so far from being injured, they are actually benefitted by an arrangement, which guarantees to them possessions acquired, at the Peishwa's expense, during the recent troubles. Again, although he writes sympathetically to the Governor-General on the conclusion of the Treaty; supplies him with facts for its vindication; exhorts him to dismiss anxiety as to the criticism of 'little minds' about its mischievous tendency; insists on the danger of going back from it on account of the rising murmurs and threatening demonstrations of Sindia and the Bonslay; carries it out so energetically by his march on Poona; confirms it by beating down the opposition of the Confederates, and defends it so elaborately against Castlereagh's strictures:—still, in spite of all this, his utterances from day to day are as far as possible from expressing an unqualified approval of it, and sometimes amount to a most decided disapproval. The causes of this unfavourable tone are not far to seek. Besides a more general objection, to be mentioned presently, Baji Rao was his *bête noir*: he almost despaired of doing any good work with such a yoke-fellow. He sometimes speaks the truth to the Governor-General, without thinking it advisable at the moment to speak the whole truth, much less to inflict on him, in the midst of his anxious toils, the full bitterness of his heart, which he pours forth, in the confidence of private friendship, to less responsible agents in the great enterprise. And this *suppressio*



*veri* might be easily garbled and distorted into something very like a *suggestio falsi*. Thus he encourages his brother in the idea, that it was clearly right to take up the Peishwa's cause against Holkar, and to conclude a Treaty with him for his restoration, even at the remote risk of thereby occasioning a Mahratta war. For this he thinks the most likely mode of averting such a war, which otherwise must have occurred under less favourable circumstances. But before going so far he had already, in a few pregnant words, hinted his uneasiness on the subject, which at a later day led him to the momentarily despairing conclusion, that the Treaty ought to be replaced by an arrangement entirely different in its leading principles. 'We must depend,' he had said (p. 219), 'upon the personal character of the Peshwa, and upon the manner in which the new Treaty will work, upon which points I shall defer to write anything until I am better informed.' When he *was* better informed, and experienced how badly the Treaty *did* work, from the Peishwa's misconduct and confirmed treachery, he submitted the facts to the Governor-General, and left him to draw his own conclusions. But to Close and Malcolm he unbosomed himself unreservedly. Thus to the latter he writes, repeating an old objection to which he gives new force, and which in fact goes far to impugn the indiscriminate application, if not the abstract policy, of Wellesley's cherished instrument:—

'One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely annihilate the military power of the governments with which we contract them; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us' (p. 244).

And he continues:—

'In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up our connexion with the Peshwah, so that he might not be trampled upon; at the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the Empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the state should be called upon to decide. In short, I would preserve the existence of the state; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty.'

And he concludes:—

'Upon the whole, I see no prospect under the present treaty, and I should decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity may offer.'

Nor is this the last occasion on which he speculates on the desirableness of leaving Baji Rao more to his own devices.

The truth is, there seems to have been a constant and severe struggle in his mind between the practical soldier's antipathy to military shams and 'too ingenious' political fictions, and an almost invincible repugnance to a close and responsible connexion with such a man as Baji Rao, on the one hand; and on the other, the claims of political expe-

fluence and loyal deference to the Governor-General's authority, and determined preference for the subsidiary alliance system. He had, from the first, a sufficiently bad opinion of the Peishwa. But he gave him the benefit of the doubt, how far he would amend his ways, when reduced to depend on our help. And at first he seemed cordial; then cool; then feckless; next suspiciously supine, if not obstructive; later unquestionably and actively unfriendly; at last, 'in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy.' Such are the phases which are faithfully reflected in Wellington's correspondence, and which successively modify his whole view of the position of affairs. There was nothing surprising in this series of phases. But it was not reassuring, and to Wellington personally it was almost intolerable. Yet, on the other hand, there were positive and considerable advantages in the alliance: it would not be easy at any time, it was out of the question at the moment, to cancel it, and the Governor-General must decide how far it could or should be modified. Such, on the whole, seems to have been Wellington's frame of mind towards the end of the period preceding the war.

What, then, were the advantages of the Treaty which he did recognize? (1) I have already said, that it was a necessary complement of our engagements for the general defence of the Nizam, and that his security was by no means unessential to our own. He had been constantly threatened, and frequently plundered by the Mahrattas; and only by controlling the Peishwa's *Durbar* could we peacefully protect him, perhaps save him from destruction. Wellington's apology for the Treaty is very emphatic on this point. (2) Had Holkar been left undisturbed, the exhausted state of the Peishwa's territories must have compelled him to seek subsistence for his Pindari bands in the Nizam's, and after a while in our own districts. We must then have fought him with a less exclusive command of our own and our ally's resources. It may indeed be objected that Holkar might have preferred to return northwards, as he afterwards did. But Wellington (I suppose) assumed that the fear of Sindia's unbroken power and unslaked animosity, combined with the less wasted condition of the Nizam's country, and the still stronger attractions of our own, would have outweighed the dread of offending the British Government. (3) The Treaty, and the prompt steps taken in pursuance of it, not only averted this danger, but made it highly probable that we should avoid a Mahratta war altogether, at least at that juncture. It is curious to observe how confidently this probability is asserted, how persistently it is repeated, how late it is abandoned. But though every instrumentality that Wellington had recommended was employed, he was for once completely wrong in his prophecy, nay, doubly wrong, considering Holkar's subsequent explosion.

(4) Again, in case of such an issue, he assumed that the Peishwa's country would afford an advanced base for assailing the Confederates. On this point he lays much stress, and recurs to it frequently. And the great campaign of 1803 fully illustrated it. But the advantage was much diminished by the previous devastation of the country, and the character and conduct of its ruler. His treatment of the southern jaghiredars made them, at best, lukewarm in his cause, and endangered the communications of the British armies with the Company's provinces, and with Mysore. After making all fair allowance for previous disorder and administrative inability, Wellington was convinced that much of the difficulty which he experienced in obtaining transport and other military requisites from Poona and the country around was deliberately created, and clearly proved that Baji Rao was playing us false. Thus to Close he writes in terms which contrast strikingly with his earlier language to the Governor-General:—

'The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved will be an useful lesson to governments, and to us all: first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is insincerity; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the distance of 700 miles from our own resources; not only not having the government of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy' (p. 247).

Yet the contradiction is more apparent than real. He had reserved his opinion on the Peishwa's character and the working of the Treaty. He now finds that his worst fears are confirmed; and he moralises accordingly. But when the actual contest came, he contrived to supply his wants, in spite of obstacles very similar to those with which he afterwards so ably and successfully grappled in Spain.

On the whole, though he appreciates the Governor-General's ulterior objects, and shews a real anxiety to avert war, his estimate of the situation is determined mainly by professional considerations. We have made a good bargain, but with a bad customer. And if we are to fight his battles, we must take care that he does not mar our efforts by shirking and contravening his part of the agreement, as its very terms incline him to endeavour to do. And when the present business is finished, it may be well to revise the contract. Its recommendation, I may add, from the Gallophobic point of view, he thinks doubtful. For it may combine the Mahrattas against us, rather than with us against the French. Still the question is of the less moment, as the French can never co-operate effectually with the Mahrattas.

But if the Treaty, which to the Governor-General seemed a masterpiece of diplomacy, and the coping stone of a solid political structure, was in his eyes rather a *pièce de circonstance* in a sudden emergency; he

showed no want of alacrity in carrying out his brother's policy. His discriminating and guiding hand is discernible in the whole conduct of affairs preceding the appeal to arms. The primary requisite was to evoke a decent amount of popular sentiment on the Peishwa's behalf, and especially to obtain the concurrence of the southern jaghiredars. Without this the Governor-General declared<sup>1</sup> he should not persist in acting on the Treaty. Wellington, in the course of his campaign against Dhoondiah, had established friendly relations with many of these chiefs; and those who co-operated in his march to Poona were just those on whom his personal influence had been brought to bear; though Baji Rao's ungracious reception of their advances afterwards alienated most of them. The next steps, the re-occupation of Poona, and the restoration of the Peishwa to the *musnud*, were accomplished with characteristic promptitude and economy of force. The city was saved from destruction; Holkar spirited away without a blow being struck; and the army judiciously distributed in stations convenient for its immediate subsistence, and for rapid concentration, if further operations should be required. When the Confederates assumed their threatening position, Wellington at once perceived and explained what our ultimatum ought to be, and why it should be insisted upon, and brought to the issue of performance, without delay. In his Memorandum he had already shown that the Monsoon was the fittest time for a Mahratta war. And the tedious negotiation which now ensued did not prevent his justifying that opinion by his brilliant campaign. For no sooner was he in a condition to command, instead of suggesting, than he cut short the hollow talking against time, and declared war. The extreme importance, on many accounts, of Stuart's position at Moodgul—'the mainstay of our operations'—he has fully explained. And this position he suggested: and he deprecated its abandonment, when the Madras Commander-in-Chief was inclined to move nearer to Pondicherry, to watch the motions of the returning French. He also pointed out the great importance of preventing Sindia from visiting Poona at such a time; and thereby no doubt averted much mischief. To obviate the clashing of authorities and divided counsels he had at first recommended, that the Governor-General should move nearer to the scene of negotiation; subsequently, that he should appoint a local plenipotentiary. And highly as the Directors resented the adoption of this salutary suggestion, when Wellington himself was entrusted with this authority, his judicious exercise of it could not be disputed; although Wellington himself, when indignantly denouncing the misapplication of some of his Treaty clauses in Bengal, was half inclined to think that he had laboured in vain. Nor was it only the confederate chiefs whom he

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, page 222.

strove to bring to reason, and save from the crushing humiliation which he never doubted his power of inflicting on them. I have already noticed his successful negotiation with Amrut Rao, whose dynastic pretensions were not to be despised, while his personal ability was really formidable. For the flying enemy Holkar he made a bridge; advising that his extortions at Aurungabad should be condoned, and that he should be assured of our peaceful intentions towards him, so long as he should avoid forcing us into war. And he adopted the same tone in addressing him. He penetrated Jeswunt Rao's design of finessing for the purpose of gaining certain districts from Sindia; and these granted, the wily Mahratta so far justified Wellington's treatment of him, as to postpone his hostility until a season less inconvenient to us. Through Close, again, Wellington laboured strenuously to arouse in the Peishwa's breast a sense of his responsibilities, to reconcile him with his estranged supporters, and to fathom, by a rather startling expedient, his crooked and treacherous intrigues. And he was equally active in endeavouring to reclaim those of the southern jaghiredars, whom Baji Rao's perversity had provoked to join his and our enemies.

Thus did he survey the crisis in all its bearings: thus indefatigably and wisely did he interpose to make the best of bad material; to avert evils which he clearly saw were almost inevitable; to animate and direct the exertions of our able diplomatists; to retain wavering friends, and overawe half-declared enemies, by the position and moral force of our armies; and thus provide either for the continuance of peace, or for every attainable advantage if we were compelled to take up arms. Lastly, it must not be forgotten, that the chief of these advantages—the selection of an able general—was suggested by Wellington himself. This appears from a short extract (see p. 527) inserted in the text, wherein the writer proposes this step, in case Stuart does not take the field in person.

### 3. THE WAR WITH SINDIA AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR.

Wellington's Mahratta campaign, though lightly regarded at the time, as he complains, by the highest authorities in England, and eclipsed by his subsequent achievements in Europe, must ever be memorable in several ways. Its rapidity, its unchequered course, the completeness of its victories in the field, the speedy reduction of the strong places attacked, the entire prostration of the Confederates after two defeats, astonished friend and foe alike, betokened a general of no common order, and showed that a new military era had dawned in India. As a work of art, as a model of the skilful and successful adaptation of means to ends, of the triumph of intelligence, energy, and perseverance over great obstacles, it was equally remarkable in itself, and serviceable to the

victor as a 'study' or prelude for the mightier work which was to absorb his maturer powers, fix the attention of the world for years, and revolutionize the political condition of Europe. It would be well worth while, though it is far beyond my present scope, to consider in how many ways, while solving the problem of Eastern campaigning, Wellington was educating himself for warfare in the half-Asiatic Iberian Peninsula; and while experiencing the crying evils of native Indian misrule, he was learning to tolerate and rise superior to the imbecility, peevishness, and corruption of the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. Meanwhile, this consideration makes it the more desirable to realise as exactly as may be, with the aid of the papers in the text, the nature and extent of his success; his diversified thoughtfulness and activity in preparing and working it out; and the circumstances which, under a common-place commander, would certainly have given a very different turn to affairs, even if they had not made the campaign an absolute failure.

The immediate object was to protect the Nizam's territories both from the Confederates, and from internal disorder, which the expected death of Nizam Ally was likely to occasion. The capture of Ahmednuggur was essential both for this purpose, for covering Poona, and for securing a post important in connexion with the theatre of war further to the north. Most desirable as it was to fight a pitched battle as soon as possible, this had generally been the great difficulty in the case of Mahrattas, whose original *forte* had been irregular warfare; and who, even after they had freely adopted the formation and armaments of their European rivals, still retained vast masses of irregular cavalry, re-inforced by swarms of utterly undisciplined and lawless Pindari horsemen; and who would, accordingly, be sure to lose no opportunity of overrunning the invaded country in every direction, levying contributions on its inhabitants, ruining its revenues, interrupting our communications, cutting off convoys, picking up stragglers, watching our motions, evading pursuit, and attacking us unawares, and at advantage. Hence it was essential to improve our marching power as much as possible; to secure a constant supply of trustworthy intelligence *en route*; to feed the army not only from hand to mouth, but in such a manner that a reserve fund should be always available on an emergency; to maintain free access to and from our original and remote base in the Carnatic, the Ceded Districts, Mysore, and Malabar; and that not only by preventing the enemy's cutting in between the forces in the front and those regions, but by neutralizing Holkar, subsidizing his *alter ego*, the Pathan adventurer Meer Khan, gaining over, even in the Peishwa's despite, his brother Amrut Rao, who was maintaining an observant and suspicious

attitude on the hills far in advance; and retaining the friendship of the South Mahratta chieftains, at least to the extent of inducing them to permit the passage of our convoys and re-inforcements. Thus, and thus only, could our armies, secure from starvation, surprise, and destruction in detail, marching rapidly, co-operating readily with each other, feeling the country as they advanced, skilfully manœuvred with a view to intercepting the enemy, and having *les bras longues*:—thus only could they hope, after a time, to bring their Parthian foe to bay; and then—Wellington was very ready to answer confidently for the issue.

How all this was accomplished, the papers in the text explain (it is hoped) with sufficient fullness for most purposes. But those who are anxious to follow the great artificer in all the details of his handicraft will find ample satisfaction in a mass of professional matter, which is necessarily excluded from this volume.

But besides all this, other duties equally imperative, and not less difficult to discharge properly, claimed the General's attention. To appease the disorders, instruct the inexperience, and develop the latent capacities of the Bombay Government, was more than even Wellington could thoroughly accomplish. And between the worthy Governor Duncan's official sophistry, the mutual jealousies of his subordinates, the quarrelsomeness and general incompetence of Colonel Murray, and the muttering thunder of renewed civil war in Guzerat, he was driven to abandon the thankless office of controlling in that quarter operations so hopelessly enfeebled and embroiled. That the task was hopeless, appeared too clearly at the opening of the Holkar war, when the state of affairs in Guzerat, and Murray's failure to co-operate with Monson, cost us so dear. Again, to supply the military chest, the failure of which would have produced the certain defection of our dubious and greedy allies, and the rapid dissolution of our own army, was at times almost impossible, and required occasional resort to measures, which did not always meet with the Governor-General's immediate approval. That this should have been the case, shews the extraordinary advance in political morality since the days of Hastings; while not only is Wellington's justification complete; but he certainly turns the tables very successfully on his brother, when he contrasts his own impecunious condition with the long catalogue of costly requirements from Calcutta, and above all the paramount duty of winning the campaign, which he could not have done unless he paid his way as he went. A letter, addressed to the Governor of Fort St. George (see pp. 550-553) further illustrates this point, and the curious economical conditions involved in the financial competition of the Local Governments. Another constant source of extreme perplexity has been elsewhere considered; and it may

be enough here to quote a short, but very significant example of its operation. After describing the rapidity of his marches, and its good effect, he adds:—

‘But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have anything to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state’ (p. 320).

Though his health had been impaired at an earlier period, and suffered later from the stress of this campaign, it seems to have stood out stoutly throughout the war, in spite of his extraordinary activity, both bodily and mental, and to have justified his *soubriquet* in our own days—‘the Iron Duke.’

The wished-for chance of fighting a decisive battle presented itself sooner than he had anticipated. Indeed, the irony of fate ordained that after taking so much thought for the organization of his intelligence department, he should, on this crucial occasion, have been almost as much surprised as the enemy, on coming so awkwardly upon them. Their change of front seems to have been well managed, but their carelessness was notable in not guarding the ford. That to cross that Rubicon at once was a very bold step, but one justified by the circumstances and by all previous experience of Mahratta warfare, has been (I believe) the almost unanimous opinion of competent critics. The severity of the action is evident from the descriptions and statistics in the text; but Wellington is silent as to his personal gallantry, which secured the victory. How great that victory was, and why it was not more actively followed up at once, he has explained. And the subsequent delay in the pursuit, after Stevenson rejoined him, was due to his humanity and habitual care for his soldiers. But Dowlut Rao’s spirit was broken, and he began to make clumsy advances towards a reconciliation. Wellington, who had refused to stop the firing at Ahmednuggur until the surrender was concluded, was not to be so trifled with; though, on more regular overtures, for his own reasons he granted an armistice, hardly in accordance with ordinary rules, but saddled with conditions which enabled him, through Sindia’s characteristic breach of them, to inflict a second and final defeat upon him, and so effectually to demolish the Bonslay’s army, that the further prosecution of the attack upon his territories became unnecessary; and he, too, was reduced to sue humbly for peace. Yet how near this crowning victory was to ending in an English defeat, we should perhaps never have known but for the conqueror’s own strong expression, on a subject upon which he must be assumed to have been the best judge. The swift reduction of Gawilghur and Asseerghur is the more notable, con-



sidering the part played by those fortresses down to the end of the, later war, when the hunted Baji Rao sought refuge within their walls.

Such were the difficulties, the perils, the precautions, and the achievements of this remarkable campaign. Its sudden and complete collapse on the part of the Confederates was of course greatly promoted by Lake's brilliant operations in Hindostan, the prompt occupation of Cuttack, and other causes. But no one who carefully studies Wellington's plan and its execution can fail to see that it had a completeness of its own; that it was well adjusted in all its parts; that it attained its end thoroughly as a natural consequence of the means employed; and that its not least meritorious feature was a negative one, the absence of the minor but serious catastrophes which were so inseparably associated with the idea and experience of Mahratta warfare.

#### 4. PACIFICATION.

The papers collected under this head are not the least interesting in the volume, nor the least indicative of their writer's honourable character, political capacity, and resolute and persevering exertions to bring to a happy issue his brother's bold undertakings. But it is with much hesitation and real regret that two lengthy Memoranda have been omitted, which exhibit Wellington's diplomatic powers in a conspicuous and, it may be added, in an amusing way. These will be found in the Supplementary Despatches<sup>1</sup>. As the Governor-General's plenipotentiary Wellington settled the two treaties of Surgee Anjengaum and Deogaum with the ministers of Sindia and the Rajah of Berar respectively, and has carefully recorded his conferences with them from day to day. In this diplomatic campaign the whole quarrel is fought over again; and the Anglo-Irishman's shrewdness and imperturbable common sense prove more than a match for the aggravating cunning and plausible, but often self-convicting, sophistry of the Orientals. He states his own view clearly and forcibly; demolishes objections with remorseless logic: from a cloud of specious and rambling words he disengages promptly the relevant issue; follows it up closely across successive lines of evasion; presses alternately each horn of the dilemmas in which the too fertile phrase-mongering of his antagonists has helped him to catch them; brings them back again and again to the material point from which, either to gain time or in the hope of shirking it by their opportunity, they have wandered; detects and exposes the insidious reserve

<sup>1</sup> Vol. iv. pp. 221-272 and 274-285.

of disputed claims latent in an affectedly frank but ambiguous concession; and leaves them at last silenced if not satisfied, and with no argumentative barrier against the acceptance of the proffered terms, modified only so far as their more genuine statements and reasonable objections have convinced his judgment, and as is consistent with the general tenor of the Governor-General's instructions. In short, though too long for insertion in this volume, the records of these conferences are well worth attention, not only as historical documents, but as a curious and lively illustration of character on both sides.

At last all was amicably settled, and Wellington satisfied himself that he had 'made two very good treaties of peace.' But, after all, the end was not yet; and we soon after find him lamenting, not without indignation and dark forebodings, that he had 'not influence to carry them into execution,' and that the violation of their spirit, if not of their letter, was too likely to involve us in a more serious and extensive war than the one so recently and happily concluded; to dim the lustre of Wellesley's 'great name' in England, and to imperil the future of our aggrandized Indian Empire. Apart from the merits of the moot points involved in the interpretation of his Treaties of Peace, there can be no question that his forebodings were well founded, and were justified in the sequel. However necessary the war with Holkar may ultimately have been, its occurrence at such a juncture was assuredly a great public misfortune, and a most convenient and timely 'handle' to Wellesley's personal enemies and political opponents. It seemed to belie his professions, to confirm the hackneyed charges against him, and to involve us in an indefinite course of trouble, anxiety, expense, and danger. Its brighter aspects and heroic feats poorly atoned in popular estimation, either in India or in England, for the opening humiliation of Monson's retreat, or for the unwonted and mortifying failure of the Blhurt pore escalades. And Wellesley had no time thoroughly to obliterate these alleged blots on his scutcheon. He was compelled to leave the threads of his policy dangling in the gale of popular disfavour; and though he still had staunch friends and ardent admirers, and his brother's and his own return to England enabled them to confront, and to a certain extent rectify, public opinion; and though the attempt to inflict a Parliamentary censure on him collapsed ignominiously, as it deserved to do, yet it was long before he was rightly appreciated, and his policy justified by its resumption and consummation. I have elsewhere endeavoured to shew<sup>1</sup> that if his counsels had been followed, Monson's disaster would probably not

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c.*, pp. xxv, xxvi.

have occurred. And this it was which gave new life to a falling cause, and tempted the Rajah of Bhurtpore to throw in his lot with Holkar. Nor ought Wellesley to have been held responsible for Lake's disregard not only of the rules of war, but of the dictates of common prudence. Still the fact remained that, even in its conduct, the Governor-General's last war was, in several ways, a very unsatisfactory one. And this to him, who as a war minister might have been called the spoiled child of victory, was a peculiarly damaging fact.

But a more serious question than the conduct of the war, and one more immediately involving his own responsibility, remained to be considered:—How came the war to happen at all? And this brings us back to Wellington and his forebodings. Granting that it was necessary to destroy Holkar, that considering his character and position, and the composition of his forces on the one hand, on the other our extensive alliances at the moment, it was almost inevitable that he should, in order to feed his army, plunder one or other of our allies, and so come into collision with us; granting again, which, considering Wellington's language<sup>1</sup>, is a liberal concession, that he was not justified in acting on his assumed right to levy contributions on the Rajah of Jyepore; granting, once more, that his tone was intolerably insolent, and his demands were utterly extravagant; granting even, which considering the vast armies which we still retained under canvass, or in their allotted stations, is not very probable, that he counted upon our exhaustion from the greatness of our late efforts; it must still be asked, how came he to assume so insolent a tone, and to defy us to mortal combat, almost before the exultation at our late triumphs had died away?

Now it is abundantly clear that, in spite of his original quarrel with Sindia, and the grudge borne to him both by that Prince and by the Rajah of Berar for deserting them at the critical moment, after Sindia had paid the price of reconciliation and assistance against the English; Holkar was tempted to assume this audacious tone by his knowledge of the indifferent understanding subsisting at the time between our Government and its late enemies, and the strong and not unreasonable hope that his resentful, rash, and capricious fellow-tribesmen were well-inclined to avail themselves of the opportunity which he offered them of reversing the late arbitrament, and retrieving their fallen fortunes. And the papers included in this Section fully account for the bad understanding on special grounds, and apart from the inevitable soreness

<sup>1</sup> See p. 313. In this passage the actual occasion of the collision with Holkar is anticipated. 'The protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us with Holkar.'

of the vanquished; and too clearly indicate Wellington's decided opinion, that they had real cause to complain; that the Governor-General and his agents had overweighted the scale in adjusting their ransom; that *væ victis!* was too much the order of the day; and that especially Sindia, his *sirdars*, and his soldiers, were all in that state of mortified desperation, which, even without Holkar's incitement, would have been too likely to end in a new war. So far then as Wellesley was too stiff and masterful in interpreting the Treaties, however honestly persuaded that his construction of them was the right one, so far must he be held responsible for indirectly encouraging Holkar in his temerity, and increasing the probability of a contest, which he had so much reason to regret. But this was not all. Wellington says significantly that the contest ought not to last a fortnight if, 'above all, Sindia should co-operate heartily in the war.' But when it broke out, so far from doing so, he was not only very passive, but gave pretty clear tokens of a disposition to take part against us; which, but for Holkar's repeated defeats, would probably soon have ripened into decided action. And, as it was, his officer and namesake Bappojee Sindia, by deserting Monson on the approach of Jeswunt Rao, greatly contributed to precipitate and ensure the catastrophe, which so much impaired our military reputation at the moment, and exalted the lately fugitive and desperate freebooter into a formidable foe. And Sindia's flimsy explanation of this defection in no degree weakens the strong probability, that it was quite in accordance with his own wishes, if not with his positive instructions. His own conduct during the siege of Bhurtpore tends to confirm this view. Thus, on the whole, Wellington's Cassandra prophecy was fulfilled, though not exactly in the way which he had anticipated. As before at Poona, so now in Hindostan, Holkar replaced Sindia as the leading actor, and our immediate antagonist.

I have hitherto referred to the mere fact, that Wellington thought the Governor-General's too exacting interpretation of the Treaties of Peace injudicious, because it was likely to occasion new troubles in India, and aggravate the prepossessions against his policy in England; and that this opinion was amply confirmed by the event. But as this is the occasion on which, if their views were not more diametrically opposed than at any other time, Wellington spoke out in the most unqualified terms; and as his letters depict very clearly his own impressions of Wellesley's disposition and surroundings, and consequent temptations to go wrong; it is important to observe both what he says, and what he does not say on these topics. Moderation, he assumes, had been the order of the day when the Treaties were made. So far the Governor-General and his plenipotentiary were perfectly agreed. The defeated

Chiefs, in addition to their military losses, were to pay a heavy political penalty; were to acquiesce in the Treaty of Bassein; make large territorial cessions; and renounce rights which they had long enjoyed, and privileges upon which they peculiarly prided themselves, and the assertion of which was, indeed, most distinctively characteristic of them as members of the Hydra that had preyed upon the Mogul Empire. Still, they were not to be destroyed, but reduced to less formidable dimensions; bound over to keep the peace, but preserved as respectable powers in India: their aggressive fangs were to be extracted, but their heads were to be exalted once more, as dominant within their own still spacious limits. They were not even to be constrained, but only invited, to enrol themselves among the other members of the general defensive association, and to accept along with its imperious conditions the solid guarantee of their dynastic and territorial maintenance, included in the subsidiary alliance overture. That their freedom of choice, in this respect, was not a solemn mockery, was proved by the fact that Berar did not accept the offer. While the way was smoothed for Sindia's accession to it by his exemption from the cost of the arrangement, which was excused on the ground of his impoverished condition, and by a convenient fiction (upon which Mr. Mill comments with his usual bitterness and pedantry) was assumed to have been defrayed in the course of his large territorial cessions. That Wellesley, in the full tide of success, and when Sindia seemed at his mercy, should have sanctioned this assumption, proves, no doubt, his eagerness to introduce his political panacea even at the sacrifice of what, under ordinary circumstances, would have been the indispensable equivalent paid by the native State for the privilege of the guarantee. Thus much may be granted to Mr. Mill; though it is obvious that, in any case, to have disarmed Sindia, and turned him into a vassal of the Company, even without his paying a rupee, or ceding any territory at all, would have greatly promoted the pacification of India. And this was what both Wellesley and Wellington calculated on effecting. But the Governor-General's acquiescence in the assumption proves also, that he really was, as his brother says later, 'sincere in his notions; ' that moderation, as he understood it, was actually his aim, and that in this, as in so many other cases in the course of the negotiation, he was amenable to his plenipotentiary's recommendations. And though the Confederates and their followers could not but resent deeply the fortune of war, and long to reverse it; yet Wellington, at this period, saw good reason to hope, that they would gradually reconcile themselves to their new position; that our influence in Sindia's *Durbar*, strengthened by the stipendiary hold which he had contrived to establish over that Chief's *sirdars*, would counteract both their restlessness and that of their master; and that the

peace would not again be broken. Such was the promising aspect of affairs at the close of the campaign.

But presently a great change comes over the scene ; and Wellington's language becomes unusually severe towards the Governor-General. Thus he writes in confidence to their brother Henry :—

‘ The system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so highly approved and extolled, is now given up.’

And the result is that,—

‘ We are all shaking again : the public interests may again be exposed to the risk of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion of ingenuity’ (p. 397).

And to Malcolm he had already written of ‘ the moderation of the Governor-General, which in any other man would pass current for ambition’ (pp. 369–370). And again to the same correspondent he had said,—‘ We shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry’ (p. 392).

And to Mr. Webbe :—

‘ The Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta ; we must conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his business ; and all his treaties, without conciliation and an endeavour to convince the Native powers that we have views beside our own interests, are so much waste paper’ (p. 399).

The documents in the text fully explain this change of tone. But the key to the writer's sentiments seems to be contained in the following passage :—

‘ I have made two very good treaties of peace, but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of their stipulations ; and there is no person about the Governor-General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and to resist the importunities of the local authorities,’ &c.<sup>1</sup> (p. 370).

Instead of heeding his brother's counsels, and duly allowing for all the circumstances of the case, Wellesley, intent on local objects, biassed for evil by inferior agents, too heavy metal to be checked by his Council, and beguiled by his own argumentative cleverness, is both overstepping the limits of justice, endangering the results of the late campaign, and compromising the character of his plenipotentiary. The last inference may seem harsh ; but when it is observed that Wellington had, through Mr. Elphinstone (p. 369), pledged his word to the Rajah of Berar that

<sup>1</sup> So also he says elsewhere :—‘ In fact, my dear Henry, we want at Calcutta some person who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. Since you and Malcolm have left him, there is nobody about him with capacity to understand these subjects, who has nerves to discuss them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is wrong’ (p. 397).

not only he, but the Governor-General wished to do, what he complains the latter is determined not to do; I cannot but think that some such feeling aggravated his dissatisfaction. Not the less because he appears to have given the above pledge, rather hastily, in reliance on his own view of the case, and on the deference that the Governor-General had hitherto paid to his suggestions, but before he had obtained the sanction which he confidently anticipated, but which was unfortunately withheld.

As to the merits of the particular questions which had caused this remarkable change of tone, it will be observed that, upon the Gohud point, Wellington thinks that the technical right was on our side, but that it was injudicious to insist upon it; that we had no right to retain Gwalior, and could only do so by breaking the spirit, if not the letter of the Treaty; and that to abide by, and compel the Rajah of Berar to recognize, the loose verbal engagements made with his outlying tributaries—or rather with their wives or ministers—was not only a forced construction of the Treaty of Peace, but was distinctly opposed to the very practice which in Wellington's case, approved by the Governor-General, had secured the prompt ratification of that Treaty, by the Rajah. Lastly, the inclusion among the treaties which he was to recognize of those not concluded until after the peace, or even the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, was known on the spot, was a transaction which even the 'ingenuity' of the Governor-General would be much taxed to justify.

What then is Wellington's opinion of his brother, upon the whole, at this most unfavourable crisis for such an estimate? Wellesley is over-confident in himself; too easily assured that his own reading of the Treaties is the right one; too impervious to advice, even when tendered by the experienced, dispassionate, and familiar counsellor who had negotiated them; too ready to resort to nice distinctions, far-fetched arguments, and questionable principles of international law, unrecognized by, and unintelligible to, semi-barbarous Orientals; too regardless of circumstances in particular cases, as well as of our general position at the time, and therein of the danger of wounding our recent enemies' pride—their strongest passion—and of thus driving them to extremities, and experiencing the truth of the old adage, that a State never knows what it can do till it is ruined; lastly, too negligent of the pronounced and growing hostility to his policy in England, and of the slight support he could count upon from the Ministry. Thus far he goes; and this is a long way; and if fully revealed at the time, it would have gladdened the hearts of the Governor-General's opponents in both countries.

But, on the other hand, there is no general condemnation of the policy that had metamorphosed India in so short a time; no hint that Wellesley is indiscriminately ambitious, and recklessly greedy of territory; that he

is at heart but a vulgar conqueror, a Napoleon of the East; and that his former moderation was only a passing whim. And even now, he is 'sincere in his notions,' and 'considers his decisions to be strictly correct.' Wellington never accuses his brother, either directly or by implication, of saying one thing and meaning another; of consciously violating or overstraining the Treaties; of deliberately and insolently crying *Vae victis!* or of intentionally circumventing the humbled but still formidable Princes.

While thus new storms seemed to be brewing in the North between us and our recent enemies, our ally the Peishwa was busily engaged in giving occasion to hardly less perilous disturbances in his own dominions. His political weakness, his selfishness, insincerity, and vindictiveness were the daily experience and indignant theme of the hero who had done so much for him, only to find himself baffled in every attempt to bring him to a better mind, and his affairs into working order. His petulant objections to the pacification, and his extravagant demand of the lion's share of the spoil acquired in a contest undertaken on his behalf, but in which he had been worse than passive, though according to the Governor-General easily overborne by the force of reasoning preconceived by himself and applied by his agents on the spot, boded no security for the future. And both Baji Rao's general conduct, and certain sinister projects which he propounded by way of cutting the knot of the difficulties relating to the settlement of his southern territories, were admirably adapted to sow a new crop of dragon's teeth. He would do nothing effectual to organize his government: intent on his own frivolous pursuits and vicious pleasures, he lavished on their gratification the funds that ought to have been applied to the maintenance of order in the country; and compelled Wellington to check the growing anarchy by threatening or inflicting the stern penalties of martial law (see p. 649). He favoured and entertained at Court men of the worst repute, and whose special merit in his eyes was their secret or even avowed hostility to the English alliance. And he not only looked coldly upon the feudatories who, in spite of his unpopular character, had aided in restoring him; but was confidently accused of encouraging the Rajah of Kolapoor's aggressions upon them; and presently conceived a notable and characteristic scheme of cutting up root and branch the most important of them, especially the Putwurduns. That this family was our oldest and staunchest Mahratta connexion in that quarter; that their immediate ancestor, Pursheram Bhow, had, however waywardly and intermittently, as became a true Mahratta, still on the whole actively and usefully co-operated with Cornwallis against Tippoo; that Wellington had always been on good terms with them, and had been formerly anxious (see p. 194) to reconcile them to the Peishwa, and set them up as a barrier



against the advance of Sindia's power under Baji Rao's auspices ; that though persistently ill-treated by their sovereign, and therefore inactive in his cause during the late war, they had offered no positive obstruction to Wellington's operations, and had been, indeed, of essential service to him, in ways already explained :—all this made it perfectly natural that Baji Rao should regard them with peculiar aversion, as accomplices in the plot for his own degradation. And to bethink himself of remunerating his more congenial adherent Gokla, by making over to him the Putwurduns' military fiefs, was also natural, and on his shewing plausible : indeed, such an expedient must have presented several attractions to such a man, so situated. But to propose such a plan to Wellington ; to solicit him or his brother not only to sanction, but to carry it out by force, at the risk of provoking a general combination of the southern chieftains in opposition to a step which so obviously portended their common destruction ; and to count on practising, and inducing the English general and Government to practise, a course of deceit which was to enable the Peishwa to devour his victims one by one, until in the solitude thus created all should be peace ;—this was certainly a remarkable proceeding, even for such an unblushing votary of crooked and insipient counsels.

The serious light in which Wellington regarded this proposal ; the alternatives that he suggested as to our course with relation to the long-standing animosities between the Peishwa and his dependents ; his arguments in favour of the line which he finally recommended ; and the careful instructions which he accordingly issued to the British agent employed in this difficult business, are all evidences of his sincere desire and earnest endeavour to establish peace upon a secure foundation, and to justify in the end his brother's precarious connexion with the personification of misrule and untrustworthiness. But they shew, not less clearly, how little the Governor-General's exact scheme of alliance found favour with him, or seemed practicable in this instance ; how Wellesley himself was led by the force of circumstances, though perhaps by no means unwillingly, to authorise its abandonment in an essential particular ; and how inevitably alliance, if it was to attain its ends, entailed supremacy as its indispensable sequel. I have already explained how Wellesley contemplated the control of the international or external relations of the States with which he contracted his subsidiary alliances ; but that their internal government, or municipal regulation was, except partially in the case of Mysore, to be left to themselves. And in this spirit, the Treaty of Bassein had stipulated that the Company's Government 'have no manner of concern with any of his Highness's children, relations, *subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his Highness is absolute.*' (See *Wellesley Selections*, p. 240.)

Now however, in spite of this strong language, it became evident how impossible it was for us thus to interfere, so to speak, by halves; and how our own safety in a time of peril, and the general security and tranquillization of India, the ultimate objects of the defensive alliance policy, imperatively demanded that we should control also the internal organization of the allied State, and its ruler's treatment of his subjects and servants; although, as before, this act of dictation was diplomatically veiled under the decent fiction of friendly mediation. And, I may add, this new encroachment upon his liberty to do wrong being equally intelligible to the Peishwa, made him writhe all the more uneasily in the toils that had been thrown round him; and hastened the later collision between himself and his *soi-disant* allies, and the final catastrophe which put an end at once to his authority and to our ambiguous attitude.

## 5. WAR WITH HOLKAR.

Short as are the extracts under this head, they are most instructive, and show how thoroughly Wellington understood the nature, difficulties, dangers, and consequent requirements of a war that differed, in some important respects, even from that with the Confederates, and fundamentally from that with Tippoo; but which his historical gleanings, personal experience, and reflective turn of mind, made familiar to him in all its bearings. There seems, at first sight, some inconsistency, even contradiction, in his estimate of the character and seriousness of the contest. Wellesley throughout systematically represents Holkar as a mere adventurer, who in contradistinction to 'the established states of India,' was indebted to adventitious circumstances for a brief and precarious importance. And so his brother says that the contest with Holkar ought to be regarded 'as a mere Polygar war,' and more than once that, 'if vigorously pushed, it ought not to last a fortnight.' Yet, on the other hand, he regards him 'as the most formidable of the three supposed confederates'; and again he remarks;—'if it [the war with Holkar] is not soon brought to a conclusion,—it will be the most serious affair in which the British Government have ever been engaged.' These last words, indeed, he explains elsewhere. In short, our recent victories had for the time paralysed, but not thoroughly pacified our foes; and any appearance of prolonged and successful resistance to our arms might arouse them to renewed exertions against us, which would involve, at a peculiarly inappropriate period, operations on a gigantic scale, and over an immense extent of country. But to reconcile the other statements, it is necessary to consider attentively Wellington's estimate of Holkar's

strong and weak points; and how, accordingly, upon the spirit and method with which we should confront him would depend the question, whether we found him a contemptible, or a very formidable opponent. I have already observed, that he had taken precisely the same view of Dhoondiah Waugh; and that his skilful arrangements and vigorous action had so promptly and effectually removed the potential danger threatened by that earlier adventurer, that the merit of the performance has been often overlooked. Yet, if his proceedings from first to last on that occasion be carefully studied, they will attest his rare proficiency in this department of warfare not less decidedly, than it is shewn by comparison with the failures of others in analogous cases, and illustrated by his prophetic warnings of the imminence of those failures, and the wise counsels by which he strove to prevent their occurrence, to remedy their evil consequences at the moment, and to avert their repetition by his luminous comments on Monson's disaster.

On the one hand, then, he says, Holkar is a contemptible foe, inasmuch as he cannot stand up to us in fair fight for a moment, if our power is properly brought to bear upon him. The very existence of his army depends on his keeping out of our way, and avoiding a general action. But, on the other hand, he is a formidable enemy, if we treat him carelessly or timidly; and if we do not bring our power to bear properly upon him. And herein lies the great difficulty. His fortune (as he himself said) being on the saddle of his horse, and that horse, typical of his whole force, being a very fleet one, he possesses peculiar advantages for playing the part of the persistent but still menacing fugitive, the sworn foe of order, and the chronic devastator. Celerity is thus everything in such a war. But celerity requires both lightness of equipment and constant command of supplies, which to carry with the army will retard its march; and which Holkar may prevent our procuring upon the spot, by choosing his own theatre of war, while his troops can always, as ours cannot, subsist on the *jowarry* of the country in which they operate. Wellington's general prescription therefore is as follows:—Our army must march as light as possible: however far its operations may extend, it must constantly keep up its communications with our own country, whence, in the last resort, it may be supplied. But to this end, and to lessen the inconvenience of depending upon so remote a base, we must secure, as far as possible, the active co-operation of the Mahratta jaghiredars in the intermediate country. Thus we shall be able both to introduce supplies through their districts, to make those districts minister to our subsistence as far as their means allow; to procure intelligence from the same quarter; and to obtain a large force of light cavalry, for subsidiary purposes rather than for actual battle; and as the jaghiredars

are the Peishwa's military tenants, at no additional expense, and on the sole condition of guaranteeing to them the future security of their tenure, thus avoiding awkward and burdensome political obligations. I may observe incidentally that, Baji Rao being what he was, the last point was not found to be very easy of execution, as appears elsewhere. But the terms of the Treaty of Bassein left us no choice in the matter; and Wellington (as we have seen) did his utmost to carry out the spirit of the Treaty, and to secure the rights of those whom their sovereign so shamefully and ungratefully requited. Military posts and a due supply of boats at the rivers were, of course, included in this well-considered plan, which was, in its chief features, a re-application of the method already so successfully adopted in the campaign against Dhoondiah. And though Wellington's march on Poona, and his subsequent precautions, averted an immediate contest with Jeswunt Rao, Sindia and his ally soon proved the efficiency of the machinery originally devised for the suppression of his rival.

Perhaps it may be thought that another trace of inconsistency is observable between Wellington's contemptuous estimate of Holkar's capacity as a belligerent at close quarters, and his cautious advice to Colonel Murray (see pp. 432-4). But it must be remembered that the Monson affair, as well as Colonel Fawcett's mishap, had occurred in the interval; that Holkar's army had been augmented in consequence of that and other events; that Murray was both heedless and timorous; and that, though his force was stronger than he affected to consider it, Holkar, emboldened by his previous success, and at the head of a large and well-appointed army, might prove unusually adventurous and dangerous, when pitted against such an officer. Thus his advice is not really inconsistent, under the circumstances, with his previous language. Though Jeswunt Rao's army, he urges, is mainly composed of light cavalry, he has also a strong body of infantry, and a numerous and powerful park of artillery. The last circumstance makes it most inexpedient that the commander even of an army containing more than the ordinary complement of Europeans should allow himself to be assailed in his camp. He must keep moving, and contrive to take the offensive, avoiding retreat, unless absolutely necessary; and then turning frequently to bay, and cowing his pursuers by repeated attacks. This is the gist of his advice; and if it seems to admit that Holkar might be a formidable assailant, it is because he knows that Murray, on the defensive, would be half conquered already; while to pluck up his courage, and beard his vaunting antagonist stoutly, was the sure way to baffle him.

When the war actually began, it is interesting to observe how exactly Wellington anticipated both its adverse and its prosperous phases. He

urges Murray to march promptly into Malwa, but predicts that he will not get far from the Myhie, and that this will have the worst effect. And so it proved. He insists that Lake ought either to dash at once against Holkar, or if not able to move at once, that he ought to do so in person when he is able, and not leave his work to others. And the detachment of Monson, and its result, are the best confirmation of the wisdom of this view. He objects to alliances with petty Rajahs; and the conduct of those with whom Monson had dealings justified the opinion more fully than Wellington was at the time aware, though he refers to Jypore and Bhurtpore. Again, he early deprecates our getting involved in sieges before utterly running down Holkar; and Lake's ill-advised proceedings at the latter place could not have been better contrived to shew that Wellington was right. Lastly, the headlong pursuit of Holkar along the Doab, and afterwards northwards into the Punjab, did not more completely ruin that Chief, abate the inclination of other powers to join a cause thus proved desperate, and confirm the reputation of the gallant veteran, in spite of his mistakes, than it evinced how accurately Wellington had, from the first, discerned the appropriate way of dealing with such an enemy; and was certainly indirectly (see pp. 423-424), but more probably directly, due to his suggestion.

On the whole, it is not too much to say that Wellington, though he took no immediate part in this last contest, and no doubt deeply regretted its occurrence, was not only throughout its discriminating critic, but contributed much to animate and direct its active and successful operations; and that not without reason does he exclaim—at Barrackpore, in August 1804:—‘Would to God that I had come round here in March, and Holkar would now have been in the tomb of all the Capulets!’

## VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

### 1. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

It will be familiar to the student of the Wellesley Despatches, that the Governor-General had a hard and constant battle to fight against those who advocated the reduction of the Anglo-Indian army, especially after the Treaty of Amiens. He states that he has consulted the military authorities upon the spot, and has based his requisitions on their estimates, though he adds that they went further than he has thought proper to do. Hence his brother's facts and arguments deserve the more attention. On the following points Wellington is emphatic.

1. The army, on its older footing<sup>1</sup>, had been decidedly inadequate 'to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to maintain internal tranquillity at the same time'; and he asserts that the Mahratta war was the first occasion on which, in the absence of their usual complement of troops, our own provinces had been exempt from internal disturbances.

2. That our Indian military establishment having been carried to its existing amount, not in consequence of the European war, but for local purposes, the conclusion of peace with France affords no good ground for its diminution, except so far as popular impatience makes some reduction imperative.

3. That on the contrary, the influx of Frenchmen into India, likely to follow upon the peace, their still hostile spirit, and their inclination to organize and discipline the armies of the native States, are rather reasons for increasing our forces, as a precaution against this danger. After the experience of the Mahratta war he modified this opinion, and objected (see p. 356) to the Governor-General's clause in the Treaties of Peace, which excluded Frenchmen, &c., from the armies of Sindia and the Bonslay; for he now urged that those armies were likely to prove more troublesome to us if left to their old formation, when cavalry was their principal and most effective arm.

4. That the Directors had made an arbitrary estimate of the force required, and betrayed a marked tendency to ignore not only the large demands on our troops resulting from annexation, or from new obligations to supply subsidiary forces, but the ample pecuniary or territorial cessions, which had been made for the express purpose of providing the subsidies.

5. He enters into a detailed calculation of the troops actually indispensable throughout the Dekkan, in its largest sense, 'the only mode in which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.' This in November, 1804, on the eve of his departure. And the result is that five new regiments, which as he shews, have been already paid for, are found necessary, and are ordered to be raised forthwith for Fort St. George. Thus, on the whole, he fully vindicates his brother's demands. And he had said expressly, soon after the European peace, 'The Governor-General appears disposed to make every reduction in the military expenses which is at all practicable.'

I have more than once noticed changes of opinion to which Wellington, not being a *doctrinaire* but a docile pupil of experience, was naturally led by his observation of the complicated and shifting panorama of Indian public life. This is one circumstance which makes his correspondence so instructive. He is not content to be oracular, though he occasionally expresses his conclusions very sententially,

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<sup>1</sup> See pp. 656-657.

almost epigrammatically. His weighty facts and cogent reasoning, besides leading up to his immediate point, and accounting for the change when he has altered his view, give much curious and minute information on what might otherwise have been obscure to the historian; while to the student of the art of war such familiar but well digested expositions must, as far as a civilian may presume to judge, be invaluable. Thus, for instance, attention has already been drawn to the papers on jungle warfare. Those which occur here on the comparative advantages of concentrating the army in a few permanent stations, or on detaching a moveable field-force to overawe disaffection, and strike it down wherever it broke out actively, not only give a lively idea of the state of the newly-acquired provinces, but abound with considerations more generally applicable, such as the tendency of the field-forces' *castra stativa* to differ little, after a time, from permanent barracks.

It is also interesting to observe that Wellington's change of opinion as to the necessity of the field-force was in a great measure due, not only to his own reforms in the mobilization of the army, but to his perception of the improvements effected by Wellesley in the civil government, and which had created a greater respect for law. We have here an incidental proof of the rapid consolidation of our power resulting from the combined exertions of the two gifted brothers. As far as the soldier was concerned, the whole secret of his success is epitomised in the words:—

‘The mere readiness of the troops is nothing in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service.’

How thorough were these preparations whenever he was called upon to make them, may be sufficiently understood from the papers included in this volume; though they form a very small instalment of the evidence left by their author that, in India as elsewhere, what his hand found to do he did with his might.

It is noticeable, in contrast to the Governor-General's constant and absorbing anxiety as to a French invasion of India, that Wellington, though he says in 1797, ‘Mauritius ought to be taken,’ and explains why he regards it as a thorn in the side of our Eastern Empire, yet observes as early as March, 1802: ‘We have long ceased to fear an attack from the French;’ and while describing the best method of baffling such an enterprise, he remarks:—

‘I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war.’

Elsewhere (see p. 244) he states why he thinks the French could not combine effectively with the Mahrattas.

Although both the state of Europe and the limits of our Indian Empire at present are so different from what they were in the earlier years of this century, the papers on the scheme for exchanging sepoy and negro corps, and on the defence of the North West frontier, have gained new interest from recent events and discussions. As I formerly intimated<sup>1</sup>, the Red Sea expedition seemed not ill-adapted to impress the imagination both of Orientals and of Buonaparte himself with an idea of the solidarity of the British Empire, and of the formidable reserved forces which the possession of such a wide recruiting-ground as India enabled us to muster in case of need. Mr. Goldwin Smith has since<sup>2</sup> pointed out that any such advantage would be far too dearly purchased. Without disputing so general a proposition, I still venture to think that in Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, Baird's contingent might have rendered important if not decisive service, especially in a short campaign, and when our command of the sea might have compelled Buonaparte to rely much upon the precarious expedient of enlisting against us the inhabitants of the countries in which his romantic and gasconading enterprise was conducted. But however that may have been, no one who carefully studies Wellington's searching investigation of the plan proposed by Castlereagh will be inclined to dispute that, for either American or European service, and against Europeans, to rely upon sepoys would be to lean on a bruised reed, and to encumber ourselves with a serious impediment. Nor, after the exhaustive condemnation, contained in the same document, of the use of negro corps in India, is such a plan likely to be revived, even if free negro recruits instead of liberated slaves were enlisted. Much the same may be said of another recent proposal, to replace sepoys by Chinamen. In the course of his argument Wellington goes too far when he says of the English soldiers, 'An instance of their misbehaviour in the field has never been known,' as will be remembered by the student of Orme. On the other hand, his statement,—

'It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen under my observation, that the Natives of India have no fear or respect for the military qualities of the soldier of any European nation excepting the English,'

is not a little remarkable, as based on such ample experience, and coming from so calm and keen an observer. Lastly, note the pithy saying: 'The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be made so.'

<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c.*, pp. xxxiii, xxxiv.

<sup>2</sup> See *Fortnightly Review* for September, 1877, p. 399.



## 2. SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE SYSTEM, AND THE ARMIES OF NATIVE STATES.

The subject chiefly discussed under this head has been to a certain extent anticipated, and may be shortly disposed of here, namely, the tendency of the subsidiary alliance system, as developed by Wellesley, to sap the spontaneous energy of the native State; to make its ruler, relying on the new force, neglect independent precautions for the police of his dominions; and thus (the subsidiary troops being too scanty to supply the deficiency) to foster indirectly the growth of Pindaris, Dakoits, and other disturbers of the peace. It must be observed, however, that so far from condemning the expedient itself, Wellington from one point of view entirely approves of it. Thus he says:—

‘Upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of them have been, that in this war with the Mahrattas, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company’s territories have not been invaded; and the evils of war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and our power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which could be enumerated as benefits resulting from those alliances, would be sufficient to justify them’ (p. 464).

But he thinks that the Governor-General relies too much upon his part of the bargain, and lets off the other side too easily; and that he does not sufficiently consider two most material circumstances. 1. However useful for securing our ascendancy over the particular State, and our military preponderance in India generally, the subsidiary forces cannot tranquillise the continent, unless they are supplemented by a really efficient body of troops, actually in the service of the allied State, and which shall both make it respectable in a community that respects no power but that of the sword, and be systematically and constantly employed in maintaining internal order, and facilitating the collection of the revenue. Impressed, on the one hand, with the successful institution and good conduct in the field of the new subsidiary troops, and on the other, with the worthless and dangerous character of the Nawab Vizier’s ‘rabble,’ as described by Sir J. Craig, it was not unnatural that the Governor-General should be rather slow to appreciate a fact which daily local experience forced upon his brother’s attention. Yet the consideration of the Mysore arrangements might have given a very different impression of the value of the native force itself; however little it might have availed to counteract the misgiving to which Wellington refers, and which he shews to be misplaced,—that where the disposition of the native Government was unfriendly, its possession of such a force as he recommended would be dangerous to our power, or rather as

dangerous as the anarchy which must result from the non-existence of such a force. 2. The greatness and the rapidity of our progress, both by conquest and alliance, made it far more necessary than before to guard against the inveterate tendency to lawlessness in every native State. The vast masses of defeated and disbanded soldiers, utterly unaccustomed and indisposed to a life of peaceful industry, would not only swell (as they did in Holkar's case) the ranks of our avowed enemies, but would be rapidly organized into Pindari hordes, prey upon the vitals of the native States, and even extend their ravages into our own temptingly richer and more cultivated provinces, unless the evil were nipped in the bud, partly by retaining them in the service of their old masters, partly by employing them against marauders. More than a century before, Aurungzib had defeated his immediate purpose of thoroughly conquering the Dekkan, involved himself in inextricable difficulties, and hastened the downfall of his Empire, by destroying the kingdoms of Bijapoor and Golconda, and thereby greatly strengthening the hosts of the Mahrattas whom he originally despised, but who proved too strong for him in the end. And though the Governor-General aimed at sustaining instead of annihilating the Powers which it was his fixed determination to dominate; yet Wellington shews very clearly that his otherwise hopeful plan, unless accompanied by the *real* and efficient execution of the stipulations which it included for the maintenance of a contingent by the allied State, was likely to end in the dissolution of native society, and to prepare the way for our own subversion.

Thus, true as it undoubtedly is that the abandonment of Wellesley's policy proved so disastrous to India, and encouraged the Pindaris in their enterprises; it is true also that the neglect of his brother's warnings, on a subject on which (as he says) he wrote volumes, and a misplaced dread of allowing our allies to be too strong, had not a little to do in bringing about the later crisis. It must be observed, however, that the objection to the establishment of an efficient force in the service of the native State did not come from one side only, and that it was not enough to *allow*—it was necessary to *compel*—our allies to raise and maintain it. In the case of Oude it had been otherwise, as to the existence of troops, however indifferent their character. 'Money,' says Wellington, 'is always wanted for the expenses of luxury and debauchery, and armies are discharged to procure it.' And knowing too well the character of the Nizam, and his disinclination to incur the cost of the required force, he thinks it worth while to suggest to the Governor-General the very elementary truths that ought to be impressed upon him, in order to overcome that reluctance, as 'that he will be able to curb his aumils and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar

dues ; and that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own expenses.' Here, again, the example of Mysore was in point.

But perhaps the most remarkable circumstance connected with this subject is the early date at which Wellington insists upon his favourite topic, while his brother's bold scheme is still immature, and little more than a year after the fall of Seringapatam. On August 20, 1800, he descants upon it, and says—even *then* :—

'In my opinion the extension of our power and influence has been greater than our means.—I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough, as much, at least, if not more, than we can defend' (p. 463).

This being his view at that time, it is easy to understand *why* he wrote volumes in deprecation of our undertaking, later, so colossal a task, without obtaining good security that our allies should fulfil their part of the compact<sup>1</sup>. On February 26, 1804, he says, under all the altered circumstances of the case, but with complete consistency of general aim :—

'The measure which I propose goes no further than to insist upon having that body of troops really, which the treaties require they should have' (p. 468).

### 3. NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

The first Memorandum on Oude shews how early Wellington became his brother's military councillor, and how consistent with his later views was the advice which he then tendered. We have here the starting-point of the military reform in Oude. But Wellington, it will be observed, recommended the dismissal of the Nawab Vizier's troops only as an alternative. 'The Nawab of Oude ought to be called upon,' he says, '*either to regulate or dismiss his force.*' And it may be assumed that the former course would have been preferred by the soldier, whereas the civilian insisted on the latter. Again, that stores, grain, and carriage bullocks should be collected betimes, was a suggestion quite in accordance with what I have already said was the great secret of Wellington's success, fully alive as he was to the fact that such deficiencies had been uniformly the disastrously weak point in our Indian warfare. He elsewhere also explains, to the same effect as here, the nature and extent of the advantages to be derived from the small fortified posts recommended by Kydd.

On the other hand, he is careful not to intrude his advice beyond the limits of his knowledge ; and the application to Sir J. Craig, and the detailed measures submitted in consequence by that officer to the Governor-General, are here seen to have been due to this professional caution.

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<sup>1</sup> That his opinion on this subject continued unchanged in later years will be seen by reference to p. 568.

From the allusion in the next paper to the Paniput campaign, as from other passages, it is clear that Wellington had not neglected to study and derive useful hints from the native as well as the British-Indian military history.

The undated Memoir on Oude gives a terse and forcible explanation of the process by which the older subsidiary system impaired the integrity of the native State, and compelled us to intervene in its internal concerns. This, no doubt, his brother duly pondered over; and his modification of the system, while it guarded against such a misapplication of the subsidiary force as had occurred in the case of the Rohilla War, was intended also to obviate the pecuniary difficulty and its disastrous consequences. But the weak point in the new arrangement has already been dwelt upon, and hence Wellington observes at a much later period:—

‘The reform of the army [of the Nizam] is the point upon which I am not of the same opinion with the Governor-General’ (p. 465).

The strategic plan for opposing an European invasion of India on the North West is an appropriate sequel to the various precautions devised or adopted by Marquess Wellesley for guarding our Eastern Empire against the French. But being written in Ireland, when his brother’s administration had become a matter of history, and Wellington’s own thoughts and energies were being fast concentrated on the struggle in the Peninsula, it belongs rather to that class of documents in which, throughout his long after career, the illustrious writer continued to interpose, both with personal and official authority, in our Asiatic affairs. And the subject thus opened is so extensive and important, that it would require to be discussed separately, and with an amount of reference to later events and changed circumstances, quite incommensurate with my present limits. One passage, however, is retrospective, and illustrative of the writer’s systematic vigilance in providing for the future tranquillity of the Dekkan; in this instance by permanently hedging in its northern frontier with a *cordon* of subsidiary troops:—

‘Before I left India,’ he says, ‘I gave in a plan for the positions of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Nizam, which, however, I am afraid that they have never been able to carry into execution. It went to the establishment of these corps upon the river Godavery, in communication with each other. If this plan had been adopted, no foreigners could enter the Deccan.’

But untoward events already adverted to prevented the carrying out of this, as of so many other of his wise suggestions.

## 4. MISCELLANEOUS.

The topics insisted upon in these extracts have been mostly noticed elsewhere ; e.g., the desirableness of capturing the French Islands ; of avoiding the false economy involved in keeping the subsidiary departments of the army too low in time of peace ; of giving due consideration, prominence, and independence within his own sphere, to the Presidential Commander-in-Chief ; of conciliating Sindia, as far as was reasonable and practicable :—on the other hand, the undesirableness of entangling ourselves in embarrassing alliances with petty chiefs, or in inglorious warfare with the wild tribes of the hills. The hint of the panic fear excited by Tippoo at Madras, confirmed probably by Lord Mornington's own observation when he visited that settlement on his way to Calcutta, was not likely to be forgotten, and perhaps inspired the Governor-General's indignant words when he wrote :—

‘So sensible indeed is the Government of Fort St. George to the terror of Tippoo Sultaun's arms, as to be apprehensive of making any effort for resisting their progress.—It is difficult to describe the pain and regret which that letter from the Government of Fort St. George occasioned in my mind<sup>1</sup> ;’

and went on to speak of—

‘The danger which it is the duty of this Government to avert by counsels of another spirit than that of despondency, and by measures of another character than that of inaction, or of implicit submission to the will of the enemy.’

It will be observed that Wellington, although fully agreeing with the Governor-General in the belief that Tippoo would too willingly avail himself of Zemaun Shah's inroads into India for the furtherance of his hostile schemes, does not attach to the Shah's separate designs and operations the importance assigned to them by his brother. Also, that his estimate of the prospect of success in the Egyptian diversion is conditional, and not very sanguine. But he helped to make the best of the situation by discussing it in a characteristic Memorandum addressed to General Baird, and which will be found in the Appendix.

## VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE.

The Memorandum on Bengal, penned apparently as the writer's private reflections on an occasional publication at Calcutta, has yet permanent interest in several ways. It was probably submitted to Lord Mornington, and seems to have influenced his conduct, or at least strengthened his determination, in the matter of the private trade. It shews, moreover, the activity of the young soldier's mind, and his

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 39, 40.

readiness to grapple with great public problems not immediately in his line. But it shews also how much Wellington's views of commercial policy at home and social freedom in the East were warped by professional considerations, and by the course of contemporary or recent history. Still, even where his assumptions are most disputable, and his reasoning is least conclusive, the sober tone, the measured words, the evident desire to be fair and judicial, and the attempt to base conclusions on general principles (as when he asserts that the Company is entitled to tribute from Bengal), are worthy of the theme and of the man. Although the paper has thus a very old-world air, awakening the echoes of once bitter, but now almost forgotten controversies, and advocating restrictions which would now be generally pronounced intolerable and iniquitous; it exhibits a raciness and an originality in the general handling of some topics, and a suggestiveness in many details, that make it still by no means uninteresting or uninstructional reading. Indeed, what such a man thought, rightly or wrongly, on such subjects, can never be an immaterial question either to the historian or to the statesman. It is, for instance, certainly desirable to know precisely why he, as well as Cornwallis and other eminent and disinterested men of local experience, so strongly objected to permanent European colonization in India<sup>1</sup>. It is well also to observe how, in discussing the propriety of high import duties on Indian goods, the professional bias predominated; and the paramount expediency of manning our wooden walls threw economical considerations, and even the claims of abstract justice, into the shade. In such an age, and in the stress of such a war as we were then waging, it was perhaps not unnatural that this should have been the case; although, as I have elsewhere pointed out<sup>2</sup>, the Governor-General, as might have been expected, took a very different view. Pitt, though a disciple of Adam Smith, and an early and powerful ally of Wilberforce and Clarkson, certainly did not help to improve the state of the case when, while his continental strategy was so unprosperous, and we were threatened with invasion, he diverted so much of the national energy to the acquisition of sugar islands; and thereby contributed to throw more dust in the eyes of those who were disposed to be blinded by the hollow argument about vested interests.

In a Minute recorded many years afterwards, and which will be found in the Appendix, Mr. Tucker, one of the authors of the 'Remarks,' does not forget this plea of investment, which was no doubt a stock one, or fail to set up a correspondingly formidable claim on behalf of those

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<sup>1</sup> See Wellington's words on the same subject later, pp. 589, 590.

<sup>2</sup> See *Wellesley Selections, Survey, &c.*, p. xliv.

interested in our Eastern commerce. But though the Minute is at times rhetorical, and enables us to understand Wellington's language as to the acrimony displayed in the anonymous publication, Mr. Tucker wields more trenchant weapons than this clumsy *argumentum ad hominem*.

As to the objections to colonization, the unfavourable action of the climate of India upon Europeans, and the proneness of our race to degenerate in that country, will hardly be disputed at present; though hill-life, of course, mitigates these irremediable evils. But the colonist has accepted the facts, and shaped his course accordingly. Moreover, facility of communication has altered the whole state of the case, and simplified the issue raised by Wellington. The planter of our day, like other Europeans in India, is for the most part a bird of passage; and escapes the penalty of rooting himself in the soil by simply not doing so. He has taken hints from his neighbour the civilian, and even from the private soldier. Occasional furlough and eventual retirement are not beyond his ken; even 'the short service system' is not unknown to him. The political argument had lost much of its force long before the destruction of the Company. And there is another side to it. The intelligent and fair-minded planter is a valuable link between the Government and the native community; loyal to the former, sympathising with the latter, he strengthens the hands of the ruler all the more, the less he is 'a man under authority;' and his familiar intercourse with the natives is calculated not only to improve them (as Wellington admits), but to promote international friendliness. Moreover, a strong body of enterprising, hardy, and active planters may surely be considered a real and not inconsiderable bulwark of the British power in the East; capable of anticipating, averting, or combating disaffection. The 'mean white' is no doubt a serious nuisance, and a political peril. But he differs, *toto calo*, from the respectable planter.

Whether this paper did, or did not, suggest to the Governor-General his measures in relation to the private trade, it certainly dealt a heavy argumentative blow against the commercial monopoly. In spite of the alleged 'necessity of bringing home the surplus of the revenues through the medium of trade,' that the Company traded at a loss, was itself a staggering statement. That this was the case, although the Company monopolized the exportation of the most valuable articles, might seem to afford little hope that private adventure could prove lucrative; especially if the Company could 'aver—with some truth' that the high rate of freight which they charged to the private trader, under the recent regulation, 'cost them more' than they thus exacted. But the estimate of the complainants as to what could be effected in the open market was

hopelessly at variance with the Company's figures. And Wellington says:—'It seems certain that tonnage can be procured at a much cheaper rate than that at which the Company supply it'; and the flourishing commerce maintained between Bengal and Continental Europe told the same tale. Advancing a step further, Wellington remarks:—'It *may* still be necessary that the trade with Bengal should be carried on through the medium of an exclusive Company.' But in the same sentence he notices 'the mismanagement natural to an exclusive Company in all its commercial concerns.' He soon after insists that 'the Company ought to be obliged to find freight at the lowest rate to as great an extent as private merchants might think fit to call for it;' which Wellesley's Despatch<sup>1</sup> shews could only be done by chartering Indian shipping. This he follows up by other recommendations, the general result of which will probably, he assumes, involve 'the annihilation of the Company's commerce.' And then comes the *coup de grâce*;—'no great evil will arise from that circumstance.' On the contrary, he says, both trade and government 'will be better and more cheaply carried on.' Yet in spite of all this he pronounces judgment at last 'that it is not advisable to throw open the trade.' If this seems a halting and inconsistent conclusion, the truth would appear to be that, for one reason or another, he thought it premature to advocate the direct repeal of the monopoly, and preferred to undermine it indirectly by insisting on changes of detail, which would make what remained not worth retaining, and thus provide for it a tranquil euthanasia. But the steps which his brother took in this direction showed that such a peaceful solution must be sought through war; and the storm which they provoked in Leadenhall Street was one of exceptional violence even in that tempestuous region.

It is to be regretted that the paper on Dearth in India is unfinished. The source of the evil in the Dekkan is so exhaustively traced to the failure of the monsoon rains, that the general impression conveyed may be expressed in the dismal aphorism that 'in the East, nature dominates man.' And this desponding conclusion has received too much encouragement from recent events and comments upon them. Wellington does refer to the expense which must attend the process of extensive well-digging. And he would probably have enlarged upon the poverty, short-sightedness, and selfish extravagance of native Princes, and the sluggishness of natives generally, as at that time insuperable obstacles to any effectual measures of relief out of our own provinces. Thus he says:—

<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, p. 700. The italics are the Governor-General's.



‘I know of no tanks or canals in any part of India excepting in the Company’s territories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore, and in the Carnatic.’

Had he been well acquainted with the vast undertakings of Firoz Shah, he would perhaps have formed a more sanguine view of native capacity, when the plague of perpetual warfare should cease to distract and paralyse the energies of princes and people. Meanwhile, he would not have forgotten the state of the Company’s finances at the close of his brother’s administration, and the precariousness of attracting English capital to India for such a purpose, and at such a crisis. Though Government has since done so much to avert, and British benevolence has been so strongly aroused to palliate, the calamities of famine; we are still constantly threatened, and periodically confronted, by this primitive and monstrous scourge, which seems a strange anachronism, and a humiliating satire on our boasted civilization. Dr. Hunter, in an extract in the Appendix, has recorded great though partial triumphs, and pointed the way to a more general campaign against famine. And though Wellington’s paper, in its present state, gives little prospect of improvement; the energy and skill which have successfully grappled in the East with so many evils once thought incurable, and the increasing humanity of a people which, in the last generation, devoted twenty millions to hasten, in the West, the advent of negro emancipation, will assuredly be little disposed to intermit the contest with the gaunt spectre of famine, in deference to *doctrinaires* who complacently assert, that India is already over-peopled, and seem to imply that this ‘positive check’ has its points of consolation.

The forethought and activity of Government, the progress of science and art, the development of native education, and the awakened sympathy of our countrymen at home, will in due time add one more to the many marvels of Anglo-Indian remedial administration; and justify our unique position by a new example of its salutary and unique results. But such a social revolution cannot be completed hastily; and famine, like slavery, though for a different and more excusable reason, will probably die hard.

## VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY.

### 1. LORD CLIVE.

The earlier extracts in the text reveal Wellington in an interesting light, as the Governor-General’s agent and mouthpiece in rousing the energies of the Madras Government, and reconciling its halting members to the spirited policy and prompt steps which the occasion demanded.

The whole picture here disclosed is, indeed, a striking one. We see on the one hand, standing out from this unpretending canvass, the high-souled, eager, and imperious Governor-General, like another Chatham, conscious that he can save the country, and that he alone can do it, chafing at every obstacle to his great design, fully resolved to endure no public criticism of his measures, and ready to launch the thunderbolts of his sonorous and scathing periods against the faintest murmur of opposition. On the other hand, we see the well-meaning but inexperienced and bewildered Governor of Fort St. George, in spite of his heroic parentage and of the *genius loci* slow to appreciate the emergency and its exigencies, and surrounded by a staff traditionally captious and self-willed, unequal to the crisis, well-disposed to find difficulties, but ill-adapted to remove them, ready scribes, but quite unable to cope with such a master of their art as had now taken up the pen against them. And lastly, we discern the calm, sagacious, and practical soldier, fully master of his brother's plans and their expedience, taking in at a glance the whole aspect and special needs of the local situation, working patiently and indefatigably at his post, as mediator and interpreter, while insinuating cautions at head-quarters through the third able member of the family triumvirate, and dreading each moment a premature and fatal explosion on one side or the other. Such a picture, with the grand *tableau* of the fall of Seringapatam as a pendent, takes the sting out of Byron's suppressed line in *Don Juan*—

• 'How many Wellesleys have embarked for Spain;'

and makes the words sound rather as an omen of good fortune.

When Wellington wrote, 'A violent or harsh letter from Fort William would spoil all,' he pointed to a real danger, which must have seemed to him not only serious but very near when, in spite of his exertions and advice, the Governor-General proceeded to animadvert, in a severe and haughty tone, upon more than one proceeding of the subordinate Government. The transmission of Mr. Webbe's memorandum<sup>1</sup>, though written 'for General Harris,' and the official adoption and announcement of its view by that officer and his Council, had already excited his highest indignation, and had been denounced in terms of lofty scorn. But Wellington's good offices, and his own personal intercourse with Mr. Webbe, completely altered the Governor-General's opinion of him: he soon fully recognized his great merits, and, by a curious coincidence, was afterwards again provoked to the uttermost by that valuable public servant's treatment at the hands of the Directors, which he regarded as an attack upon Lord Clive, and a violent side-blow at himself. But to return.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 4-11.

Wellington's judicious suggestion that Lord Mornington should repair to Madras, when the Mysore war became inevitable, produced the best effects. The dangerous activity of pens was exchanged for close and familiar converse. The Governor-General's courteous and delicate magnanimity quickly won over Lord Clive, and he became an enthusiastic sympathiser with Wellesley's policy, and in some sense a confessor on its behalf. The 'little men' followed the example of their chief, and were soon eagerly and usefully engaged in the serious business of preparation for the great enterprise; and Wellington himself, relieved from his diplomatic responsibilities, had leisure to organize the details of the forthcoming campaign.

But Wellesley made proselytes of Lord Clive and Mr. Webbe, and secured henceforth their loyal assistance, only to find his views thwarted, and his hands more effectually tied, by the conduct of the Directors towards the Governor of Fort St. George, and his right-hand man. Lord Clive's grievances are summed up in the following passage :—

'The points on which he and the Court are at issue are the interference of the Court in the appointments to offices under this government, the sending back to India persons sent home for their crimes, and the encouragement given by the Court of Directors to a spirit of controversy and opposition in the Councils' (p. 516).

The two first subjects may be postponed, as they will demand attention in connexion with the Governor-General's own complaint on the same grounds. And as to the third, any one who has the slightest acquaintance with Anglo-Indian History in its earlier days, and who recalls the internecine contests of Hastings and his opponents in the Council, the desperate anarchy that had so long reigned at Madras from a similar cause, and the serious perils, manifold evils, and almost ruinous consequences to our dominion in the country, that had resulted from these constant and scandalous dissensions, will not be slow to condemn the conduct described by Wellington as not only the height of injustice, but as suicidal impolicy on the part of a Governing Body, which could not be ignorant either of the above facts, or of their too obvious moral.

## 2. MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

From a very early period the disposal of Indian patronage had been a problem very difficult of adjustment, and a bone of contention between the several powers which by right, or from the fact of being able to control the Company's destiny, were inclined to assert pretensions to it. In the seventeenth century, royal favourites were fond of intruding their creatures into the service of those who were incorporated

by Royal Charter, and therefore owed their collective existence and their privileges to the royal bounty. Great nobles who patronized the Company, even when they did not condescend to take shares in the annual 'adventures,' naturally expected that their personal recommendations should receive much attention. Thus very undeserving, incapable, and troublesome persons were often foisted into the service, to the great detriment of the Company affairs; and the original job at home was too often followed by scandalous affairs abroad. The blighting influence of this aristocratic Upas tree became at one time so serious, that the Directors protested that they did not want any *gentlemen* in their service; which, if it indicated the proud humility of the *bourgeois* class, was at least as much an expression of jealous concern for their monopoly of appointment, and of disgust at the unbusiness-like and insolent habits of the needy slips of gentility and other dependents of great men, thus illegitimately domiciled in their factories. When, later, it became necessary for the Company to strengthen themselves in Parliament, support was procured, or opposition bought off, not only by the grosser expedient of pecuniary 'gratifications,' but by a similar prostitution of the Company's patronage. As time went on, other irregular and sinister influences were at work in the same direction. Thus, even after Lord Cornwallis had gone out avowedly bent upon reforming and purifying the Civil Service, his high character and known intentions did not prevent the Prince of Wales, Lord Rawdon, and other titled persons from importuning him with applications on behalf of their clients, which he uniformly staved off in a characteristically decisive though courteous tone. But meanwhile the Directors themselves, who at least, even in such a lax age, might have been supposed to have the well-ordering of their establishments at heart, and to have felt the importance of strengthening the hands of their Governor-General, by leaving him as much as possible unfettered in the choice of his instruments, and free to avail himself of his local opportunities of making merit the general ground of promotion, were too often, as individuals, foremost and most persevering in privately recommending unfit persons for special favour. Of this disgraceful fact also Cornwallis's letters afford ample evidence, as well as of the futility of such attempts to induce that upright and sensible ruler to stultify himself. The Wellesley Despatches do not show any symptoms of the repetition of such practices during the period over which they extend. Even the First Gentleman in Europe seems to have hesitated to air his fine moral taste by favouring Wellesley, as he had favoured Cornwallis, with insidious petitions on behalf of his hangers-on, wrapped up in unctuous compliments.

But, if exempt from individual and private importunity, the Governor-General had serious reason to complain of the public interference of the Directors, as a body, with the patronage which he considered an important branch of his prerogative, and indispensable to the maintenance of his full authority, and to the success of his administration. And when, so far from being simply inconsiderate and casual, this interference assumed the aspect of a deliberate attempt to deprive him of a discretionary power, which he could not consent to forego, and even looked too like a studied design of insulting him, and wreaking upon him personal spite; it is more easy to imagine than to describe the loathing which he conceived for 'the cheesemongers of Leadenhall Street,' who had already galled him to the quick by their petty-minded, ungenerous, and arrogant communications in relation to Mr. Henry Wellesley's Oude Commission. That such a man, under such circumstances, should tender his resignation, was to be expected, even if he surmised that he was thereby justifying the calculations, and gratifying the wishes, of his opponents in the Directory. And though to them he assigned other grounds for his resignation, and even consented to retract it, and comply with their grudging and half-enforced request, that he would remain at his post for another year; his long and bitter letter to Mr. Addington<sup>1</sup> very clearly reveals his personal feelings, while it fully establishes his view of the public evil inevitable from the interference of the Directors, or of the Board of Control, with the Governor-General's patronage.

How fully his brother Arthur sympathised with him, both on public and private grounds, is evident from the extracts printed in this volume. Thus the attacks on Lord Clive are treated as levelled against the Governor-General. At the same time Wellington is careful, as usual, not to yield to mere feeling, or to exaggerate the crisis, when the orders for abolishing the College arrive. He deprecates a light abandonment of the determination to remain in India another year, 'on certain conditions.' But when, after the Mahratta War has compelled Wellesley to prolong his stay beyond that time, the prospect of ministerial support also begins to vanish, and the cup of injustice is full; he is equally decided in recommending the Governor-General to seize the first opportunity of notifying his intention of promptly departing, and to act on it as soon as he can. The Chairman's mysteriously curt note<sup>2</sup>, when Wellington, on his return, proposed to 'wait upon the Directors,' was not calculated to improve his opinion of their behaviour to his brothers. And when he reports to the Governor-General his conferences with various states-

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<sup>1</sup> Mr. Martin prefixes the whole letter to his third volume. An extract will be found in the *Wellesley Selections*, pp. 690-694.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 560.

men on Indian subjects, he intimates that 'Bucky' dwelt upon 'the means of revenging the injuries you have received from the Court of Directors;' but adds, 'about which body I suppose you will never think after you will arrive in England.' Though this could not be literally the case, he did not under-estimate Wellesley's magnanimous readiness to abstain from the course which 'Bucky' so disinterestedly and delicately pointed out. But it is pleasant to turn from these mutual animosities, and the attempt, by a third party, to make political capital out of them, and to contemplate the final harmony between the Second Founder of our Eastern Empire and the successors of his suspicious and wrathful employers. Yet even then, in the serenity of his green old age, the touching words in which the 'glorious little man' of other days acknowledged the munificence of the Court, and its emphatic and practical approval of his policy, revealed also how deeply he had felt his previous grievances, though he was not the man to become 'Bucky's' tool in avenging them.

### 3. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The extracts in the text are intended to illustrate Wellington's position and personal feelings at several important crises of his Indian career. He preceded his brother by a short interval both in going out, and in returning to England. And in both cases, this circumstance was very beneficial to the Governor-General. To find, on his arrival, so scrutinizing a student, so impartial a judge, and so clear and systematic an expounder of the characters of men and the state of affairs, animated alike by fraternal affection and public spirit to assist in disentangling and solving the great and pressing problems of the time, was precisely the sort of advantage which Lord Mornington, full of zeal, abstract principles, and ingenious ideas, but destitute of local experience, would most covet, and which completely accorded with his disposition to seek information eagerly from the best sources, and to employ the most efficient instruments; but to decide eventually himself both what should be done, and how it should be carried out. Thus the first extract alone would go far to account for his confident tone from the beginning, and for his masterly grasp not only of the general position, but of details, which is exhibited in the able Minute of August 12, 1798. On the other hand, the Introductory paper, the account of Sir Arthur's interviews with English statesmen on his return (pp. 561—567), and his speech in Parliament on the financial aspects of Marquess Wellesley's administration, are enough to shew how vigorously he exerted himself to allay the storm of disapproval, which had set in at the close of his brother's career, and to prepare the public mind to welcome home the great Proconsul in a spirit more befitting his noble character and patriotic achievements.

What, between these two periods, the soldier had done to promote the success of the statesman, it is the object of this essay to explain, and it is unnecessary here to recapitulate.

But what, meanwhile, had been the soldier's views and feelings about his own situation and professional prospects? This question, which the papers in the text answer pretty fully, is the more interesting, because they shew very clearly that Wellington's early disappointments were apparently, in the ordering of Providence, at least as essential as his early successes to the development and strengthening of a character which should be adequate to the extraordinary demands to be made on its fortitude; a character which was to be the instrument for resisting and undermining the power of Napoleon, so often and so confidently pronounced irresistible, but which was eventually overwhelmed in the tempest foreshadowed by the little cloud that had arisen out of the Western sea. In a word, the *soi-disant* slighted Indian officer is here learning, by bitter but bracing experience, to become the sorely-vexed, but still indefatigable, indomitable, and at last triumphant hero of the Peninsula.

That the Colonel anticipated no special opportunities of promotion from his brother's exaltation, he made very clear at once in the words:—

‘Such are the rules in the disposal of all patronage in this country, that I can't expect to derive any advantage from it which I should not obtain if any other person were Governor-General.’

And his appointment at Seringapatam was not his brother's, but Harris's act. But he did expect fair play; and he was very sensitive about his professional reputation. Thus, while he was no doubt gratified, and perhaps not a little surprised, when the Governor-General selected him for the chief command of the Mauritius and Red Sea expedition; he was intensely mortified when he was subordinated to Baird. Why, he has very fully explained in a letter which shews that, however habitually deferential to authority, he was by no means disposed to brook what he conceived to be unjust and injurious treatment, even from the Governor-General—as *such*; for he adds:—

‘Under any other government, I should certainly have asked, whether any misconduct or incapacity of mine had occasioned my supercession.’

He had formerly (see page 57) complained of Harris's grudging recognition of his services in preparing the equipments for the Mysore War. The appointment at Seringapatam had made handsome amends for any such omission. But having proved his competence for independent command in the campaign against Dhoondiah, and having been entrusted by the Governor-General with what he calls ‘the drudgery’ of arranging the preliminaries of the new expedition, he seems to have feared that, in spite of evidence to the contrary, he was in danger of

being 'ticketed' and shelved as a good organizer, simply; and he no doubt felt the stigma the more keenly, from his consciousness that the secret of his success in the field lay so much (as I have said) in this arduous but unostentatious work, the merit of which was too apt to be overlooked; and he was therefore the less inclined to see its more showy results appropriated by those who had not borne the burden and heat of the long day of preparation. The Governor-General does not appear to have himself answered this severe arraignment. And it may be doubted whether their brother Henry's soothing epistle ministered more than very equivocal and cold comfort by referring to the reputation acquired by the Dhoondiah exploit; inasmuch as it was precisely that which had mainly justified the appointment, and therefore made the sting of the supersession the more unexpected and galling. It is hardly necessary here to enter upon other disagreeable circumstances connected with this subject, which gained too much prominence for a while from Mr. Theodore Hook's injudicious advocacy, in his biography of the gallant and distinguished, but too impetuous Baird. Although illness compelled Wellington to remain in India, personal mortification did not prevent him from contributing an important Memorandum (see pp. 537-541) in aid of the enterprise.

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that Wellington solicited the command in the Dekkan against the confederated Mahratta Chiefs, in case Stuart should not conduct the campaign in person. Although, under the circumstances, this arrangement was appropriate, if not inevitable, it is pleasing to read the cordial and grateful terms in which the successful General acknowledges his obligations to his superior officer, who seems to have been well entitled to them; and whose high character, valuable services, and thoughtful counsels were fully appreciated by the Governor-General.

The Bombay Reply to the congratulatory Address is a model composition of its kind; epitomizing happily the several aspects of the war, dignified and modest, but instinct with the chastened enthusiasm which the occasion could not but arouse even in so staid a breast. The writer seems indeed for the moment, while quite coinciding with the Governor-General's point of view, to have caught also a touch of his style. The subjoined sentence might well have been penned by Marquess Wellesley<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> 'The contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the established discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in the uniform effects of our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of our national reputation in India.'



But while unmixed complacency<sup>1</sup> breathes through this review of the great public transactions on which Wellington's Indian fame has been mainly founded, the writer's mind was ill at ease on his own account; and a fortnight only elapsed before he stated his professional grievance to the Commander-in-Chief in India, and applied for leave to quit the scene of his prolonged activity, and recent glory. To the Governor-General's Military Secretary he opens his mind more unreservedly; and the 'crabbing' of Wellington at this juncture, though, as he intimates (page 566), due to the temporary unpopularity of the administration with which he was so necessarily identified, may console others who, even if (as he says of himself) 'not very ambitious,' are still conscious of merit, and while anxious (as he again says) to 'get forward,' experience the unpleasant sensation of being left out in the cold. But let the full moral of the precedent be noted. Wellington, though very sore at his treatment by the authorities at home, does not throw up in a pet. He will not desert Lake, much less his brother, in their difficulties. He hesitates much before declining to resume his command in the Dekkan; and decides at last on reasonable grounds. And his wish to go home is not only connected with the impaired state of his health, but springs a good deal from the conviction, that he can be more useful in England, and that the time is come, when his presence there is very, desirable on public grounds. He is not going home to sulk, to 'ventilate' his personal grievances, or to live otherwise than for the advancement of the public service. Thus he affords no justification for half-mutinuous manifestos, and sentimental resignations; but shows essentially, even in his most exasperated mood, the same temper as when he patiently endured his supercession in Portugal, and persevered for years in living down, and putting to open and endless shame, by his stupendous exertions and brilliant achievements in Spain, the blind prejudice and determined incredulity which so long dogged his footsteps, only, in the end, to enhance his glory.

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<sup>1</sup> Perhaps there is an exception to this statement in an implied rebuke to the Bombay staff, which is pretty discernible in the expressed hope of future efficiency.

Extract from Colonel Gurwood's

PRÉCIS

OF THE

COMMISSIONS, SERVICES, OFFICIAL COMMANDS,  
AND PUBLIC HONOURS

OF

FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.

|  |                |
|--|----------------|
| Born . . . . .                           | 1 May, 1769    |
| Ensign . . . . .                         | 7 Mar. 1787    |
| Lieutenant . . . . .                     | 25 Dec. 1787   |
| Captain . . . . .                        | 30 June, 1791  |
| Major . . . . .                          | 30 April, 1793 |
| Lieutenant Colonel . . . . .             | 30 Sept. 1793  |
| Colonel . . . . .                        | 3 May, 1796    |
| Major General . . . . .                  | 29 April, 1802 |
| Lieutenant General . . . . .             | 25 April, 1808 |
| General, in Spain and Portugal . . . . . | 31 July, 1811  |
| Field Marshal . . . . .                  | 21 June, 1813  |

1794.

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Embarked at Cork in command of the 33rd regt. to join the Duke of York's army in the Netherlands, and arrived at Ostend . . . . . | June. |
| Re-embarked and proceeded by the Scheldt to Antwerp . . . . .   | July. |

1795.

|  |      |
|--|------|
| As senior officer commanded 3 battalions on the retreat of the army through Holland . . . . .  | Jan. |
| Early in the Spring, on the breaking up of the ice, the army, including the 33rd regt., re-embarked at Bremen for England.                     |      |
| On return to England, embarked in the command of the 33rd regt., on board the fleet commanded by Adm. Christian, for the West Indies . . . . . | Oct. |

## 1796.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| But owing to the heavy equinoctial gales, after being 6 weeks at sea, returned to port . . . . . | 19 Jan.   |
| Destination of the 33rd regt. changed for India . . . . .  | 12 April. |
| Joined the 33rd regt. at the Cape of Good Hope . . . . .   | Sept.     |

## 1797.

|  |      |
|--|------|
| Arrived in Bengal . . . . .  | Feb. |
| Formed part of an expedition to Manilla, but recalled on arrival at Penang . . . . . | Aug. |
| Returned to Calcutta . . . . .   | Nov. |

## 1798.

|   |       |
|---|-------|
| Proceeded on a visit to Madras . . . . .                    | Jan.  |
| Returned to Calcutta . . . . .                              | Mar.  |
| The 33rd regt. placed on the Madras establishment . . . . . | Sept. |

## 1799.

|   |          |
|---|----------|
| Appointed to command the subsidiary force of the Nizam, the 33rd regt. being attached to it . . . . .   | Feb.     |
| Advance of the army on Seringapatam; Col. Wellesley moving on the right flank, attacked and harassed by the enemy . . . . .   | 10 Mar.  |
| Tippoo Sultaun in position at Mallavelly; the attack and defeat of his right flank by the division under Col. Wellesley, and the cavalry under Major Gen. Floyd . . . . .   | 27 Mar.  |
| Arrival of the British army before Seringapatam . . . . .   | 3 April. |
| The army before the west face of that fortress: first attack on the Sultaunpettah Tope, by the 33rd regt. and 2nd Bengal Native regt. under Col. Wellesley . . . . .  | 5 April. |
| Second attack with an increased force, the Scotch Brigade (94th regt.), 2 battalions of Sepoys, and 4 guns . . . . .  | 6 April. |
| Siege of Seringapatam, until . . . . .  | 3 May.   |
| Assault and capture: Col. Wellesley commanding the reserve in the trenches . . . . .  | 4 May.   |
| Col. Wellesley appointed Governor of Seringapatam . . . . .   | 6 May.   |
| A Commission, consisting of Lieut. Gen. Harris, Lieut. Col. Barry Close, Col. the Hon. A. Wellesley, the Hon. H. Wellesley, and Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, appointed by the Governor General for the settlement of the Mysore territories . . . . . | 4 June.  |
| Commission dissolved . . . . .  | 3 July.  |
| Col. Wellesley appointed to the command of Seringapatam and Mysore . . . . .  | 9 July.  |

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Gurwood dates this event—8 July. But the Governor-General says, 'the commission was then dissolved on the 3rd of July.' See *Wellesley Selections*, p. 145.

1800.

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| Col. Wellesley named to command an expedition against Batavia, in conjunction with Adm. Rainier; but declines the service, from the greater importance of his command in Mysore . . . . .                  | May.     |
| The tranquillity of Mysore troubled by Dhoondiah Waugh, a Marhatta freebooter. Col. Wellesley takes the field against him . . . . .  | July.    |
| Defeat and death of Dhoondiah, and end of the warfare . . .  | 10 Sept. |
| Recalled from Mysore to command a force assembling at Trincomalee . . . . .  | Oct.     |
| Appointed to command this force, to be employed at Mauritius, or in the Red sea, in the event of orders from Europe to that effect; or to be ready to act against any hostile attempt upon India . . . . . | 15 Nov.  |

1801.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| A dispatch, overland, received by the Governor General, with orders, dated 6th Oct. 1800, to send 3000 men to Egypt .  | 6 Feb.    |
| The expedition being ready at Trincomalee, the Governor General directed the whole force to proceed to the Red sea; and appointed Gen. Baird to command in chief, and Col. Wellesley to be second in command . . . . . | 11 Feb.   |
| In the mean time Col. Wellesley, having received from the Governors of Bombay and Madras copies of the overland dispatch from Mr. Dundas, sailed from Trincomalee for Bombay in command of the troops . . . . .        | 15 Feb.   |
| Col. Wellesley, on his way to Bombay, informed of the appointment of Major Gen. Baird to the chief command . . .   | 21 Feb.   |
| Prevented, by illness, from proceeding on the expedition to Egypt; Col. Wellesley is ordered to resume his government of Mysore . . . . .  | 28 April. |

1803.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Appointed to command a force assembled at Hurryhur to march into the Marhatta territory . . . . .  | 27 Feb.   |
| Advance from Hurryhur . . . . .  | 9 Mar.    |
| Arrival at Poonah . . . . .  | 20 April. |
| The Peshwah replaced on the musnud . . . . .   | 13 May.   |
| Empowered to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Nizam, the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta States and Chiefs in the Deccan; similar authority being given to Gen. Lake in Hindustan . . . . . | 26 June.  |

|   |          |
|---|----------|
| The Marhatta War commenced . . . . .              | 6 Aug.   |
| Siege and capture of Ahmednuggur . . . . .        | 11 Aug.  |
| Siege and capture of Baroach . . . . .            | 29 Aug.  |
| Battle of Assye . . . . .                         | 23 Sept. |
| Siege and capture of Asseerghur . . . . .         | 21 Oct.  |
| Battle of Argaum . . . . .                        | 29 Nov.  |
| Siege and capture of Gawilghur . . . . .          | 15 Dec.  |
| Treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar . . . . . | 17 Dec.  |
| — with Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . . .              | 30 Dec.  |

## 1804.

|  |                        |
|--|------------------------|
| Surprise of a body of predatory Marhattas, who were routed and destroyed, after an extraordinary forced march, near Munkaiseer . . . . .                 | 5 <sup>1</sup> Feb.    |
| A sword of the value of £1000 voted to Major Gen. Wellesley by the British inhabitants of Calcutta . . . . .   | 21 Feb.                |
| Visited Bombay . . . . .   | } 4 Mar. to<br>16 May. |
| Fêtes and address by the garrison and inhabitants . . . . .  |                        |
| A golden vase voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, by the officers of his division ; afterwards changed to a service of plate, embossed with 'Assye' . . . . . | 26 Feb.                |
| Returned to the army near Poonah . . . . .   | 17 May.                |
| Called to Calcutta to assist in military deliberations . . . . .   | 25 May.                |
| Resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General . . . . .   | 24 June.               |
| Left the army for Seringapatam . . . . .   | 28 June.               |
| Address voted to Major Gen. Wellesley, on his return from the army, by the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .                                  | 6 <sup>2</sup> July.   |
| Received by the Governor General at Calcutta . . . . .   | 12 Aug.                |
| Appointed a Knight Companion of the Bath . . . . .   | 1 Sept.                |
| The civil and military powers vested in him on the 26th June, 1803, and resigned on the 24th June, 1804, renewed by the Governor General . . . . .       | 9 Nov.                 |
| Returned to Seringapatam by Madras . . . . .   | 30 Nov.                |

## 1805.

|   |         |
|---|---------|
| Resigned the political and military powers in the Deccan, and proposes to embark for Europe . . . . . | 24 Feb. |
| Addresses on quitting India :   |         |
| From the Officers of the division lately under his command . . . . .                                  | 27 Feb. |
| Answer . . . . .  | 8 Mar.  |

<sup>1</sup> Gurwood says, 6. But see page 548.

<sup>2</sup> The address is dated—16. See Gurwood's 2nd Edition, Vol. II. p. 1281.

|   |          |
|---|----------|
| From the Officers of the 33rd regt. . . . .   | 28 Feb.  |
| Answer . . . . .  | Mar.     |
| Addresses on quitting India :   |          |
| From the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam . . . . .   | 4 Mar.   |
| Answer . . . . .  | 4 Mar.   |
| Grand entertainment given to him at the Pantheon at Madras,<br>by the civil and military Officers of the Presidency . . . . .   | 5 Mar.   |
| • Appointed Col. Wallace, Major Barclay, and Capt. Bellingham<br>to superintend the prize affairs of the army of the Deccan . . . . .                                   | 6 Mar.   |
| The Thanks of the King and Parliament for his services in the<br>command of the army of the Deccan, communicated in<br>General Orders by the Governor General . . . . . | 8 Mar.   |
| Embarks in H. M. S. Trident for England . . . . .   | Mar.     |
| Landed at Deal . . . . .  | 11 Sept. |
| Appointed to command a brigade in an expedition to Hanover,<br>under Lord Cathcart . . . . .  | Nov.     |

1806.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Appointed Col. of the 33rd regt. <i>vice</i> Marquis Cornwallis, de-<br>ceased . . . . .                                     | 30 Jan.   |
| On the return of the expedition from Hanover, appointed to<br>command a brigade of infantry in the Sussex district . . . . . | Feb.      |
| Returned to serve in the Imperial Parliament for the town and<br>port of Rye . . . . .                                       | 12 April. |



# SYNOPSIS.

• Where a document is inserted entire, an asterisk is prefixed. The first edition of the Despatches published by Colonel Gurwood is denoted by G<sup>1</sup>. A reprint of the earlier volumes only, with additions and the papers differently arranged, was called not second, but new Edition. This re-issue is here quoted as G<sup>1a</sup>; and Colonel Gurwood's complete and so-called second edition as G<sup>2</sup>. The Supplementary Despatches, edited by his Grace, the present Duke of Wellington, are cited as S. D. The series, still in course of publication by the same Editor, in continuation of the Supplementary Despatches, is referred to as S. D. C. The Roman numerals denote the volume; the Arabic, the page.

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[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 99-100. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 537. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 425.]

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[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 148-149. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 605-606. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 474-475.]

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[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 218. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 241-242. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1158.]

## V. MAHRATTAS.

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- 109. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer . . . . .** 201

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**\*115. Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from Goklah, to Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley . 215**

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## 2. FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY TO THE RUPTURE WITH THE CONFEDERATES.

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118. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 217

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Partial and hesitating co-operation of the South Mahratta Jaghiredars. They distrust, hate, and fear the Peshwah, and are jealous of our alliance with him. But they look to, and help, us. Their conduct will depend on the Peshwah's.

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Why the alleged confederacy should be promptly dealt with, by requiring Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda; and why, if he does so, our army should be broken up.

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Diplomatic precautions to prevent the burning of Poonah.

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- \*121. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 221

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- \*122. To the Governor-General . . . . . 223

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Forced march to Poonah. Unresisted occupation of the city. Military advantages of the position. The step justifiable on the

ground of the imminence, in any case, of a Mahratta contest. The Governor-General should not be anxious about the criticism of 'little minds.' [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 142-144. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 506-509. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 404-406.]

**123. To Colonel Stevenson . . . . . Page 225**

*Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.*

- The Confederacy probably not concluded; but reported in order to alarm the Nizam. The Resident with him should not encourage such reports. [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 82. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 511-512. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 407-408.]

**\*124. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 226**

*Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.*

- The Peshwah's Sirdars hold off; and he does not seem to favour the Jaghiredars, whom our influence has attracted. [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 83. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 512-513. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 408.]

**\*125. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 227**

*Camp at Panowvallah, 10 m. from Poonah, 27th April, 1803.*

Improbability of the Confederacy. Holkar not likely to become Scindiah's tool. The Mahratta Chiefs aware of our power and resolution. They have not threatened British agents, only their native servants, and the Nizam's Court.

- [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 88-89. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 520-522. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 414-415.]

**126. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 228**

*Camp at Panowvallah, 3rd May, 1803.*

Proposed military movements in case of Scindiah's advance to Poonah, or junction with Holkar, and attack on the Nizam's country. His approach would probably lose us the support of the Southern Jaghiredars. [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 150-151. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 532-536. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 424.]

**127. To Major Kirkpatrick . . . . . 229**

*Camp, 3rd May, 1803.*

- Our advanced military position may avert war. To abandon it, and our engagements with the Peshwah, would be dangerous both to us and to the Nizam. [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 155. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 541. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 428.]

**128. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 230**

*Camp, 9th May, 1803.*

Inherent weakness of the Confederacy. Our best means of dissolving it. Circumstances favourable for Colonel Collins' negotiation with Scindiah. [S. D. IV. 73-74.]



**\*129. To the Governor-General . . . . . Page 231**

*Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.*

Danger of Scindiah's marching to Poonah. Colonel Collins does not see this. Desirableness of one decisive local authority, under the Governor-General's instructions.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 114-115. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 557-558. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 438.]

**\*130. To Lord Hobart, Secretary of State . . . . . 232**

*Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.*

Retrospect of measures for the restoration of the Peshwah. Military dispositions for the defence of the Nizam's and the Company's territories, and of Mysore. The Peshwah's government settling fast: he appears decided to abide by the Treaty. Without it, a Mahratta war must have occurred, which it may prevent.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 115-119. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 560-564. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 438-441.]

**131. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 236**

*Camp, 10th May, 1803.*

Colonel Collins' withdrawal from Scindiah's camp premature and mischievous.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 156-157. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 558. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 441.]

**132. To the Hon. H. Wellesley . . . . . 236**

*Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.*

Holkar apologises for his conduct at Aurungabad. Scindiah's inconsistency. Proposed remonstrance with him, and march into the Nizam's country. The Peshwah seems true to the alliance.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 123-124. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 572-574. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 448-449.]

**\*133. To the Governor-General . . . . . 238**

*Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.*

Failure of the Peshwah to perform his engagements to secure the Southern Jaghiredars. Their consequent absence from General Wellesley's army. Mischief of delay. General Wellesley thinks the Peshwah incapable only, not treacherous. The importance of promptly compelling Scindiah to take a decided line—increased by the news of peace in Europe. Need of special powers from the Governor-General insisted on.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 155-157. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 614-616. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 481-483.]

**\*134. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 240**

*Camp near Charowly, 4th June, 1803.*

Scindiah's language would justify immediate war. Yet he will probably yield at last. Still, both local circumstances and the prospect of renewed war with France require that he should be brought to a prompt decision.

[S. D. IV. 105.]

**135. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . Page 241**

*Camp, 8th June, 1803.*

Stubborn facts, which impugn the Peshwah's sincerity in the alliance. Ought we not to withdraw from it, and negotiate with the Confederates on a different basis?

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 166-167. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 628-629. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 491.]

**\*136. To Major Malcolm . . . . . 242**

*Camp at Rooie, 20th June, 1803.*

Doubtful policy of the Treaty. Want of independent authority in the Peshwah. Bad tendency of subsidiary alliances, in weakening the governments subject to them. Effect of the Treaty in case of war with the French—the crucial test. It gives us a good military position; but may overbalance this by uniting the Mahratta Chiefs against us. War with France will involve war with the Mahrattas. Yet they could not efficiently unite with the French. Proposed modification of our alliance with the Peshwah. His dislike of us, and unsteadiness to it. Scindiah's hostile attitude really due to him.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 189-192. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 20-23. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 513-515.]

**137. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 245**

*Camp, 23rd June, 1803.*

Holkar's conduct will probably determine that of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Hence, the impolicy of threatening him with war on our part. General Wellesley's want of grain and transport. The Peshwah's faithlessness to the alliance, and his failure to provide transport bullocks. Political and military moral of the situation.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 197-201. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 33-36. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 521-523.]

**138. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 247**

*Camp, 24th June, 1803.*

Want of communication with Holkar; and of singleness and unity of authority in the conduct of the negotiation.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 193-194. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 38. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 525.]

**139. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 248**

*Camp, 25th June, 1803.*

The Governor-General's instructions no longer meet the actual case. The Peshwah's misconduct alters our whole position. Hence, we ought to alter our line, and retrace our steps. The Governor-General should go to Bombay.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 202-203. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 41-43. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 527-528.]

**140. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . Page 249***Camp, 29th June, 1803.*

War to be avoided, if possible. The Mahratta Chiefs jealous of us, but also of each other; and more afraid of us than of each other. Profit and loss to them from the Treaty of Bassein. Why they affect to be united, while they are probably not, nor will be. We ought to avert war by acting on their fears, and lessening their hopes of gaining by it. Course suggested to accomplish this. [S. D. IV. 123-127.]

**141. To the Governor-General . . . . . 253***Camp at Peeplgaum, 8th July, 1803.*

Time lost through Col. Collins' mistaken belief in peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and the Peshwah's plausible inactivity. 'General Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations.'

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 221-222. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 74-76. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 544-545.]**142. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 254***Camp at Baungaum, 10th July, 1803.*

War with Holkar to be avoided, if possible. Goklah restless and dissatisfied. [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 223. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 77-78. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 547.]

**\*143. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 255***Camp, 11th July, 1803.*

Intimation of his intention to countermarch the British army when the Confederates withdraw theirs. [S. D. IV. 136.]

**\*144. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 256***Camp, 14th July, 1803.*

The language of the Confederates inconsistent with itself and with their conduct. The latter hostile. They are finessing to gain time, and to secure Holkar, and a better season for war. They must at once be brought to the test of action—must retire, or have war.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 218-220. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 82-83. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 549-551.]**\*145. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 258***Camp, 14th July, 1803.*

The Peshwah sends only a fraction of his stipulated contingent; provides no adequate means for paying this; and diverts it from the general objects of the armament. Explicit remonstrances to be addressed to his ministers.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 220-222. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 86-88. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 552-554.]

- \*146. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah . . . . . Page 260  
*Camp, 14th July, 1803.*

You have pledged your word for peace. Yet you have threatened war, both in word and deed. This has required counter precautions. You must be the first to withdraw—then I shall. Otherwise, I shall attack you. Your condition—that we shall respect Treaties—is otiose.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 222-224. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 88-90. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 554-555.]

- \*147. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar . . . . . 262  
*Camp, 16th July, 1803.*

Your interests are secured by the Treaty of Bassein, of which I send you a copy. Hence, I have little doubt that you will remain at peace with the Company, which is your best course.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 225. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 94-95. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 558.]

148. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close . . . . . 263  
*Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.*

Why no day named for Scindiah's countermarch.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 227-228. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 98. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 560-561.]

- \*149. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 263  
*Camp, 17th July, 1803.*

Scindiah may send a news-writer, if he retires—not otherwise. Why no day fixed for his retiring.  
 [S. D. IV. 139-140.]

150. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins . . . . . 264  
*Camp, 18th July, 1803.*

Instructions to insist on the immediate countermarch of the Confederates, as an ultimatum; and to leave Scindiah's camp unless they comply. Information to be obtained about their forces.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 228-230. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 99-101. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 561-562.]

- \*151. To the Governor-General . . . . . 266  
*Camp at Sangwee, 24th July, 1803.*

Report of proceedings relating to the Confederates. Advantage in case they comply with our ultimatum. The weakness of the Peshwah's government, the state of the country, and the wavering disposition of the chiefs—our great difficulties. The state of the Guickwar's government, and the Nizam's failing health, also inconvenient. An European war cannot shake our strength in India. Success in the war not doubtful. The difficulty of reconciling the Peshwah to Amrut Rao. Intercourse with Holkar.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 237-244. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 120-126. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 572-576.]

- 152. To Colonel Collins** . . . . . Page 272

*Roorie, on the Scenah, 31st July, 1803.*

Excuses of the Confederates for not retiring, futile, and justify our course. Unless they withdraw, if still in their camp, leave it at once.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 262-263. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 149-151. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 600-601.]

- 153. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close** . . . . . 273

*Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug., 1803.*

Underhand dealings of the Peshwah with the Confederates, and insidious advice of his ministers to Col. Collins. The drift of the Peshwah's negotiations to be ascertained by remonstrance, or by paying his ministers for the information. This may enable us to settle the Poonah government on a better footing.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 253-254. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 160-161. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 603.]

- \*154. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close** . . . . . 274

*Camp, 5th Aug., 1803.*

The same subject. Answer to objections against buying the secrets of the Peshwah's durbar from his ministers. Our relations to him and to the Nizam contrasted. Necessity of doing in the former case what would be inappropriate in the latter.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 257-260. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 175-178. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 614-616.]

- \*155. To Ramchunder Pursheram** . . . . . 277

*3rd Aug., 1803.*

An earnest remonstrance against defection.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 255-256. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 174. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 613.]

- \*156. MEMORANDUM** . . . . . 278

*6th Aug., 1803.*

Resort to war vindicated by a retrospect of the negotiations with the Confederates, from the Treaty of Bassein to the rupture.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 289-292. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 181-183. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 618-619.]

- \*157. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah** . . . . . 280

*6th Aug., 1803.*

Declaration of War.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 287-288. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 178-179. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 616-617.]

### 3. THE WAR WITH SCINDIAH AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR.

- 158. To Colonel Stevenson** . . . . . 281

*Camp, 18th July, 1803.*

Instructions to check the advance of the Confederates, until General Wellesley can co-operate.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 232-233. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 103. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 563-564.]

- 159. To General Lake** . . . . . Page 282  
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[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1041.]

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- \*219. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . Page 383  
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[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 239-241. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 268-269. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1175-1176.]

**225. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley . . . . . Page 395***Bombay, 13th May, 1804.*

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**226. Translation of a Mahratta letter from Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 9th Suffun, answering to the 20th May, 1804 . . . . . 398**

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**227. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. . . . . 399***Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.*

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**228. To Colonel Close . . . . . 399***Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804.*

Hurry Pursheram seeks reconciliation with the Peshwah, through the influence of the British Government. Gen. Wellesley's advice to him, and to the Resident at Poonah, on the general question of the Southern Chiefs.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 319-322. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 385-388. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1255-1257.]**229. To E. Strachey, Esq. . . . . 401***Camp at Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804.*

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[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 324-329. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 397-402. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1266-1270.]**230. To Major Shawe . . . . . 404***Seringapatam, 14th Dec., 1804.*

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- 231. To Colonel Close . . . . .** Page 406

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Scindiah most blameable for not punishing those concerned in the attack on Mr. Jenkins. He is probably overawed by Ghautky. Neither probably desires war with the Company, or they would have acted sooner. Difficulty of interposing to save Mr. Jenkins, and yet avoid war. To write a letter, and advance a corps near to Scindiah's army,—the safest and most pacific plan. Alternative courses likely to be adopted by Scindiah. How far each is compatible with peace.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 596-600. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 665-669. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1441-1444.]

- 232. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick . . . . .** 410

*Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.*

Choute a regular branch of revenue, and a vested interest. Its varied and intricate arrangement in the Nizam's territories. Owned by him and his aliences;—rarely by the Peshwah.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 602-603. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 672-673. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1445-1446.]

- \*233. To Major Shawe . . . . .** 411

*Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.*

War with Scindiah to be carefully avoided now. We are in no condition for it. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 605. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 674-675. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1447.]

- \*234. To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm . . . . .** 412

*Hastings, 31st July, 1806.*

Sentiments on the final arrangements with Scindiah and Holkar. Strong feeling in England in favour of peace, at any price.

[G.<sup>2</sup> III. 2-3. S. D. IV. 586-587.]

## 5. WAR WITH HOLKAR.

- 235. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . .** 414

*Seringapatam, 27th Nov., 1802.*

The object of the campaign is to bring Holkar to a general action, as soon as possible. This he will avoid as long as he can. His advantages over us in this respect. We cannot choose the seat of war; he can. Thus we must keep up our communications with our own country, to ensure supplies. Hence we should obtain the alliance and co-operation of the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India. Answer to political objections against such alliances. Military advantages of the connexion.

[S. D. III. 432-436.]



- 236. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.** . . . . Page 418

*Camp, 22nd June, 1803.*

Expediency of direct—inexpediency of indirect—communications with Holkar. [S. D. IV. 119-120.]

- \*237. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins** . . . . 419

*Camp, 16th July, 1803.*

General Wellesley has written to Holkar, with a copy of the Treaty. [S. D. IV. 138-139.]

- 238. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley** . . . 419

*Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.*

A contest with Holkar not to be precipitated. [S. D. IV. 337-338.]

- 239. To Colonel Montresor** . . . . . 420

*Bombay, 26th March, 1804.*

War with Holkar probably avoidable : if not, he ought to be promptly suppressed. [S. D. IV. 363-364.]

- \*240. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.\*** . . . . . 420

*Bombay, 20th April, 1804.*

General Lake ought to dash at Holkar at once; or postpone hostilities until he is strong enough to do so. [S. D. IV. 373-374.]

- 241. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.** . . . . . 421

*Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.*

Why the English government ought not to support Cashee Rao Holkar. [S. D. IV. 376.]

- 242. To Colonel Murray** . . . . . 421

*Bombay, 30th April, 1804.*

Murray to march quickly into Malwa, when the war with Holkar begins. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 222. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 247. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1161.]

- 243. To Colonel Murray** . . . . . 422

*Bombay, 7th May, 1804.*

Instructions for the conduct of the war with Holkar.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 232-234. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 257-259. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1168-1170.]

- \*244. To General Lake** . . . . . 423

*27th May, 1804.*

Rapid and continuous pursuit, with corps capable of sustaining an action, the best mode of dispersing such an army as Holkar's.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 536-537. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 316-317. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1200-1201. S. D. IV. 97-98.]

245. To Colonel Murray . . . . . Page 424

*Camp at Niggerce, 28th June, 1804.*

Murray's force adequate to its requirements. Mischiefs of innuendos that it is not. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 318-319. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 381. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1252-1253.]

246. To Major Malcolm . . . . . 425

*Barrackpoor, 24th Aug., 1804.*

Peril involved in the prolongation of the war. Murray and Monson both afraid of Holkar; and each justifies his retreat by that of the other. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 371-372. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 443-444. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1297.]

247. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace . . . . . 426

*Fort William, 12th Sept., 1804.*

Narrative of Monson's retreat. Rationale of his disasters. Lessons from his campaign.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 384-390. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 456-463. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1306-1311.]

248. To Colonel Murray . . . . . 432

*Fort William, 14th Sept., 1804.*

Advice on the conduct of the war with Holkar.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 392-394. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 464-466. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1312-1313.]

249. To Colonel Agnew . . . . . 434

*Seringapatam, 13th Jan., 1805.*

Dangerous impression produced on the native mind by Monson's retreat. [S. D. IV. 480.]

250. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. . . . . 434

*Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.*

Navigable rivers the only natural barrier against Mahrattas. Alliances with petty Rajahs unprofitable. [S. D. IV. 481-482.]

251. To Colonel Malcolm . . . . . 435

*St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.*

Assaults on Bhurtpoor mismanaged, and of dangerous consequence. [G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1457. S. D. IV. 511.]

## VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

### 1. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

252. To Lord Clive . . . . . Page 436.

*Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.*

Alteration of the military system in the Company's territories desirable. There must be an active field force; and as few garrisons as possible. [G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 156-157. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 123-124.]

253. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. . . . . 437

*Seringapalam, 22nd March, 1802.*

Peace in Europe no good ground for reduction of the army in India. How it may best be reduced. [S. D. III. 119-120.]

254. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 439

*3rd July, 1804.*

Distribution of the military establishment required for the pacification and defence of the Madras Presidency. The conquest of foreign enemies does not alone enable us to reduce our armies. The increasing influence of the civil government may do so; and make a field force less necessary than I once thought it.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 565-571. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 390-395. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1259-1263.]

- \* 255. To Lord W. Bentinck . . . . . 444

*Fort William, 29th Aug., 1804.*

Necessity of adding five regiments to the Madras army. Their pay has already been provided.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 372-374. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 444-446. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1298-1299.]

- \* 256. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military establishments of India . . . . . 445

*Fort William, Nov., 1804.*

Arbitrary and inadequate provision of the Court of Directors for the military requirements of Madras and Bombay. Rapid and large expansion of those requirements since; coincidently with, and in consequence of, the acquisition of territorial and pecuniary resources for the support of the additional troops.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 448-452. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 522-526. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1345-1348.]

- \*257. **Memorandum on the plan proposed of an interchange of Native troops of India and the Negro Corps of the West Indies. 1805** . . . . . Page 449

The plan involves replacing English soldiers in India by negroes. The high qualities of the former are unique, and the foundation of our power in India. Negroes will possess no such peculiar combination of remarkable qualities; and will be a source of weakness and danger. They might with less disadvantage be sent to Ceylon. Considering their inferiority, they will be more costly than European troops. The plan also contemplates sepoy replacing, in the West Indies, European as well as negro troops. Considering the general character of the defensive service required there, only a third of the Europeans could thus be replaced; and that would require twice the number of sepoys. As light troops, for offensive operations, against savages, &c., sepoys are quite unsuitable. Nor will the climate agree with them. They can only be sent as volunteers. And few will volunteer for such service. The difficulties and expense connected with their peculiar food, their attendance, and the allowances of their European officers, make the plan, on a large scale, impracticable. And it would check future recruiting in India. The King's officers might recruit in Chittagong, for partial service, as in Jamaica; but not without a tendency to increase the cost of native troops. A better plan would be, to raise Malay corps. On the whole, negroes would not suit India, nor sepoys efficiently defend the West Indies. The certain difficulties and cost overbalance the too hastily assumed advantages of both parts of the plan; and make the second, on a large scale, impossible. The previous objections also apply to sending sepoys to the Cape; but negroes might be sent thither. [G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1468-1473. S. D. IV. 520-532.]

## 2. SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE SYSTEM; AND THE ARMIES OF NATIVE STATES.

258. **To Major Munro** . . . . . 462  
*Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug., 1800.*

Scindiah's overweening influence at Poonah threatens our tranquillity. Perils attending the extension of our own power and influence. [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 65-66. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 209-210. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 169-170.]

259. **To Major Shawe** . . . . . 463  
*Camp, 14th Jan., 1804.*

The good and the evil of subsidiary alliances; and the necessity of modifying them according to special circumstances.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 36-37. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 667-668. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 969-970.]

- 260. To Major Shawe** . . . . . Page 465

*Camp, 26th Feb., 1804.*

The subsidiary alliances, on their present footing, are inadequate to secure the tranquillity of the Native States, or, ultimately, of the Company's territories. We are threatened with a vast development of the free-booting system, which our great and rapid expansion tends to promote. The appropriate remedy is to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency. This will not make them dangerous to us, but the reverse. The freebooters would be powerful instruments in their hands against us.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 126-131. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 99-103. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1066-1069.]

- \* 261. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Freebooter system in India** . . . . . 469

*Fort William, 2nd Nov., 1804.*

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 446-448. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 520-522. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1344-1345.]

- 262. To Major Shawe** . . . . . 471

*Seringapatam, 27th Dec., 1804.*

Vital importance of compelling our allies to maintain an adequate force for the suppression of rebels and plunderers. They are too weak to be made responsible for the misdeeds of their lawless subjects. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 509-510. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 583-584. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1384-1385.]

- 263. To Colonel Close** . . . . . 472

*Seringapatam, 27th Dec., 1804.*

The same subject. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 512. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 585. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1385-1386.]

### 3. NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

- \* 264. Memorandum on the Defences of Oude** . . . . . 472  
[1798.]

[Forwarded to the Governor-General.]

Advantages of small fortified posts, especially against cavalry. Sir J. Craig to be consulted on the defence of the N. W. Frontier. Depôts to be formed at Allahabad and Futtyghur; and carriage bullocks systematically provided. The Nabob of Oude to regulate or diminish his force: new regiments to be raised. Suggestions on a plan of operations for the defensive army. [S D. I. 82-83.]

- 265. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley** . . . . . Page 474  
*Fort St. George, 10th Nov., 1798.*

The line of the Jumna probably preferable for the defence of the North-West frontier. A corps de réserve to be formed near Chunar.

[S. D. I. 128-129.]

- \* **266. Memorandum on Oude** . . . . . 475  
*(Undated.)*

The control of Oude naturally coveted by the rulers of Bengal and Bahar, for defensive purposes. Character and ulterior tendency of the connexion of the Company with the Nabob. Inevitable depression of the native State, and interference of our Government with its internal economy.

[S. D. II. 615-617.]

- \* **267. To the Right Hon. H. Dundas** . . . . . 477  
*Dublin Castle, 20th April, 1808.*

Plan for defending India against a Franco-Russian invasion. The enemy should be met on the Indus, though that is a weak barrier. The main British army to be stationed on the Ganges and Jumna, and near Delhi: supplies to be collected gradually: native light troops engaged to join when wanted. A strong corps to cover Delhi and the cantonments; and to act promptly on the enemy's advance, supported by the main army. Position of reserves and subsidiary forces. A flotilla useless. The pirates to be encouraged to defend the Lower Indus.

[G.<sup>2</sup> III. 13-15. S. D. IV. 592-601.]

#### 4. MISCELLANEOUS.

- 268. To the Earl of Mornington** . . . . . 480  
*Fort William, 12th July, 1797.*

The retention of Mauritius by the French dangerous to our Indian Empire. Tippoo's alleged military preparations—a constant bugbear at Madras. Zemaun Shah's expected movements, and probable designs.

[S. D. I. 13-15.]

- 269. To Sir Ralph Abercromby** . . . . . 482  
*Bombay, 6th April, 1801.*

Prospect of success in the Red Sea Expedition. [S. D. II. 349.]

- 270. To Lieutenant-General Stuart** . . . . . 483  
*Seringapatam, 9th July, 1802.*

The Bombay pioneer corps to be maintained, for service in Malabar.

[S. D. III. 221.]

- 271. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.** . . . . Page 483  
*Camp, 11th June, 1803.*

Relations of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief. Desirableness of magnifying his office, in order to obviate the defects, and promote the efficiency, of the army. [S. D. IV. 112-113.]

- 272. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay** . . . 485,  
*Camp, 5th Nov., 1803.*

We should not exact tribute from wild tribes; and can do so only to the injury of our military reputation.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 487-488. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 474-475. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 833-834.]

- 273. To Major Malcolm** . . . . . 486  
*Bombay, 9th April, 1804.*

Impolicy of over-weakening Scindiah, and of raising small powers to independence.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 509-510. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 211-212. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1138.]

## VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE.

- 274. Memorandum on Pulo Penang** . . . . . 487  
*[1797.]*

The Company trade at a loss, except with China. This results from their political character and obligations. Objects subserved by their Indian trade. They have almost an European monopoly of the China trade. [S. D. I. 29-30.]

- \*275. Memorandum on Bengal** . . . . . 488  
*[1797-8.]*

The agriculture of Bengal is not more heavily taxed by the British, than by previous native rulers; and is more encouraged by the Permanent Settlement. Sanitary and political objections against permitting Europeans to colonize, and purchase, land. Agriculture might be fostered by markets, and improved communications by land and water. Bengal has free trade with India and the Eastern seas. The Company, though monopolists of the more valuable home traffic, trade at a loss. The cost of freight is almost prohibitive of private trade with England, (in spite of the recent regulation). This private trade, therefore, goes mostly to the foreigner. Bengal loses the English market: but England suffers equally. The price of freight should be lowered. This will probably destroy the Company's commerce: but that would be no great evil. The salt and opium monopolies produce a surplus, which is drawn away in trade. But this is better for Bengal, than if it were

dissipated on the Zemindars, as, if remitted, it probably would be. England is entitled to levy a tribute on Bengal; and to protect West Indian sugars, at the expense of East Indian. The vested interests of West India proprietors should be considered. The political importance of those Islands, and their superior facilities as a school for seamen. Other Indian articles saddled with heavy duties to promote the general diffusion of English trade, and prevent our depending too much on so distant a market as the East. General conclusions.

[S. D. I. 34-49.]

- \*276. **On Dearth in India** . . . . . Page 503  
[1805.]

Occasion of the discussion. Personal experience of the calamity which suggested it. The discussion falls under three heads. 1. Different modes of cultivation; and effect upon them of deficient rainfall. Area watered by the two monsoons respectively. Speaking generally, the natives avail themselves of one monsoon only, in each place. The cultivation is either of wet or of dry lands; the former mostly producing rice. Rice lands are watered by either (1) rain, (2) canals from rivers, (3) tanks filled directly by rain, or by canals supplied from monsoon floods, or (4) by wells, filled by rain. How these methods of irrigation are carried out; and their comparative dependence upon the monsoons. Limited extent of the rice-producing country. The dry lands are watered by the western rains. The produce throughout, of both kinds of lands, ultimately depends mainly on the timely arrival and extent of the periodical rains. To improve the cultivation of either kind of lands, so as to supersede this dependence, seems not very feasible.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1463-1467. S. D. IV. 514-520.]

## VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY.

### 1. LORD CLIVE.

277. **To the Earl of Mornington** . . . . . 510

*Fort St. George, 15th Sept., 1798.*

Colonel Wellesley explains the Governor-General's policy and proposed measures. Lord Clive's character and bearing.

[S. D. I. 86-88.]

278. **To the Hon. Henry Wellesley** . . . . . 512

*Fort St. George, 19th Oct., 1798.*

Lord Clive's disposition. The Governor-General should treat him with forbearance and confidence.

[S. D. I. 109.]



- 279. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley . . . . .** Page 512  
*Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1798.*

Lord Clive is only unfamiliar with official routine, not hostile to the Governor-General. A private letter from Lord Mornington would set him right. [S. D. I. 134.]

- \*280. To Josiah Webbe, Esq. . . . .** 513  
*Seringapatam, 21st Oct., 1801.*

Corrupt and mischievous interference of the Directors in the patronage of the Madras Government. [S. D. II. 586-587.]

- 281. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. . . . .** 515  
*Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1801.*

The same subject. [S. D. II. 612-613.]

- 282. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. . . . .** 516  
*Seringapatam, 4th June, 1802.*

The same subject. Members of Council incited to oppose their Governors. [S. D. III. 191-192.]

## 2. MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

- 283. To Major Malcolm . . . . .** 517  
*Seringapatam, 20th April, 1802.*

The Madras permanent settlement well carried out by Malcolm. Corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall Street in the operations of Lord Wellesley's government, incompatible with his retention of office; and ruinous in tendency to British power in India.  
 [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 284-285. S. D. III. 150-151.]

- \*284. To Major Malcolm . . . . .** 518  
*Seringapatam, 12th July, 1802.*

Lord Wellesley justified in suspending the execution of the Court's orders for abolishing the College. The question of his resignation not affected by those orders. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 288-289. S. D. III. 226-230.]

- 285. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . . . . .** 519  
*Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.*

The Ministers have broken faith with, and are not prepared to support, you; nor are they properly alive to the value of your services. You are in danger of being dismissed; which would be a great evil on

public grounds, as well as injurious to your character. You should therefore fix, and announce to the Directors, the earliest convenient time for your departure, i.e. the 1st of October. Were the war not at an end, I should have recommended an earlier time. For you could not then have wound up affairs, as you may now do by October.

[S. D. IV. 334-336.]

286. To Colonel Malcolm . . . . . Page 523

*St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.*

Is not the appointment of Lord Cornwallis intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley?

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1456-1457. S. D. IV. 510.]

### 3. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

287. To the Earl of Mornington . . . . . 524

*Fort William, 27th July, 1797.*

Relations of Colonel Wellesley\* to the Governor-General.

[S. D. I. 18.]

- \*288. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley . . . 524

*Bombay, 16th April, 1801.*

The circumstances connected with Colonel Wellesley's supersession contribute to make that step an injustice, and a slur on his military character.

[S. D. II. 362-365.]

289. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 527

*Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.*

Desire to serve under General Stuart in the Mahratta War; or to command, if General Stuart does not take the field.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 22. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 413. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 338.]

- \*290. Reply of Major-General Wellesley to the Address of the British Inhabitants of Bombay . . . . . 527

*[March, 1804.]*

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 164-165. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 146-148. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1096-1097.]

291. To Lieutenant-General Stuart . . . . . 529

*Bombay, 7th April, 1804.*

Testimony to Lieutenant-General Stuart's merits, as Sir Arthur's (Presidential) Commander-in-Chief.

[G.<sup>1</sup> III. 506. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 206. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1134.]

- \*292. To Lieutenant-General Lake . . . . . Page 529  
*Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.*

Equivocal treatment at Head Quarters; and application for leave to go home. [G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1153-1154. S. D. IV. 376-377.]

- \*293. To Major Shawe . . . . . 531  
*Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.*

Additional reasons for wishing to return to England, subject to the Governor-General's pleasure, and need of his services.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 292-294. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 339-340. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1219-1220.]

294. To Major Shawe . . . . . 532  
*Seringapatam, 4th Jan., 1805.*

Public reasons do not require his remaining in India. On private grounds he wishes to go home. His treatment by the Directors, in spite of unique services, and by the King's Ministers, is discouraging. The public interest claims his presence in England.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 519-521. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 592-594. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1390-1391.]

## APPENDIX.

### I. GENERAL.

295. To the Earl of Mornington . . . . . 535  
*Fort William, 12th July, 1797.*

Severe estimate of native character. Two circumstances which tend to degrade it. [S. D. I. 16-17.]

296. Transmitted to the Governor-General . . . . . 536  
*18th July, 1798.*

Grain depôts for the army in the Baramahal should be placed near the frontier. [S. D. I. 65-66.]

297. To Major-General Baird . . . . . 536  
*Bombay, 9th April, 1801.*

Personal explanation to General Baird, à propos of the Red Sea Expedition. [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 89\*-90. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 313. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 246.]

**\*298. Memorandum on the operations in the Red Sea . Page 537**

[Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major-Gen. Baird.]

Proposed objects of the expedition. Cosseir should be gained. Morad Bey, apparently, the head of the Mamelukes, and formerly reputed to have been friendly to us. He has made peace with the French, who have ceded to him Upper Egypt. But neither party trusts the other; and Sir R. Abercromby's operations will leave him free to consult his own interest. He will probably be induced to join us for the expulsion of his present allies. This he ought to be promptly urged to do, by a full explanation of their critical position, and by an offer of arms, ammunition, and an auxiliary force. Our possession of Cosseir will tell strongly to the same effect. Neither the expeditionary force, nor a detachment of it, ought to cross the Desert (though that, however difficult, is feasible) unless assured of being joined by a body of natives at the Nile. For otherwise, the army will starve, as efficient means of transport for adequate supplies cannot be provided. And to cross the Desert without them will only expose our weakness, and incline the natives to side with the enemy. Arrangements recommended, in case the Mamelukes are heartily with us. The French may annoy us in the passage of the Desert. Arms, &c., should be promised, not given, till native co-operation is certain; then furnished liberally.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. \*90-95\*. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 314-319. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 246-250.]**299. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley . . . . . 541***Seringapatam, 26th May, 1801.*

Prosperity of Anglo-Hindoo Mysore. [S. D. II. 410-411.]

**300. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley . . . . . 542***Seringapatam, 8th July, 1801.*

A receipt for health in India. Good temper rare there.

[S. D. II. 501.]

**301. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq. . . . . 542***Seringapatam, 24th Aug., 1801.*

Projected abolition of the Government of Bombay.

[S. D. II. 553-554.]

**\*302. To His Highness the Nizam . . . . . 543***21st Sept., 1802.*Courtly letter to the Nizam. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 293-294. S. D. III. 309-310.]

- \*303. To ——— . . . . .** Page 544  
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 [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 328. S. D. III. 547-548.]
- 304. To the Governor-General . . . . .** 545  
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- 305. To Colonel Murray . . . . .** 545  
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 [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 443-444. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 411. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 781.]
- 306. To the Governor-General . . . . .** 546  
*Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec., 1803.*  
 Mr. Elphinstone's experience, acquirements, and services.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> I. 561. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 595. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 919.]
- \*307. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar . . . . .** 546  
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 Pacificatory letter after the conquest of the Confederates.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 411. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 625. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 940-941.]
- 308. To Marquess Wellesley . . . . .** 547  
*Camp, 21st Jan., 1804.*  
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 [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 62. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 700-701. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 992.]
- \*309. To the Governor-General . . . . .** 547  
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 Forced march, and summary chastisement of marauders.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 97-99. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 42-44. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1022-1024.]
- 310. To Major Graham . . . . .** 549  
*Bombay, 11th April, 1804.*  
 Measures for providing against the effects of famine.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 202-203. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 215-216. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1140-1141.]
- \*311. To Lord W. Bentinck, Governor of Fort St. George 550**  
*Chowke, 18th May, 1804.*  
 The project of raising money at Poonah, for the service of the Madras government, inexpedient, because (1) it is not likely to suc-

ceed at present; (2) it will embarrass the Bombay government. The inadequate resources of Bombay are eked out by bills on Bengal, negotiated largely, through the soucars, at Poonah. The exchange on Bengal has lately fallen very low. Causes of the fall. This has led me to refrain from drawing on Calcutta, (while I depend much on Bombay); as the competition of my bills and those of the Bombay government would tend to depreciate the value of both. Why the plan is not likely to produce much money. Publication of the tenders of the Fort St. George government, therefore, suspended. Why I have been unable to avoid charging that government with the payment of the subsidiary force.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 254-258. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 285-290. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1183-1186.]

- \*312. **G. O.** . . . . . Page 553

*Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24th June, 1804.*

Farewell address to the Deccan army.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1236. S. D. IV. 442-443.]

- \*313. **To the Governor-General** . . . . . 555

*Seringapatam, 18th July, 1804.*

Present amount and proposed reduction of the Rajah's cavalry. His gross revenue; the result of Poorneah's good management. Expenses regulated by the fixed condition of laying by an annual surplus to provide a fund for meeting extraordinary calls by the British government, for military assistance. Detail of peace establishment. Composition, pay, and service, of the Candachar peons. Composition, pay, armament, command, and discipline, of the regular infantry. The Dewan's zeal and efficiency in supplying the Deccan army, during the Mahratta war; and in maintaining troops for the defence of the Mysore frontier. General success of the plan for settling the Rajah's government.

[G.<sup>1</sup> II. 349-353. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 423-428. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1283-1286.]

- \*314. **General Orders by the Governor in Council at Madras** 558

*28th July, 1804.*

Official recognition of General Wellesley's services.

[S. D. IV. 457-458.]

- \*315. **To the Magistrate at Seringapatam** . . . . . 559

*Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805.*

Provision for Dhoondiah Waugh's son. [S. D. IV. 500.]

- \*316. **To the Chairman of the Court of Directors** . . . 560

*19th Sept., 1805.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley proposes to wait upon the Directors.

[S. D. IV. 532.]

- \*317. [The Chairman to Sir Arthur Wellesley] . . . Page 560  
*India House, 23rd Sept., 1805.*

A diplomatic answer. [S. D. IV. 532.]

- \*318. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors . . . 560  
*No. 18, Conduit Street, 24th Sept., 1805.*

Sir Arthur Wellesley will wait on the Chairman. [S. D. IV. 532.]

- \*319. To the Earl of Mornington . . . . . 561  
*Deal, 21st Dec., 1805.*

Report of communications with Pitt, Castlereagh, and other statesmen as to Lord Wellesley's administration, and political course on his return to England. Sir Arthur's view on the latter subject. His own treatment by the Commander-in-Chief and the Directors.

[S. D. IV. 533-541.]

- \*320. To Viscount Melville, President of the Board of Control 567  
*Elvas, 12th March, 1812.*

European troops in India should be the King's; native troops the Company's; so long as the Company exercises sovereign rights. The Presidential armies should be distinct. Suggestions for subordinating the military to the civil power. Discipline should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. How military patronage should be adjusted between the Governor and him. [G.<sup>1a</sup> VIII. G.<sup>2</sup> V. 545-547.]

- \*321. To the Right Hon. George Canning . . . . . 568  
*London, 11th Aug., 1816.*

The Subsidiary System, as distinct from looser alliances, should not be extended to other Powers than the Peshwah and the Nizam. And *they* should be urged to maintain efficient cavalry, according to their Treaties with us. [S. D. XI. 459.]

- \*322. Memorandum on the Deccan Prize Money . . . 569  
*10th Sept., 1825.*

In preferring an exclusive claim to prize taken at Poonah, Nagpore, and Mahidpore, Sir T. Hislop and the Deccan Army were wrong both in their main fact, and their reasonings. They urge that (1) There was no previous concert or association between them and Lord Hastings and the Grand Army, in the operations against the *Mahratta Powers*. But Lord Hastings did anticipate the fact, though not the circumstances, of the Mahratta rising; and his appointment of Sir T. Hislop, with special powers in the Deccan, proved this, and met the

occasion. (2) There was no actual co-operation on the part of the Grand Army. But it kept Scindiah and Meer Khan from interposing in the Deccan. Thus it co-operated politically at Poonah; and in a military way at Nagpour; and more completely and extensively at Mahidpour. (3) Sir T. Hislop's was a separate command. It was, in no sense, intended to be so, after he should have crossed the Nerbuddah. And, throughout, Lord Hastings did not, and could not, renounce his authority as Commander-in-Chief; though he might issue his orders through Sir T. Hislop. His words prove that he deemed the Deccan army part of his own. (4) He commanded Sir T. Hislop only as Governor-General, in a political, not military, manner. This is untrue; though, combining the two functions, he exercised *also* the political authority, which all Governors-General have over the army. As to the original fact:—the spoils of Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour, had been already handed over to the prize agents. The sum in question was a later acquisition, the result of the general war, and of the exertions of the united armies.

[S. D. C. II. 489-499.]

**\*323. Memorandum on Mutiny at Barrackpore . Page 577**

*10th Oct., 1825.*

Summary of the conduct of the mutineers. The Commander-in-Chief did his duty in compelling them to lay down their arms, before he would consider their demands. The Committee find that the mutiny arose from:—(1) antipathy to the scene—and (2) to the character—of the war. This is true. But government could not yield to such antipathy. (3) Dislike to serving on board ship. This (they had reason to know) was an ungrounded fear. (4) Want of baggage cattle. Why the sepoys require this. The government, and the commanding officer, did their best to supply the want. (5) The exactions of those engaged in this service. But the service was occasional, as contrasted with (6) The alleged inadequate pay of the sepoys. Besides permanent employment, they have batta, pensions, &c. It is not unjust to exact a premium, when they are paid in Sicca rupees. Nor is their pay, judged by the price of food, really inadequate. (7) The want of knapsacks, for which they were charged. No fair cause, though the charge should have been postponed. (8) The undue influence of two native officers. Their influence was for good, not harm.

The indiscipline and bad feeling of the Bengal army are naturally accountable for by the detachment, from regimental duty, of a large, and the better, part of the European officers; and by the little interest



taken by those who remain (including, on this occasion, the staff officers, adjutant, and quartermaster) in the wants and proceedings of the sepoys. General conclusion:—The government not to blame. Real *rationale* of the mutiny. Its vigorous suppression, was salutary, not censurable. [S. D. C. II. 521-530.]

- \*323 a. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn . . . . . Page 585,  
*Stratfield Saye, 18th January, 1826.*

Terms of peace to be concluded with Ava. [S. D. C. III. 68-69.]

324. To the Duke of Newcastle . . . . . 587  
*Stratfield Saye, 5th Nov., 1826.*

Lord Combermere's capture of Bhurtpoor. The Duke declines to put himself in a false position. [S. D. C. III. 444-445.]

- \*325. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn . . . . . 588  
*London, 11th November, 1826.*

Importance of retaining Arracan and Tenasserim; and of discouraging European colonization. [S. D. C. III. 449-451.]

326. To Lord Combermere . . . . . 590  
*Sudbourne, 22nd December, 1826.*

Danger of disputes between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General. [S. D. C. III. 501-502.]

327. To Lord Ellenborough . . . . . 591  
*Middleton, 9th October, 1828.*

How we may help the Shah and the Pacha of Bagdad. [S. D. C. V. 118-119.]

- \*328. To the Right Hon. J. W. Croker . . . . . 592  
*London, 24th January, 1831.*

Why Col. Wellesley was preferred to General Baird as commandant of Seringapatam. [S. D. C. VII. 396.]

## II. MILITARY.

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329. To Major-General St. Leger . . . . . Page 593

*Fort William, 11th April, 1797.*

Suggestions on the proposed introduction of 'galloper guns.'

[S. D. I. 1-3.]

- \* 330. Regimental Rank in the Army of the East-India

Company . . . . . 595

[1798.]

Why promotion was originally general. Early system of officering Sepoy corps. King's commissions given to Company's officers. Promotion still general, in each Presidency. Lord Cornwallis' plan imperfectly carried out. Present system of organizing Sepoy regiments, with European and native officers. Promotion is still not regimental. This circumstance makes the discontent at the slowness of promotion, and at the loss of old perquisites, a general grievance throughout the service. In Bengal, it also seriously impairs discipline, by the removal of officers from corps to corps: less so in Madras, where such removal is rare. And it greatly increases the cost of the Bengal army.

[S. D. I. 77-81.]

331. To Major-General Sydenham . . . . . 599

*Seringapatam, 16th Jan., 1800.*

In future Indian wars, celerity of movement will be a primary requisite. Hence the whole corps of bullock-drivers ought to be retained. Purposes to which the permanent bullock-train should be applied.

[S. D. I. 433-434.]

332. To Colonel Pater . . . . . 600

*Camp 2 miles south of Cullumbella, 1st June, 1800.*

Dealers not to be constrained by the civil government to supply the troops on march. If you pay what they ask, self-interest will induce them to sell; and competition will lower the price. [S. D. I. 584-585.]

333. To the Secretary of Government, Madras . . . . . 601

*Camp at Luckmaisir, 24th July, 1800.*

Inefficiency of the bullock system, from the absence of the real owners of the cattle. Officers ought to be responsible for the transport of their tents; and be put on tent allowance.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1606-1607. S. D. II. 70-71.]

- 334. To Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister** . . . . . Page 602  
*Seringapatam, 21st May, 1801.*  
 Military corvées forbidden. [S. D. II. 400.]
- 335. To Major Paterson** . . . . . 603  
*Seringapatam, 31st July, 1801.*  
 Military bazaars; and discouragement of a disputatious spirit.  
 [S. D. II. 535-536.]
- 336. To Lieutenant-Colonel Shee** . . . . . 603  
*Seringapatam, 2nd Oct., 1801.*  
 Eurasians in European regiments. [S. D. II. 567.]
- 337. To Captain Wilks** . . . . . 604  
*Seringapatam, 16th Aug., 1802.*  
 Retiring pensions of officers in the Company's army.  
 [S. D. III. 272.]
- 338. To Lieutenant-General Stuart** . . . . . 605  
*Walwajee, 17th Sept., 1802.*  
 Native elephant-keepers require European superintendence.  
 [S. D. III. 307-308.]
- 339. To Lieutenant-General Stuart** . . . . . 606  
*24th Jan., 1803.*  
 To what extent, and on what conditions, advances should be made  
 to the brinjarries. [S. D. III. 553-555.]
- \* 340. Memorandum upon Forage** . . . . . 607  
*[21st Feb., 1803.]* [S. D. IV. 20-21.]
- \* 341. To Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas** . . . . . 609  
*Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.*  
 Unnecessary expense for forage disallowed. [S. D. IV. 61-62.]
- 342. To Lieutenant-General Stuart** . . . . . 610  
*Camp at Poonah, 27th May, 1803.*  
 Predatory tendencies of the brinjarries. We ought not to depend  
 on them far from their homes.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 141. G.<sup>1a</sup> I. 597-598. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 467.]
- \* 343. G. O.** . . . . . 610  
*Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21st Nov., 1803.*  
 Grain to be paid for before removal. [G.<sup>2</sup> II. 874. S. D. IV. 290.]

- \*344. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay . . . Page 611  
*Camp at Tiralo, 27th June, 1804.*

Expediency of a provision for wounded silladars, and for the families of those killed; and of a compensation for horses killed or wounded. [G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 372-374. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1247-1248.]

- \*345. To Sir William Clarke, Bart. . . . . 612  
*Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.*

Expediency of training infantry to work guns. [S. D. IV. 502-503.]

- \*346. To the Right Hon: Charles Wynn . . . . . 612  
*London, 6th August, 1826.*

Reasons against amalgamating the Presidential armies; and equalizing their pay. [S. D. C. III. 368-371.]

- \*347. Memorandum.—East India Company's Army . . . 615  
*31st July, 1828.*

Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field. Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions of artillery. Officers in the service of the E. I. C. in civil employments, or on the Staff, not properly attached to the army. [S. D. C. IV. 561-564.]

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- \*348. G. M. O. . . . . 617  
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Instructions for troops crossing rivers. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 119. S. D. II. 19-20.]

- \*349. Memorandum respecting Basket Boats . . . . . 618  
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- \*350. Memorandum on the manner of laying a bridge  
 of boats across a river . . . . . 619  
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- \*351. G. O. . . . . 620  
*Poonah, 23rd May, 1803.*

Memoranda on cavalry manœuvres. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 459-460. S. D. IV. 91-92.]

- \*352. G. O. . . . . Page 622

*Camp at Jaum, Friday, 11th Nov., 1803.*

Discretion of officers as to the execution of orders.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 850. S. D. IV. 287.]

- \*353. G. O. . . . . 622

*Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 16th June, 1804.*

Instructions for the combined march in line of infantry battalions.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1228. S. D. IV. 429-430.]

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- \*354. To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny . . . . 623

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Embezzlement of Stores, and manifold rascality. [S. D. II. 487-489.]

- \*355. To the Right Hon. Lord Clive . . . . 626

*Seringapatam, 23rd Oct., 1801.*

Mercy seasons justice.

[S. D. II. 592.]

356. To Major-General Baird . . . . 626

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Wellington's abhorrence of corrupt practices. [S. D. II. 625.]

357. To the Commander-in-Chief, Fort St. George . . 626

*Seringapatam, 12th June, 1801.*

A low official estimate of professional character reprobated.

[G.<sup>2</sup> I. 259-260. S. D. II. 440-441.]

- \*358. G. O. . . . . 627

*Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801.*

The same subject.

[G.<sup>2</sup> I. 268. S. D. II. 520-521.]

- \*359. To the President of the General Court Martial . 628

*Seringapatam, 21st Sept., 1801.*

Witnesses before Courts Martial not to be drilled by the accused or his agents. [S. D. II. 561-562.]

- \*360. G. O. . . . . 629

*Seringapatam, 17th July, 1802.*

Intoxication most degrading to the character, and ruinous to the efficiency, of an officer. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 288. S. D. III. 236-237.]

361. **The D. A. G. to Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage** . Page 630  
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Commanding officers to communicate personally with their subordinates in garrison—not write to them. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 291.]

- \*362. **To Mr. ———** . . . . . 630  
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A sharp stimulant to a malingerer. [S. D. III. 280–281.]

- \*363. **To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron Bulôt** . . . 631  
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Abuse of invaliding. The rules of the service do not favour neat jobs. [S. D. III. 289–290.]

- \*364. **G. O.** . . . . . 632  
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Officers forbidden to beat natives. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 291. S. D. III. 296–297.]

365. **To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles** . . . . . 632  
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The paymaster not to live away from head-quarters. [S. D. III. 300.]

- \*366. **G. O.** . . . . . 633  
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Military insolence tested by the rules of the service. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 293. S. D. III. 301–302.]

- \*367. **The D. A. G. to Major \* \* \* \*, commanding a detachment of H. M. — regt.** . . . . . 634  
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Exposition of the futility of excuses pleaded for levying purveyance in the Mysore country. Restitution required. [G.<sup>2</sup> I. 314–315.]

368. **To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor** . . . . . 635  
*Camp, 3rd July, 1803.*

Subalterns not to put each other in arrest, except in case of absolute necessity. [S. D. IV. 129.]

- 369. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial** . . . . . Page 636  
*Camp, 18th July, 1803.*

Courts Martial ought not to give sentence of honourable acquittal 'merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt.'

[S. D. IV. 141-142.]

- 370. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor** . . . . . 636  
*Camp, 30th July, 1803.*

*Scribendi kakónthes* among officers to be checked. [S. D. IV. 148.]

- 371. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay** . . . . . 637  
*Camp, 11th Nov., 1803.*

The same subject. [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 367. G.<sup>1a</sup> 497. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 853.]

- 372. To Colonel Murray** . . . . . 637  
*Camp, 14th Sept., 1803.*

The service not to suffer through the private quarrels of officers.

[G.<sup>1</sup> I. 375-377. G.<sup>1a</sup> II. 300-302. G.<sup>2</sup> I. 708.]

- \*373. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial** . . . . . 638  
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A private reprimand an inadequate punishment for insulting a magistrate in consequence of his acts, as such. [S. D. IV. 190-191.]

- 374. To Major Doolan** . . . . . 639  
*Camp, 6th Oct., 1803.*

Frivolous and factious regimental quarrels highly dangerous to the public interests, especially in time of war; and to the European officers engaged in them. [S. D. IV. 193-195.]

- \*375. G. A. O.** . . . . . 640  
*Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec., 1803.*

Officers to pay ready money for shop goods.

[G.<sup>2</sup> II. 923. S. D. IV. 300-301.]

- 376. To Colonel Murray** . . . . . 640  
*Camp, 26th Jan., 1804.*

Military inefficiency, from improper use of men or equipments, worse than indiscipline. [G.<sup>1</sup> II. 84-85. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 16. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1003.]

- 377. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron, commanding at Seringapatam . . . . .** Page 641

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Strong obligation of British officers to support the authority of the civil magistrate. [S. D. IV. 424.]

- \*378. To Major Symons . . . . .** 641

*Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.*

The same subject. [S. D. IV. 426-427.]

- 379. To Lord Ellenborough . . . . .** 642

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How the officers of the East India Company's army are excited to mutiny. [S. D. C. VI. 138-140.]

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- \*380. To the Adjutant-General, Bombay . . . . .** 644

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All the public means ought to be applied to the public service when necessary. [S. D. I. 533-535.]

- 381. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick . . . . .** 645

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The hill forts ought to be destroyed. [S. D. II. 10.]

- \*382. To Lieutenant-Colonel Spry . . . . .** 645

*Seringapatam, 5th June, 1802.*

Officers who build houses on cantonment ground are entitled, strictly speaking, on selling them, to receive the price of the materials only. [S. D. III. 193-195.]

- \*383. To the Officers commanding Chittledroog, Paughur, Nundydroog; to be communicated to those commanding Mudgherry, Mergasie, and Goorybunda . . . . .** 647

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- 384. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace** . . . . Page 649  
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 Martial law indispensable in a lawless land.  
 [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 496. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 186. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1122.]
- 385. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace** . . . . 650  
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 Importance, to a commanding officer, of habitual secrecy on public matters. [G.<sup>1</sup> III. 563. G.<sup>1a</sup> III. 382-383. G.<sup>2</sup> II. 1253-1254.]
- 386. To Lord Bathurst** . . . . 650  
*London, 26th Jan., 1824.*  
 Position of officers of King's troops in India.  
 [S. D. C. II. 193-194.]
- \*387. To the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn** . . . . 651  
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 At what age European soldiers may most safely be sent to India.  
 [S. D. C. III. 351-352.]

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- 388. Colonel George Chesney** . . . . 652  
 Rise and Development of the Indian Army.  
 [Indian Polity, pp. 275-284. First Edition.]
- 389. Dr. W. W. Hunter** . . . . 659  
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- 390. H. St. G. Tucker, Esq.** . . . . 662  
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- 391. Memorandum by the Prince Consort.** . . . . 668  
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## MAPS AND PLANS.

1. **Historical Map of India.**

[Wellington Supplementary Despatches, Vol. I. 1858.]

2. **Battle of Mallavelly.**

- [Lushington's Life of Lord Harris, 1840.]

3. **Environs of Seringapatam.**

[Beatson's War with Tippoo Sultaun, 1800.]

4. **Siege and Storm of Seringapatam.**

[Beatson, *ut supra*.]

5. **Map to illustrate the Partition of Tippoo's Dominions.**

[Beatson, *ut supra*.]

6. **Battle of Assye.**

[Marquess Wellesley's Notes Relative to Transactions in the Mahratta Empire, 1804.]

7. **Battle of Argaum.**

[Welsh's Military Reminiscences, 1830.]

## EXPLANATION OF THE PLANS.

Mallavelly.—The following is given in Mr. Lushington's *Life of Lora Harris*, to explain the Plan reproduced from that work in this volume :—

‘References. Red, denotes the first position of the English army. Blue, the 2nd ditto. Purple, the 3rd ditto. Yellow, Tippoo's, the 1st ditto. Green, the 2nd ditto. Orange, shows the encampment of the army after the action.

A. A large body of the enemy's horse kept in check by the 25th regiment of light dragoons. B. A party of the horse and rocket boys driven off by the picquet. C. A small party of the enemy's horse charging the 1st, or European brigade, and repulsed. D. The 2nd regiment of cavalry advancing to charge, but halted on the European brigade beginning to fire. E. A large body of the enemy which retreated on the party C being repulsed. F. A party of the enemy's infantry engaged with the left of the European brigade, and obliged to retreat. G. Another party that attacked the 33rd regiment, the head of Colonel Wellesley's division. H. Retreat of the party G charged by the 33rd regiment. I. Charge of three regiments of cavalry, under General Floyd, on the fugitives H. K. Two brass 18-pounders on a high spot, cannonading the enemy while the line formed. L. Ditto advanced to some commanding rocks, from which they opened on the enemy as the line advanced.’

The two Plans of Seringapatam, and the Map descriptive of the partition of Tippoo's territories, are taken from the semi-official work of Lt.-Col. Alexander Beatson, Aide de Camp to the Marquess Wellesley, and Surveyor General to the Army in the Field, entitled *A View of the War with Tippoo Sultaun*. It seems unnecessary to add anything to the explanations which that author gave in the margin of each ; and which will enable the reader to follow, in detail, the military operations, and the political arrangements.

The Plan of the Battle of Assye is reproduced from the Governor-General's *Notes Relative to Transactions in the Mahratta Empire*. The following details result from a comparison of that work with Major Thorn's *Memoir of the War in India*.

Battle of Assye.—A. English army advancing to the ford. 1, 2, 3, Nizam's and Peishwa's cavalry. X. The left of the enemy's infantry line, in its original position, which it was proposed to attack. B., B., Second position of the enemy's infantry (first line), and of the English army confronting it. D. Enemy's second line of infantry, after its re-formation. C. English army pursuing the enemy's routed first line. E. Mahratta cavalry charging the 74th regiment. F. Countercharge of the English cavalry. G. General Wellesley's charge with the 78th regiment and 7th regiment N. C. H. Position of the General and these troops, after the charge.

Battle of Argaum.—The Governor-General did not insert in his *Notes*, nor Major Thorn in his *Memoir*, a plan of this engagement. But Colonel Welsh, who was present on the occasion, has supplied the want in his *Military Reminiscences*. The array, on both sides, was so simple, and the catastrophe so prompt, that this rough sketch will, it is hoped, be sufficient for the purpose.

# SELECTIONS

FROM

## WELLINGTON'S INDIAN DESPATCHES.

### INTRODUCTION.

#### MEMORANDUM<sup>1</sup> ON MARQUESS WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

IN order to understand the merits or demerits of Marquess Wellesley's government in India, it is necessary to review the state of that country when his Lordship assumed its government in May, 1798, and that in which it was left in April, 1806, which was the close of the official year in which Marquess Wellesley resigned the government. This subject is large, and will require a minute detail of many measures, of the causes which led to them, and of their consequences. But this paper shall be made as short as possible; and nothing shall be inserted in it which is not necessary for the elucidation of the subjects on which it is written.

The first intelligence which reached Marquess Wellesley, upon his arrival in India, was that the ancient Native enemy of the Company had formed an alliance with the French at Mauritius, for the purpose of attacking the British nation in India; and that, in consequence of this alliance, a body of Frenchmen had already been landed at the port of Mangalore on the coast of Malabar, and had marched to Seringapatam. Shortly after the receipt of this intelligence, it was known in India that Buonaparte, with a large French army, had landed and taken possession of Egypt, and that the avowed object of this expedition was to invade India by that route.

The state of warfare which was to be expected in consequence of the intelligence of these measures and movements of the enemies of the British government, rendered necessary a review

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<sup>1</sup> Written after the Session of Parliament of 1806. The sums and dates left in blank in the original memorandum, were filled up at the Board of Control and the India House.—*Note in the original editions.*

of its situation in all its branches ; and what follows is the result of that review, and of the measures which were adopted to apply a remedy to the inconveniences and evils which were found to exist.

The Company were found to have a revenue of 8,059,880*l.*, a sum less than that which they had been found to have in 1793, at the renewal of their charter, by 165,748*l.* The debt amounted to 10,866,588*l.*, having increased since 1793 ; and the interest was annually 746,933*l.*, having increased since 1793. The total amount of the charges of the government in India, including the interest of the debt, was 8,178,626*l.* ; and the deficiency of the revenues, in comparison with the charges, at a time of profound peace in India, was 322,530*l.* At the same time the Company's credit was at the lowest ebb. Money could not be borrowed in Bengal at 12 *per cent.* interest ; the Company's bonds and securities at that rate were circulated at such a discount, as well at that Presidency as at Madras and Bombay, as to amount nearly to a stagnation ; and with this great war in expectation, the Company's financial servants in India were entirely at a loss to find the means for supporting and carrying on the ordinary operations of the government in time of peace. The Company's armies, although in a high state of discipline, and maintained, that of Fort William at the expense of 1,996,487*l.*, that of Fort St. George at the expense of 1,868,498*l.*, and that of Bombay at the expense of 641,469*l.*, were not in a state of preparation and efficiency to perform the operations which the crisis of the Company's affairs was likely to require from them. The Commander in Chief and Adjutant General of Fort St. George reported that 6 months would be required to prepare for service the army serving under that Presidency, upon which the brunt of the contest was likely to fall ; and the government of that Presidency were apprehensive of the consequences of drawing the attention of the enemy by making the smallest preparation for defence against the attack which they well knew he had meditated. The army of Bombay, on which naturally the task would have fallen of co-operating in the contest with that of Fort St. George, was necessarily scattered in the disaffected provinces under the government of Bombay ; and the army of Bengal was stationed principally in the Vizier's territories, with a view to keep them in tranquillity, and to defend them from the expected invasion of the King of Caubul.

Those powers on whom experience of former wars with Tippoo had shown that the Company ought to rely for assistance were

the Nizam, the Peshwah, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the petty rajahs and zemindars on the coast of Malabar. Since the peace of 1792 with Tippoo, which had attained the object of the alliance between the first two and the Company, the situation of these powers had been considerably changed. The Nizam, by the result of an unfortunate state of hostility with the Mahrattas, which ended in battle, and a peace, or rather capitulation, concluded at Kurdlah in the year 1795, had fallen from the state of a great and leading power in Hindustan to that of a tributary to the Mahrattas. His ministers were appointed by the Mahrattas; his army was disbanded; and the only support of his authority was a corps consisting of about 14,000 men, trained, disciplined, and commanded by French officers. These officers had possession of a considerable portion of the Nizam's territories, from the revenues of which they were to pay their troops; and by the power which they acquired by this possession, and by the state of confusion of the government of the Mahrattas at Poonah, the weakness of that of the Nizam, and the supine indifference of that of the Company, they were becoming a French state in the peninsula of India. By their power and violence they overawed the Nizam's councils, and precluded all hope of his co-operation in the war which was expected with Tippoo and his French allies in the year 1798.

The Mahratta government of Poonah, which had afforded such material assistance to the British government in the war which had ended in 1792 by the treaty of Seringapatam, was become equally incapable with the Nizam of affording any aid in that which was expected in 1798. After the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, threw himself from a window in his palace at Poonah, and died upon the spot. A contest then ensued for the possession of the power of that government, in which all the principal Mahratta chiefs were engaged, and which, having lasted with various success during the years 1796 and 1797, had ended by placing all the power at Poonah in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This Chief already possessed the Mahratta territories upon the Jumna and Ganges bordering upon those of the English and the Nabob of Oude, and the actual sovereignty of all those situated to the northward of the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. By the gain of the influence over the government of the young Peshwah, Bajee Rao, he extended his power to the northern frontier of Tippoo's dominions in Mysore; thus holding in his own hands all the different Mahratta states.

In 1798 this extended power was but feebly established, and would have been unequal to the exertion to be made in the expected contest with Tippoo, even if it could be supposed that Scindiah's policy would have led him to enter into it. But when that Chief became the sole head of the Mahrattas, his policy would have led him to support Tippoo rather than the English in the impending contest, supposing his power to have been in that state to enable him to enter into it. He must have been aware that, with respect to him, the English were the most formidable of the two powers; and that his objects would have been forwarded by their defeat. Besides this, Scindiah's principal force consisted in a body of infantry, raised, disciplined, and commanded by French officers; and although the influence of these officers over the government of Scindiah was by no means of the description of that exercised by those in the service of the Nizam over the government of that prince, it was still sufficiently strong to prevent Scindiah from adopting a measure which was contrary to his obvious policy, as the sole possessor of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges to the Toombuddra.

Thus, then, nothing was to be expected from the two powers which had been the principal allies of the Company in the former war with Tippoo; and as the French were likely to be actively and personally engaged in this expected war, it was to be apprehended that they would derive assistance from the force commanded by Frenchmen in the service of those powers who had formerly been considered as the firm allies of the British government.

Since the peace of 1792 the Nabob Mahomed Ali of the Carnatic had died, and had been succeeded by his son, Omdalool Omrah. This prince, who was very unpopular in his territories, showed every disposition to impede rather than to forward the operations of the British army. He gave them no assistance; and it was afterwards found at Seringapatam that he was in correspondence with the Company's enemy.

As for the rajahs of Malabar, they (with the exception of the Rajah of Koorg) had been in a state of hostility with the Company from the conclusion of the peace of 1792 till the year 1798, and had kept a considerable proportion of the Bombay army in constant hostile operations against them. No assistance was to be expected from them; but, on the contrary, everything which was in their power to annoy and harass the army and to aid the enemy.

Add to this representation of the state of our affairs in India

at this period, that a revolution had just been effected in Oude by Lord Teignmouth; that the government of the reigning Prince Saadut Ali was most unpopular, and by no means firmly established throughout the country; that his army was mutinous and disaffected; that an invasion of his country was expected from Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, against which it was necessary to provide by the assembly of a large force in Oude under the command of Sir J. Craig; and that, in this emergency of affairs in Oude, such was the state of mutiny and disaffection of the Nabob's troops, that his Highness could not trust to them the guard of his person, but was obliged to call for British troops to preserve him from the effects of their treachery; and Sir J. Craig, to whom was intrusted the defence of Oude, considered these troops in the light of an enemy's fortress in his rear.

Another circumstance which embarrassed government in India at all times, and was a considerable source of embarrassment at the period under consideration, was the nature and state of the alliances between the British government and its dependent and tributary states.

These alliances had always been formed in a moment of extreme weakness, and generally after the Native and dependent state had been conquered. The principal stipulation was uniformly protection by the British government, in consideration of subsidy to be paid by the Native state, and in other respects the Native state was declared or was considered to be independent in the management of all its internal concerns.

The Native states having in every instance contracted these alliances in a moment of weakness, in which, of course, all the powers of their governments were paralysed, they have invariably been under the necessity of calling for the assistance of the British protecting government for the support of their authority in the management of their internal concerns.

The system of government in India, the foundations of authority, and the modes of supporting it and of carrying on the operations of the government, are entirely different from the systems and modes adopted in Europe for the same purposes.

The foundation and the instrument of all power there is the sword; and when these alliances have been formed, the sword, or, in other words, the army of the East India Company, became the only support and the only efficient instrument of authority of the protected Native states.

This position of affairs, which was the result of the principle



of government long established in the East, and of the weakness of the Native state, was attended by a stipulation in some cases, or an understanding in others, that the Native state should be *independent* in all the operations of its internal government; and at the very moment in which this stipulation was made, the interference of the British government was required, and all the internal concerns of the Native state submitted to its judgment, in order that its agents might see whether the cases in which its interference was called for were of a nature to justify it.

Here, then, the door was necessarily opened to the interference of the British government in every concern; and the result was increased weakness in the Native state, jealousy of this interference, and disunion bordering upon treachery.

These evils had long appeared to require a remedy; and they must have been felt particularly at the moment in which the British government was likely to be involved in a most extensive warfare with the most formidable of the Native powers, assisted by the French.

This having been the state of India at the time Marquess Wellesley assumed the government in the year 1798, the measures adopted to apply a remedy to the evils which existed will form an epitome of the history of his Lordship's administration. I shall detail them in that order which is most likely to make them clear to the understandings of those who will read this paper.

The objects which pressed most upon his Lordship's attention in May and June, 1798, were to place the army of Fort St. George in a situation to resist the expected hostility of the enemy, to relieve the finances from the difficulties under which they laboured, and to bring back the allies of the Company to the state in which they had been left by the peace at Seringapatam in 1792, so that the allies might be able to render the assistance in the war which they were capable of affording.

The measures of finance which were at that time successfully adopted laid the foundation of the system which was subsequently acted upon, and which will be fully considered in another part of this paper.

Effectual measures were immediately adopted to put in a situation to enable them to defend themselves the whole disposable force of Fort St. George, and eventually to perform the service which might be, and was afterwards, required from them.

The army of Fort St. George was reinforced by European troops from Bengal, and preparatory measures were adopted to

enable government to reinforce it still further with Native troops, when the most favourable season for transporting them by sea should come round.

• But the principal measure of those days, that which gave a turn to the state of the Company's affairs in India, and to the general sentiment of the people of that country respecting the British government, was the negotiation at Hyderabad, which ended by the substitution of a British for a French force at the capital of the Nizam.

The Nizam had long been connected with the British government, and by the treaty of 1789 it had been stipulated that he should have the assistance of two British battalions when he should call for them. This article of the treaty had not been performed till the war broke out with Tippoo, which ended by the peace of 1792, when Lord Cornwallis made a new treaty [1790] with the Nizam, and attached to his army two British battalions, which acted with them during that war. At the same time two British battalions were attached to the Mahratta army under Pursheram Bhow.

The services of these battalions stationed with the Nizam, as will be observed by the treaty, were to be confined to operations against foreign enemies and domestic rebels; but not to be directed against the Mahrattas, and in particular not against certain tributaries of the Nizam stationed upon the Mahratta frontier, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah.

After the defeat and capitulation of the Nizam at Kurdlah in 1795, which has been above referred to, the Mahrattas had obliged his Highness to send these battalions back into the Company's territories; but during the disputes at Poonah for the succession to Madhoo Rao, his Highness had taken advantage of the momentary weakness of the Mahratta government, and had recalled these battalions to his capital.

The object of the negotiation which Marquess Wellesley commenced with the Nizam was to prevail upon his Highness to perform the defensive treaty of Hyderabad, 1st Sept. 1798; and as it appeared that his Highness was unable to perform it on account of the power which the French officers and their faction had over his councils, it was proposed to his Highness that he should dismiss them and their troops from his service for ever; and an offer was made to supply British troops to enable his Highness to accomplish this object, and to remain thereafter at Hyderabad as substitutes for the troops under the command of the French officers.

A treaty was concluded on this basis with the utmost secrecy and despatch, which contained all the restraining articles for the service of the troops which had been in the treaty of 7th May, 1798; and a body of British troops entered the Nizam's territories, and had made some marches towards Hyderabad before the French officers were aware of their fate. This body of troops, having joined those already at Hyderabad, performed the service on which they were sent without bloodshed; and the Nizam was thus restored to the power of performing his defensive engagements with the Company, and one of the great and fruitful sources of the evils impending over us in 1798, which has been already described, was removed by a timely, well contrived, and able exercise of the power of the British government.

This negotiation at Hyderabad was accompanied by another at Poonah, with a view to the same objects. But this failed, for reasons which will be reviewed hereafter. In the course of this negotiation all the circumstances attending that carrying on at Hyderabad were described to the Peshwah, with a view to prevent the jealousy which might otherwise have been expected upon the renewal of the ancient alliance between the Company and the Nizam.

After one of the principal allies of the British government had thus been placed in a situation to be enabled to perform his treaty of alliance, a negotiation was opened with Tippoo Sultaun, the object of which was to bring that Prince to an early decision, whether he should be at peace or at war with the Company. It was obvious that the assistance which he had hitherto received from his allies, the French, was small in comparison with that which he might expect from them; and that it was not of an extent and description to be very formidable to the British government, particularly as its alliance with the Nizam had been renewed, and the source of danger in that quarter had been removed. All that was required from Tippoo, therefore, was a renunciation of this offensive alliance, and such an unequivocal proof of it as should be satisfactory to the whole world; and the adoption of arrangements which should facilitate the usual friendly communications between states not in hostility with each other.

These negotiations were attended by military preparations which were calculated to secure early success and a speedy termination to the war, which it was determined should be the consequence of Tippoo's refusal to give the allies the reasonable

satisfaction which they had required. The wisdom of these early preparations was soon proved; for on the very day that Tippoo, after a delay of some weeks beyond the period fixed for his answer to the remonstrance of the British government, despatched his answer, and desired that a British officer might be sent to negotiate with him, he commenced his march to attack the Bombay army, which was assembled in the territories of the Rajah of Koorg.

In this review of the measures of Marquis Wellesley's government, it is not intended to detail the movements or the actions of the different armies. The result of the well prepared and well combined operations of the war against Tippoo was the capture of his capital, with all his arsenals, treasure, &c.; his own death, on the 4th May, 1799; and the subsequent reduction and submission of all his territories to the allied governments.

The army of the Nizam, with the subsidiary force as formed by the late Treaty of 1798, co-operated in this war with the British army; and his Highness's government shared equally with the British government in the advantages arising from its successful termination. The territories of the Company were increased by the addition of those belonging to Tippoo, situated upon the sea coast of Malabar, and those which gave possession of important military positions. The Nizam received an equivalent, contiguous to his frontier; and a portion was reserved for the Peshwah, to be given on the condition that his Highness should become a party to the alliance between the other governments, and should accede to certain stipulations which were proposed to him, and which will be discussed in a subsequent part of this paper. His Highness having refused to accept these conditions, this portion was divided between the Company and the Nizam.

The principal and all the centre part of the territories of Tippoo were given to a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, in whose person a state was formed under the immediate influence and protection of the British government. This state was connected by a treaty of alliance with the Company, which was bound to defend it on condition of the payment of a stipulated tribute. As alliances of this description, by conferring a nominal independence on the Princes connected by them with the Company, had been found in other instances to be attended with many inconveniences, to render necessary a constant interference by the protecting government in the

internal affairs of the Native subordinate state, and to occasion internal weakness, jealousy of the protecting power, and a waste and embarrassment of the resources of the government, it was thought best, in the treaty of alliance with the government of Mysore, to provide for the interference of the British government in all its concerns when such interference might be necessary; and the state in which this government is found to be at this moment, the cordial and intimate union which exists between the government of Mysore and the British authorities, and the important strength and real assistance which it has afforded to the British government in all its recent difficulties, afford the strongest proofs of the wisdom of this stipulation of the treaty.

Thus, then, in less than one year from the period at which the perils which I have above described threatened the existence of the British government in India, our principal ally, the Nizam, was restored to us, the French state growing in the peninsula of India was destroyed, our formidable Native enemy, Tippoo, the certain ally of the French in India, was subdued, and in his place was established in Mysore a government calculated to afford, and which has afforded, the most substantial assistance to Great Britain in all her difficulties.

The Governor-General having now relieved the peninsula of India from the danger by which it was threatened, and affairs in that quarter having been placed on foundations of strength calculated to afford lasting peace and security, turned his attention to the great and increasing cause of the weakness of the north-west frontier of the Bengal provinces. These provinces were covered in that quarter by the territories of the Nabob Vizier of Oude, who was connected with the Company by a treaty of alliance, by which, in consideration of a subsidy amounting to a sum not exceeding 50 lacs sicca rupces *per annum*, the Company were bound to defend him; and with this view to maintain at all times at least 10,000 men in his territories; and in case this number should for any cause be increased beyond 13,000 men, the Nabob was to pay the actual expense incurred by the Company. This treaty was attended by the usual stipulation of the independence of the Nabob in his internal concerns; which stipulation had been uniformly frustrated by the necessary and uniform interference of the Company in all those concerns for the support of the Nabob's authority, for the preservation of tranquillity in the country, and for the security of the funds from which the Company derived

so important a portion of the resources applicable to the payment of their military establishments.

For some years previous to 1798 apprehensions had been entertained that Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, would carry into execution an old and favorite plan of the Affghan government to invade Hindustan; and these apprehensions had appeared so well founded in 1798 that the Governor-General, Marquess Wellesley, had found it necessary to assemble a large British army in Oude, under the command of Sir J. Craig, for the protection of the Nabob's territories against this expected invasion, notwithstanding the difficulties under which the government laboured at the same period in the peninsula of India.

At the close of the year 1797 the Nabob, Azof ool Dowlah, died, and was succeeded in his government by his supposed son, Vizier Aly. This usurper had been formally deposed by the authority of the British government under Lord Teignmouth, after a full examination of the justice of his claim; and Saadut Ali had been placed in the government of Oude.

This prince was very unpopular with the army, and was not generally agreeable to his subjects. His disposition was parsimonious, and his habits were not of a nature to conciliate the affections of his turbulent subjects.

When the preparations were making to resist the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, the Nabob, Saadut Ali, although fully convinced of the necessity of collecting the largest force upon the frontier, called for a detachment of the British troops to attend and guard his person against his own turbulent and disaffected troops. He declared repeatedly that these troops were not to be trusted in the day of battle, or on any service; and after viewing their state of discipline and equipment, and obtaining a knowledge of their principles and attachment to the cause of the allied governments, Sir J. Craig considered these troops as worse than useless, as dangerous, and of the nature of an enemy's fortress in his rear; and he actually left a detachment of British troops to watch them, and the turbulent inhabitants of Rohilcund, the frontier province of Oude to the north-west.

The Governor-General, by his negotiations at the court of Persia, had drawn the attention of the King of Caubul to the defence of his own western frontier; and availed himself of the certain tranquillity which he had obtained on the frontiers of Oude to arrange the affairs of that country on a basis better calculated to give it permanent security and tranquillity, and to

increase the strength of the British government on its north-west frontier, which was one of its weakest points.

Towards the close of the year 1799 the Governor-General called upon the Nabob of Oude to dismiss his expensive, useless, and dangerous troops, and to fill their places by increased numbers of the Company's troops. The Nabob had desired the assistance of the Governor-General in the reform of the different establishments of his government; but the British government had a right, under the article of the treaty of 1798, to require that this reform should be made. After some difficulties, arising principally from the defective principle on which the military establishments were formed, paid, and commanded, this great object was effected; and arrangements were made for introducing into the Vizier's territories 3000 additional British troops, at the expense to the Nabob Vizier of 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees *per annum*.

In order to improve the security of Oude still further, a reform of the civil administration of the government was necessary; and this reform was pressed upon the attention of the Nabob. But while the negotiations for this purpose, and for the final arrangement of the military establishments, were going on, the Nabob gravely declared that he was not able to pay the expense of the troops which had been stationed in his country for its defence at the time of the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, or the expense of the additional troops which had been necessarily stationed in his country upon the occasion of the reform of his military establishments, although he was bound by treaty to defray the whole of these charges.

A demand was then made upon him to give territorial security, according to the 11th article of the treaty of 1798; and, after a long negotiation, a treaty was concluded on the 10th Nov. 1801, by which, in commutation for subsidy, and for the perpetual defence of his country, the Nabob ceded to the Company the territory of Rohilcund, the Dooab, and Gorruckpoor; the two former being his frontier provinces towards the Mahrattas, the Seiks, and Affghans, and the latter bordering upon the Company; and he engaged, further, to introduce a better system of management into the territories which remained in his hands.

By the whole of this arrangement the Company gained,

1st. The advantage of getting rid of a useless and dangerous body of troops stationed on the very point of their defence, and ready at all times to join an invading enemy:

2ndly. The advantage of acquiring the means of placing upon this weak point additional numbers of the British troops, and thereby increasing its strength, and the general security of the provinces in their rear :

3rdly. Ample territorial security for the regular and perpetual payment of these funds for the support of their military establishments in Bengal :

4thly. By the introduction of their own system of government and management into the countries ceded to them, and the employment of their own servants in the administration, they secured the tranquillity of those hitherto disturbed countries, the loyalty and happiness of their hitherto disaffected and turbulent inhabitants ; and, above all, they acquired the resources of those rich but hitherto neglected provinces for their armies, in case of the recurrence of the necessity for military operations upon that frontier.

These advantages, the full benefit of which, as will be seen hereafter, were felt in a very few years, were gained without incurring any disadvantage whatever ; in particular, that was not incurred which appears most likely to weaken a great continental power, such as the Company is in India, viz. the frontier was not increased. The Company were equally bound to defend, and had actually defended, this same frontier in 1798 and 1799, when the country was governed by the Nabob ; so that all was gain and strength, without the smallest degree of disadvantage or weakness.

But the advantages in this arrangement were not gained by the Company only ; those of the Nabob were at least equal to those of the Company. Whatever increased the security of the Company manifestly increased his security likewise ; and here he acquired a great advantage. But this was not all. It is known that the Nabob of Oude had never collected from the countries ceded, and realised in his treasury, even the sum of 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees, being the old subsidy paid under the treaty of 1798 ; much less had he realised the increased sum which he was obliged to pay in consequence of the increase of the number of troops stationed in his country. His pecuniary gain was the difference between the annual sum he realised and that which he was bound to pay. Under the new treaty of Nov. 1801, the Company were bound to defend the territories of the Nabob under all circumstances ; and no new demand could be made upon him on any account, whatever might be the extent



of the service, or of the expense incurred in their defence. . The Nabob has already felt the full advantage of this stipulation.

Besides these advantages of a pecuniary nature, the Nabob derived others from the arrangement. The cession of the provinces had been preceded by the discharge of a large proportion of his troops ; and those which remained in his service scattered over the whole surface of his enlarged territories, were unequal to the performance of the duties required from them. These duties could not, with convenience, be performed by the Company's Native troops, commanded as they are by European officers, as the civil government remained in the hands of the Nabob's Native servants. Both the Company's government and the Nabob suffered inconvenience ; the former from the frequent calls of the Nabob for the service of their troops in the detail of the collections of the revenue ; and the latter from the want of habit of these troops in duties of this description, and the difficulties of performing them through the agency of European officers directed by Native servants. When the provinces were ceded to the Company, the Nabob had the means and advantage of employing in a reduced territory the troops which had been found insufficient for the conduct of the administration of one of greater extent ; and these troops, being more immediately under his inspection, and within the reach of his authority, were kept in better order.

Thus, then, upon the whole, this arrangement has been advantageous, and has proved satisfactory, to both the parties to it, whatever may have been the difficulties in settling it ; and Marquess Wellesley removed by it all the inconveniences and weakness felt upon the north-west frontier of Bengal, and added considerably to the resources of the British government.

The evil to which Marquess Wellesley next directed his efforts was the nature of the British alliances with its tributary states in general, and particularly with the Nabob of Arcot. The alliance between the Company and the family of this prince had commenced in the infancy of the British power in the peninsula of India, and the terms of it had been altered at different periods. The general purport of them, however, at all times, had been protection of the Carnatic by the Company, on the condition of the regular monthly payment of a stipulated subsidy by the Nabob ; that the Nabob should have no political communication with any foreign power, excepting through the intervention or with the consent of the Company ; that the Company should

not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government ; and the last treaty of 1792 provided particularly that, in case of failure in the payment of the stipulated subsidy, certain countries should be ceded to the Company.

One of the great evils in this alliance, as in all those of this description which had been formed in India, was that it provided that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government, at the same time that the interference of the Company in every possible case was absolutely and essentially necessary for the support of the Native government, and was practised on every occasion.

Another evil which affected this, as well as every alliance of the same description, was that the amount of the subsidy to be paid to the Company was to be realised from the country by the Nabob ; and that this subsidy necessarily bore so large a proportion to the revenues which the country could afford, that it was scarcely possible to realise it so as to make the regular monthly payments required by the nature of the Company's service, and stipulated in the treaty. The consequence was that the Nabob was obliged to borrow money, at large interest, to make his payments at the stipulated periods ; and as the Natives were unable or unwilling to come forward to lend their money upon these occasions, the loans were made from the Company's civil and military servants, and the European inhabitants of Fort St. George and its dependencies.

The interest upon these loans was usually 3 *per cent. per mensem* ; and the security for the payment of the interest, as well as the principal, was generally a tuncaw, or order, or assignment, from the Nabob, upon the revenues of certain portions of his territories. It is obvious that the tuncawdar, or holder of these orders, could have no interest in the prosperity of the country of which he was thus appointed by the Nabob the temporary collector, excepting to recover from it as he could, and at the earliest possible period, the sums supposed to be due. Here, then, was established a system which tended not only to the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Nabob, and to the destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic, but it was carried into execution by the Company's civil and military servants, and by British subjects.

In this view of the evil it was of enormous magnitude. The practice of lending money to the Native powers by British subjects had been repeatedly forbidden by the Company, and

the continuance of it, therefore, was a breach of their most positive orders; but it was so general, and the profits so large, that no government had been found sufficiently strong entirely to prevent it. But the evil did not consist only in the ruin of the Nabob and his country, and in this breach of order and discipline, but it established at Madras, and in the subordinate territories, a body of men in the service of the Company, or living under its protection, whose interests and objects, as relative to the Nabob of the Carnatic, were different from those of the Company. On all occasions, whether trifling or important, of difference between the Company and the Nabob, the latter was certain of the advice, assistance, and active exertions of this description of men; and he never failed to succeed in his objects. It is not astonishing, therefore, that a Prince whose views were directed to an increase of his political power, and whose vanity was flattered by the services performed and court paid to him by so many Europeans of the first rank and consequence in that country, should have promoted every object which could have a tendency to continue this system, and should have set his face against every measure calculated to restrain it, although it was evidently ruinous to his finances, to the revenues of his country, and to his real interests and independence.

The countries which by the treaty of 1792 had been assigned as security to be assumed by the Company, in case of the failure in the regular payment of the subsidy, were among the richest of all those under the government of the Nabob; and it had been particularly provided by the treaty that tuncaws should not be granted upon these districts. Those who lent his Highness their money, however, had no objection to take these countries as their security; and it was natural that the Nabob should feel a slighter degree of interest in the permanent prosperity of those countries than in that of the other provinces subject to his authority. Accordingly, tuncaws were generally granted, contrary to treaty, upon these provinces assigned by treaty for the Company's security; and in aggravation of the accumulated evils of this system, the Company's governments abroad had the mortification to observe the daily and increasing ruin of the resources of Fort St. George, and the deterioration of the prosperity of the provinces allotted as their security by the means of their own servants and those living under their protection. Not a month elapsed that did not afford matter of

speculation whether the Nabob could continue to pay his stipulated subsidy; and not one in which he did not procure the money by loan at a large interest, by means which tended to the destruction of the country.

From the time the operation of the treaty of 1792 was observed, every Governor had endeavoured to prevail upon the Nabob to consent to an alteration of it, by which the Company's resources should be secured, and the evils above described should be prevented. The endeavours, however, of Lord Buckinghamshire, Marquess Wellesley, and Lord Powis, equally failed in prevailing upon the Nabob to consent to a modification of the treaty; and when the war broke out with Tippoo, the country was labouring under all the accumulated disadvantages of the system, its resources were ruined, and its inhabitants, from long oppression, disaffected.

Besides these evils, there was a manifest indifference, or rather disaffection, in the Nabob, Omdal ool Omrah, himself, to the cause of the British government and its allies, the meaning of which was not discovered till Seringapatam was taken, and the papers of Tippoo had fallen into the hands of the British government. Among them were found all the written communications and correspondence which had been carried on between the Nabob Mahomed Ali and the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, his son, and Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge of the Company's government.

The fact of the existence of the correspondence alone was a breach of the treaties by which the Nabobs of the Carnatic had been allied to the British government; but in addition to this fact it was found that the correspondence referred to objects under discussion by the different parties to it, and entirely inconsistent with the principle of the connexion between the British government and the Nabobs of the Carnatic, with the terms of the treaties by which that connexion had been formed, or the existence of friendly intercourse between any states in any part of the world.

As soon as Marquess Wellesley had ascertained all the circumstances attending these communications, by an examination of the persons who had been instrumental in carrying them on, he referred the whole subject to the authorities in England, and stated in detail his sentiments on the conduct of the Nabob, and on the measures which it would be advisable to adopt. These sentiments having been approved, his Lordship proceeded to

carry into execution the measures which he had proposed to adopt.

His Lordship's principles on this question were, generally, that the Nabobs, by their communications with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, had broken their treaties of alliance with the Company; and that in consequence of this breach of treaty the Company had a right to act in the manner that best suited their own interest. That which best suited their own interest was, to take into their own hands the entire management of the civil and military government of the Carnatic; giving to the Nabob, for the support of himself and his family, such a proportion of the revenues as should be sufficient for those objects, provided his Highness would acquiesce in the arrangements which should be carried into execution. These principles were considered to apply equally to the son, or supposed son, of the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, as it was obvious that he could claim to inherit the authority of his father in the Carnatic, and the advantages derived from the connexion with the Company, only under the treaties between the Company and his family, all of which had been broken by the correspondence carried on with Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultaun, by Mahomed Ali and Omdal ool Omrah.

When the orders from Marquess Wellesley upon this subject reached Madras, the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah was in such a state of health as to be incapable of attending to business; and soon afterwards he died. The supposed son was then apprised of the discoveries which had been made at Seringapatam, of the sentiments of the British government in consequence of these discoveries, and of the measures which they proposed to adopt in the Carnatic. But he refused to accept the situation held out to him under the new arrangement. As the claim of this Prince to succeed to his father, supposing that circumstances had allowed of the succession, was by no means clear, and as it was desirable for the peace of the Carnatic that the Nabob's family should adopt the arrangement, Lord Clive (now Earl of Powis) determined to set aside Ali Hussein entirely, and to propose it to Azeem ool Dowlah, the eldest legitimate son of Ameer ool Omrah, who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and brother of the late Nabob Omdal ool Omrah. This Prince having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty was concluded by which the whole of the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company; and the Nabob Azeem ool Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their

title and dignity, and to receive one fifth part of the net revenues of the country<sup>1</sup>.

Thus was this important arrangement concluded in a peaceable manner, by which a remedy was provided for all the evils which had attended the former connexion between the Company and the Nabobs of the Carnatic; additional security was given to the British government, and an addition of 800,000*l. per annum*, value of 20 lacs of star pagodas, was made to their pecuniary resources. This improvement in their situation was not attended by any extension of their frontier (for the Company was bound before, both by treaty and positive interest, to defend the same line of country), or any circumstance which tended to weaken the British government in the Carnatic.

The arrangement, the nature of which I shall next discuss, is the treaty of 1800, with the Nizam. It will be recollected that the treaty of 1798, which had been a remedy for some of the inconveniences existing at that time in the connexion between the Company and the Nizam, had been directed principally to the object of enabling his Highness to perform his part of the triple alliance of 1790, formed against the power of Tippoo Sultaun, in which object it had completely succeeded. But in reference to the Nizam, there were objects in contemplation also at that moment, which could not be carried into execution; and some inconveniences had grown out of the treaty of 1798 for which it was necessary to provide an early remedy. Between the years 1792 and 1798 the power of the government of the Nizam had fallen under the influence of the Mahrattas. This power had large claims upon his Highness; some founded upon the treaty or capitulation of Kurdlah, which claims had been afterwards modified and given up by other treaties; and others founded upon the general principle of overbearing extortion of the Mahratta government.

As will appear in a subsequent part of this paper, the Governor-General had endeavoured, in 1798, to prevail upon the Peshwah to become a party to the treaty made that year with the Nizam, and to allow the British government to arbitrate in the Mahratta claims on the Nizam's government, but without success; and the Mahrattas continued to bring forward these vexatious and groundless claims, and at different periods, as well during the

<sup>1</sup> Unless the revenue exceeded the sum of 25 lacs of star pagodas, in which case the 5th part of the excess was to be applied to purposes of military defence.

war against Tippoo as subsequently, Scindiah, who at that time possessed the power at Poonah, had collected armies upon the Nizam's frontier for the purpose of enforcing them.

Another evil which had existed in 1798 affecting the Nizam's government, and for which the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, had been no remedy, was the state of the Nizam's government in relation to its tributaries, who were likewise tributaries to the Mahrattas. A considerable proportion of the pecuniary resources of the Nizam was derived from this source; but the Nizam was unable to enforce payment of his just demands, which the tributaries were encouraged by the Mahrattas to withhold from his Highness.

Under the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, the Nizam was not entitled to the assistance of the British troops stationed in his country, either to defend him against the Mahrattas, or to assist him in overawing those of his tributaries who were likewise tributaries to the Mahrattas; and after the conquest of Mysore the British government, which by that event had become paramount in India, was obliged to determine the precise nature of the relation in which it would stand, as well to the Nizam's as to the Mahratta government, and that in which those powers should stand to each other.

It was obvious that the Mahrattas would continue to make, and would at length enforce, their unjust demands upon the Nizam's government to the length of replacing affairs at Hyderabad in the situation in which they had been left by the treaty of Kurdlah in 1795, when a Mahratta minister had governed the Nizam's territories. But this was not the only danger. The Nizam's government could not proceed unless its tributaries were brought under subjection. This measure was necessary as well on account of the pecuniary relief which it would afford to the Nizam, as because the rebellion of these tributaries was a dangerous example of insubordination to the governors and collectors of the revenue of the distant provinces of the Nizam's territories. The existence of rebellion and insubordination in any country must always be formidable to its neighbours; but it is particularly so in India: and in the years 1799 and 1800 the existence of these evils was peculiarly inconvenient to the British government, and impeded the settlement of the new government of Mysore and the conquered provinces.

After the peace of Seringapatam, therefore, the British government were compelled to advert to the means of strengthening

the government of the Nizam. Those which occurred were first to encourage and aid the Nizam in raising an army, to be disciplined and commanded by European officers. It would have been impossible to provide the number of English officers which his Highness's service would have required, even if all the persons of this description who might have been prevailed upon to go to India could have been depended upon, and if the national policy in respect to India had allowed of the emigration to that country of such a large body of persons. These European officers must therefore have been foreigners, all of whom have been invariably found to be inimical to the British interests, and principally Frenchmen. Here, then, the evil would have been revived, of which the inconvenience and danger had been felt previous to 1798, and for which the treaty of 1798 had been a remedy.

The second mode which occurred was to encourage the Nizam to raise a Native army. From the treachery of the Native chiefs, from their habits of correspondence and communication with the Mahrattas, and the superiority which this nation had acquired over them in a long series of contests, nothing effectual was to be expected from this measure, and it would have led directly to place the Nizam in a state of subjection to the government of Poonah. The Mahrattas would thus have been brought to the Company's frontier in the Northern Circars, the Carnatic, and to the boundaries of the new government of Mysore. The power of the Poonah state was at that time exercised by Scindiah, who was in his own right in possession of all the Mahratta power in Hindustan. Thus one Mahratta would have had in his hands all the power from the Ganges and Indus to the frontiers of the Carnatic and Mysore; touching the Company's frontier on the whole line, and possessing the means of attacking it where he should think proper. Such a power has never appeared in India, and it is to be hoped never will!

The third mode was to extend the basis of the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798; to make it generally defensive against all powers; and, in fact, to take the Nizam under the protection of the British government.

Adverting to the state of the government of the Nizam, to the fact that it was incapable from weakness of carrying on its ordinary operations over the countries and people submitted to his Highness's authority, excepting by the assistance of a Gallo-Indian army, by means which would have subjected his



Highness to the Mahrattas, or by the assistance of the British government; and that in either of the former cases it would have fallen into the hands of our rivals or enemies, and would have been exercised to our disadvantage, there is no man who will doubt of the propriety of the arrangement made by the treaty of 1800.

But this treaty was preceded and attended by other circumstances, which, as a political measure, rendered it more necessary. It has already been stated that, since the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Mahrattas had never ceased to make vexatious demands upon the Nizam, supported generally by the assembling of armies upon his frontier. The remonstrances and negotiations of the British government had prevented the invasion of his Highness's territories, with a view to enforce the payment of these demands; and there is no doubt that any symptom of an intention to withdraw from his support would have been followed by their immediate conquest, in the same manner as the omission of the British government to interfere between the two powers in 1795 had been the occasion of the war, and the disasters which were followed by the capitulation of Kurdlah.

Here, then, is a new view of the case—a Mahratta conquest made of the Nizam's territories, in consequence of our moderation at least; and the conqueror placed upon our frontier.

If there had been no treaty with the Nizam, if the British had no interest in his preservation excepting what related to themselves, they would have been bound to interfere to prevent this evil.

But besides the great views of policy which rendered the alteration of the treaty of 1798 desirable, as far as related to the employment of the forces, there were other circumstances, of inferior importance certainly, which rendered expedient the other alterations made by the treaty of 1800.

Under the treaty of 1798 the British government had been bound to furnish the Nizam with a certain force, for the payment of a stipulated sum of money monthly. As was usual in all these cases, this subsidy fell in arrear; and the records of the Presidency are filled with accounts of the complaints made of the existence of these arrears, and of the measures adopted to secure their liquidation. These arrears gave rise to complaints and remonstrances from the British government, which of course must have tended to weaken the good understanding which ought to have existed between the Nizam and them; and they were equally prejudicial to the interests of both powers. The grant

of territorial security for the payment of the subsidy removed all these causes of misunderstanding.

The territory which was granted to the Company was that which had been under the government of Tippoo Suldaun, and had been ceded to the Nizam by the treaties of Seringapatam of 1792 and 1799. The authority of the Nizam had never been firmly established in those countries; and the state of confusion in which they were in 1799-1800 was highly prejudicial to the British interests in Mysore, and in the Company's recently acquired countries. The Nizam's treasury had never received anything from those countries; and his Highness had supported the Company's subsidiary troops by funds acquired from other parts of his territories. It was hoped that the introduction of a better system of government would have produced order and regularity among this hitherto turbulent people, a hope which has been completely fulfilled; and this territory now yields a revenue of \_\_\_\_\_, a sum fully equal to pay the expenses of the subsidiary force stationed with the Nizam, and of the administration of government in the provinces which his Highness ceded.

Under this arrangement the Company's frontier is defined by the course of the Toombuddra to its junction with the Kistna; and then by the course of the Kistna to its entry into the province of \_\_\_\_\_. The provinces acquired under this treaty cover the Mysore country to the northward; and have removed the source of danger to be apprehended to that newly established government, from the neighbourhood and example of a turbulent and disaffected people, paying no revenue or obedience to the government under which it is placed.

From the general view which has been given of this arrangement, it will readily be believed that the Nizam wished to accomplish it much more eagerly than the British government did. In fact, his Highness felt that before this arrangement was made his government was not in a state of security; and it will be observed that the security of his Highness' government was the principal object and motive of this treaty. Other objects were connected with this principal motive, equally interesting and advantageous to both the parties to the treaty; and upon the whole it may be said that it does not contain an article or an arrangement in which both parties were not equally interested.

The next subject to which I shall advert is the arrangement made with the Peshwah by the treaty of Bassein. It will be

recollected that the Mahratta government of Poonah had been connected with the British government by a treaty made by Lord Cornwallis on 1st Sept. 1798, commonly called the Treaty of Triple Alliance, against Tippoo Suldaun. Under this treaty his Highness was bound to assist the British government and the Nizam, in case either of these powers were attacked by Tippoo.

After the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, the Mahrattas attacked the Nizam, and the war ended by a peace or capitulation concluded at Kurdlah, by which the Nizam ceded half his territories, placed the remainder under the influence of the Mahrattas, paid a large sum of money, gave up his minister as a prisoner, and appointed other ministers nominated by the Mahrattas. Shortly after this peace the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, died. A contest ensued among the different Mahratta chiefs for the succession to the office of Peshwah, and the possession of the influence and power of the government, which, after various success, ended in the establishment of the present Peshwah, Bajee Rao, and the possession of all the power and influence of the government by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

This chief already had, by right of succession to his relative Mahdajee Scindiah, all the Mahratta territories in Hindustan, situated between the river Nerbudda and Taptee, and the Ganges and Indus. The principal support and instrument of his government was an army disciplined and commanded by French officers, with a formidable train of artillery; and, by his influence at Poonah, he had now acquired that part of the power of the Mahratta government which was not already in his hands.

This was the general state of Mahratta affairs in the year 1798, when Marquess Wellesley assumed the government. But this power of Scindiah's was by no means consolidated. A formidable rebellion prevailed in his territories north of the Nerbudda, which was directed and encouraged by the female relations of his predecessor: and the confusion in the southern parts of the Empire which had attended the progress of the contest for the possession of the power at Poonah, had not subsided upon its establishment in the hands of Scindiah.

Besides these causes of disquietude, Scindiah was not uninterested in the invasion of India by Zemaun Shah, at that time expected. The first effects of that invasion would have been felt by Scindiah; and his only hope of safety was in the assistance which he might derive from the British government.

It appears that, from this state of affairs, the Governor-General,

Marquess Wellesley, endeavoured to derive additional strength and security to every part of the British Empire in India. His first object was to procure the assistance of the Peshwah in the war against Tippoo Sultaun, which was impending, according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Triple Alliance; and with this view he endeavoured first to prevail upon Scindiah to return to Hindustan for the protection of his northern frontier against Zemaun Shah; and secondly, he acquainted the Peshwah with the course of measures he was pursuing for the restoration of the power and activity of the other party to the alliance, the Nizam; and offered to adopt similar measures for the establishment and support of the power of the Peshwah.

With the object of obtaining the assistance of the Mahrattas in the war against Tippoo, was connected another equally important to the permanent interests of Great Britain in India. I have already related the effect which the existence of the Mahratta claims upon the Nizam, and the mode in which they had been enforced, had produced upon the strength of his Highness's government, and upon the general strength and efficiency of the Triple Alliance formed against Tippoo Sultaun, in 1798.

In the view which the British government must have taken of the probable issue of their discussions with Tippoo in 1798, they naturally considered the continuance of that alliance and the strength of all the parties to it as essential to the preservation of the peace of India; and in any event, even if they could have anticipated that which occurred in May, 1799, they must have considered the security of the Nizam's government to be essential to the peace and security of the British territories in the peninsula of India.

The propositions made to the Peshwah, with a view to obtain his assistance in the war, were accompanied by offers to arbitrate in the Mahratta claims on the Nizam, and were attended by a negotiation with Scindiah, to induce him to return to his territories in Hindustan, for their defence against the invasion of Zemaun Shah.

The influence of Scindiah, however, occasioned the failure of this negotiation, and the war against Tippoo was carried on and concluded without the assistance of the Peshwah.

After this event, which ended in the death of Tippoo, the destruction of his power, and the transfer of it to the British government and the allies, the principal object of the Triple Alliance of course existed no longer. The other objects of the

alliance with the Peshwah, viz. the independence of his power in relation to Scindiah, and the arbitration and settlement of the Mahratta claims in his name on the government of the Nizam, still existed. The British government therefore repeated the offers which it had made to the Peshwah, accompanied by others, to allow his Highness to participate in the advantages resulting from the war, which were likewise rejected by the influence of Scindiah.

The negotiation was renewed by the Peshwah at different periods, particularly in the year 1800, when his power and the safety of his person were threatened by Scindiah; but their object was always defeated by the influence and violence of that chief, and by the apprehension of the Peshwah of their effects in the period which must elapse between the moment in which Scindiah might become acquainted with the negotiation and that at which the British troops would be in a position to protect the Peshwah.

At length the confusion which had existed in the northern parts of Scindiah's territories from the period of the death of Mahdajee Scindiah came to a crisis towards the close of the year 1800, which drew Scindiah's attention, and required his presence in that quarter; and here commenced a new scene in Mahratta affairs, which led immediately to the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent transactions in which the British government have been engaged.

It has already been noticed that the female relations of the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were at the head of a party in Hindustan, who were in rebellion against the authority of Scindiah's government. When the contest had lasted for some time, the Mahratta chief, Tuckajee Holkar, who had been next in rank and power to Scindiah, died in the year 1797; and the sons of that chief came to Poonah to arrange with the Peshwah the succession of one of them to the territories of their father. Scindiah's objects in this arrangement were to procure the succession for Cashee Rao Holkar, the legitimate son most likely to favour the pretensions and objects of Scindiah in the Mahratta Empire. The wishes of the family were for Mulhar Rao Holkar, with whom were connected his illegitimate brothers, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Vittojee Rao Holkar.

While the negotiations were going on at Poonah between these different branches of the Holkar family and the Peshwah, Scindiah, on the night of the      Sept. 1797, attacked the camp

of Mulhar Rao Holkar, put him to death, seized his widow, and dispersed all his adherents, including his illegitimate brother. Vittojee Rao Holkar was soon afterwards taken in rebellion against the Peshwah, and was put to death at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar fled first to Hyderabad, and then to Nagpoor, the capital of the Rajah of Berar, where, by the influence of Scindiah, he was put in confinement; and, after a short time, having made his escape from Nagpoor, he fled into Hindustan, where he joined the army of the rebels against the authority of Scindiah's government, assembled under the influence of the female relations of his predecessor. In a short time Holkar acquired considerable influence in the councils and the army of these females, which he soon turned to his own advantage; and he suddenly attacked and plundered them, and placed himself at the head of their troops. He then increased his forces to the utmost extent that was practicable, and on the 17th and 18th July, 1801, made an attack upon a large detachment of Scindiah's regular infantry stationed at Ougein, the capital of Scindiah's government, which detachment he defeated with great slaughter, particularly of their European officers; and he plundered the city of Ougein. This event drew Scindiah's serious attention to the situation of affairs in Hindustan; and he removed from Poonah with his army in the month of Dec. 1800. His agents, however, still conducted the operations of the Peshwah's government. His Highness's prime minister had been appointed by Scindiah; and, although his Highness's person and his councils were in some degree relieved from the previous constraint under which they had labored for some years, no act of the government could be carried into execution without the consent of Scindiah's servants.

When Scindiah arrived in Hindustan with his army the contest between him and Holkar continued with increased violence; and at length Holkar was defeated in a great battle, which was fought at Indore, the capital of the possessions of the Holkar family, on the [14th Oct., 1801]. After this battle, Holkar was obliged to withdraw from Hindustan into the hilly countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, into which Scindiah was unable to carry the war, as his attention was still taken up by the settlement of his government in the north of Hindustan, and his armies were not reunited sufficiently from the loss sustained in the different battles which had been fought. Holkar took advantage of this respite to carry the war across

the Taptee into the Peshwah's country. In the course of the year 1802 he had several engagements with the Peshwah's troops in Candeish and on the Godavery, in which he was uniformly successful, and at length, in the month of October, 1802, he approached Poonah. Scindiah had sent a small detachment of his regular infantry and a body of cavalry to join the remnant of the Peshwah's army; and on the 25th October, 1802, a great battle was fought between these armies, almost within sight of the city of Poonah, which ended in the complete defeat of the troops of the Peshwah and Scindiah. After this battle the Peshwah fled from Poonah into the Konkan, or low country on the sea-coast between Bombay and Goa. Having been pursued by Holkar's troops, he embarked at Severndroog, on board a ship which was sent from Bombay for his accommodation, and he arrived at Bassein, opposite to the Island of Salsette, on the 16th Dec.; and Holkar remained in possession of the authority of the government of Poonah.

During the progress of Holkar in his invasion of the Peshwah's territories, his Highness the Peshwah renewed the negotiations, which had been so frequently broken off, for the assistance of the British government. These negotiations, however, were not brought to a close on the day of the battle near Poonah; and after the result of that day was known, and immediately previous to his flight, his Highness signed a paper, by which he engaged to perform all the material stipulations required by the British government as the conditions on which they would consent to give him the assistance for which he asked. These were, principally, that his Highness would allot a territorial security for the payment of the troops which the Company would detach into his country; that those troops should occupy a position within his territories; that the Company should arbitrate on the differences between him and the Nizam; and that the Peshwah should not enter into any treaty or correspondence with any foreign power excepting with the knowledge and consent of the Company.

When the Governor-General received this paper from Poonah, it was necessary that he should revise all the proceedings in the negotiations at Poonah, and all the reasonings which had led to and operated upon them; and that he should decide according to the new appearance which affairs had taken in the Mahratta Empire since the late revolution.

The principle on which the negotiations at Poonah had turned

since the death of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th May, 1799, had been, the necessity of introducing the arbitration of the British government in the disputes and claims which existed between the Peshwah and the Nizam. It was obvious that unless the British government should interfere, the Nizam must fall under the power of the Mahrattas; and for this reason the treaty of 1798 with the Nizam had been made generally defensive against all powers whatever by the treaty of October, 1800. When this treaty was concluded there existed a necessity for continuing to urge the Peshwah to admit of the arbitration of the British government in the Mahratta claims; or the British government must have been prepared for, and must have expected, war with the Mahratta nation, whenever these claims should be made, and the Mahrattas should find themselves in a condition to enforce them. The attainment of this political object, therefore, was the only one likely to insure the peace of the Peninsula of India.

The introduction of the British troops into the Peshwah's territories was a mere military question, and turned exactly upon the chance of being able to support the Peshwah's power, and of giving him sufficient authority in his own government to enable him to perform his treaty with the Company in favour of the Nizam.

The cession of territory for subsidy was the best mode of avoiding the disputes and inconvenience which had invariably attended these subsidiary alliances in other instances; and the article respecting the intercourse of the Peshwah with foreign states was rendered necessary by the nature of the constitution of the two governments, the alliances by which each was bound, and the laws which regulated their intercourse with foreign states. The necessity for this connexion with the head of the Mahratta Empire was rather increased by the successful invasion of the Peshwah's territories, and by the usurpation of his Highness's authority by Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and the circumstances which existed at the close of the year 1802, and in the commencement of 1803, afforded the fairest prospect of effecting this great object without hostilities.

Immediately after the flight of the Peshwah from Poonah, Holkar took upon himself the government of the Peshwah's territories; but finding that this arrangement was not popular, and gave offence to the chiefs in the southern parts of the Empire, he appointed the son of Amrut Rao, who was the adopted son of the father of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, to be the



new Peshwah; and Amrut Rao to be his minister, and himself to be the head of his armies. He endeavoured to obtain the consent and acknowledgment of the Nizam and of the British government to this arrangement; and while the negotiations were going on upon this subject, it is well known that he was collecting about his person all the pretenders to authority, and the disaffected subjects of the Company and their allies, that could be found; and he was preparing the documents on which he intended to found the vexatious claims of the Mahratta government on the Nizam, the territories of Mysore and Arcot. He was at the same time urging the British government to acknowledge his new dynasty at Poonah, and to interfere in the settlement of the Mahratta affairs. Scindiah, who had been informed by the Governor-General of the progress of the Peshwah's negotiations with the British government in the year 1802, and who must have been aware of the engagement which the Peshwah had signed upon his departure from Poonah, earnestly urged the British government to interfere in the Mahratta affairs, as the only mode of settling their actual confusion. 19150.

The animosity between Scindiah and Holkar still existed with the greatest violence; and in the operations which must be carried on to relieve the Peshwah and to restore his authority, there was every reason to expect that Holkar would find himself exposed singly to the hostility of all the great powers in India, and that he would withdraw from the Peshwah's territories.

Orders were therefore issued for the conclusion of a treaty with the Peshwah, upon the basis of the paper which had been delivered by his Highness to the Resident at Poonah on the day preceding his flight; and the treaty was concluded accordingly on the 31st Dec. 1802. Scindiah's minister, who, as was before related, was the Peshwah's dewan, was privy to the whole transaction; and he, on the part of Scindiah, and on the part of Cashee Rao Holkar, engaged to make good to the Peshwah a part of the expense which he should incur in procuring the interference and assistance of the British government.

The treaty having been concluded on the 31st Dec. 1802, and all the preparatory arrangements made, the British troops marched from the frontiers of Mysore on the 12th March. They were joined on their march by the principal of the Mahratta chiefs and of the Peshwah's officers in the southern parts of the Mahratta Empire. The detachments of Holkar's army, which had been upon the Kistna and Godavery, successively fell back;

and the British troops formed a junction with the Nizam's army and the subsidiary British troops in his Highness's service on the 15th April, within 100 miles of Poonah. Nearly about the same time Holkar withdrew from Poonah to the northward, and left that city to be occupied by the British army. A communication was immediately opened with the Peshwah, who was at Bassein, under the protection of a detachment of the army of Bombay, and his Highness entered Poonah and took upon himself the government of his country on the 13th May.

In this manner this great arrangement was effected without the loss of a man. By a skilful and ready application of the forces and resources of the government, and by taking advantage of opportunities, the ally of the Company was restored to his dignity and to the exercise of his authority; the usurpation of a most rapacious freebooter was destroyed; and this dangerous neighbour was removed from the frontier of the Company's allies. At the same time an arrangement was made which was calculated to preserve peace between the Company's allies, and secure the weak government against the unjust claims of the strong; and, by preserving all in the relative situation in which they were at the moment the arrangement was made, to strengthen all the powers of India against the attacks of a foreign invader, and to secure its internal tranquillity.

From the knowledge which the British government possessed that Scindiah was aware of all the circumstances of the negotiations which the Peshwah was carrying on, that he had earnestly desired their interference in the Mahratta affairs, and, above all, because he must have known that they had acquired a most formidable position for their armies in the Peninsula, of which nothing could deprive them excepting great military success, it was confidently expected that this arrangement would not have occasioned any subsequent hostilities.

But these were not the only grounds on which this expectation of the continuance of peace was founded. Scindiah had, in point of fact, no right to interfere in an arrangement between the Company and the Peshwah, particularly in one concluded under all the circumstances which had attended the treaty of Bassein.

The Mahratta Empire has at times been considered as an institution, in some degree, of the same description with the Empire of Germany; at others it has been considered as the union of a number of chiefs possessing territory and power, acknow-

ledging the Peshwah as their nominal head ; and at others, the Peshwah has been considered as the real head of a government of which Scindiah and others were only the powerful officers. Arguments have been drawn from the supposed existence of all these imaginary forms of government to prove that the Peshwah had no right to enter into the treaty of Bassein without the consent of Scindiah and other chiefs of the Mahratta Empire.

Admitting the existence of all, or any, of these forms of government (and excepting the similarity to the Empire of Germany, all have in reality existed at different periods of the Mahratta history), the fact is, and cannot be denied, that the Peshwah has frequently made treaties, not only to which none of the Mahratta chiefs consented, but to which some of them objected. For instance, the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in 1798, was objected to by Mahdajee Scindiah and Tuckajee Holkar. The treaty of peace in 1792, at Seringapatam, and of partition, was not consented to by any of the Mahratta chiefs. But if it be true that the Peshwah, who is acknowledged by those who reason upon all these different forms of government to be either the real or the nominal head of what is commonly called the Empire, cannot make a treaty without the consent of Scindiah and the other chiefs, it may be presumed that Scindiah and the other chiefs, who are supposed to be of the second rank, cannot make a treaty without the consent of the Peshwah. How is this fact? They make war and peace in their own names against whom they please, when they please, and as they please ; and never use the Peshwah's name, or refer to its authority, excepting as a last subterfuge in the discussions which may attend their negotiations. In point of fact, Scindiah, instead of being a powerful subject, and in that light a party to be consulted in an agreement to be entered into by the Peshwah with the British government, was himself the guarantee of the treaty of Salbye between the same parties.

In this very capacity of guarantee of a treaty he must have been considered, and must have been, in fact, independent of the two powers contracting it. Before he became a guarantee, the history of those times shows that he was independent of the Peshwah. But this very act of guarantee has always been considered important in India, particularly by the Native politicians, as it afforded complete evidence of the division of the Mahratta power.

The hopes of the continuance of peace, then, were founded as

well upon the right of the Peshwah to conclude the treaty of Bassein, as upon the circumstances which attended its negotiation and its execution.

A new party, however, came forward upon this occasion, through whose means and by whose exertions a peace was patched up between Scindiah and Holkar, on which was founded a confederacy against the British government.

The Rajah of Berar had not been engaged in hostilities since the year 1780, when he had marched to the British frontier of Bengal, and had received a sum of money to desist from his hostilities, excepting during the short campaign of 1795, in which he had co-operated with the other Mahrattas against the Nizam. He was the oldest of the chiefs of the present day, and was renowned among them for his wisdom and political knowledge and skill. He had claims upon the power of the state of Poonah, from his relationship to the Rajahs of Sattarah; and he was known to have entertained serious designs of forming an union of all the Mahratta powers against the British government.

When he perceived the advantage which the British government had taken of the existence of the disputes among the Mahratta chiefs, he saw that he must become the victim of the arrangement. Holkar had been obliged to retire to the northward in front of the British troops; but he could not venture to cross the Taptce, as he would then have been exposed to Scindiah's hostility. Holkar would have been unwilling to discharge his army; he could not remain in the Peshwah's territories, or invade those of the Nizam; and his only resource to provide for their subsistence would have been to enter Berar.

The Rajah, who clearly perceived this consequence (and who has since acknowledged this motive for his conduct), determined to endeavour to organise a confederacy of the Mahrattas against the British government.

Whatever might have been the claim of Scindiah to the possession of the power of the Peshwah's government, and the degree of encouragement he gave to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, there is no doubt that he lost solid power by the arrangement, which he could not hope to recover. He had nothing to gain by the continuance of hostilities against Holkar; and the sacrifices which he made, and which he intended should be only nominal, were more than compensated by the advantages which he hoped to acquire from the confederacy, in which, from

the efficiency and the general state of his power, he must act the principal part. Holkar could hope nothing from the continuance of his hostilities with Scindiah. The latter had driven him from Hindustan; and in the course of the years 1801, 1802, in which he had settled his government in the northern parts of India, he had acquired additional strength which he could apply in his contest with Holkar, if it should continue.

A combination of all the Mahratta chiefs, with their forces, had long been an object with the Mahratta politicians; and the plan flattered the national vanity, although it was impracticable, unless attended by great and important military successes at its outset. The Rajah of Berar, therefore, succeeded in patching up a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, none of the important articles of which were performed by either party.

Before I proceed to the relation of the events which followed the treaty of Bassein, it will be proper to discuss the justice and policy of the British government in entering into the treaty of Bassein, on the ground that they must have expected the event which followed it.

I have already pointed out the objects of the treaty, the favourable circumstances under which it was negotiated, and the probability which existed that its arrangements would be carried into execution without a war, and that it would secure the permanent peace of India. But the faithless nature of the Mahratta character, and the habits of the councils of all the chiefs, are so well known, that it may be admitted that the British government ought to have contemplated the chance of a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs to oppose the arrangement.

Considering the nature of the materials of which that confederacy was to be formed; that the two most powerful of the chiefs entertained the most rooted and inveterate animosity against each other; that after they had signed their treaty of peace their hostilities continued, and they could not trust each other so far as to place their armies within reach of attack; that none of the chiefs trusted the other; and that the pride of all prevented them from placing the management of the affairs and the command of the armies of the confederacy in the hands of one; the British government had but little to apprehend from this confederacy, provided vigorous measures were adopted at an early period of time to oppose it effectually, and to prevent it from acquiring strength and consistency by success.

The arrangements which had been made by Lord Wellesley, viz.

the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, the treaty with the Guickowar, the arrangement at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty with the Nizam, of October, 1800, and, above all, the treaty of Bassein, afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success. If the troops did their duty with their usual bravery, its early dissolution became certain; and by the advanced position in which the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein placed the British troops, the evils of the war would be removed to a distance from the British territories, the seat of the resources of the government.

But it is not clear that the omission to conclude the treaty of Bassein would not have led equally to a war with all the powers of the confederated Mahratta states, under circumstances of increased disadvantage. The removal of Holkar from Poonah was absolutely necessary on every ground of justice, policy, and good faith; and if the treaty of Bassein had not been made, the British government must have aided Scindiah in effecting that object. Holkar's armies would have been defeated, and the power of his rival, Scindiah, would have been established in full vigour at Poonah. He would thus again have been in possession of all the Mahratta power from the Ganges and the Indus to the Toombuddra; and his situation would have been so far more advantageous, as in the course of the years 1801 and 1802 he had overcome the rebellion which had till then prevailed in his northern dominions, and had completely established the authority of his own government in those rich countries. His first demand would have been upon the Nizam; and here at once the Company would have come in contact with a Mahratta confederacy, but under very different circumstances of strength from that with which they were engaged in 1803. In this contest Scindiah would have been really, as well as nominally, at the head of the confederacy; he would have had no rival, or rather actual enemy, in Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and would have been able to direct all his forces against the British government. He would have had on his side, instead of against him, all the strength of the Peshwah, including, what is of no small importance, all the strength of the southern chiefs situated on the frontier of Mysore. The Company, on the other hand, would have been obliged to engage with this more formidable confederacy with diminished means and resources, as they would not have had the Peshwah and the southern chiefs on their side. But their principal loss would have been the position

for their armies which the treaty of Bassein gave them. By adopting this position in the Deccan in 1803, the armies were enabled immediately to render offensive the operations of a war which had been undertaken solely for defence. In the war which must have been expected if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded, the operations must have been defensive upon a frontier extending above a thousand miles, assailable in all its parts; and the seat of the war would have been either the heart of the territories of the Nizam, or those of the Rajah of Mysore.

Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was a wise, just, and politic measure; that none of the chiefs had any right to interfere in it or question its stipulations; and that it was concluded under circumstances and at a time which promised that it would be followed by lasting tranquillity. If it should be contended that the British government ought to have expected, as a consequence of the treaty, the confederacy and war which happened in 1803, I answer that, with the military and political advantages they acquired by the treaty of Bassein, they had nothing to fear from that confederacy; and that if they had not concluded the treaty of Bassein they would in a few months afterwards have been involved in a war with the same power, much increased in strength and resources, and possessing superior advantages, while those of the Company, in every point of view, would have been diminished.

As soon as the British government was made acquainted with the measures which had been adopted by the Rajah of Berar to arrange a confederacy of the Mahratta chiefs against the Company, the Governor-General directed that measures should be taken to make the Rajah of Berar and Holkar acquainted with the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to all the chiefs the innocent and defensive nature of the treaty, and the arrangement contained in the article which provided for the security of all their rights. They were at the same time called upon to declare the nature and object of their negotiations, and their views in marching to join each other in a station at so great a distance from the Nizam's frontier. In answer to these representations, Scindiah declared that he could not say whether there would be peace or war till he should meet the Rajah of Berar. After Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had joined their troops in a position which enabled them in one march to enter the Nizam's territories, letters were presented to them from the Governor-General, in which the nature and objects

of the treaty of Bassein were fully discussed and explained. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar wrote the following answers to these letters. In the mean time the peace between Scindiah and Holkar had been signed, although but one article of it had been carried into execution, viz. that which stipulated that Hindoo Rao Holkar, the infant and posthumous son of Mulhar Rao Holkar, should be delivered over by Scindiah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The object of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in writing these answers to the Governor-General's letter was to gain time, to allow the season of the rains to pass over, to conciliate the confidence and receive the co-operation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to complete their preparations for attack on all parts of the frontier of the Company and the allies. Early measures, however, had been adopted by the British government to resist their hostilities, and their armies were completely prepared in the middle of July, 1803. It was an object of importance to bring the confederates to a decision whether there should be peace or war before the season of the rains should pass over, before they should have time to complete their preparations, and to conciliate the confidence of Holkar. Accordingly the following letter was written to them by the commanding officer in the Deccan, in answer to their letters to the Governor General. They refused to comply with the reasonable demand contained in this letter, and the British Resident quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 3rd Aug. and hostilities immediately commenced.

It is useless to follow the operations of the British armies. It is sufficient to state, that, owing to the preparations which were made, the positions which they had taken, and the favourable season in which the military operations were commenced, they were uniformly successful; and the result was, the early dissolution of the confederacy, in which Holkar never joined, and that in less than two months the confederates sued for peace.

Treaties were concluded with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the end of December, 1803, by which the allies gained an acknowledgment of the treaty of Bassein. The Company acquired from the Rajah of Berar the district of Cuttack, &c., by which they insured the defence of a weak part of the frontier of Bengal, and the continuity of their possessions, and the certainty of a communication at all times between the Presidency of Fort William and Fort St. George. On the north west frontier they acquired from Scindiah all his possessions on both banks of the



Jumna ; by which they got that river for a frontier, and secured its navigation, an object of infinite importance to the commerce of that part of the country. They also acquired from Scindiah the town, port, and territory of Baroach, in Guzerat, by which they secured the government of the Guickowar, and all the Company's interests in that quarter. Scindiah was also obliged to relinquish the influence which he had exercised over the person and power of the Mogul ; and to admit the independence of all the petty states in the north of India, who, during the war, had connected themselves by treaty with the Company. By this arrangement, which affected the Rajpoot state of Jeypoor, and all the petty Rajahs to the northward of that state, the Mahrattas were removed to a distance from the Company's frontier, which was surrounded and guarded by these petty states.

The Nizam acquired by these treaties an exemption from all demands of all descriptions on his territories by the confederates. He also acquired on the side of Scindiah a defined boundary, and all the territories belonging to Scindiah which were within that boundary.

From the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam acquired the province of Berar, with the river Wurda and the hills to the northward as a frontier ; by which cession he gained an addition of revenue amounting to 800,000*l.* annually.

The Peshwah acquired from Scindiah the fort and territory of Ahmednuggur, and, by an arrangement made with Amrut Rao at the commencement of the war, he had acquired the jaghire of this chief upon the Godavery. By these arrangements his territories became compact ; the city of Poonah was rendered more secure, and the pretext of posting troops in the neighbourhood for the purpose of collecting the revenues of territories in that quarter was annihilated.

Besides these advantages acquired by each of the allies by this war, the British government destroyed entirely the corps in the service of the enemy, which was commanded and officered by Frenchmen, and took from them not less than 823 pieces of ordnance. The advantages resulting from these military successes will be best understood by reflecting on the difficulties and losses sustained in gaining them, and on the reputation for bravery and other military qualities acquired by our officers and troops.

During this war with the confederacy the conduct of Holkar

had been rather favourable than otherwise to the British government. This chief had employed his army in levying contributions in the countries under the government of Scindiah situated north of the Nerbudda, and in endeavours to establish the authority of his infant nephew in the jaghire of the Holkar family. When Scindiah was obliged to collect a body of troops at Ougein, in consequence of the progress made by the army in Guzerat towards that capital, Holkar proceeded to the northward, and began to plunder the Rajpoot states. Shortly afterwards, peace was concluded between the British government and the other members of the confederacy.

## I. MYSORE.

### 1. WAR WITH TIPPOO.

#### 1. Draft of Observations upon Mornington's Minute.

##### *Inexpediency of a prompt breach with Tippoo.*

28th June, 1798.

The reasoning upon the proclamation of the Governor of Mauritius, and upon the evidence of the persons who were there at the time it was issued, is conclusive.

There is not a doubt but that Tippoo offered to conclude, and that he, in fact, has concluded with that Government, an alliance offensive and defensive against the British nation, and that the immediate object of that alliance is to drive us out of India. These circumstances I must, however, say do not appear upon the face of the proclamation, or even upon a cursory and slight view of it; nay, the proclamation itself, unaccompanied by the evidence which has been procured of the conduct of the Ambassadors at Mauritius, would not be sufficient evidence to lead to the two conclusions which I have above stated, neither would the landing of the troops at Mangalore lead to it; but the evidence of the officers of the *Brisk*, which throws a light upon the conduct of the Ambassadors whilst at Mangalore, is what leads to the strong conclusion that the alliance, as stated in the proclamation, was offered, and has been concluded.

The consequence of that alliance has been an addition to the forces of Tippoo of 150 men at most, and a certainty that he can receive no more assistance from the island of Mauritius.

I shall presently inquire what chance he has of assistance from France; but as he stands at this moment, we know that in consequence of his late negotiations and offensive alliance he has got no more than 150 men. If we had not had a long and expensive war in Europe, if our allies were all ready to assist even as they did in the last war, if the Company's resources in this country were in a flourishing condition, or if any resource existed to

which recourse might be had in order to carry on the war at all, short of lessening the investment, which must be so severely felt both here and in England, I should not hesitate to declare that the cause of war was sufficient, and that either security must be given that no steps will be taken in consequence of this alliance, or that Tippoo must be attacked, and put in such a state as will secure us against his machinations in future. As, however, we are not in the fortunate circumstances which are desirable before we enter into a war, I have considered whether it is not possible to get rid of this subject without going so deeply into it as to render it requisite to save our honour that we should do that which makes a war almost inevitable,

The consequence of the alliance to Tippoo I have above stated to be an additional force of 150 men. That certainly cannot be very dangerous to us; and whatever might have been his hope and his intentions before he received it, he cannot now have an idea of carrying the intentions of the alliance into execution.

If we are to have a war at all, it must be one of our own creating; a justifiable one, I acknowledge; one which we shall think necessary, not on account of any danger which we may immediately apprehend, but one which we suppose may eventually be the consequence of this alliance with the French, and in order to punish Tippoo for a breach of faith with us.

Here arises the question whether it is probable that the French will or can assist Tippoo with troops, and whether that assistance will be such as to give us any just cause to apprehend much greater danger from delaying the war than we shall certainly derive benefit to our resources by it.

Upon the first question it is useless to say much. The obstacles to the departure of any French force from Europe are obvious to everybody. They must then pass the squadron at the Cape, and, even if their first object were not the recovery of the French settlement at Mauritius, they would then have to elude the vigilance of the squadron here, which would have but a small extent of coast to watch, and it is therefore probable would succeed in intercepting them.

The next question is, what is the extent of the force which France could give and he would receive. In men France could assist him to any extent, provided she could transport them; but I don't believe he would accept, nor do I believe she could transport, a larger number than 3000 men. She certainly could not

send them away without the knowledge of our Government, and increasing the chances of their being intercepted. The Governments in India would likewise know of their being sent ; the squadron would be prepared to intercept them, and the forces in the field to make the attack upon Tippoo, probably before they were landed at Mangalore.

But even if this force were landed, considering that they would be in the service of a native power who neither can nor will understand the manner in which Europeans must be treated in this climate in order that they may render effectual service, and that they will be for a considerable time at a distance from the scene of action, they would be reduced to half their number before they saw their enemy, and even then the service they would render would not be equal to that of half their number in the Company's service.

Is there, then, any danger in deferring the war to that period when your resources will have revived, when you will have the benefit of the assistance of all your allies and others which it is not necessary to mention, but the want of which will be most severely felt at present?

In my opinion, if it be possible to adopt a line of conduct which would not lead immediately to war, provided it can be done with honour, which I think indispensable in this Government, it ought to be adopted in preference to that proposed in the conversations. I would, therefore, propose that, in canvassing this question, the evidence of the officers of the *Brisk* should be sunk. That, in my opinion, alone proves the alliance to have been concluded, and enables us to prove it from the proclamation and the landing of the troops. Let the proclamation be sent to Tippoo with a demand that he should explain it and the landing of the troops. Don't give him reason to suppose that we imagine he has concluded an alliance with the objects stated in the proclamation ; and finding he has derived so little benefit from the alliance, there is every probability that he will deny the whole, and be glad of an opportunity of getting out of the scrape. In the mean time we shall believe as much as we please, and shall be prepared against all events.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 2. Memorandum upon the Barahmahal.

*Measures recommended for defending the Carnatic, and prosecuting the war offensively.*

(Extracts.)

18th July, 1798.

I will now recapitulate the measures, purely defensive, which I recommend, First, with a view to prevent devastation by looties :

1. That the pettahs of the occupied hill forts and the mud forts should be kept in such a state as to prevent cavalry from riding into them. That old guns may be left in them, and a small quantity of ammunition, and that a few matchlock peons may be hired for the defence of the latter in time of war.

2. That the villages may be enclosed by good bound hedges and gateways.

3. That measures may be taken to form good partisans, with a particular local knowledge of those countries in which they are likely to act.

Secondly, with a view to defence against a solid enterprise I recommend :

1. That Amboor and Sautghur may be strengthened.

2. That a good engineer may be called upon for a plan for fortifying and making tenable the hill fort Sasarow, above Vellore. It is commanded by the neighbouring hills, and was in danger of being taken by Hyder in the war of '80. It made an admirable defence.

3. That Chinroyen Droog may be repaired again.

4. That a plan may be adopted for contracting the defences of Kistnagherry upon similar principles to those upon which Ryacotta has been strengthened. It will then require fewer men to defend it, and will spare more for *la petite guerre*.

5. That Verabudder Droog may be put in a state of defence.

6. That the defences of the Lingarpet and Changama Pass may be reversed.

7. That Sankerry Droog may be repaired again, and its works contracted.

8. That Namkool may be put in a state of defence.

9. That the Nabob may be required to finish the fortifications which he has begun at Trichinopoly.

10. That in all these places, ordnance, stores, and provisions,

and every requisite which the necessary garrison may want for a siege of<sup>1</sup>      months, may be placed as soon as possible.

11. That all the other hill forts and strong holds which are not to be kept as garrisons (excepting mud forts, &c. &c., which I have noticed) in the Barahmahal and Salem countries, and in the valley of Amboor, may be immediately destroyed effectually.

\*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*

In general it is a rule that no part of the equipment of an army ought to be placed too near the enemy's frontier. Whatever advantage there might be in having provisions, artillery, and stores far advanced towards the point of attack, unless the army is on the same spot the enemy might place himself between its equipment and it, might cut them off for a time, or if skilful, might deprive your army of them entirely. The risk is greater than the advantage; and therefore in general the equipments of an army ought to be placed in a central spot, where the largest part of the army may collect, and from whence it may commence its operations. Applying that general rule to the circumstances of the army in the Carnatic, I recommend that the equipments, such as artillery, military stores, &c., may be placed eastward of the Changama Pass or in Vellore.

\*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*      \*

The measures, then, which I recommend with a view to offensive operations are :

1. That 450,000 maunds of grain may be stored in Kistnagherry and Ryacotta, and 100,000 maunds in Arnee. As I find that for certain reasons a contract for the grain for cattle is preferred to an agency, a smaller quantity would be necessary. In that above mentioned I include grain for cattle, rice for followers, &c. &c.

2. That Arnee may be made the *depôt* for battering-train, field-train, and their equipments; for camp equipage and military stores of all kinds.

3. That that place may be properly fortified.

4. That an establishment of<sup>1</sup>      draught bullocks for the artillery may be constantly kept there.

5. That the disposable force of the army may be stationed there.

6. That the communications and roads to and along the frontier may be shortened as much as possible, and perfected.

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<sup>1</sup> Blank in MS.—*Ed.*

3. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Desirableness of prompt negotiation with Tippoo.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 19th Sept., 1798.

There is one circumstance, however, of which I was not aware till lately, which has had great weight upon my mind. It is this: unless you can march from hence early in January, you can't expect to do any good, as the Malabar monsoon in May will oblige you to retire from Seringapatam. Will you be able to march in January? Certainly not, as the Bengal troops will not arrive till the latter end of that month. If, then, you cannot expect to do anything effectual this year, it is not worth while, by keeping back your proposition, to risk to engage in hostilities in which everything short of the most complete success (viz. being able to invest Seringapatam with a good prospect of taking it) is ruin.

Therefore, as it is probable that it will prevent him from commencing hostilities, which, from circumstances, must be ruinous to us, I think your proposition ought to be made as soon as possible.

4. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Should Tippoo be required to renounce his connexion with the French?*

(Extracts.)

Fort St. George, 21st Oct., 1798.

I still think, as I always have, that the want of a Commander-in-Chief, the scarcity of money, the war in Europe, are strong reasons to avoid a war here if possible; and that the re-establishment of the alliance, forcing Tippoo to receive an ambassador, and placing the army in the Carnatic in a respectable state of preparation permanently, might be considered as taking as great advantage of the circumstances of the times as any man could expect.

There being, then, these difficulties in the way of carrying on a war, I recommend that nothing should be demanded which is not an object of immediate consequence; and therefore, although I acknowledge that a great object would be gained if the French were sent away, and if Tippoo were prevailed upon to engage not to take them or others into his service again, I would confine the demand to his receiving an ambassador from us.



I think that he will agree to that, but the personal interest which the French have in remaining in his service will induce them to endeavour to prevent him from signing a treaty so prejudicial to them and the avowed objects of their government in Europe. Considering how late the message from you will go, his conduct upon the last treaty at Seringapatam, and his disposition to hostilities, no additional inducement ought to be given to him to break with us.

\* \* \* \* \*

At the same time I am aware of the advantages of the terms which you propose in your minute.

Perhaps it is not so necessary that he should send away the Frenchmen which [*sic*] he has now, as that he should agree to take no more. We must expect that at the close of this war in Europe hordes of Frenchmen will come out here. They are not to be considered hereafter in this country in the same light in which they were formerly. They were then under some regulation, as are the subjects of Great Britain; but now not only they will be under no regulation, but they will come here for no reason excepting to make mischief; and if Tippoo does not become cordially our friend, his durbar will be a perpetual scene of French intrigue against the British nation. It is true that that is an evil which may bring its own remedy; he may become jealous, and tired of their constant *tracasseries*.

##### 5. Reflections upon the plan for having the army in the Carnatic at all times in a state of preparation.

*Is a Bengal reinforcement necessary for besieging Seringapatam? Madras and Bombay can supply an army equal to that of Cornwallis; and our present circumstances are more favourable than his were. Assuming that a reinforcement is requisite; by what arrangement it can most conveniently be provided; and what local preparations should be made for mobilizing the Madras army.*

26th Oct., 1798.

The first question to be considered is, whether, with any preparation, the greatest army which it is possible for the Company to maintain in the Carnatic can, in co-operation with the army on the Malabar coast, take the field with any prospect of success without assistance in men from Bengal. The object which these armies must have is the siege of Seringapatam, and can they

undertake it with any reasonable prospect of success, with the numbers which it is possible for them to bring into the field?

Cavalry:

|                         |              |
|-------------------------|--------------|
| Native . . . .          | 1,600        |
| European . . . .        | 800          |
|                         | <hr/> 2,400  |
| Artillery . . . .       | 400          |
| Native infantry . . . . | 9,000        |
| Europeans . . . .       | 3,500        |
|                         | <hr/> 15,300 |

These numbers are according to an enlarged calculation of General Harris, which provides for leaving in Fort St. George, and other necessary garrisons in the Carnatic, a sufficient number of troops to defend them. What the army from the Malabar side would be, it is impossible to say; but I will suppose it 5000 men, composed as usual of European and Native infantry, and of European artillery. Thus the army destined for the siege of Seringapatam would consist of 20,000 men.

It is impossible to decide absolutely whether this army would be sufficient for the siege of Seringapatam without having been at that place, and knowing not only its former but its present situation. We must therefore have recourse to conjecture upon this subject, and must be led by probabilities founded upon the experience of the former war; and we must at the same time take into consideration the circumstances which bear upon the question, and which have occasioned an alteration in our situation since that time. When Lord Cornwallis made his attempt he had about 20,000 men. He had, it is true, a larger number of Europeans than the army would have at present, and a larger proportion of artillery; but I believe the total numbers of his army were not greater than what I have above stated that we should have under the arrangement proposed by General Harris.

There are some circumstances, however, in the relative situation of this army and Tippoo's which are considerably advantageous to us. The first of these is, that we have now a considerable body of regularly disciplined cavalry: at that time we had none. Another is, that he had at that time the frontier: we have it now. He had parties which acted constantly in our rear, which obliged Lord Cornwallis occasionally to detach large bodies not only for the immediate protection of his convoys, but for the safety of the Carnatic, and probably that of his own

army: as we have now that iron frontier, the fortresses of which we never had in our possession in the last war, there is no reason to expect that the same detachments which were then necessary will be equally so in any war that we may have in future.

Another consideration is, that in the former war the operations from unavoidable causes took two campaigns. One of these was the necessity of reducing Bangalore. At present Bangalore is destroyed; and although that may by some be reckoned a disadvantage, yet as it is not absolutely necessary to adhere to that route to Seringapatam, the disadvantage of wanting the place as a *dépôt* is more than counterbalanced by the advantage of not being obliged to wait to take it. Either by the route of Cauveryporam or Ryacotta, the communication between Seringapatam and one of our own fortresses is nearly as short as it is between that place and Bangalore; and there is this additional advantage by using one of these last routes, that there will be no necessity to take many of those large and strong hill forts to which Lord Cornwallis laid siege and took in the last war. This will save much time.

Another circumstance of advantage in the destruction of Bangalore is, that, as probably the operations will not linger out to two campaigns, there will not be so much necessity for a junction with the Allies as there was in the last war, and time will not be lost in effecting the junction, and time and troops will be saved in taking the places of which it was necessary to have possession in order to insure their communication with their own country, and all the benefits which we must expect to derive from their co-operation. In every future war the possession of our present frontier will enable us to commence our operations more from the southward, and the measures taken to secure a supply of grain upon the scene of action will enable us to proceed without the immediate assistance of our Allies.

Under these circumstances, then, it appears not only that the army would be as large as that which Lord Cornwallis had, and with which he succeeded, but that this country has many advantages at present which it had not at that time, and which would enable the Government to undertake the operation with a better prospect of success than it had formerly, and of success in a shorter period of time.

Those, however, who know most upon this subject, at least whose official situation enables them to be the best judges, say that this number of men is not sufficient, and that it is impos-

sible to commence the operations against Tippoo Sultaun without assistance in men from Bengal. It becomes therefore necessary to consider the question relating to the state of preparation of this army with a reference to that assertion, supposing it to be well grounded.

The march of a detachment, say of six thousand men, from Bengal, may be supposed to take six months at least. Whether the number of men is six thousand or eight thousand, it is a matter of indifference; but it is certain that, whatever the number may be, it cannot take less than six months, and probably it will take more, to bring them down by land.

If then it will take six months to bring down that which will alone enable the Government to undertake anything effectual against the enemy, why may not the preparations be making during the time that the reinforcement is on its march? Why should the Company be put to the expense of keeping up an immense army of 15,000 men constantly in a state of preparation for the field, when those who are in the command of it, and who propose that it should be kept up to that extent, are of opinion that even then it can do nothing?

The question then is, is it advisable to incur this large expense under these circumstances? Those articles of preparation which will occasion expense are, 1st, an establishment of bullocks for the train; 2ndly, one for carriage; 3rdly, a depôt of grain; 4thly, an augmentation of the Native troops, in order to make the number of those in the centre division in readiness equal to 9000; 5thly, camp equipage for the officers.

There is no doubt but that bullocks might be provided for the train during the time that the Bengal detachment would be coming down, if it is to come down by land; and therefore that it may be said that the expense of keeping up draught bullocks in time of peace, with a view to their use in war, would not be necessary. However, in answer thereto, it may be said, 1st, that the measures which I shall propose presently may bring the Bengal detachment here in a shorter period than six months; 2ndly, that the draught bullocks which will have been trained for a certain time, will be better than any which are provided just at the moment when they are wanted; 3rdly, not a military, but a political object will be gained by having some bullocks, as it will not be necessary that foreign powers should know the full extent of our preparations, and probably they may have the effect of preventing the execution of any

hostile design. I therefore think that at all events it is advisable to have always 1500 draught bullocks ready.

2ndly. The carriage bullocks.

I understand that these are to be had in any number by making advances to the bullock owners or maistries in proportion to the number wanted; that two months will give any number that the army may want; and that any permanent expense, however great (short of the expense of keeping at all times the entire number wanted), would not produce them in a shorter time. If this is the case, it is not advisable to incur any expense under this head.

3rdly. The expense of a depôt of grain is so trifling, it gives so much ease to all the first movements of the army, and renders its operations so certain, that it ought certainly to be incurred.

4thly. The augmentation of the army.

General Harris proposes that <sup>1</sup> regiments should be added to its present numbers, even supposing that all the regiments were in the Carnatic, &c., and that other means of defence were found for Ceylon and the conquests to the eastward. According to his distribution, there would then be 9000 disposable Native infantry in the centre division, and all the garrisons would be amply provided for. Here will be the great expense; and as even that number of men will not enable this Government to make a forward movement, and as a reinforcement from Bengal must still be waited for, I recommend that no part of it should be incurred.

The number which I think sufficient is from 4000 to 5000 Natives in the centre division; and the number of regiments which therefore ought to be struck off General Harris's account is two. The manner in which I propose to provide the remainder of the men is, 1st. To put the Bengal marine battalion upon the establishment, and make it a regiment of two battalions, or 2000 men, all to be raised at Chittagong. 2ndly. To turn the Calcutta militia into another marine regiment of 2000 men. 3rdly. If the Nawab-Vizier will consent to reduce his establishment of troops, and to take our troops in lieu of them, to raise at Chittagong and upon the sea coast all the regiments which must be added to the establishment in consequence thereof; but at all events to add a third marine regiment of 2000 men to the establishment, even if you should be obliged to reduce one of the high caste regiments at present in the service.

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<sup>1</sup> Blank in MS.—*Ed.*

These marine regiments should always be kept at Barrackpoor, Midnapoor, Burhampoor, &c. &c., in the neighbourhood of Calcutta: they would answer equally well with the others for doing the duty of those places; and they would not only enable the Supreme Government, in addition to volunteers, to send to this country a large body of troops in a short time at short notice, but they would be a body of troops which might be employed in all parts of India, and would therefore add infinitely to the power of the Company, which is cramped by the prejudices and habits of the Bengal Native troops.

If it should be necessary to add any regiments to this establishment in consequence of the arrangements with the Nizam, they ought to be raised here; as the sepoy of this country are cheaper, and I must say better, than any that can be got in Bengal. It may then be said, why not raise in this country any force which must be raised avowedly for the purposes of its defence? It must be observed, however, there will be no additional force, at least a very small one: it will be only an arrangement, making a battalion a regiment, turning militia into regulars, and making a high caste regiment one which will go to sea.

4thly. Camp equipage for the officers.

What has been said upon the subject of carriage bullocks applies equally to the means of conveying camp equipage. It can always be got ready before the army is ready to take the field, but a sufficiency for a very large body of troops ought to be kept in the stores in the centre division.

Having noticed those subjects which General Harris has mentioned, I come now to the consideration of one of which he has taken no notice. It is the repair of the garrisons upon the frontier and in the Carnatic. Both require it, and it will cost some money immediately, as well as annually a certain sum.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 6. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

*Articles of the ultimatum to be offered to Tippoo.*

(Extract.)

Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur, 2nd Jan., 1799.

Your propositions to Tippoo ought to be moderate, at least so much so as to make it probable that he will acquiesce in

them, because I am of opinion that our war cannot be successful in one campaign. First, there is a general scarcity of grain in the country, which will greatly impede our military operations. Secondly, there is a want of money, which must be fatal. Thirdly, there is a chance that the Nizam's troops will not join us in time to enable us to advance together to the siege of Seringapatam. Fourthly, preparations do not appear to be sufficiently advanced on the Malabar side of India to make it certain that we shall have the co-operation of the Bombay army. Fifthly, we have no General. I have repeated some of these objections to hostilities so frequently, that I am afraid I shall be accused of boring Mornington; but some of them are new, and have been occasioned by the circumstances of the present time.

There are three demands which can be made upon Tippoo. First, that he should receive an ambassador. Secondly, that he should dismiss his Frenchmen, taken into his service under his offensive treaty. Thirdly, that he should give up to us his sea coast. I think still that the first would give security, but I see that preparations are very forward, and I know that our war must in the end be successful, and therefore I would demand the second. As to the third: first, I don't think it absolutely necessary for our security, as, in consequence of having a resident with him, we shall be able to watch his transactions with the French, and can guard his coast by our cruisers when we find it necessary to prevent his communication by sea with European powers. But I think it will be difficult hereafter to prevail upon any French to adventure in this country when it will be known that Tippoo has sent away those whom he took into his service under the terms of the most solemn treaty. In the next place, I don't think that we have any right to expect that he should give up territory without a war, which even the most successful war might not enable us to gain. If that be true, we must give him something in exchange, and I don't see anything that we can give him to lose which would not be a greater disadvantage than we can possibly reap benefit from the acquisition. If the Allies would give up a portion of their territory for what we now demand, and would take compensation from us in peshcush or remission of subsidy for our troops they have in their service, it might answer; but I imagine it will be as difficult to persuade them to do that as to persuade Tippoo to give up his coast.

Thirdly, there is another view of the question which relates to the Allies. How are we to divide with them what we may acquire? The fairness of the division in the last war is the cause of the ease with which they are prevailed upon to join us at present; and no division at all, which must be the case if we get the sea coast, or a division disadvantageous to them, may occasion jealousies which will eventually do us more harm than anything we can gain will do us good.

### 7. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Why the Governor-General should not join the army; and Lord Mornington's reply.*

Camp near Vellore, 29th Jan., 1799.

My dear Mornington,

I have just received a letter from Henry, in which he has desired that I should give you my opinion respecting the propriety and utility of your joining the army and accompanying it during the campaign.

I am entirely ignorant of the objects which you may have in view in coming, which may certainly counterbalance the objections I have to the measure; but it appears to me that your presence in camp, instead of giving confidence to the General, would in fact deprive him of the command of the army, and that scene would be acted over again, probably in the presence of the enemy, which, to my annoyance, I have so often witnessed at Madras. Every thing which the General might think necessary will be thwarted and canvassed, not by you probably, but by those whom you will naturally wish to consult; the General's own staff, and the principal officers of his army, who ought to think of nothing excepting how his orders are to be carried into execution, instead of their propriety, and in what manner they shall thwart them if they should not approve of them. All I can say upon the subject is, that if I were in General Harris's situation, and you joined the army, I should quit it.

In my opinion he is at present awkwardly situated, and he will require all the powers which can be given to him to keep in order the officers who will be in his army. Your presence



will diminish his powers, at the same time that as it is impossible you can know anything of military matters, your powers will not answer the purpose, which even those which he has at present may, if you or Lord Clive are not in the army<sup>1</sup>.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

The General arrived in camp this morning.

### 8. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Authority and prestige of the Commander-in-Chief to be strengthened.*

(Extract.)

Camp near Vellore, 4th Feb., 1799.

The rules of patronage ought to be the same at Madras as they are in Bengal, where the Governor-General, although

<sup>1</sup> Lord Mornington thus replied to the above:—

Fort St. George, 2nd Feb., 1799.

My dear Arthur,

You will not be surprised at my long silence under all the circumstances of the late crisis. Nothing has given me more pleasure than to hear from all quarters such unqualified commendations of your arrangements in your late command. I wish to God the whole were under your direction; but even as it is, I think our success is certain: and I found my opinion on the united sentiments of Close, Beatson, Macaulay, and Agnew.

I entirely concur in your opinion respecting the impropriety of my taking the field with the army: my judgment was always the same as yours; but certain persons made such a clamour on the subject, that I wished to learn how you thought upon it. Your observation with respect to military counteraction in this place is perfectly just: it is with the utmost difficulty that I can restrain the Council (I except *no one*) from interference in the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements; but I have now plainly declared war against every attempt of the kind, and I trust that Harris will now find no impediment to the prompt execution of such orders as must be carried into effect here. Henry means to proceed to the army in a day or two: he will communicate fully to you all my sentiments and intentions.

Ever yours most affectionately,

MORNINGTON.

probably the most powerful subject in the world, cannot in the ordinary course of business make a corporal. Here the Commander-in-Chief, by the encroachments of Lord Hobart, first upon General Brathwaite, and lastly upon Sir A. Clarke (and by the operation of throwing all the business of the army into the Military Board, where he debates with the officers who ought to execute his orders), has no more power over the army than if he were a common soldier. The whole establishment look to the Governor for favour and promotion instead of to their legal head; and thus it is that the Commander-in-Chief becomes contemptible to the army which he is to lead. I told Lord Clive all this long ago, and particularly stated to him the necessity of giving the General credit at least for the appointments of the different Commissaries, if he did not allow him to make them. It was impossible to make him too respectable, or to hold him too high, if he was to be placed at the head of the army in the field.

This want of respectability, which is to be attributed in a great measure to the General himself, is what I am most afraid of: however, I have lectured him well upon the subject, and I have urged publicly to the army, in which I flatter myself I have some influence, the necessity of supporting him, whether he be right or wrong.

#### 9. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Prospects of the war. The writer's personal exertions, and their official recognition.*

Camp near Wallajah-Nuggur,  
27th Feb., 1799.

My dear Mornington,

In a letter which I received from General Harris yesterday he informed me that you had appointed me one of a Commission with Colonel Close, Colonel Agnew, and Captain Malcolm; but I have not yet seen the instructions, nor any of the papers relating to the objects with which you have intrusted us, to which you have referred me.

I expect General Harris in this camp to-morrow, when I will read all those papers.

I am glad that you are prepared for a failure, and that you

have framed instructions accordingly, which I will give at the proper moment. Considering the lateness of the season, and that we are run almost to a day, it is possible for the enemy to throw such impediments in our way as to prevent us from laying siege to his capital in this year; and as matters have been already in some degree mismanaged, I should be sorry to see our future operations and the safety of the army committed to the dictates of ——'s judgment. •

My despondency goes thus far, and no farther; and as it has induced you to think it possible for us to fail, and to provide for such an event, I think I have done better to make it known to you, than to tell you that it was impossible that we should not succeed.

It is better to see and to communicate the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise, and to endeavour to overcome them, than to be blind to everything but success till the moment of difficulty comes, and then to despond.

No force which the French can land on the Malabar coast must prevent us from following up our object. I understand that our stores and provisions which are to come from the Malabar side will be in safety at the top of the Ghaut under charge of a small force, and a garrison must be left in Cannanore. Not another man ought to be sent even to watch them, if he can be usefully employed at the siege.

Tippoo is the main spring of their means of annoying us in India; and their arrival on the Malabar coast ought to have no effect upon us, excepting to induce us to accelerate our operations against Seringapatam. Till they join him they cannot move, and will probably subsist with difficulty: they will depend upon him for everything, and I think that we can contrive to occupy his attention sufficiently to prevent him from moving towards them.

If we succeed in our attempt upon Seringapatam, their destruction is certain; as the Malabar monsoon, the climate, their intemperance, their want of Native allies, and consequently of everything, will nearly effect it for us before the season comes round in which we can operate against them. If we fail in our attempt, the question will be, whether we shall retire to the Malabar province, or towards the Carnatic, or what portion of the army ought to go to the one, and what to the other.

If the French land, it will certainly be necessary to send a part

of the army back to the Malabar side; but as in the next season we shall have to carry on a very extensive warfare, for which the Carnatic is best, or indeed alone, able to furnish the supplies of troops, rice, and cattle we shall want, I should imagine that the largest part of the army ought to retire towards this part of India.

I don't think that anything can be done at present excepting to desire that the Admiral will remain upon the coast as long as he possibly can, and even leave something there during the monsoon.

General Harris has sent me an extract of a letter from Mr. Webbe to him, written by your desire. I am much obliged to you for the notice you take of what I did for the public service, and I wish for several reasons that you had a Commander-in-Chief under you, who, when he approved of the conduct of an officer, would have a sufficiency of spirit to make known his approbation. The fact is that when I went to the army there was not a grain of rice to be got in the country: I bustled through the difficulty, and in a short time had plenty in my camp; and not only I took nothing from the public stores, but if what I desired had been done, I should have thrown a large supply into them which I did not want; and, notwithstanding all opposition, I did form a small store, which, if they had known how to use it, would have been of essential consequence in the moment of difficulty and scarcity. Besides that, I paid a sum of money into the General's hands for the public service which other officers had always heretofore taken to themselves.

The General expressed his approbation of what I had done, and adopted as his own all the orders and regulations I had made, and then said that he should mention his approbation publicly, only that he was afraid others would be displeased and jealous. One of these others, General Floyd, had been in a similar situation with mine, but his army was starving: he had been supplied from the public stores at Madras, Vellore, and Arnee, and latterly by me from my own camp.

As in fact there is nothing to be got in the army but credit, and as it is not always that the best intentions and endeavours to serve the public succeed, it is hard that when they do succeed they should not receive the approbation which it is acknowledged by all they deserve. I was much hurt about it at the time, but I don't care now, and shall certainly continue to do every-

thing to serve General Harris, and to support his name and authority.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHIUR WELLESLEY.

Pray don't show this letter to anybody but Henry, and tell him that Mons. de Meuron has just been here about *du ris au bazar*.

Upon reading over my letter, I find that in stating my own grievances I have omitted one thing, which is, that the moment General Harris came to the army, and relaxed or altered the system which I had adopted, he began to want, which want increased to distress, and I assure you was at last very near famine. It is now, however, all over; we have plenty, and not too cheap.

#### 10. Draft of the Description of our march to Major-General St. Leger.

##### *March of the army to Seringapatam.*

The British grand army and the Nizam's army had joined previous to our entering Mysore, and marched together. The former consisted of about 3000 excellent cavalry, five strong regiments of European infantry, all good, and eleven battalions of sepoy, with about fifty pieces of cannon.

The Nizam's army, under my command, consisted of the 33rd, six excellent battalions of the Company's sepoy, four rascalion battalions of the Nizam's, which, however, behaved well, and really about 10,000 (which they called 25,000) cavalry of all nations, some good and some bad, and twenty-six pieces of cannon. These armies marched in two columns parallel to each other; one from its right, the other from its left, at the distance of about three miles from each other.

The British cavalry generally led the British column, about 500 of the best of the Nizam's led that of the Nizam; these two generally closed towards each other.

One regiment of British cavalry was generally in the rear of the British column, the whole of the cavalry of the Nizam in the rear of mine, and these rather closed to each other, so that the march of these two armies was almost in the form of a square or

oblong, of which the front and rear were formed of cavalry, and about two or three miles in extent; the right and left (owing to the immense space taken up in the column by field-pieces drawn by bullocks) about six or seven miles. In this square went everything belonging to the army, and the whole space was filled excepting what lay between the leading brigade of infantry of each column, which was left clear, lest it should become necessary to form.

You will have some idea of what there was in that space when I state to you the number of bullocks that I know were in the public service, and in the employment of brinjarries or grain merchants, which did not compose one-half of the whole number that were with the army. There were in the department of the commissary of stores about 25,000, in that of the commissary of grain about 20,000, in that of the commissary of provisions about 5000, in that of the camp equipage department about 5000, making in all in the service of the British grand army about 60,000 bullocks, of which about 15,000 were draught, the others carried loads.

The Company's bullock department in the Nizam's army had in it about 3000, divided among different departments. Besides these there were with the grand army about 20,000 bullocks loaded\*with grain belonging to the brinjarries, about 8000 loaded with gram for the cavalry horses belonging to the gram agents. The Nizam's army (to my constant daily annoyance) had with it 25,000 bullocks loaded with grain belonging to the brinjarries. Besides all these, the number of elephants, camels, bullocks, carts, coolies, plunderers, &c. &c., belonging to individuals in the army, particularly in that of the Nizam, was beyond calculation; but as upon one occasion I had an opportunity of seeing one wing of the British army, and the whole army of the Nizam, move light to attack the enemy, that is to say, without anything belonging to the public excepting what was necessary for the field train, and a few days' provisions for the Europeans, I was able to form a judgment of the quantity of private baggage in the army, and I have no scruple in declaring that the number of cattle and people in the employment of individuals was double that in the employment of the public. Yet on that day it is fair that I should mention to you the Nizam's army marched above twenty miles. You may have some idea of the thing when I tell you that when all were together, there was a multitude in motion which covered about eighteen square miles.

We brought forward from Madras to Seringapatam a battering train, and in fact a moving arsenal. The former consisted of 50 pieces of iron cannon, for each gun of which were brought forward 1200 rounds of shot and immense quantities of powder, and every kind of small stores which are used in an arsenal.

Our march was usually as long as those made by large armies in Europe, from ten to twelve miles; we always started at six, and we arrived at our ground about twelve, sometimes later, if there were difficulties on the road. We encamped in two lines fronting different ways, and this heap of baggage between us. What is most extraordinary, by the order of march and encampment above described, we did not lose anything to signify during our whole march, notwithstanding the efforts of the enemy's light troops who constantly attended us, and who are certainly the best troops of that kind that I have ever seen<sup>1</sup>.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

<sup>1</sup> *Return of Tippoo Sullaun's Army at the commencement of the Campaign of 1799.*

| Names.   | Number<br>of Fighting<br>Men. | Monthly Expense. |
|--|-------------------------------|------------------|
|  |                               | Cant. Pagodas.   |
| Meer Meerans (Generals) . . . . .  | 26                            | 2,800 0 0        |
| Meer Suldoors (Officers in general superintending<br>of Forts) . . . . .         |                               | 750 0 0          |
| Buckshees, or Commanders of Brigades . . . . .                                   | 101                           | 4,840 0 0        |
| Stable Horse . . . . .   | 3,503                         | 25,799 3 0       |
| Silladar Horse (a horse the property of the rider)                               | 9,392                         | 86,800 0 0       |
| Infantry, Regulars . . . . .   | 23,483                        | 132,884 9 2      |
| Geish (Armed Militia) . . . . .  | 6,209                         | 25,518 8 0       |
| Ashâam (Matchlockmen and Peons) . . . . .  | 4,747                         | 12,956 6 8       |
| Total Fighting Men . . . . .   | 47,470                        | 292,349 6 10     |
| Mootsuddies, Lascars, Pioneers, Artificers, Establish-<br>ments, &c. &c. . . . . | 22,392                        | 67,971 5 12      |
| Total of every description of Persons }<br>attached to the Army . . . . .        | 69,862                        | 360,321 4 6      |
| Out Garrisons, 27 Principal Forts . . . . .                                      | 14,947                        | 43,338 1 14      |
| „ 113 Lesser Forts . . . . .   | 14,981                        | 14,955 1 14      |
| Total . . . . .  | 29,928                        | 58,293 3 12      |

*Return*

## 11. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Mismanagement of the bullock department. Battle of Mallavelly.  
Prospects of the siege.*

Camp, 2 miles west of Seringapatam,  
5th April, 1799.

My dear Mornington,

We arrived here this morning, and I take the opportunity of writing to you which is offered by General Floyd going to meet General Stewart. I wrote you two letters before: one to inform you that we should cross the Maddoor on the 26th; the other to let you know that we had had an action with Tippoo, in which his troops had been driven and defeated by ours.

We had much difficulty to contend with after the army entered the Mysore country. The bullocks in the department of the Commissary of Stores failed almost entirely, notwithstanding that there were quantities of forage in the country, of which they might have had their share. This failure of the bullocks increased in so alarming a manner by the time that we got in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, particularly on the last march towards that place, that I had serious apprehensions that we should have been obliged to take post there, and defer our further operations to an ensuing season. However, upon inquiry, it was found that

*Return of Killed and Wounded Sirdars, from the 6th March, 1799, to  
the 4th May inclusive.*

| Rank.   | Killed.         | Wounded.       | Total. |
|---|-----------------|----------------|--------|
| Jaghiredars <sup>1</sup> (Noblemen of Rank) . . . . .                             | 2               | —              | 2      |
| Meer Meerans <sup>2</sup> (Generals) . . . . .                                    | 5 <sup>3</sup>  | 4              | 9      |
| Meer Khazuns (Lords Treasurers) . . . . .   | 1               | 1              | 2      |
| Meer Asufs (Members of the Revenue Board) . . . . .                               | 3               | —              | 3      |
| Buckshees (Commanders of Cutcherries) . . . . .                                   | 7 <sup>4</sup>  | 3 <sup>5</sup> | 10     |
| Sepahdars and Mokubdars (Commanders of Cu-<br>shoons of Foot and Horse) . . . . . | 14 <sup>6</sup> | 7 <sup>7</sup> | 21     |
|   | 32              | 15             | 47     |

<sup>1</sup> Hussein Ali Khan, on the 6th April, at the Sultaunpettah Tope.

<sup>2</sup> Seyd Sahib, on the 4th May, wounded during the assault, and since dead.

<sup>3</sup> 2 killed at Sedaseer, on the 6th March.

<sup>4</sup> 1 wounded at Mallavelly, since dead.

<sup>5</sup> 2 wounded at Sedaseer on 6th March, since returned to Seringapatam.

<sup>6</sup> 2 killed at Mallavelly, 1 at Sedaseer.

<sup>7</sup> 2 wounded at Sedaseer.



the root of the evil lay in a parcel of absurd, impracticable, shop-keeping regulations which had been made for the bullock department, under which no great undertaking could ever prosper, and the first step taken was to abolish them all. The spirit and zeal of the army were then called forth with the greatest success. Many stores (absolutely useless excepting as lumber, and which I had pressed the General to leave behind him at Vellore) were destroyed; and, in short, we have contrived to bring on the largest useful equipment that ever was known in this country. We have plenty to take this place, which appears to me at present to be strong only from its situation. I have great satisfaction in informing you that the Nizam's sirdars exerted themselves, as well as the rest of the army, in carrying stores. Above eight thousand shot have been brought here from the neighbourhood of Bangalore by Meer Allum and the people immediately belonging to the Nizam alone, without counting what have been brought by the Company's servants.

We shall commence all our preparatory operations to-morrow, and probably we shall break ground before General Stewart arrives. It is the General's intention to attack, from both sides of the river, the western angle, and I think that we shall contrive to have such a fire upon it as will make it impossible for the Suldaun's troops to remain long in the place. •

I reckon that we have forty days before us from this time, and even more, if we can contrive a passage over the river when it swells. However, five days will make a breach for us after we once begin to batter, out of which his troops will not be able to keep ours.

In the action of the 27th of March, at Mallavelly, his troops behaved better than they have ever been known to behave. His infantry advanced, and almost stood the charge of bayonets of the 33rd, and his cavalry rode at General Baird's European brigade. He did not support them as he ought, having drawn off his guns at the moment we made our attack, and even pushed forward these troops to cover the retreat of his guns. This is the cause of the total destruction of the troops he left behind him, without loss to us, and of the panic with which we have reason to believe all his troops are now affected. His light cavalry, looties, and others, are the best of the kind in the world. They have hung upon us, night and day, from the moment we entered his country to this. Some of them have always had sight of us, and have been prepared to cut off any persons venturing out of

the reach of our camp-guards. We came by a road so unfrequented that it was not possible to destroy all the forage, which would have distressed us much ; but they did as much, even in that way, as could be expected from them. If Tippoo had had sense and spirit sufficient to use his cavalry and infantry as he might have done, I have no hesitation in saying that we should not now be here, and probably should not be out of the jungles near Bangalore.

We have had much blundering and *puzzling*, and I have been present at many strong and violent discussions in the cabinet. However, all parties are apparently well together, and we are now here with a strong, a healthy, and a brave army, with plenty of stores, guns, &c. &c., and we shall be masters of his place before much more time passes over our heads.

The fatigue and heat of the weather (which is greater here than even at Calcutta) and bad water had given me a bowel complaint, which did not confine me, but teased me much. I have nearly got the better of it, and I hope to be quite well in a few days.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

I omitted to mention to you that we have thirty-three days' rice for thirty thousand men at full allowance, besides what the brinjaries have, so that there is no danger of our feeling want. General Harris does not write, trusting to my giving you an account of our state.

## 12. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Night attack on the enemy's outposts. Deficiency of rice in camp.*

Camp before Seringapatam,  
18th April, 1799.

My dear Mornington,

Since I wrote to you on the 5th instant, we have, by the junction of the Bombay army, been enabled to take up such a position as makes it as certain as these things can be that we shall very shortly be in possession of Seringapatam.

On the night of the 5th we made an attack upon the enemy's outposts, which, at least on my side, was not quite so successful as could have been wished. The fact was that the night was

very dark, that the enemy expected us, and were strongly posted in an almost impenetrable jungle. We lost an officer killed, and others and some men wounded (of the 33rd); and at last, as I could not find out the post which it was desirable I should occupy, I was obliged to desist from the attack, the enemy also having retired from the post. In the morning they re-occupied it, and I attacked it again at daylight, and carried it with ease and little loss. In the course of the night of the 5th and the day of the 6th the General was enabled to occupy a line of posts which gave complete security to his camp till the Bombay army joined, at the same time that they enable him to commence his operations for the siege with advantage.

I got a slight touch on the knee, from which I have felt no inconvenience, on the night of the 5th; and I have come to a determination, when in my power, never to suffer an attack to be made by night upon an enemy who is prepared and strongly posted, and whose posts have not been reconnoitred by daylight. We remained in the posts which we occupied on the 6th till the Bombay army joined on the 14th. It crossed the river on the 16th, and yesterday occupied a post close to the fort, which gives us every reason to believe that we shall carry our object without much difficulty.

I cannot write with common temper about our rice concerns. The last time I wrote to you I had reason to believe that we had plenty: you will probably hear that we have now rice for only eighteen days at half allowance. This is unpleasant, and, considering the quantity of rice we brought with us, and the pains taken upon the subject, it is shameful. However, if Read comes we are still safe, and we must only redouble our exertions to get the place before the 4th of May, up to which day we have rice.

The brinjarries who go down to the Barahmahal at present ought to be loaded without delay, and prepared to move to us again by the first opportunity. With this view, the magazines at Vellore and Arnee ought to be sent forward as fast as possible. Every exertion should be made to do this.

I hope that Read marched on the 17th, and that he has been joined by Colonel Brown. If we can't take the place, our salvation depends upon that; but I trust we shall have the place.

Believe me, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 13. To Lieutenant-General Harris.

*Description of the breach on the eve of the storm.*

(Extract.)

3rd May, 7 a.m.

Licut. Lalor, of the 73rd, crossed over to the glacis, I believe, on the left of the breach. He found the wall, which he believes to be the retaining wall of the glacis, 7 feet high, and the water (included in those 7 feet) 14 inches deep. It is in no part more so, and the passage by no means difficult. Several other officers crossed by different routes, but none went so far as Licut. Lalor. All agree in the practicability of crossing with troops. The enemy built up the breach in the night with gabions, &c., notwithstanding the fire which was kept up upon it. It was impossible to fire grape, as our working party was in front of the 5 gun battery, from which alone we could fire, as we repaired the other.

## 2. SETTLEMENT OF MYSORE.

## 14. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Misconduct of the troops after the storm. Disposal of the conquered territory. Governor-General's presence inadvisable. Colonel Wellesley's uncertain status.*

(Extracts.)

Serīngapatam, 8th May, 1799.

My dear Mornington,

I wrote to you on the 18th or 19th of last month, and sent my letter by General Floyd. A series of successful attacks upon the enemy's posts, particularly one which I made upon his posts close to the river and within about 400 yards of the fort on the 26th of April, enabled us to erect our breaching batteries at a very short distance, and to complete our breach in the place where it was thought most advisable to have it by the 4th instant. On that day, as you will probably have been informed by General Harris, the place was stormed, and was in our possession in about two hours after the troops first began to

move out of the trenches. Tippoo was killed in one of the gateways, and to complete our good fortune his body was found among about 500 others piled one upon the other in a very narrow compass. All his family and treasures fell into our hands that night, excepting Futteh Hyder and Abdul Kaliz. The latter came in and gave himself up the next morning. It was impossible to expect that after the labour which the troops had undergone in working up to the place, and the various successes they had had in six different affairs with Tippoo's troops, in all of which they had come to the bayonet with them, they should not have looked to the plunder of this place. Nothing therefore can have exceeded what was done on the night of the 4th. Scarcely a house in the town was left un-plundered, and I understand that in camp jewels of the greatest value, bars of gold, &c. &c., have been offered for sale in the bazaars of the army by our soldiers, sepoys, and followers. I came in to take the command on the morning of the 5th, and by the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging, &c. &c., in the course of that day I restored order among the troops, and I hope I have gained the confidence of the people. They are returning to their houses and beginning again to follow their occupations, but the property of every one is gone. Many of Tippoo's principal sirdars were killed in the storm: Meer Saduck, Seyd Sahib, Seyd Ghoffar fell upon that occasion, and others of some consequence had fallen in the different affairs which he had with our troops since the commencement of the war. Cummer u Deen, Purneah, and Ali Reza are out with troops which had been sent either to intercept the convoy coming under General Floyd, or to annoy the rear of the army employed in the siege. We have sent cowle to Cummer u Deen, Purneah, and Futteh Hyder. The former (before he received the cowle) sent in Ali Reza to propose to give up himself and his troops (about 4000 horse) without terms, at the same time stating claims which he had to a certain jaghire, which I presume will be made known to you by General Harris. I expect that Purneah and Futteh Hyder will come in likewise with Cummer u Deen in the course of a day or two, and then I may congratulate you upon having brought the war to a most fortunate conclusion in the course of about two months, and of having destroyed the greatest enemy the British nation ever had in India, and one whose powers were most formidable.

The question respecting what is to be done with the Mysore Empire at the present moment is certainly a most important one; and although it is impossible that I should have been able to turn it over sufficiently in my mind to have formed any decided opinion upon it, and although even the discussion of it requires more information than I possess of the political views and interests of our Allies, particularly the Mahrattas, I shall communicate to you what has suggested itself to me since I have been in the command of the place.

From the conduct of Meer Allum at the time the species of negotiation with Tippoo was going on, it appears to me to be very clear that the Allies will expect more than half of the dominions of Tippoo to be divided among them and the Company. After the total destruction of Tippoo and his government, and its means of annoyance and defence, by our capture of this place, I am afraid that any government which you might establish here, with the remaining half or rather third of Tippoo's revenues as its support, would fall an easy prey to either of the other two which might think proper to attack it; unless the Company either take it under their protection, as they have the Rajah of Tanjore and the Nabob of Arcot, or unless they bind themselves to support the government, which I suppose to be established, in all cases of war either with the Nizam or Mahrattas. In short, this new government must be dependent upon the Company for its support; and the question is, whether that dependence may not weaken the bonds of alliance between us and one or both of our Allies, may not draw us into a new war, and whether upon the whole it will not be more safe and better, and more creditable, to keep Seringapatam ourselves as a check upon both, and to make such a division of Tippoo's country as will satisfy them and all parties concerned. In order to decide this question, I must have more information than I have at present of the views and interests of the Mahrattas; but from the unfavourable impression I have already received of the system of (what may be called) a divided government in the Carnatic, in Tanjore, and even in Oude, I am inclined to prefer the latter, not only as most creditable, but as most safe, and not so likely to lead us into new wars.

Every man who has had an opportunity of gaining any knowledge of the politics of these times has framed a system which he thinks will answer best for the future government of these countries. My system is to take it all as a conquest, subject to

the following restrictions. 1st. The family of Tippoo ought to be provided for. His women and those of his father ought to have suitable jaghires. Each of his sons ought to have a large jaghire. 2ndly. The great sirdars in his service ought to be provided for. Cummer u Deen asks for Gurrumcondah, which probably for many reasons cannot be granted ; but he, Budder u Zeman, Ali Reza, Gholam Ali, Purneah, and others of different ranks in this government, ought to have jaghires given to them for their subsistence. These jaghires ought not to be sufficiently large to enable them to keep up troops, nor ought they to have upon them any strongholds to tempt their owners to rebel against their superiors. After giving these jaghires, the jaghiredars ought to have the choice under which of the three Governments they would live, and ought to hold from that Government which they prefer ; but their choice ought not to alter the proportions of the remaining territory which each of the Allies would divide. 3rdly. The remainder of the territory (after deducting these jaghires) to be divided into three parts, either equal or otherwise, as you may think fit, and taken by each of the Allies. We must have Seringapatam and a safe communication with it from the Carnatic, likewise the sea-coast. What part the Nizam ought to have, and what the Mahrattas, must depend as well upon their own choice as upon the line of frontier which you might think it advisable to take for yourself ; but I should imagine with our superiority there would be no difficulty in settling their respective shares.

\*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

Many persons in camp, and particularly those about the General, are exceedingly anxious that you should come here to settle everything. I am (as I was upon a former occasion) of a different opinion. That which is to be settled is a political question, of some consequence certainly, viz. whether you will at all, and in what manner, and in what proportion, take possession of the territory which has been conquered ; but there is no information to be got here which can aid you in deciding that question : it can be done equally well, if not better, in your closet at Madras, and we here can execute your orders. I mention this because I know that you must have been pressed by them to undertake a most fatiguing journey here, and yet when I give the above-mentioned reason why you should not be asked to come, there is no answer to it. Your presence cannot be necessary to induce a set of persons in our power to take what will enable them to live in

the manner to which they have been accustomed, and, excepting to be teased by them to increase that stipend, I don't see what other end it can answer.

General Harris ought to go away as soon as he can, as the plunderers of his army and of that of the Nizam still occasion great confusion and terror among the inhabitants, and tend to obstruct our settlement of the country.

Before the General goes, I intend to come to a thorough understanding with him respecting the nature of my situation here. I certainly wish that he would give me all the power which he has himself till you can give your orders upon the subject. Whether I have that power or not, I shall be considered, and probably shall be really, responsible for everything that happens: but I have felt so sensibly my disagreeable situation in the Nizam's army for which I was responsible, although another man by a political manœuvre in fact commanded it (particularly latterly), that I should have resigned it if it had not been for the fear of displeasing Meer Allum. I do not mean to insinuate that — and I are not upon the very best terms; but what I mean is, that upon one or two occasions he sent me orders which he said came from Meer Allum, and which never could have entered his head excepting from his own suggestions, and which if I had obeyed I should probably have lost part of the detachment. This is of course between ourselves. I intend to ask to be brought away with the army if any civil servant of the Company is to be here, or any person with civil authority who is not under my orders, for I know that the whole is a system of job and corruption from beginning to end, of which I and my troops would be made the instruments.

\* \* \* \* \*

9th May.

The Mahrattas having failed in the performance of their engagements, and as there is reason to believe that they have entered into some with Tippoo, of course nothing will be given to them. The country will be to be divided between us and the Nizam, and in my opinion there is now more reason than ever for not suffering any part of the family of Tippoo to have any power.



## 15. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Cummer-u-Deen's services, and their requital.*

Seringapatam, 13th May, 1799.

My dear Mornington,

Since I wrote last, Cummer u Deen and Purneah have come in, and Futtch Hyder is expected in to-morrow. General Floyd and his convoy have joined the army.

General Harris has not informed me of his plans, nor of the proposals which have been made to him by Purneah. I have altered my mind respecting Cummer u Deen; he has behaved so well, and by coming in so early has rendered us so great a service, that, *coute qui coute*, we ought to give him what he wishes for. If he had remained in arms, we never could have settled this country unless we incurred the enormous expense of keeping our army in the field, and even then the operations to be carried on would be liable to all the hazard of protracted military operations. He has saved us this at least, and has thereby rendered us a service almost as great as any of those rendered by His Highness the Nizam. But the Nizam *may* be satisfied by another part of the territory, and in that case there can be no doubt of the propriety of rewarding Cummer u Deen.

I wish that the army were gone; we should then soon settle every thing.

I hope that you mean to punish ———.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 16. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Political treatment of Tippoo's family. His anti-English designs disclosed by his archives.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 23rd May, 1799.

I think that the persons about the General now seem to be of opinion that it would be best to restore part of the country to one of the sons of Tippoo, keeping garrisons in its forts and strongholds, or taking from him annually a certain sum as tribute. This is one of Purneah's proposals, upon which it must be observed that they were all framed with a view to his own interest, and the future management of the revenues of the

country to be restored by himself. Although I don't think that there is any reason to believe, as he states, that the country cannot be settled unless part of it is restored in some manner to one of Tippoo's sons, that, on the contrary, I am certain that it can be settled under any arrangement that you think proper, it is not quite clear that the most politic and most proper measure, and certainly the most generous one, would not be to place one of them in the Government of part of it. This is a question of policy, which however has no relation whatever with the settlement of this country, and one upon which you might decide with as much propriety in Calcutta as you could in Seringapatam.

\* \* \* \* \*

I forgot to mention to you that I have found some capital French letters among Tippoo's papers, likewise some from his vakeels at Poonah, which you might find useful. I gave the former to Macaulay some time ago to have copied for you. They have translated the latter, I imagine, and will send them. If any proof were wanting of his designs against us, these letters afford it amply.

• 17. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Objections to an article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Sreringapatam.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 14th June, 1799.

Colonel Kirkpatrick will have written to you yesterday respecting the 6th article of the Subsidiary Treaty. We all agreed that that ought to be modified in some manner. As it now stands, it will give ground for the belief that we give the Rajah the country at the present moment with the intention of taking it away again when it will suit our convenience. Supposing that the candid and generous policy of the present Government should weaken that belief as far as it regards them, it must be allowed that the conduct of the British Government in India has not at all times been such as to induce the natives to believe that at some time or other improper advantage will not be taken of that article. They know as well as we do that there may be a change of government immediately, and that there certainly will be one in the course of a few years, and the person then appointed Governor-General may not have such

enlarged systems of policy as those by which we are regulated at the present moment. This induces me to believe that they will object strongly to that article, and I don't think that it will be very creditable to us to insist upon it.

### 18. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Inexpediency of placing the Company on the Mahratta frontier.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 23rd June, 1799.

I recommend it to you not to put the Company upon the Mahratta frontier. It is impossible to expect to alter the nature of the Mahrattas; they will plunder their neighbours, be they ever so powerful. The consequence of their plunder of the Company's territories will be perpetual representations at Poonah of grievances which it will not be in the power of Poonah to redress, and a bickering which will have no end. It will be better to put one of the powers in dependence upon the Company on the frontier, who, if plundered, are accustomed to it, know how to bear it and to retaliate, which we do not.

### 3. ANGLO-HINDOO MYSORE.

### 19. To the Secretary of the Military Board.

*Improvements recommended in the fortifications of Seringapatam.*

(Extract.)

25th Nov. 1799.

To conclude then, I recommend that the inside rampart may be thrown into the inside ditch on the north and south-west faces. That the outside rampart on all faces, and its defences, may be made of the proper thickness, with the usual slope. That the stone glacis on the north and south-west faces should be completed, and that a work of the nature of a redoubt should be constructed at each flank of the inner rampart, which I propose should remain on the south and east faces.

That the ditch in front of the south and east faces should be formed into a covert way and palisaded, and that a second glacis should be formed on those faces.

In this I have considered the subject only as the Military Board are desirous that it should be considered.

But if every thing is to be done to the place which, in my opinion, would render it complete, I should recommend that the ditch on the northern and south-west faces may be deepened, so that it may in all parts contain the quantity and depth of water which there will be at the sluices at the north-east and south-west angles; that the ditch on the esplanade in front of the east and south faces may be filled, the glacis and esplanade completed, and the ditches of the outworks at the east angle, in front of the Bangalore and Mysore gateways, and others, should be joined to the main ditch of the place.

## 20. Memorandum upon Seringapatam<sup>1</sup>.

*Its fortifications ought to be maintained, because (1) its power and influence over the country are very commanding; (2) it is the most suitable dépôt for service in Malabar and Canara; (3) as well as for warfare on the northern frontier, as my experience has proved. Answer to objections, that (1) it requires too large a garrison; (2) it is unwholesome; (3) it is not well situated for arresting an enemy; (4) to repair it would be too costly; (5) the river isolates it inconveniently.*

1. In consequence of the possibility that it may be necessary to alter the arrangements for the government in Mysore, after the peace expected in Europe, it has been proposed to destroy the fortifications of Seringapatam; not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult of access from falling into the hands of our enemies, but as one advisable, even if it were certain that the arrangements for the government of Mysore would remain as they are.

2. If there is a prospect that Great Britain will be obliged to make a peace so bad, as that Mysore will come again into the hands of our enemies, there is no doubt whatever but that the destruction of Seringapatam would be for many years a considerable drawback upon them. It would be so, however, only till the place could be rebuilt: the position, which is the great strength of Seringapatam, would still remain, on which a new and a stronger fort might in time be raised.

3. Admitting, however, the propriety of the measure, connecting it with a bad peace in Europe, there are several considerations which lead me to be of opinion, that it would be an improper one,

<sup>1</sup> July, 1801, given in Colonel Gurwood's Index, 1 August, 1801. But see p. 86.—*Ed.*

if the present arrangements for the government of Mysore are likely to continue.

4. Seringapatam has long been the capital of an extensive and powerful empire, the whole of which is now in the possession, or under the government, or under the immediate influence, of the Company's government of Fort St. George. The conquest of Seringapatam, which was accompanied by the fall of Tippoo, and the possession of his principal arsenal, gave the Company the possession and the power of disposing of this vast empire.

5. Whatever may be the real state of the case regarding the power of Seringapatam, resulting from its strength and its position in Mysore, there is no doubt whatever but that the natives look to it as the seat of power, and that they consider themselves under the government of that power in India which has possession of that fortress.

6. There is a double government in Mysore, the operations of which are now conducted in such a manner, as that there can be no occasion for exerting the influence and power in the hands of the Company from the possession of the fort of Seringapatam. But however well the person, in whose hands the conduct of that government is at present, may establish his system, can it be certain that it will last? Is it known who will succeed to him? Who will be the Native successor of the present Dewan? If the French are to return to India, and particularly if they are to be allowed to have any but commercial establishments, is it known the effect that such a change may have upon the system of government in Mysore?

7. The treaty with the Rajah provides that, under certain circumstances, the country may be resumed by the Governor-General in Council. It is to be supposed that, whenever the Governor-General shall be desirous of resuming the country, it will be in consequence of the difficulties in which the general government will be involved by the pressure of an extensive warfare. It is hardly possible to suppose any other case in which the resumption would be justifiable, or could be attempted. In this case, however, it will not be possible to spare troops to force the execution of the treaty, if the Rajah should be inclined to resist it. Will Bangalore or Chittledroog give the power and influence over the country which will be necessary under such circumstances, and which, doubtless, Seringapatam has?

8. Seringapatam has been found, by experience, to possess means for equipping an army, which no other place in the

Company's territories, or under their influence, has, Madras excepted. It is supposed, however, that these means are to be attributed to its being the ancient seat of empire, to its large garrison, and to the residence of many of the Rajah's servants in the fort, and on the island. It is also supposed that this effect of its being the ancient seat of the empire will soon be done away by the emigration of the people who depended upon the former government ; that the means which are the consequence of the size of the garrison will exist wherever there may be an equal number of troops ; and that those which are the consequence of the residence of the Rajah's principal servants will remove with them to Mysore.

9. Admitting that any other garrison of equal strength would draw to it the same number of people that have been brought to Seringapatam by the troops, and that the removal of the Rajah's servants to Mysore will occasion a diminution of the population of Seringapatam, I cannot admit that the fall of the empire of Tippoo has diminished, or will diminish, its population in the least. In fact, the place is more populous now than it ever was, if the armies that Tippoo had are struck out of the calculation ; and, supposing that those who were attached to his government and person should be inclined to leave it, which they are not, they would find it difficult to pitch upon a place in the peninsula in which they would not live under a British government.

10. But I attribute the facility which has been found in equipping an army at Seringapatam, the great means which that place affords, to its being a British possession, as well as to the other causes to which have been attributed those excellent effects. Bangalore, Chittledroog, Sera, Nuggur, Colar, are nearly, if not equally populous with Seringapatam : some of them are places of great trade and riches, and all of them might afford, and doubtless afforded, to Tippoo, the means of bringing his troops into the field.

11. When I took the field last year, the Rajah's government had the strongest interest in my success ; and I do them no more than justice in saying, that they did every thing in their power to forward it : yet, notwithstanding their exertions, and those of the officers in command of the different forts, I did not get a bullock, or a man, or any thing which could enable the troops to remain in the field, from any place excepting Seringapatam.

12. At Chittledroog, there was a numerous, if not a more numerous garrison at that time, than at Seringapatam ; but still,

the followers of the corps at the former were brought from the latter; which fact may be adduced as a proof that the means of Seringapatam are not to be attributed exclusively to the size of its garrison; and that even those means which depend upon its garrison might possibly not be removed with it. When the troops were ordered into the field, one regiment of cavalry was brought from Bangalore, the followers and equipments of which were sent from Seringapatam.

13. It may be said that, although the fort of Seringapatam may be destroyed, and its garrison and depôt of stores removed to another place, the island will still belong to the Company; and that the population and means of equipment which it affords will still be in our power, and in the Mysore country. But admitting that to be true, I contend that we shall not enjoy the same advantages from them which we have hitherto: we shall not be able to apply them with the same readiness to the service, if it should be possible to procure them for it at all.

14. We have experience of the benefit of equipping an army at Seringapatam; we know that those means still exist; and we have reason to believe that they will continue as long as the garrison and depôt of stores are at that place. We do not know that they would exist at Seringapatam if the fort were destroyed and the garrison removed; and we have reason to know, from experience, that they would not exist at Chittledroog, even if the garrison and stores were removed thither; and I believe that they would not exist at Bangalore, if they were removed to that place.

15. But not only have we experience of the singular advantage of Seringapatam as a place of equipment, but we know it is acknowledged by all parties as the most convenient depôt in point of locality for service in the province of Malabar: I might also add, in the province of Canara. In truth, next to the opinion which universally prevails of the power attached to the possession of this fort, this is the point of view in which to have possession of it appears to me to be the most important.

16. From Goa to Cochin, there is not a single post which could be held by any body of troops for a moment. The works of Cannanore have been erected at vast expense, but the garrison could not remain in that fort opposed to the fire of a man-of-war anchored in the roads. The works are commanded in such manner as to render the situation of the besieged very disadvantageous, if the fort should be attacked on the land side; and the fort is

so small as to be incapable of holding even the quantity of stores which are necessary for the desultory service in the Malabar province. Besides, it is falling down, as appears by the reports made to the Military board. The stores in Canara are now in the open town of Mangalore.

17. The state of the seasons on the coast of Coromandel and Malabar operates as a strong reason for preserving the fort of Seringapatam, and making it the depôt of the troops in those provinces. The vessels which could be employed to convey stores could keep up the communication only in the months of January, February, March, April, and part of May; and, even during those months, with considerable difficulty and delay. In the latter part of May, in June, July, August, and September, it is impossible for vessels to approach the Malabar coast; and in October, November, and December, it is equally so to approach Madras. It is more easy to communicate between Bombay and the coast. But the consequence of supplying the troops in those provinces with stores, either from Madras or Bombay, is, that a fort must be constructed, and arsenals must be built, for their preservation. The question is, therefore, whether it is better to keep Seringapatam, with all its supposed inconveniences, or to build a fort in one of the provinces below the ghauts to the westward.

18. Many objections might be urged against building a fort in those provinces, the expenses of which are sufficiently obvious; but there is one objection to which particular attention is requested, as it may bear upon the general question in other respects.

19. A fort situated upon the sea coast is liable to particular objections. An enemy, although of inferior strength, has the power of attacking it, and, unless it is of great strength, would possess himself of it before assistance could be sent to it. This would certainly be the case, if the supposed enemy were stronger at sea; which, it is true, we have no reason to expect at the present moment. But it might be the case if we were stronger at sea.

20. The extent of the seas under the Admiral in this part of the world renders it impossible for him to provide for the protection of every part; and the difficulty, in all seasons, of going to all parts of both coasts must for ever render the situation of a fort on the sea coast in some degree dangerous.

21. If such a fort should fall, the enemy has immediately an



establishment on the coast, to deprive him of which would require an army, and the equipment for a siege; whereas, his landing, under any other circumstances, would be an event, the bad consequences of which might be defeated as soon as the body of troops in the western provinces, supported by those above the ghauts, could be collected.

22. In regard to the insurgents in Malabar, the war against them cannot be carried on at all without assistance, either from Seringapatam, or from Bombay, or Surat. Stores, ordnance, and grain might be sent round from Madras, or from Bombay; but a fort must be built to receive them, and then there are no means of moving them in those provinces independent of the assistance above mentioned. In point of economy, there is no doubt whatever but that it is more expedient to supply these means from Seringapatam, than from Bombay or Surat.

23. Having thus stated the grounds which I have for believing that Seringapatam is the most convenient depôt for the coast of Malabar, I proceed to consider that place, in the same point of view, in reference to the line of frontier to the northward. I must first beg, that the principles of European warfare may not be applied to this country, in arguing this question, to a greater degree than they are applied to the service when that is to be carried on.

24. It would be convenient, that a depôt of stores, for a service intended in any particular country, should be as near the scene of operations as possible. In European warfare, it is absolutely necessary that the expense magazines, &c., should be on the spot; and they are usually moved forward in proportion as the army is enabled to advance. But in this country, in which armies take the field with such formidable equipments, with arsenals and magazines, in fact, which they always carry with them, it is not necessary, however convenient it would be, that the depôt, which is to supply those equipments, and the wants of the service, should be immediately in the neighbourhood of the scene of action.

25. My experience of service, in this country, proves the truth of that observation. In Gen. Harris's war, notwithstanding the number of posts in advance, in which depôts had been formed, every article of provisions, and stores and ordnance, was brought from Madras; and, in fact, if the cattle could have been fed in that neighbourhood, and if there had not been a necessity of forming a corps of observation at Arcot, for the

speedy support of which it was necessary to provide, Gen. Harris would have gained time by collecting his army at Madras, and marching at once from thence, instead of collecting at Vellore. In the last campaign, in the same manner, although Chittledroog was not unprovided with stores, every article was brought from Seringapatam. In neither case was there either delay or inconvenience; and, in both cases, the armies would have been as well provided, and equally secure, if there had not been a gun, or an article of military stores or grain, in any of the advanced posts.

26. I do not contend that, in the one case, it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Madras at Vellore or Kistnagherry; or, in the other, that it would not have been convenient to have had the arsenal and means of Seringapatam at Chittledroog: but I contend that it was not inconvenient to have them otherwise; and that the service, in either case, did not suffer from the distance of the depôts, as it would have done if the same warfare had been carried on in Europe, without moving forward the magazines.

27. This circumstance arises as well from the nature of the service in India, in which immense equipments always accompany the troops, as from the manner in which those troops are usually posted in times of peace. Considerable time must elapse before a body of troops can be collected on the frontier for service; and the stores required for such service would be on the frontier from Seringapatam, as they were in the last campaign, before all the troops for the service could be collected.

28. I am aware that the consequence of this reasoning goes the length of giving up Chittledroog: upon which I have to observe, that, if I am to choose between Seringapatam and Chittledroog, for a general depôt for all possible services, I should certainly prefer Seringapatam; and that I have no desire to keep the stores in Chittledroog, even for service in the Mahratta territory. I prefer, by far, the fort of Hullah in Soonda, on the one hand, and that of Hurryhur on the other; and in these I should desire to have no stores or grain, excepting such as I might find it convenient to lodge in them, at the time the service should be going on.

29. With a view to service on the frontier, there is but little difference in the distance of Seringapatam and of Bangalore from the scene of action. Bangalore is 85 miles distant from Sera: Seringapatam is 104. It is true, that those articles of ordnance and stores, which must come from the Presidency, by

going to Seringapatam, must thus go 80 miles more than they would if the depôt were fixed at Bangalore. But, in the first place, it is to be considered, that, if the resources of the Mysore country are fairly called into action, but few articles will be required from the Presidency. In the next place, it is to be recollected, that a large proportion of those articles, which might be wanted from the Presidency, will be required in the western provinces, if it should be determined, according to my system, that the corps serving in those provinces should be provided from this country; and, therefore, that they will not suffer by being transported at once to Seringapatam. But supposing the circuitous route to the frontier, by Seringapatam, should be an objection to that place, of such weight as to occasion a preference for Bangalore, let the other advantages of Seringapatam be taken into consideration: the general opinion of its power, the means which experience has proved it possesses of equipping an army, its superior convenience as a depôt for the Malabar coast, which will more than compensate for the trifling disadvantage of being obliged to go 80 miles of distance to reach it.

30. But there are other objections to Seringapatam, which, if well founded, would be decisive of the question. In the first place, it is supposed that Seringapatam requires a garrison, even in times of peace, of one regiment of Europeans, 3 battalions of sepoys, and a large proportion of artillery. Seringapatam is full of Moorish inhabitants; and, as it contains a large arsenal, it is not deemed safe to trust this arsenal without a large garrison, till these inhabitants are removed from the fort. But measures are now taking to remove these inhabitants to the pettah; and when they, and the Rajah's servants, shall have left the fort, there will be no reason to have any apprehension for the arsenal. The works of Seringapatam are in ruins, because they have never been repaired since the siege: the weather and river have done them damage to a much greater degree than they would if they had been in good repair; and they are accessible in many places. The communication between one part and another of these works is not complete; and it is, therefore, necessary that the guns which may be required for the works should be always in their places. These two inconveniences, which the repair of the fortifications would remedy, create a necessity for larger guards, and a greater number of them on the works, than would otherwise be required. The garrison of

Seringapatam furnishes the Rajah's guard, and that of the Resident. It is the seat of the head quarters of the division, which necessarily causes the employment of a number of men on duty: it furnishes the guards for the public elephants and cattle, and other small detachments; and as the paymaster, the treasure, and the stores, are at Seringapatam, the detachment with the treasure and stores for the out stations are furnished from its garrison. These circumstances naturally create a want of troops; but the removal of the Moorish inhabitants, and the repair and completion of the fortifications, would enable us to provide for those duties, and to keep the arsenal in safety, with as small a body of men at Seringapatam, as at any other place in the country. In time of war, and in case of a siege, Seringapatam would require as small, if not a smaller, garrison for its defence, than any other place that has been proposed as a great depôt. An army which should besiege Seringapatam must determine at once to attack it from the north, or from the south side of the river, or from the island. No army could be brought there sufficiently numerous to form 3 divisions, or even 2 divisions, large enough to make 2 or 3 attacks upon the place, because these divisions would be effectually separated from each other, and each must be strong enough to defend itself against the army which would be employed to raise the siege. In providing a garrison for the defence of Seringapatam, if such a measure should ever be necessary, no more men would be required than to defend it on one point of attack. But looking to Seringapatam as a place liable to be attacked, it has a singular advantage over every other fort in India, viz. that, from the month of June to the month of December, in every year, it is impossible to approach it.

31. It is also said that Seringapatam is unwholesome, and that art cannot remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. Seringapatam certainly has been found to be unwholesome to the European troops; and, indeed, in the last year, the same objection applied to all parts of the upper country. I apprehend, however, that Seringapatam is not really more unwholesome than Bangalore; and, upon that point, I should be glad to have the opinion of Mr. Anderson. I apprehend that a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam is to be attributed to the nature of the buildings which the officers and the troops have occupied. Open choultries and

buildings, which do not keep out the weather, cannot be supposed to answer in this country; and have been equally fatal in all parts above the ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and, in this season, we have not had any sick officers, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons.

32. It is also said, that the position of Seringapatam is bad, not only in reference to a *dépôt* for service on the frontier, but as a fortress to cover the country, and stop the enemy. In this respect, Seringapatam is not worse than we know Chittledroog to have been. Pursheram Bhow passed in sight of that fortress more than once; and it appears to have been no impediment to his operations in the northern parts of Mysore. But, in fact, no fortress is an impediment to the operations of an hostile army in this country, excepting it lies immediately in the line on which the army must necessarily march; or excepting it is provided with a garrison of such strength and activity, as to afford detachments to operate upon the line of communication of the hostile army with its own country. In case the Company should be involved in hostilities of such extent, as that they should be obliged to stand on the defensive in this country, when at war with a foreign power, it is not probable that the government will be able to give garrisons to the fortresses in this country, of the strength sufficient to afford detachments to operate upon the enemy's line of communication with his own country; and all the fortresses which have been proposed as *dépôts* would be equally incapable, from situation, of stopping an enemy.

33. The advantage of the possession of them, therefore, would be the power which each would have over the country; and their relative advantage would be in proportion to the power of each. I have already pointed out the power which, in my opinion, is attached to the possession of Seringapatam; and the history of this country has pointed out more than one instance, in which the Mysore country has been overrun by a victorious army, which, however, has been obliged to quit it, because it had not possession of Seringapatam.

34. An objection has been made to Seringapatam, on account of the expense of the repairs which will be necessary to that place. These repairs will not cost one third of the sum at which they have been estimated; but it is said that, at all events, they will be more expensive than the repairs of Bangalore. When the

buildings required for Bangalore are completed, I should much doubt it. But it is forgotten that Seringapatam affords cover for one regiment of Europeans at least ; and that it will afford cover for 2 regiments, when the family of the Sultaun shall have been removed from the place. The buildings at Seringapatam will also give an hospital, some quarters for officers, &c. In comparing the expense of the repair of Seringapatam with that of Bangalore, and the establishment of the depôt at that place, or at Chittledroog, the expenses of the cantonment, arsenal, hospital, &c., to be built, ought to be added to the latter. Besides, I have above shown the necessity of building a fort on the Malabar coast, in case Seringapatam is destroyed, the expense of which ought likewise to be added to that of establishing the depôt at Bangalore or at Chittledroog.

35. There is no doubt but that Seringapatam is better provided with timber than almost any other place in the peninsula : that article is cheaper in the bazaar at Seringapatam than it is at Madras. Provisions, and every other article, are cheap : firewood alone is dear, but not dearer than at Chittledroog, or than it would be at Bangalore, if Bangalore were equally populous. The dearness of firewood is a necessary, although a greatly inconvenient, consequence of large populations, in almost every part of India.

36. In regard to the inconvenience of the river, it is trifling. The communication has seldom been interrupted, and never for more than 2, or at most 3, days at a time, and even then not entirely. Six iron 18 pounders, four 12 pounders and howitzers, with all their equipments, were sent to the northward, in the year 1799, when the river was full, with but little inconvenience ; and, in the last year (1800), the army in the Mahratta country received regular supplies of every thing from Seringapatam, not only across the Cauvery, but across the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba, by means of basket boats, without any inconvenience.

## 21. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Rajah's servants.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 29th July, 1801.

The claim of Butcha Rao to interfere in this case brought

a letter from Capt. Symons to me, in which he desired that I would consider and state my opinion whether, and how far, the Rajah's servants are, and should be, liable to the jurisdiction of the Court.

I have done so nearly to the following purport; and I hope that this opinion, and the practice which I have recommended, will be agreeable to you and to them. In the first place, the regulation makes no exception of any persons, being Natives; all of that description residing upon the island of Seringapatam are liable to the jurisdiction of the Courts which it establishes. It could not have been in the contemplation of the government to make an exception in favour of the Rajah's servants, because, in fact, it is not supposed that they reside on the island; and the tendency of such an exception would have been to confine the jurisdiction of the Court to those who should choose to submit to it, and to those of whom it could be proved that they received the pay of the Company, or were in the service of some of their officers and servants.

I have therefore no scruple in laying down the principle broadly, that every person, being a Native residing in the island of Seringapatam, is liable to the jurisdiction of the Court.

I now come to consider the restrictions upon acting upon that principle thus laid down, which are required by expediency, policy, and good manners. Purneah resides in the Fort, with all his property and his family; and the principal officers of the Rajah's government reside there likewise. I do not see any necessity for restricting the operation of that principle in the Court of Phousdarry. It is not very probable that the persons, in whose favour we might wish to restrict it, will commit crimes for which they could be tried there; and it is clear that their servants and adherents must be subject to its jurisdiction, as long as they remain on the island.

The question is entirely different when the crimes are considered which it is possible might come before the Cutchery. In the course of the administration of the government of this country, it is not possible but that Purneah, or his officers, must occasionally do injury to, or seize, private property. It would be a curious circumstance if the person, whose property should thus receive injury, should have a right, by taking a house at Seringapatam, to bring Purneah into the Court of Cutchery.

Considering the connexion between the island of Seringapatam

and the Rajah's country, it is impossible but that questions must arise daily between the inhabitants and the Rajah's servants, residing on the island, some of whom it would be highly improper, and others it would be very necessary, to bring into the Cutchery ; and yet without more experience than we have had of the operation of the Court (of the manner in which the machine works), it is not possible to define cases so as that government may enforce a regulation which will secure the jurisdiction of the Court on one hand, and will prevent the Rajah's principal servants, residing upon the island, from suffering inconvenience on the other. I have therefore proposed to Capt. Symons the following arrangement and rules for his proceedings in the cases above described.

In the 1st place, I have proposed that, whenever a complaint is made in the Court of Cutchery against any of the Rajah's principal servants, or any of his servants, for an act of government, the matter of it should be referred to the Resident, or to the commanding officer, before any further steps should be taken.

2ndly : That, whenever a dispute shall be brought into the Cutchery between 2 persons notoriously in the Rajah's service, that dispute shall be referred to the Rajah's tribunals, provided both parties consent.

3rdly : That disputes regarding property in which no act of the Rajah's government is concerned, and in which one of the parties is not one of his principal servants, shall be tried and decided in the Cutchery.

## 22. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

*Close's political abilities. Danger to Mysore from its isolated situation.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 10th Oct. 1801.

I regret exceedingly Close's departure. Although there is no doubt whatever but that he is the ablest man in the diplomatic line in India, and that his knowledge of the languages is so extraordinary, and so superior to that of any other European in India, that that alone renders him the most fit for a diplomatic situation ; and besides that qualification, he has others in an equal, if not a superior, degree to other candidates for



those situations. Nevertheless, I consider that his presence in Mysore for a few years longer would have been of great benefit, and would have established the new government on so firm a foundation that nothing could hereafter shake it. The great want in this country is of money. There is plenty of everything to bring it into the country ; but as it is entirely cut off from the sea, and has no navigable streams, there is no commerce, and accordingly in many parts of the country the revenue is paid in kind and the common purchases are made by barter. As the Company will take nothing but money in payment of the subsidy, I am always afraid that the government will, at some time or other, be reduced to borrow upon the crops from the Madras sharks, and the first time they do that they take a stride towards their downfall, which will soon be followed by others. Close had a thorough knowledge of this evil, and, by his care and management, I think that he would have prevented its bad effects.

### 23. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Additional reasons for maintaining the fortifications of  
Serlingapatam.*

Sir,

Camp, 5th Feb. 1802.

I have the honour to enclose a memorandum upon the subject treated of in your letter of the 27th of January.

This memorandum was written in the month of July last, and I never intended to communicate it to anybody in its present form. I thought it probable that before the Governor-General should order the destruction of the fort of Serlingapatam, he would require from me my sentiments upon Mr. Webbe's memorandum, and I wrote them at the time of perusing it, intending to put them in the form of a letter when I should be called upon for them. However, I think it better to send you this paper, with this explanation, than to delay it in order to make any alteration whatever.

I beg to observe that the more I consider the subject, the more convinced I am of the utility of Serlingapatam.

Upon a subject of this kind, in my opinion, we ought to take into consideration every event at all within the verge of probability. We have seen the French navies contend with those of Great Britain ; and an opinion has frequently been advanced by those who are in the habit of considering these questions,

that during this war the navy of France would have been as formidable as her army if it had not been for the Continental contest, which rendered the land service more necessary to her. It is not then absolutely impossible for France and her allies or dependents to have a formidable navy.

If she should in a future war have a navy in this country equal to contend with that of Great Britain, upon what will the power of the Company in the Peninsula depend? Not upon Fort St. George, or any place upon the coast, because those places will follow the fate of the fleet, whatever that is; but upon the stability of the power and resources of the Company in the inland country.

As I have pointed out in the enclosed memorandum, there is no place which gives such power or has such resources as Seringapatam, and which, in case of such an event as that which I have in contemplation, would be so capable of keeping in awe the Native powers, or of affording a foundation on which the edifice of the Company's power in the Peninsula might be raised again, and their affairs retrieved.

In addition to the 27th paragraph of the enclosed memorandum, I have to observe that, considering the manner in which the troops in general are necessarily posted in India in times of peace, to place the great depôt of stores at Chittledroog, or in any very advanced situation, might be either unsafe, or that depôt might be useless to the troops.

When hostilities should become necessary on the northern frontier, a length of time must elapse before a body of troops could be collected; and till they were collected, unless there were a large garrison in Chittledroog (a much larger garrison than Seringapatam would require under any circumstances whatever), the depôt of stores would be in danger.

The enemy would be at all times nearer to this depôt than the great body of our army, and before a body could be collected to be opposed to him, he would place himself between us and our stores. Our army consequently, which would be intended for operations on the northern frontier, and for the use of which this depôt at Chittledroog would have been formed, would have to be equipped from some other place, which would of course be Madras. Thus the depôt at Chittledroog would be rendered entirely useless, and the operations of the army would be stopped for months.—I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 24. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*Advantage of Mysore's isolated situation.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 27th Feb. 1802.

It is impossible for a man to be more ignorant of European politics than Purneah is; indeed, he does not appear to me to have had any knowledge of the late orders from Europe, and the proposed changes of men and measures at Madras, which were so likely to affect his own situation. I attribute his salutary ignorance upon these points to his not having any communication with Madras dubashes, who know everything.

## 25. To J. H. Piele, Esq.

*Jurisdiction of Courts at Seringapatam over the Resident's servants.*

(Extract.)

Sera, 26th Sept. 1802.

All the Native inhabitants of the island of Seringapatam are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts established by the regulation, and of course to the police. I am aware that even under the best institutions for the administration of justice political considerations must have their weight, and must at times operate to prevent the natural course of justice. This is particularly the case in this country, and is so at Seringapatam probably more than at any other place; and accordingly you will perceive in my correspondence with Colonel Close that I have restricted the jurisdiction of the courts as far as lay in my power in respect to the servants of the government of the Rajah of Mysore residing upon the island, and I have desired that certain complaints of, and questions regarding, them might be referred in the first instance to the Resident. This restriction was adopted because Purneah and many of the principal servants of the government resided at Seringapatam, and had property there, and it appeared probable that persons who might have complaints and claims against them for acts done in the common transactions of the government might lodge their complaints in the Cutchery, and thus that the ordinary transactions of this government might come under the review of the judge. In a place situated as

Seringapatam is, it is scarcely possible that questions should not arise between the Rajah's subjects and those of the Company on the island, many of which it is exceedingly proper, and others very improper, that the judge should decide on ; but you will perceive that the line is clearly drawn in my letter to Colonel Close ; and I have the pleasure to add that in this, as upon most other occasions, he and I agreed in opinion. The question is, whether the people attached to you are at all of the description of those belonging to the Rajah's government in respect to whom the jurisdiction of the court is restricted ; some of them are certainly people of a better description ; others, against whom the majority of these complaints are made, are peons, gardeners, shepherds, horsekeepers, &c. &c. This description of people are liable to the jurisdiction, even if in the Rajah's service, and are certain of punishment if they misbehave or break the peace. The reason for which the jurisdiction was restricted in respect to the higher rank of the Rajah's servants was, that they might not be brought before the Court for acts purely of government, and that Purneah and his principal people might not be frightened out of the place by the danger of being brought before the Foujdarry by every drunken sepoy, dubash, or maty boy who might choose to complain of them. But I beg to know whether the same reasons apply to the principal people in your service ? They are not concerned in the government in any manner, and as long as they are in your service they are obliged to remain at Seringapatam if you do. The only reason then for which they should not be brought before these courts appointed by government to have jurisdiction over them is, the prejudice they have themselves to it, and the desire they have in common with every man to live under no control, and to be the judges of their own actions. But this reason, in my opinion, has no weight against the principle that the law is common to all, particularly in a case in which it is evident that no political consideration can have any influence. In this view of the subject, I think that your servants, particularly the lower classes of them, ought to be made to attend the Cutchery when called, in the same manner as other Natives, and even Europeans are, and ought to be punished there for their public offences.

It may happen, however, that you or Mr. Webbe may think that the character of the Resident is lessened in the opinion of the Natives in general by the obligation that his servants should attend these courts, and you may therefore be desirous that all

complaints against them should be referred to you. I acknowledge that I am not of this opinion; I should imagine that Webbe is not, and I know Colonel Close was not; and when you consider the question on a broad principle, I think you will not.

**26. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.**

*Purneah not to go beyond the Treaty, by paying gratis military expenses.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 3rd Dec. 1802.

Purneah says that he proposes to pay all the horse whom he will entertain in Mysore himself, but I have discouraged this notion. He may make an advance of the money to the Company, but he ought not to incur an expense of this kind which he is not required to incur by the treaty, and it is better that we should owe him money for the services he will render upon this occasion than gratitude. The expenses incurred by him, which probably ought to be incurred by the Company, on account of useful works for the country, stand upon grounds entirely different.

**27. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.**

*Objections against ceding Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 15th Dec. 1802.

I have always thought it advisable to conciliate the Rajah of Koorg by every kind of indulgent and liberal policy. We owe him much: the position of his country is highly important to us, and it is more so to our character in this country to keep him in the situation in which he is, and in good humour with our government. For this reason I would give him the territory in Canara proposed to be given to him, and I would arrange his boundary on the Mysore side permanently, by means of a European gentleman, in a manner that would be satisfactory to him.

I observe in your letter to Piele that Malcolm has started a proposition to give Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg. I think

that it would be convenient to us to get rid of that district, and it is probable that the Rajah of Koorg would be glad to have it; but we must recollect that the Rajah of Mysore has an interest in it as well as ourselves, for which we must make provision in case of such arrangement. We ought also to recollect that when we give Wynaad to the Rajah of Koorg, he will have in his possession all the passes from Mysore to Malabar, between Soobramany and Paulghautcherry. I am convinced that as long as the Rajah lives, and we continue towards him the liberal policy by which we have been guided in our transactions with him hitherto, they could not be in better hands; but we don't know what kind of man his successor may be, and if we adopt this arrangement, and indeed in any case if we give him territory, we ought to urge him to point out his successor. In fact, a dispute for the succession to the government in those territories would be almost as inconvenient and prejudicial to us as to have in it a man who should be inimical to our interests.

## 28. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Active cooperation of Purneah in providing for the Mahratta war.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 1st Jan. 1803.

I cannot conclude this letter without letting you know how amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment of the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily our little friend Purneah has come into all my plans for the service.

1st. I have raised here 8000 bullocks before they had got one at Madras; besides the bullocks for the cavalry gram.

2ndly. At the end of the gram harvest, one month before the new gram comes in, the cavalry Gram Agent Gen. is supplied with 7000 loads; and the cavalry are brought upon the frontier, with 500 loads each regiment, where they find 6000 loads to supply their consumption while they remain there.

3rdly. A dépôt is formed of 7000 loads of rice at Hurryhur.

4thly. Mysore alone gives 32,000 brinjarry bullocks loaded, which will meet the General at the back of the Chittledroog hills, at the end of this month.

5thly. 60,000 sheep, assembled in different flocks between Sera and Chittledroog; and

6thly. A body of silladar horse, amounting to above 5000.

## 29. To Colonel Carlisle.

*The Garrison of Seringapatam not exempted from the control of the police.*

Camp, 7th July, 1803.

My dear Colonel,

I have received a letter from Mr. Knot, in which he informs me that he has had some difficulties in carrying on the duties of the police which have been imposed upon him, in consequence of the interference of officers and others to screen their servants from the powers of his Cutchery, and of the non-attendance of sepoys, lascars, &c., when required either as witnesses or prisoners; that lately the shroffs had left the fort because they had found that the police had not strength to protect them, and particularly in one instance had not been able to punish a man who had beaten one of them.

The police of the fort and island of Seringapatam is, by the judicial regulation of government relative to that place, submitted to the commanding officer in the Mysore country. I have not by me at present the regulation of government, but I desire Lieutenant Knot by this post, to give you the copy to read, which must be in Major Symons's possession, and among the papers in his office.

You will perceive from a perusal of that paper that, although for obvious reasons the police is placed under a military officer, its jurisdiction is strictly civil, and it must be considered in every respect in the same light as the police of Madras, or that of any other town in the Company's territories which may be under the direction of the Company's civil servants.

The objects of criminal police are principally the prevention of crimes, but they refer also to the punishment of them, particularly those of a trifling nature, such as are likely to occur daily in a bazaar. But no police can possibly answer any end for which it may have been established if any set of inhabitants can hold themselves superior to its regulations and its power, or can be screened from punishment when their conduct deserves it, or even from inquiry. Much less can it answer if the persons claiming these privileges are above all others the most

likely and the most accustomed to commit the crimes which it must be the object of the police to prevent if possible, and to punish the criminals if the crimes cannot be prevented, viz. the followers of officers and soldiers, and the sepoys, artificers, and lascars of the garrison.

Accordingly, with every wish to indulge the military, and to protect them as far as may have been in my power, I have thought it proper upon all occasions to support the power of the police and of the civil magistrate. I have given directions that any person who may be seen in the act of committing a crime shall be liable to be arrested by the servants of the police; that if such person should be a military man, of course the police officer must give notice of this arrest to the commanding officer of the garrison; that all persons residing in the fort or on the island of Srirangapatam may be obliged to attend the Cutchery when their attendance may be required either as witnesses or to answer any charge that may be made against them; but that if the person whose attendance is required should be a military man, the police officer must write to the commanding officer of the garrison to request that his attendance may be ordered. Under these rules the police has been kept up as well as local circumstances would permit; at least I have had the satisfaction of seeing the place prosper, and become the most populous and most useful town in the Mysore country.

I most anxiously therefore request from you an adherence to this same system, and the support of the gentleman upon whom the duties of the police have been imposed, much against his inclination, and by no means to his advantage.

I write to him to desire that he will give orders to his officers to arrest any person who may be guilty of crimes or irregularities, giving notice to the commanding officer of the garrison if such person should be military, and to enforce the attendance of all those whose presence may be required either as witnesses or to answer to charges brought against them, excepting military persons, for whose attendance he must make application to the commanding officer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



**30. To the Governor-General.***Efficiency and good discipline of the Mysore cavalry.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Cheeskair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lordship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army since I was detached from the Toombuddra, in the month of March last. They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses. To the credit of the government of Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British troops; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example that I attribute the conduct of the Mahratta troops serving with this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to complain.

**31. To Major Shawe.***Mysore ought to be placed directly under the Governor-General.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 14th Jan. 1804.

In respect to Mysore, I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal civil service should be Malcolm's successor there. The government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor-General in Council. The governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan, or the Peshwah. The consequence of the continuance of the existing system will be, that the Rajah's government will be destroyed by corruption; or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil; or who has strength of character or talents to defend the government against the second. In my opinion, the only remedy is, to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor-

General; and this can be done effectually only by appointing, as Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal civil service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor-General. To fill this office with advantage to the public will not require very extraordinary talents when this arrangement shall be made. Good character, and decent, respectable manners will be far more important.

### 32. To the Governor-General.

*Good working of Wellesley's settlement of Mysore.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Chowke, 9th March, 1804.

While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting to the conduct of the government of Mysore during the late war, and congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures, and the accomplishment of all your objects in establishing it. In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, or for the large quantities of grain required for the cavalry, and by the brinjarries. All these supplies were furnished with a facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India. He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command, as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major Gen. Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have already drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan has had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier since I marched from the Toombuddra, which he has commanded in person; and a detachment of these troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves upon a late occasion, in the destruction of a numerous band of freebooters who had assembled in the Savanore country, and threatened Mysore.

## 33. To Captain Wilks.

*Relations of the English Government with the Rajah's servants.*

(Extract.)

Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804.

I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to be very cautious in our interference with the servants of the Rajah's government; and I have always proceeded upon that principle. In the case of Govind Rao, in particular, I requested Purneah to fix upon the person who should be sent to the southern chiefs, and the allowance which should be given to the person upon whom he should fix. Accordingly, this allowance has been paid from that time by Purneah.

I think, however, that it is not inconsistent with the principle not to interfere with the Rajah's servants, to give rewards to those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with fidelity; particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these instances, to bring forward the government of Mysore as much as possible; and to provide that the rewards given shall go through the hands of the Rajah's government, and shall be dependent upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan.

Purneah, like other men, has his faults. He is particularly jealous of the intercourse between the servants of his government and the European gentlemen, and of the favours which the former may receive from the Company. This jealousy arises principally from ignorance of the European character, and partly from being insensible of the strong impressions in his own favour, which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon all the persons who have at present any power in India. But I am of opinion that we should not act as we ought, if we were to allow that jealousy to prevent us from giving those rewards which are justly due, and which policy urges us to give as strongly as justice and gratitude.

## 34, To Purneah, Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore.

*Farewell testimony to Purneah's merits, and parting advice.*

(Extracts.)

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

I part with you with the greatest regret; and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honour and prosperity

of the government of the Rajah of Mysore over which you preside. For 6 years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration.

Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which was first made of the government of Mysore ; and I am convinced that under no other management would it have been possible for the British government to derive such advantages from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in the various difficulties with which we have contended since your authority was established. Every principle of gratitude, therefore, for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense of the public benefits which have been derived from your administration, render me anxious for its continuance and for its increasing prosperity ; and in every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass which I may think favourable for rendering you service.

Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the liberty to recommend to you to persevere in the laudable path which you have hitherto followed. Let the prosperity of the country be your great object ; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity ; do justice to every man ; and attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by the British Resident ; and you may depend upon it that your government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it to be.

\* \* \* \* \*

As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to you from Bengal.

## II. DHOONDIAH WAUGH.

### 35. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Necessity of destroying Dhoondiah. Hence a possible complication with the Mahrattas. Colonel Wellesley doubtful as to going to Batavia.*

Camp at Cuddapa, 29th May, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., and I am very much obliged to you for the offer which you make me of sending me with the Admiral to Batavia.

I do not deny that I should like much to go; but you will have learned, before you receive this, that my troops are in the field, and it is therefore probable that Lord Clive will be desirous that I should remain in this country, until its tranquillity is ensured, and the troops can be sent back to their different garrisons. I have written to him upon the subject, and I have desired him to accept your offer for me, or not, as he may find it most convenient for the public service, after having ascertained from the Admiral at what time he proposes to depart from the coast on this service. If he should not depart until late in the year, I think it more than probable that I shall be able to go with him. I do not know which of the services will answer best; but I am certain that it will be more easy to spare troops from the Carnatic and Mysore, towards the end of the year, than it is at this moment.

Dhoondiah is certainly a despicable enemy; but, from circumstances, he is one against whom we have been obliged to make a formidable preparation. It is absolutely necessary to the peace of this country of Canara and Malabar, that that man should be given up to us; and I doubt not that before now you will have made a demand for him upon the government of Poonah. If we do not get him, we must expect a general insurrection of all the discontented and disaffected of these countries. I have information that letters have been received by most of them, either from him, or from others written in his name, calling upon them to take the opportunity to rebel against the Company's government, or that of their allies; and his invasion of our territory is looked to as a circumstance favourable to their views.

The destruction of this man, therefore, is absolutely necessary for our tranquillity; and nothing will be more easy, if the Marhattas are really disposed to enter into the plan. If they are not, it will be a matter of difficulty, and it may become a question whether the whole power of the Company ought not to be turned to this object. I was aware that this was the case, before the troops were collected; and although I was certain that it was the only mode of saving this country from being plundered, I did not like to put it in execution without Lord Clive's orders.

It was clear that, when an army should be collected to oppose a man who had an asylum in the Marhatta country, and who may therefore be reckoned a part of the Marhatta state, the government would be committed with that of the Marhattas; and our honour would require that we should go through with the business, until that man should be given up to us, or that we should have some adequate security for his good behaviour. If, then, the government of Poonah is inclined to give this man up to us, or to co-operate with us in his destruction, it may be possible for me to go to Batavia. If they should not, matters here will take a very serious turn, and no prospect of advantage, or of credit to be gained, shall induce me to quit this country. Besides the destruction of this Dhoondiah, there are other objects, which comparatively, however, are of a trifling nature. The attainment of these might be given in charge to other people, if it should be thought desirable to postpone the expedition to Batavia, until matters are settled on the Marhatta frontier.

### 36. To the Adjutant-General.

#### *Successful attack on Dhoondiah's camp.*

Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Manowly,  
31st July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have had it in my power to strike another blow against Dhoondiah. After I had got possession of Gudduck, having heard that he was encamped near Soondootty, and that he was endeavouring to cross his baggage over the river Malpoorba, at Manowly, I formed a plan of attacking him and his baggage at the same time, by the co-operation of the detachment under Lieut.-Col. Bowser. He did not arrive at Dummul till the 28th, and was, therefore,

2 marches in my rear, but it was possible that Dhoondiah might wait at Soondootty, to cover the passage of his baggage, till Lieut.-Col. Bowser should come within reach; and as it was important that I should be near the enemy to take advantage of any movements he might make, I marched on, and, on the 29th, reached Allagawaddy, which is about 15 miles from Soondootty and 26 from this place: at Allagawaddy I proposed to halt till the 31st, on which day I expected Col. Bowser to be at Nargoond.

As soon, however, as Dhoondiah heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy he broke up from Soondootty; one part of his army went to Doodwar, another to the eastward, towards Jellahal, and a third towards this place with the baggage; and I am informed that, upon this occasion, he was deserted by a large proportion of his troops. I marched yesterday morning, the 30th, to Hoogurgoor, to the eastward of the Pursghur hill, as a central situation, at which I was most likely to procure good intelligence, and there I heard that Dhoondiah had come here with his baggage. I determined then to move on and attack him. I arrived here with the cavalry at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and found the camp standing, and that we had surprised the enemy. I instantly attacked his camp with the cavalry only.

Lieut.-Col. Torin attacked their left with the 1st and 4th regts., and Col. Stevenson and Col. Pater their front and right with the 25th dragoons and 2nd regt. of cavalry. The camp was strong, with its rear to the Malpoorba, covered by the fort of Manowly on the other side of it, and a deep nullah along its front and left. The 2nd regt. of cavalry, under these circumstances, was the only corps which got into it; but every person there was either killed or driven into the river. All the baggage, 2 elephants, many camels, horses, bullocks, &c. &c., fell into our hands. Numbers of people were drowned or shot in attempting to cross the river, and many prisoners, women and children, &c. &c., were taken.

Major Blaquiere, with 4 troops of the 25th dragoons, pursued to the eastward a party which appear to have been outside of the camp, and drove them into the river.

Upon the whole, the disposition of the attack of this camp was most ably made by Col. Stevenson, and well executed by Col. Pater and Lieut.-Col. Torin, and the troops under their orders, who conducted themselves much to my satisfaction. Dhoon-

diah's guns had been passed over the river before we reached the camp, and when the infantry came up we made an endeavour to dismount them ; but night coming on, and the troops having undergone great fatigue, I withdrew my guns to my camp.

It is not certain whether Dhoondiah was with this part of his army or not : if he was, he went off with the party which was pursued to the eastward, and was driven into the river by Major Blaquiere.

I have this morning received messages from the brinjarries to ask for cowle, which I have granted. Among other families which have fallen into my hands, I have got that of the head brinjarry, and I hope soon to have the whole of that class of people on my side.

P.S. I have the pleasure to inform you that, since writing the above, I have got possession of Dhoondiah's guns, 6 in number.

There was a boat immediately under the fort, which Lieut. Fitchet and Lieut. Jackson, and some men of the 73rd and 77th regts., swam over the river to seize. The fort was evacuated, and I have brought away and have given over the guns to the Marhattas.

### 37. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

#### *Characteristic precaution in the pursuit.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Kittoor, 5th Aug., 1800.

I arrived here this morning upon the plan which I stated to you in my letter of the 3rd. Dhoondiah is gone quite into the jungles, and his head is beyond the sources of the Malpoorba. Stevenson is at a place called Eytetul, about 6 miles from hence, and will follow the tail of Dhoondiah to-morrow, part of which he may probably cut off. I halt here to construct boats, to make certain other arrangements which I am about to detail.

1st. It is very certain that, as Dhoondiah has crossed by the sources of the Malpoorba, I could follow him by that route ; but I must have a communication with this country, which by the same route would be long and difficult, and would be liable to constant interruption from the violence of the rains in these jungly countries. I have therefore determined to have my communication by boats, and at Sungoly, which is 3 coss from hence, and I halt here to construct the boats, as it is in the neighbourhood of a bamboo jungle, and of Darwar, where I can



get hides, and it is a plentiful country, with rice, green and dry forage, &c.

2ndly. I must throw my sick and wounded into a place of security, and none will answer so well as Hullihall, which place is 5 coss from hence.

3rdly. I propose to make a collection and depôt of rice at Hullihall, and that cannot be done, unless I go there myself to have a little conversation with the dubash in office. What do you think of the difficulties stated in procuring the supply for that garrison, when I tell you that, about half an hour after my arrival, a buccall of this place told me that he would let me have 500 bags to-morrow, and would make it 1000 before 8 days elapsed?

4thly. It is necessary to curb Munro's amildars a little, who are taking possession of every place in the country, whether belonging to friends or to foes, and who have given great disgust to the allies.

The first is the only reason which induces me to halt; but I shall have a sufficiency of occupation while I am here. I have made all the arrangements for constructing the boats; and I shall go over to Hullihall to-morrow morning to settle the other points which are objects of my attention.

### 38. To Colonel Stevenson.

#### *Dhoondiah to be circumvented.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Jellahall, 30th Aug., 1800.

In my opinion our last operations against Dhoondiah had this fault: we pushed him from the westward before we were prepared to the eastward to stop him; and we must take care to avoid the same error in future. It is impossible to expect to catch him or to distress him so as to reduce his force by any direct movement upon his rear, because, in truth, he can march as far in one day without distress, as we can in two days by making the greatest efforts; he lives upon the grain which is the produce of the country, we upon that which comes from a distance, and for supplies of which we must occasionally halt; and therefore the best mode of proceeding with him is, to place ourselves so that some of us may be enabled to stop him, while the others pursue him. We never had so good a chance as we have now that the rivers Toombuddra and Kistna are full, and likely to remain so for a month longer.

I come now to consider the plan which you have proposed for renewing the pursuit. In the first place, it is absolutely necessary that we should all halt to give time to supplies of grain and rice to come up. The last of Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser's brinjaries left Hooley on the 25th; and if they make the same marches as I did, they must be with us on the 1st of September, and with Colonel Bowser on the 2nd.

The supplies which I have with me were calculated as sufficient for an operation to which the rivers were likely to put an end; and I trusted that its success in some degree would have given us a halt of a few days, which would have brought up the remainder of the supplies.

But even if we had supplies to enable you to move forward immediately, your doing so would only drive Dhoondiah to a greater distance, and he would certainly then be able to adopt, and carry into effect, some plan for his escape, before it would be possible for any of the other parts of the detachment to come up with him. My idea is to march by Kanagherry or Hunmunsagar into the Dooab; if Dhoondiah goes that road, to keep farther to the southward. When I shall have got well forward on my march you may begin yours, and push him towards Raichore, and the fork of the Toombuddra and the Kistna. If he attempt to cross the latter you will have him, and he will not like to go between you and me, or to push for the former.

There is another reason why we ought to have a force to the southward of him before we push him from the northward and westward. The Toombuddra empties earlier than the Kistna. His object certainly is to go to the Soorapoor Polygar; but there are other polygars south of the Toombuddra, bordering upon Gurrumconda and Nundydroog, who have already commenced a war with Colonel Cuppage, in correspondence and connection with Dhoondiah, who would readily give him an asylum, and receive from him great assistance. It is, therefore, necessary that we should be prepared to follow him if he should attempt to go that way. In order to be able to carry on the operations which I propose with effect, it is necessary that I should have it in my power to send out another detachment; this I cannot do without another regiment of cavalry, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send me back the 1st regiment.

\* \* \* \* \*

Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser proposes that we should have one corps north of the Kistna, and another south of the Toombuddra.

This would certainly be very desirable, but the truth is, that there are no means of supplying large detachments at such a distance. Hitherto I have fed the Colonel with some difficulty, on account of a short distance between us; hereafter he will be able to feed himself, but he will not be able to feed a detachment from his corps, which will be moving north of the Kistna, any more than I shall one from mine, moving south of the Toombuddra.

### 39. To Colonel Stevenson.

#### *Detailed plan of pursuit.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Jellahall, 1st Sept., 1800.

It appears by all accounts that Dhoondiah's family and his baggage are gone towards Goodygonta and Deodroog, at the last of which places they are to cross the Kistna into the country of the Soorapoor Polygar. Dhoondiah himself, it is said, is at Moodgul, and he will either keep near his baggage or he will turn to the southward and endeavour to cross the Toombuddra, and get among the polygars on the Mysore frontier. We must make a run at his baggage; and we must, by all means, prevent him from approaching Mysore; and what follows is the plan.

I shall march the day after to-morrow with my whole force by the route which is enclosed No. 1; and my object will be to keep to the southward of the enemy, if possible, until I find a convenient opportunity of striking a blow at him. If I find he strikes up to the northward I shall not proceed further east, and I shall follow him or not, according as I may find it may be advantageous, in order to prevent him from getting to the southward, or to distress him.

I beg that you will march upon the baggage and the detachment that is with it, as soon as you will have got what you may think sufficient supplies by the route enclosed (No. 2) towards Goodygonta and Deodroog; but, of course, if an opportunity should offer of striking a blow, which you may think of more importance at the time it offers than that of seizing and routing the baggage, you will deviate from this route; and you will also deviate from it if you can hear of a shorter or better road to Goodygonta, or if you find that the baggage is gone by any other road.

As soon as you have got possession of the baggage, or if you should find it impossible to get it, I then wish you to move

directly upon Dhoondiah, wherever he may be. Let me have constant intelligence of your motions.

I have ordered Noor Khan and Saddoolah Khan to come here to cross the Malpoorba, and those sirdars shall follow you.

I don't mean that the Mahrattas should pass their own frontier, but they shall be collected in one body, and I hope will be strong enough to prevent the enemy from returning to the Savanore country. At all events, if he does return, I shall be so far to the southward, that, by a movement to my left, I shall be able to cover the supplies from Mysore before he can reach them to do any mischief.

It is clear to me that we can never do anything by a direct movement upon his army; we may catch his baggage as we did before at Manowly, and thus distress him; and afterwards, by pushing him from opposite sides, his numbers may decrease; so that if he does escape to this country, which, until the Kistna and Toombuddra fall, is his only resource, our allies may think themselves sufficiently strong to dash at him.

#### 40. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

##### *Dhoondiah's arrangements with the Brinjarries.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Kanagherry, 7th Sept., 1800.

These brinjarries give a curious account of the manner in which Dhoondiah goes on. They say that he has with him still above 40,000 of their class, that he employs them and gives them the means of living in the following manner. When he approaches a village or a town which is unprotected by a fort, he sends a body of horse, and of brinjarries, to levy a contribution: he takes to himself all the money he can get, and gives them at a certain low price all the grain and all the cattle they can find. They pay him this price for the grain and cattle, and they are allowed to sell them at such profit as his camp will afford. They say that he has with him nearly all the brinjarries of this part of India. These people who were taken belonged to the Baramahl, and they say there are many others from that country, from the Nizam's and Mahratta country. In the latter, indeed, there is not now a brinjarry to be found, and, from the state of Col. Bowser's supplies, I should imagine that there can be but few in the Nizam's country.

## 41. To the Adjutant-General, Army of Fort St. George.

*Final defeat and death of Dhoondiah.*

Camp at Yepulpurvy, 10th Sept., 1800.

After I had crossed the Malpoorba at Jellahall, I marched on the 3rd inst., and entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmun-sagur on the 5th. As Col. Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpoorba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river till the 4th. It appeared to me probable, that, when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication; or, if favoured by the Patans of Kurnool, and the polygars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river, and would enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of those designs, if he had them; and afterwards to push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able; while Col. Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between 12 and 20 miles from the Kistna, and the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.

I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th; and on the 8th moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place; the infantry being on those days at Nowly and Chinnoor, about 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about 25 miles from Raichore, at which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna; but on his road having seen Col. Stevenson's camp, he returned and encamped about 9 miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did not know that I was so near him; and I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor.

I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place called Conahgull, about 6 miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward; apparently with the design of passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regts. of cavalry.

The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank

covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood for some time with apparent firmness; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those 4 regts., which I was obliged to form in one line, in order at all to equalise in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others Dhoondiah, were killed; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp about 3 miles from Conahgull; I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and every thing he had<sup>1</sup>.

The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and, above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valour and discipline were conspicuous; and their conduct and that of their commanding officers, Col. Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Capt. Doveton, and Capt. Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time I must inform you, that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services.

It is also proper that I should inform you how much reason I have to be pleased with the gentlemen charged with the business of procuring supplies for the troops. Notwithstanding the distance of the scene of my operations from the usual sources of supplies, and rapidity of my marches; and the necessity, from the species of warfare carried on, of perpetually altering their direction, I have always been well supplied with every thing which the troops could want. The Mahratta and Mogul cavalry are now employed in the pursuit of the fugitives; and I propose to draw off towards the frontier of the Rajah of Mysore in a few days.

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<sup>1</sup> Among the baggage was found Salabut Khan, a son of Dhoondiah, a child of about 4 years old. He was taken to Col. Wellesley's tent, and was afterwards most kindly and liberally taken care of by him. Sir Arthur, on his departure from India, left some hundred pounds for the use of the boy in the hands of Col. J. Hely Symons, the judge and collector at Seringapatam. When Col. Symons retired from service, the Hon. A. Cole, the Resident at the Court of Mysore, took charge of him, and had him placed in the Rajah's service. He was a fine, handsome, intelligent youth. Salabut Khan died of cholera in 1822.—Note by Col. Gurwood. [See Sir Arthur's Letter on this subject, *To the Magistrate at Seringapatam*, in Appendix.—Ed.]

**42. The Governor-General in Council to the Secret Committee  
of the Honourable Court of Directors.**

*Pursuit, final defeat, and death of Dhoondiah.*

Fort William, 3rd October, 1800.

‘Honourable Sirs,

‘1. Our last letter to your Honourable Committee in this department was dated and closed on the 31st of August. Since that time further details have reached us of the operations of the army under the command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, and, finally, we have received the satisfactory intelligence of the happy and honourable issue of the expedition against Dhoondiah Waugh, which terminated, on the 10th of September, by a decisive and brilliant victory obtained, under the personal command of Colonel Wellesley, over the remnant of the rebel army; by the death of Dhoondiah Waugh, who fell in the action; and by the entire destruction or dispersion of the troops which that insurgent had assembled on the frontier of Mysore. Deeming these details to be equally interesting and important, we propose to submit them to your Honourable Committee in the present despatch.

‘2. After the destruction (on the 30th of July) of that part of the revolted army encamped near Manowly, Dhoondiah retired precipitately in the direction of Kittoor, whence he effected his escape by penetrating through the jungles in the vicinity of that place, and by taking a circuitous route round the sources of the river Malpoorba. He thus surmounted the difficulty to which he had been reduced by the want of boats, and on the 7th of August he reached Shawpoor, in the vicinity of the river Gutpurba.

‘3. Colonel Wellesley, marching from Soondootty on the 3rd of August, arrived at Kittoor on the 5th. Here he was detained until the 10th of August in preparing boats for the passage of the Malpoorba. Colonel Wellesley justly concluded that boats might be constructed for the passage of the river with more expedition and facility than the movement of the army, with its guns and stores, could have been effected through the jungles of Kittoor, in the track of Dhoondiah’s route.

‘4. In the meanwhile Colonel Stevenson, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser’s detachment and the 4th regiment of Native cavalry, lightly equipped, was detached to some distance in

Dhoondiah's track, for the purpose of cutting off a part of the insurgent's baggage. This detachment afterwards crossed the Malpoorba before Colonel Wellesley was able to effect the passage, and for some time menaced Dhoondiah's rear. Colonel Stevenson's detachment was ordered not to push the rebel force closely until the troops under Colonel Wellesley's personal command should attain a position sufficiently advanced to support the operations of the detachment.

'5. Dhoondiah, continuing his march along the river Gutpurba to the eastward, attempted to pass that river west of Gokauk, but was prevented, in consequence of Colonel Wellesley's express desire, by a polygar named Narity Seerjary. Colonel Stevenson's detachment continued its march along the Gutpurba, while Colonel Wellesley, having completely effected the passage of the Malpoorba, moved along the left bank of the latter river, being accompanied by a force of Mahratta and Mogul cavalry from the Peshwah's and the Nizam's armies, acting as our allies against the rebel force.

'6. With a view to prevent Doondiah from crossing the river with any large body of troops and followers by the passes of the Malpoorba, east of Manowly and near Badamy, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper's brigade, with the Mahratta cavalry under Chintomeny Rao and Baba Saheb, was detached by the road to the right of the river Malpoorba, and was ordered to occupy the passes most likely to be fordable.

'7. Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, marching for this purpose through the valley of Purusghur, assaulted and carried by escalade, on the 22nd August, the fort of Hooley, situated in that valley. The garrison of this fort had received cowle from Colonel Wellesley after the action of Manowly on the 30th July, but had, notwithstanding, plundered the baggage of the dragoons as it passed the fort on the march to Soondootty on the 1st August. Colonel Wellesley was prevented by other more urgent objects from punishing the perfidy of this garrison at the time, but the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Capper's march affording a favourable occasion for the purpose, it was not neglected. From Hooley, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper proceeded on the same day to Syringhy, another fort, situated about eight miles to the eastward of the former, and occupied by a polygar in the interest of Dhoondiah. The escalade of this fort being found impracticable, the gateway was attacked and the outer gate carried; but the passage being too narrow to admit a gun upon its carriage, the



gun was immediately taken off the carriage and transported to the inner gate under a very heavy fire from the fort. This gallant enterprise was happily accomplished by Sir John Sinclair and a detachment of the Coast and Bombay artillerymen, and the gate was speedily burst open. The fort of Syringhy is represented as being very strong.

‘8. The gallantry of the action performed by Sir John Sinclair and his party is highly commended by Colonel Wellesley, and, we are persuaded, will attract the notice and approbation of your Honourable Committee.

‘9. Colonel Wellesley having been informed that the Polygar of Talloor had in his possession and under his care some guns, stores, and ammunition belonging to Dhoondiah Waugh, despatched Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, on the 24th of August, with a detachment, to seize and destroy them. This service was performed very satisfactorily by Colonel Montresor. In the place were found one iron and four brass guns, with excellent carriages, several tumbrils, a quantity of ammunition, several (Company’s) muskets, ammunition for them, &c., all of which were destroyed. The hill fort of Catar Ghur was abandoned on Colonel Montresor’s approach.

‘10. Before any part of our army could reach Dhoondiah’s force, the river Malpoorba suddenly fell so considerably that Dhoondiah was enabled, on the 24th August, to cross that river near Boodeyhaul, and to enter the Nizam’s country. Colonel Wellesley immediately prepared to pursue the rebel, but the British force was not able to cross the Malpoorba until the 29th August, at a very deep and rapid ford near Jellahall. Here Colonel Wellesley was detained until the 3rd September, being obliged to wait the junction of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, and to allow time for Colonel Stevenson’s passage of the river, which it was necessary to perform in boats. These operations delayed the advance of the British army until the 4th of September. On the 5th of September Colonel Wellesley, following the track of Dhoondiah, entered the Nizam’s territories at Hunmunsagur.

‘11. It appeared probable to Colonel Wellesley that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Dooab, he would return into Savanore by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede the supplies and interrupt the communications of our army; or, if favoured by the Patans of Kurnool and the Polygars on the right bank of

the river Toombuddra, Dhoondiah might pass that river and might enter the territories of the Rajah of Mysore: Colonel Wellesley therefore judiciously determined, by moving his own detachment to the southward, to preclude the execution of either of those designs, and afterwards to push Dhoondiah to the eastward, taking such advantage of the movements of the rebel force as might be practicable. Colonel Stevenson, in the meanwhile, was ordered to move by Moodgul and Moosky, at the distance of between twelve and twenty miles from the Kistna; and the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry (collected in one body) was put in motion between the divisions of the forces under the respective commands of Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson.

‘12. Having thus, with a degree of judgment and skill which cannot fail to attract the notice of your Honourable Committee, combined his future operations, Colonel Wellesley proceeded, on the 7th September, to Kanagherry. On the 8th he moved with the cavalry alone to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to Yepulpurvy, the infantry being, on the last day, about fifteen miles in his rear.

‘13. On the 9th, in the morning, Dhoondiah appears to have moved from Mudgherry, a place about twenty-five miles from Raichore (where he had been encamped for some days), towards the river Kistna; but, on his road, having seen Colonel Stevenson’s camp, he returned, and encamped about nine miles in Colonel Wellesley’s front, between Colonel Wellesley’s position and Bunnoo. It was evident that Dhoondiah was not apprised of the vicinity of Colonel Wellesley’s force; the latter was well informed that Dhoondiah believed him to be still at Chinnoor.

‘14. On the morning of the 10th of September Colonel Wellesley moved forward, and met Dhoondiah’s army at a place called Conahgull, about six miles from Yepulpurvy. Dhoondiah was then on his march to the westward, apparently with a design of passing between the body of the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry and Colonel Wellesley’s detachment, which Dhoondiah supposed to be at Chinnoor. The insurgent at that time was accompanied by a large body of cavalry, consisting of about five thousand men, which Colonel Wellesley immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th dragoons and 1st and 2nd regiments of Native cavalry.

‘15. The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conahgull, and stood

for some time with apparent firmness. Colonel Wellesley was obliged to form the four regiments of cavalry in one line in order to render his line in any degree proportioned in length to that of the enemy, and such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by the four regiments, that the whole line of the enemy gave way, and was pursued for many miles. Many persons (among others, Dhoondiah Waugh himself) were slain, and the whole body of the rebel force was scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp, and was taken possession of by our troops.

'16. Colonel Stevenson, on the same day (10th of September), took near Deodroog the only two remaining pieces of cannon belonging to the enemy, together with a large quantity of baggage, camels, bullocks, and brinjarries.

'17. Colonel Wellesley has borne the most ample testimony to the bravery and perseverance of all the troops employed under his command during the whole of this active and rapid expedition. When it is considered that the expedition was commenced and prosecuted in a season of the year most unfavourable to military operations, through a country presenting various impediments, and in pursuit of a bold, active, and skilful enemy, at the head of a numerous body of light cavalry, the zeal and the gallantry manifested by our troops on this occasion, and the ability and energy with which they were commanded, are entitled to particular commendation.

'18. In our despatch of the 31st August it was our public duty to express our sense of the able and spirited conduct of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley in the former part of the campaign against Dhoondiah; the same obligations of public duty and of justice to merit require that we should declare to your Honourable Committee that Colonel Wellesley's subsequent operations have realized every expectation which we were induced to form from our confidence in his professional knowledge, in his skilful management of his resources and supplies, and in his enterprising and active spirit.

'19. The manner in which the expedition against Dhoondiah Waugh has been conducted and terminated has effectually removed the immediate danger which menaced the possessions of the Company and of their allies and dependents in the peninsula of India, and the impression made by our success against this insurgent cannot fail to contribute in an eminent degree to

the permanent establishment of tranquillity in our recent conquests and on the whole line of our new frontier.

‘We have the honour to be,

‘Honourable Sirs,

‘Your most faithful, humble servants,

(Signed) ‘By the GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

‘(A true Copy) W. KIRKPATRICK,’

‘Secretary to Government for Political Department.’

### III. THE MALABAR COAST.

#### 43. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

*Physical and social obstacles to the conquest of Malabar.*

*Character of the Koorg Rajah.*

(Extracts.)

Cannanore, 7th April, 1800.

Mr. Smee, the gentleman who has for some time had charge of the Cotiote district, has made an arrangement with the friendly Nairs for opening certain roads which are essentially necessary for our future military operations. I have given directions that certain coolies and others who had been collected for the service of the troops which were to have been employed on the expedition may be sent to their assistance, and I have great hopes that these works will be finished before the rains set in. I then propose, if possible, to construct places of strength and security for grain, provisions, and stores, in the centre of Cotiote, with which, by means of these roads, the communication will be easy and secure; and during the rains I propose to employ the same people in filling them with such articles in sufficient quantities to last a detachment of 3000 men for two months. The troops on this side will then be well advanced for a co-operation on Wynaad early in the next season.

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The annihilation of the Pyche Rajah will have a great effect on the minds of the disaffected, with which this province abounds.

There never was a country which, from its nature, its situation, the manners of its people and its government, was so well calculated for turbulence; but the fall of the Pyche Rajah, and the reduction of Wynaad, will curb it considerably; and I shall direct my inquiries to ascertaining the means of settling the other parts of this province which are disturbed.

The whole country is one jungle, which may be open in some parts, but in others is so thick that it is impossible to see objects at the distance of two yards; and till roads are made, the country is impracticable for our troops. In this jungle, criminals who deserve punishment, those who wish to evade the payment of the dues to Government, and those who oppose its authority, take refuge, where they are supported by chiefs who have strongholds in the upper country, and by the fruits of the trees and a little cultivation scattered in different parts in valleys in the jungle. The province of Malabar is bounded on the N.E. by the Koorg country, and on the E. by Wynaad, Mysore, and Coimbatore. From Malabar into Wynaad there are many Passes, and it has been the constant practice of all those who have disturbed the peace of this province, when they have been pressed by the troops below the Ghauts, to slip up into Wynaad, which country it would almost appear that Tippoo had allotted to the purpose of giving an asylum to those who should disturb our Government. Accordingly, in Wynaad, and Todinaar bordering upon it, they have many strongholds, from whence they issue to burn, plunder, and destroy below the Ghauts, and to which they retire when pressed. The subjection of Wynaad therefore, and of the Pyche Rajah, who is at the head of the disturbers of the peace, is the first object; and the next will be the establishment of easy communications for our troops through that district between the upper and lower country, and then easy access to every considerable stronghold both above and below the Ghauts. Small posts and small detachments of our troops will then be able at all times to give effectual assistance to the civil magistrate, with whom it will rest to do his duty. The nature of the people is considerably influenced by that of their country and its situation. They are savage, cruel, and everything that is bad. Every man is armed against his neighbour. The Nair destroys the Moplah, and the Moplah the Nair, and both agree in despising and resisting the authority of the Company's government, and of its magistrates. Property has been established without a symptom of civilisation, and English law administered by Native agents.

The consequence is, that the whole system is tyranny, and corruption, and impunity. The great Landholder, as he is called, when he finds it most convenient to tyrannise legally, pays the Native judge, and supports him in his office by his influence. The complaints of the inferior landholders and cultivators reach the European gentleman superintending, who, instead of dismissing and punishing the judge, finds him too strong for him. On the attempt to punish, the judge and his patron retire to the jungles, the whole country flock to their standard, the cultivation is neglected, and the revenue is lost. To pursue them in the jungles would be useless and dangerous, and under these circumstances the superintendent is obliged to submit and to restore the judge to his situation, and to wink at future enormities. Various remedies have been proposed; some have proposed to disarm the people, others have made propositions which would not tend more to remedy the evil. To disarm the people entirely, would in the first place be impossible; and in the next it would have the effect of delivering over the disarmed part of the community (that is to say, those who should submit themselves to the orders of Government, and allow their arms to be taken) to the mercy of those who should oppose its authority, and would therefore be cruel. To disarm the people may be practicable and proper hereafter; but it will first be necessary to conquer them.

The plan for this I have already stated, and if I receive the orders of Government, and there should be nothing more important for the troops in the next season, I think this country can be settled. It will afterwards remain with Government, by a reform of those parts of the system of tenure of lands not applicable to this country, and of the judicial system, to establish the civil authority upon a firm foundation.

In my journey through Koorg I saw the Rajah. He appeared to be much afraid that we on the eastern side of the Peninsula were not aware of the services which he had had it in his power to render to the Company, and that we should listen to his enemies, who he said were very desirous of prejudicing us against him. After a long conversation he appeared better reconciled to us than he was at first.

There is more simplicity in his manners, and in what he says, and apparently more sincerity, than in any native that I have yet seen. He is much attached to the English, and it would certainly be a misfortune if he were to be estranged from us.

## 44. To Colonel Sartorius.

*The best mode of carrying on war in jungly countries.*

Camp at Kanagherry, 18th Sept., 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. The first object of your attention must be to throw into Montana such a supply of provisions as will secure that garrison from a probability of want. To that every thing else must give way. To weaken Cotce-angary or any other post in the country which has heretofore been reckoned of importance is a matter of immaterial consequence, when compared with the necessity of getting the better of, or, I may say, of defending yourself against the Pyche Rajah. When he shall have been subdued, every thing else will be quiet, and probably the numerous posts now out in Malabar will be found to be of no use. The Rajah presses you now upon Montana; you must relieve that post by all means, and at all events in the first instance, and it will be time enough afterwards to consider in what mode we shall carry on the war.

The result of my observations and considerations upon the mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this, that as long as the jungle is thick, as the enemy can conceal himself in it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our side. You propose as a remedy to move in small compact bodies in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind; I say only some purposes, because their success would not be complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as the Nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But as we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system, the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road.

This you say is a work of time ; it is true it is so, but it must be recollected that the labour of every man turns to account, that the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following season, as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security to the followers is adopted.

We will suppose that my principle is conceded, and that it is agreed that in order to be successful we must secure those who supply us with all we want, and that the best mode of doing this is to cut away the jungle in order to deprive the enemy of his concealment ; I proceed to state in what manner I should carry on my operations in Cotiote.

I would assemble my troops at Cotaparamba, and begin by laying open the country back to Tellicherry, lest when I should move on towards Montana the enemy should take advantage of the close jungles between Cotaparamba and Tellicherry in order to interrupt my communication with the latter, which must be secure before I can hope for success. After having done this I should push forward my advanced posts, well strengthened in different directions, as you propose in your letter of the 6th inst. Under their cover strong working parties should be employed in clearing the jungle. When they should have cleared forward to the distance of 2 or 3 miles I would move the camp that distance, and remain in that new position till more road and country should have been cleared for me. By degrees I should get forward to the most advanced of my posts, and the result of my labours would be, that no Nair would venture into a country where I had deprived him of his advantage, viz. his concealment. But even if he should venture in my rear, tempted by the prospect of interrupting my communication and distressing me for provisions, he could not do so without my knowledge, and a very small body of troops would answer to protect my convoys when the country will have been opened, and I should be thus enabled to derive all the advantage of the discipline of my troops.

After having thus got myself well forward in the country, my posts well established and supplied, and my communication with my rear well secured, as well as that between one post and another, I would begin to carry on the war on a more active plan, and I would send out light detachments in all directions in



order to hunt out every nair who should be in the country. If at the same time another body of troops was carrying on operations on a similar system in Wynaad, I would endeavour to open a secure communication with that country. In the end you may depend upon it that the Pyche Rajah, nor no other man, could hold out; he would be deserted by his people, and probably at last would fall into the hands of one of my detachments, as Dhoondiah did a few days ago.

Depend upon it, my dear sir, that the success of military operations in India depends upon supplies; there is no difficulty in fighting, and in finding the means of beating your enemy either without or with loss: but to gain your object you must feed, and you can feed only by communication with the sea, and you can secure that communication only by the operations which I have above described.

In the mean time, however, many modes of distressing the Pyche Rajah might be adopted. Nairs, I am informed, are gentlemen, and probably the idlest of that character. The Wynaad country, which is in their possession, is almost a desert, and certainly does not produce a sufficiency for their consumption. They live there upon what is sent to them from the coast, and they pay for what they get by sandal wood, pepper, &c. I am informed that the Company's servants buy these articles from the Nairs of Wynaad. In the first place you should call upon the Commissioners publicly (and do so in my name if you like it) to put a stop to all communication between Wynaad and Malabar, and particularly to stop the trade from the latter in rice.

There is a fellow, by the name of Mousa, at Tellicherry who supplies the Rajah with rice, to my certain knowledge. A hint might be given to him that I am in the habit of hanging those whom I find living under the protection of the Company and dealing treacherously towards their interests; that I spare neither rank nor riches; but that, on the contrary, I punish severely those who by their example create the evils for which the unfortunate people suffer.

I have written you this letter in a private form, but I beg that you will hand it over to your successor if you should think of going to Bombay, as containing my sentiments on the operations to be carried on in Cotiote, and the grounds upon which I have formed them.

## 45. To Captain Moncreiff. .

*Same subject. Answer to objections.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 1st Oct., 1800.

I conclude that you will have seen a letter which I wrote to Col. Sartorius on the 18th Sept., in which I enter fully into a statement of my opinion regarding the mode of carrying on war in a jungly country, and I apply those opinions to the state of the Cotiote district and to the enemy with whom we have to contend in that quarter. The great principle upon which I ground my opinion is that you must have a secure communication between your posts and the sea, or between your detachments in that country and the sea; and I contend that that communication will not be rendered secure till the Nairs are deprived of their concealment.

Your idea is, that to open the road more than it is at present will be attended with bad consequences, and you say that the greatest loss was sustained at those places at which the road was most exposed; and you propose to secure the communication with Montana by means of posts, to be established at intermediate stations between that place and Cotaparamba. I agree with you entirely, that in order to subdue a country more is required than to be able to march through it; but before you can subdue it you must certainly have that ability with very small detachments at least. Indeed the security of the communication appears to be the great object of your consideration as well as of mine; we differ only as to the means of obtaining it.

I will suppose that all the posts which you propose should be established are finished, garrisoned, and provided; and that the Pyche Rajah should enter Cotiote at the head of 1000 Nairs, and should attack any one of those posts. In what manner is it to be relieved? Is it to be left to its chance, or must the army which can be collected move to its assistance? If the latter is the plan to be adopted, is it not probable that the same loss will be incurred as was suffered upon the late occasion?

You say that the Nairs will not dare to post themselves between our garrisons when they will be so near one another; but experience has shown us that they will approach as near to us as one enemy will approach another; and as they would take care

to cut off the communication between one post and another, there could be no concert, which is all that they might have to fear from their position between any two of our posts. I don't mean to assert that the number of our posts would not diminish our risk, but still it would not give us security, which is what we must look for.

I now come to consider your objection to opening the jungle on the sides of the roads. It is that the enemy takes a position inaccessible directly to our troops, from which the openness of the jungle enables him to see them, and he annoys them. This is the constant practice every where; but it is the business and duty of the commanding officer to make his arrangements for dislodging the enemy from such situations before he exposes the great body of his troops to the fire which can be given from them; and after this has been done sometimes, the enemy is not so ready to trust himself in a position of the kind. I don't pretend that, by opening the jungle, I shall gain absolute security, as I am aware that even in an open country the communication is always liable to be interrupted; but I contend for it that where concealment is the great object and the principal resource of the enemy, the diminution of the means of affording it to him is the most effectual mode of distressing him. It is certainly true that it is necessary to have posts in the country along the road which is to be used as the communication, particularly if the enemy should be disposed to operate upon your line of communication with your rear; and I may, therefore, conclude that the establishment of your posts upon my roads would be the most effectual plan to subdue this Rajah.

#### 46. To J. Smee, Esq.

*Colonel Wellesley's strong objection to the establishment of purely military law.*

Camp ten miles south of Copaul, 15th Nov., 1800.

I beg that you will do me the favour to send me your opinion upon a point on which I have received a letter from Colonel Sartorius. He applied to me some time ago for powers to try by general court-martial. I have procured for him from the Commander-in-Chief the usual powers to try military offenders, and the government of Fort St. George have authorised me to extend to Malabar the powers which I have of trying by military

process rebels and persons conspiring against the government. The question is, whether the exercise of that power will supersede or suspend that of the ordinary tribunals, and whether in that case it will not do more injury than good.

I am fully aware that the military gentlemen in Malabar are exceedingly anxious to establish what they call military law. Before I should consent to the subversion of one system of law, and to the establishment of another, I should be glad to know what the new law was to be; and I have never procured from any of those gentlemen yet a definition of their own idea of military law. I understand military law to be the law of the sword, and, in well-regulated and disciplined armies, to be the will of the General.

I should not wish to have the trouble of managing a country like Malabar myself, and I acknowledge that I should not think it very proper to commit the management of that province (by the establishment of military law) to any other officer under my orders.

The question then is, whether the systems of revenue, of jurisprudence, of police, now established will not be either suspended, if I give to Colonel Sartorius the power of trying offenders by military process, or they will be supposed to be suspended, and the officers of the army will deem it their right and their duty to interfere in them all, in consequence of the establishment, as they will imagine, of their favourite system of military law.

I shall be glad to have your opinion upon this point. If the overthrow of the present system can be avoided, it may perhaps be proper to give to Colonel Sartorius the power of trying rebels, &c., by military process; but I acknowledge that I for one shall always object to the establishment of a purely military law in any country to which I have anything to say.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 47. To Major-General Baird.

*Pursuit and distress of the Rajah of Bullum.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 21st June, 1801.

The campaign in the province of Malabar ended in May, when the rains commenced. Colonel Stevenson had not been able

to get possession of the Rajah's person, although he had upon more than one occasion pushed him so hard as that he had been obliged to leave his clothes and provisions. In one flight from our troops the Rajah had been so hard pushed as that it is well known he had not been able to stop to dress his victuals, and he had not eaten for four days, and that subsequently he was abandoned by all his followers, and was wandering alone in the southern parts of the Malabar province. His followers have not collected since the rains commenced, and our troops have remained in the undisputed possession of all their posts in Wynaad and Malabar.

#### 48. To Colonel Stevenson.

##### *The use and abuse of martial law.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 1st July, 1801.

By the former orders of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, you were authorized to try by military process and to punish persons taken in rebellion, or aiding and assisting or exciting others to rebel; and there can be no doubt, therefore, of the propriety of your carrying into execution those orders in the instances to which you have alluded.

I have in my hands an authority of the same kind, extending to the province of Canara; of which authority I made use in the last year to punish those concerned in Vittel's rebellion and in the capture of Jemalabad.

Canara is now in tranquillity, and I conceive that my authority to try by military process is no longer in activity; but in case of rebellion in that province it will be in full force, and you shall be empowered to make use of it.

In the exercise which I have made of the power intrusted to me to try the persons above described by military process, I have not thought it necessary at all times to proceed by a general court martial. In some cases, as in that at Dummul, I have given orders for punishment without farther inquiry; in other cases, when it has been inconvenient or impossible to assemble a general court martial, I have given orders to officers to assemble as a court of inquiry to examine evidence upon the case, and to report that evidence and their opinion as to the guilt of the prisoner to me; and I have given orders for his punishment.

I conceive that the orders of government giving me authority to try by military process, and to punish, were founded upon the necessity of the case, and that punishment, whether inflicted in consequence of the sentence of a court martial, or in consequence of evidence taken before a court of inquiry, or in consequence of my own personal view and knowledge of the crime, was equally legal and proper, and intended by the orders of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council.

I am of opinion, however, that it would be desirable at all times to try a prisoner by a court martial, if it should be possible or not attended by a delay or inconvenience which would frustrate the object proposed in the authority given to try and punish by military process; but I communicate to you my opinion and practice upon this subject, in order that you may not be embarrassed by a notion that it is necessary to assemble a court martial in all cases.

Having thus stated to you what I think regarding the powers intrusted to you, I come to consider the request made in the ninth paragraph of your letter to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, to 'allow the full operation of martial law' in Malabar and Canara under the sanction of his Lordship's government. The object of the request is to have the power of punishing rebels and rebellion, which you have already; but the consequence of granting it would be the suspension of all the civil authorities and establishments in those provinces. Instead of the tribunals and persons established for the consideration of the common questions which arise, and for the transaction of the common business of those provinces, all would be referable and referred to the military commanding officer, as in a camp, and would be decided upon military principles either by himself or his officers.

I am convinced you did not intend this, and that his Lordship will not consent to the establishment of martial law in a greater degree than it is at present established.

I mention it merely as an inducement to urge you to lose no time in using the powers which you have already to try rebels, &c., by military process, in waiting for other powers which are not necessary, and which I am convinced will never be granted.

## 49. To Colonel Sartorius.

*The Rajah of Bullum to be dashed at summarily.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1801.

I cannot think it necessary either to establish the posts or to cut the road which you propose in order to enable you to pursue the Rajah wherever he may go, as experience has proved that our troops can go wherever he can. When the Rajah had the upper hand, and when we found that we could not move from one place to another without a vast loss in men, it was necessary to open roads everywhere, and to establish posts upon them; but that system and our greater strength having given us the upper hand, the Rajah being now a fugitive, attended only by a few followers, the same precautions are no longer necessary; and as the operations which you propose would inevitably point out the line on which you would have thought of acting, they would impede rather than accelerate the accomplishment of the only object which we ought to have in view. This object is the apprehension of the Rajah's person, which can be effected only by the number of our detachments and the activity of their movements. But if more posts are to be occupied, fewer troops can be employed in detachments; and if roads are to be made before the troops move, the pursuit will be an endless one.

It may be necessary, however, upon other grounds to open the road which you propose, and I can have no objection to it if that work be preferred to the others above mentioned. I only protest against it as a measure to enable the troops to perform the operation which you have in view, in concert with Lieutenant-Colonel Burrowes; and, at all events, I hope that you will not occupy any more posts.

## 50. To J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq.

*The Rajah of Bullum to be straitened on all sides.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 9th Oct., 1801.

Within these few days I have had a conversation with the Rajah's Dewan respecting the Rajah of Bullum. It appears

that this Rajah is blocked up entirely in his district of Bullum by the troops employed by the Rajah of Mysore, and that he depends entirely for all his supplies, excepting rice, which his country produces in abundance, upon his communication with Koorg and with the sea-coast of Canara. I have written to the Rajah of Koorg to request that he will stop his communication with Koorg, and I shall be obliged to you if you will take measures to prevent his receiving any supplies, particularly of salt, from Canara. His principal means of communicating with Canara are by the Soobramany and, I believe, the Jemalabad Ghauts.

#### 51. To Major Macleod.

*True and false remedies for a debased coinage.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 19th October, 1801.

I have long considered one of the evils which you mention in the province of Malabar, viz. the exchange of money. The exorbitancy of this evil in that province is to be attributed not only to the circumstances which have occasioned it in other parts of India, and which are, I am afraid, irremediable till there is a total change in the system of traffic in all parts of the country, but to another circumstance which has come to my knowledge. Some years ago Mr. Duncan, the Governor of Bombay (who is an excellent, well-meaning man, and with good abilities, but is sometimes misled), purchased at Bombay at a low price, and sent into Malabar, a large number of rupees, called in that part of the country hookery rupees. These rupees, although of a value probably greatly inferior to that of the money which was given for them, were issued to the troops, and were circulated at one greatly superior, and the government had some paltry gain upon the transaction.

The merchants of Bombay, however, were unwilling that the advantage of this traffic should be confined solely to the government, and they began immediately to send down oceans of rupees to Malabar; and next the Rajahs, who saw the advantages of it, wished to participate in it, and they coined rupees worse even than those which Mr. Duncan and the Bombay merchants imported by sea. The result was that Malabar was inundated by bad rupees; and the inconvenience felt by the troops and Company's servants in consequence of the depreciation of the



exchange became so great that it was necessary to apply a remedy.

In this situation the only remedy to apply would have been to meet the evil at once, whatever might be its extent, or the expense attending the remedy; but this was a measure too strong for those who were to conduct it. They ought to have stopped entirely the circulation of hookery rupees after a certain period, and ought to have called them into the Treasury, and have given a certain value for them if brought before a certain day. They ought then to have issued a good coin to the province.

The expense of this operation would have been exactly equal to all that had been originally made by government in the first purchase and issue of the rupees, to all that had been made by the merchants, and by the different Rajahs. Instead of doing this, however, they adopted a different mode, which was less expensive at the time; and the consequence is, that the expenses of the reform of the coin will be far greater now than they would have been if the coin had been reformed at the proper period. The remedy adopted at that period was to call in the rupees at the expense of about one lac of rupees; but instead of issuing in their place a good coin, the rupees, when melted down, were somewhat refined, and were coined over again into fanams, which are now in circulation. These fanams are still of considerably less value than the sum of which they are the representatives; and the consequence is that there is a great importation of them from Bombay, and a great coinage of them by the Rajahs.

The result then of the half remedy which was applied when the inconvenience of the circulation of the base rupees was first found out is, that when the whole remedy will be applied the expense of it will have been increased by all the profit which will have been made by the merchant importers and by the coining Rajahs in the intermediate period. You will perceive that the consequence of this reasoning is, that the longer the complete measure is delayed, the greater will be the expense, and therefore that you cannot too soon give your attention to it.

Some of the speculators in Malabar, upon this subject, have notions of different palliatives, none of which will answer at all, excepting you should determine to begin your administration by an act of flagrant injustice. One measure which they propose is, to reduce by authority the current value of the fanams, and to order that they should pass in Malabar only for that which they would really bear any where else, or, in other words, that

the fanams should be received in revenue or other payments to government only at their real value. This measure would immediately stop the importation, and certainly the coinage; but these speculators forget that it would rob, for the advantage of government, to whom the debasement of the coin ought entirely to be attributed, all the holders of fanams of the exact sum which would be the difference between that at which they are now current and that at which they would be current hereafter in consequence of this proposed measure.

You see that I have given you a fine dissertation on coin and coinage.

## 52. To Major Walker.

*Semi-military rule in Malabar, provisionally, a necessary evil. For without it, we cannot disarm the people. When that is effected, civil government should be re-established.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 23rd Oct., 1801.

These countries become daily more interesting; and I am glad to find by your account of their present state, that they are likely to become valuable appendages to the British territory in India. Whatever may be the fate of the new system of government lately established in them, there can be no doubt of the merits of the former one, any more than of the zeal and ability of those who conducted it. The great fault which, I understand, has been found with that system is its expense: that certainly is a fault which must be more felt at the present moment than at any other, and has probably been the cause of a departure from it; but I acknowledge that I wish that it had been tried a little longer, and that, before we abolished it entirely, we had waited to see the effects upon the country which may be expected to be the result of the probable arrest of the person of the Pyche Rajah.

As soon as the person of this rebel shall be taken, it is probable that the inhabitants will be more ready than they have been hitherto to give up their arms; and the day on which the inhabitants give up their arms, and acquiesce in the orders and regulations of government, which require that no man shall appear armed, will be the date of the establishment of civil government in the province. Till then every thing must be chance or force. The question in my mind, upon a comparison of the two systems for Malabar, that heretofore and that lately

established, is, which is most likely to complete the disarming of the inhabitants, supposing the Pyche Rajah still to remain at large.

As to their comparative expense there can be no doubt, because no man will deny that the perpetual contests which have existed in Malabar, and will for ever be the consequence of governing an armed people, are much more expensive than the largest civil establishments.

In order to complete this measure of disarming the inhabitants, you will have observed the large share of power which has been placed in the hands of the military commanding officer, not only in districts disturbed by rebellion, but in all parts of the province. This power has been given in conformity to the opinions of all those who have written upon this subject, who have almost unanimously declared that it would require an army to disarm the inhabitants of Malabar. This power, then, being necessary, the question is, could it exist with the old civil government? I put the difference of men out of the question, as, notwithstanding my partiality for the present collector, I have a very high opinion of those to whom he succeeded: but could a military power, such as has lately been established, go on in co-operation with a regular civil government, with all its branches separately established and balanced, and must not the latter have given way? The judicial powers and the powers of the magistrates must have been suspended immediately, and the whole business of the civil government must have been confined to the collection of the revenue; and that being the case, the number of servants employed on that duty at present is perhaps as large as it ought to be.

Supposing, then, that the Pyche Rajah is to remain at large, and that to disarm the inhabitants requires the extensive military powers which have been lately given, without which I look upon all civil government in Malabar to be mere chance, there is no doubt that the new system will be more suitable to the exercise of those powers than the old could ever have been; and it is to be hoped and looked for, that eventually it will accelerate, more than the old could have done, the great objects for which the military powers have been granted. That being the case, according to my principle it ought to be preferred.

I acknowledge, however, that I long for the return of the civil government. Although a soldier myself, I am not an advocate for placing extensive civil powers in the hands of soldiers merely because they are of the military profession, and I have always

opposed the idea excepting in cases of necessity. The case of Malabar is one of these, which I regret exceedingly; but I hope that the necessity will not be of great duration.

### 53. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Description of the Bullum Rajah's country and position, and proposed steps for reducing him.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 31st Oct., 1801.

The larger the force employed upon an occasion of this kind the greater the prospect of success, and the smaller the probability of sustaining a severe loss in officers and men.

The district of the Bul Rajah extends about thirty-five or forty miles along the Western Ghauts, between the Currut Kull or Jemalabad Ghaut, the road to which is its northern boundary, and the district of Koorg, which bounds it to the southward.

Its general breadth from west to east is about twenty-five miles, and it is bounded to the eastward by the river Hemavutty, which rises nearly in the Cundacull Ghaut, and falls into the Cauvery after passing the boundary of the districts of the Rajahs of Koorg and of Bul.

The country enclosed in the space above described is in general mountainous; the hills in some parts jungly, in others open; the valleys wet, and under cultivation; and the sides of the hills jungly. The country is populous, with many villages, which are all enclosed by strong hedges and ditches. Tippoo built a small fort at Munserabad, in order to keep this country in subjection, to cover Mysore on that side from the Rajah of Koorg, and the approach into it from Mangalore by the Soobramany or Bissolee Ghaut. This fort is situated about ten or twelve miles north of the Koorg boundary, and about four or five west of the river Hemavutty. It has been in the possession of the troops of the Rajah of Mysore since it was delivered over to them by a detachment under the late Captain Campbell which went into that country in the year 1799.

At the distance of about four miles south-east of this fort is a high jungly tract called Arrekeery, lying on the right of the road from Seringapatam to Munserabad, and between it and the river Hemavutty. In this tract, which is about eighteen miles in circumference, and in the neighbourhood of which the country

is in general open, there are many villages, valleys, and rising grounds, such as I have already described to be all over the country; and here it is where the Bul Rajah has established and fortified himself in the Polygar style, and has hitherto resisted all the efforts which have been made to dislodge him.

In the last year Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor carried several barriers and the principal village in this tract, called Arrekeery, which he destroyed. He drew off to an encamping ground outside of the tract, however, in the evening, and the Bul Rajah took again, and has ever since remained in the possession of, the whole of it. The warfare which has since been carried on between him and the troops of the Rajah of Mysore has been with a view to throwing provisions into Munserabad on the part of Mysore, and to impede that operation on his; and it has been so far successful on our side, as that the Bul Rajah has not been able to prevent the provisioning of Munserabad, and he has been entirely prevented from making any plundering excursions to the eastward of the river Hemavutty.

In a country such as that which I have described there may be other positions in which opposition may be expected, as well as in that one to which I have already alluded, and there are particularly some barriers towards the Bissolee Ghaut; but I imagine that the possession of Arrekeery will settle the business, and to that our attention ought to be directed.

I should accordingly propose to attack it from this side, and to move from hence with the troops intended for this expedition towards the end of December, when troops may be expected from the southward and the country will be tolerably dry. I should propose to have two field-pieces for each battalion, which are drawn with ease in all parts of the country by the sircar bullocks. At the same time I should think it advisable to put in the field, and to assemble at the Soobramany Pagoda at the bottom of the Bissolee Ghaut, the five companies of the 75th which are at Mangalore, and the 1st of the 3rd Bombay regiment; the detachments of which last at Jemalabad and Cundapoor might be relieved by detachments from the 1st of the 8th Bombay regiment, and that at Bednore by a detachment from the 2nd of the 4th at Hullihall in Soonda. These troops might move up the Ghaut, or not, according to circumstances and the mode in which the Bul Rajah should defend himself. I have everything here which the troops can want excepting tents and a few carts. These, with your orders, I can have made previous

to the time when it will be proper to put the troops into the field.

#### 54. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Pacification of Bullum. Danger of diminishing the force in Malabar; increased rather than lessened by the Peace in Europe.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Huttery Hilly, 23rd Jan., 1802.

Since I wrote to you last we have pressed the Bullum Rajah so hard that he has been left entirely alone; we have taken his Dewan (a Brahmin), and his brother-in-law called Conetty Naig. The Rajah is in some danger of being taken also, I hope. While all this is going on, we are opening a road to the Ghauts through the centre of the rebel country. The inhabitants are in their villages, everything is quiet, and they are destroying their bamboo hedges and ditches in consequence of their cowle. So much for Bullum.

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Troops are wanted everywhere, and that is one reason for delaying to dismiss or reduce any even of the worst kind; but there is another reason for not doing so in Malabar, which is applicable peculiarly to the state of that country. We are now trying a new system of government there, which we are resolved to force upon the people whether they like it or not. We have also determined to prevent the practice of carrying arms, which has been common there hitherto, and to which we have been informed that the people are particularly partial. The people of Malabar are not to be coaxed into submission to government, or to give up their arms: terror, however, will induce them to either or both. But they are sufficiently sagacious to see that when we reduce a large number of our troops, and make detachments into other parts where their services may be required, they have no reason to fear; and when they don't fear the government, they will not submit to it, and will not deliver in their arms. A contrary mode of reasoning will lead to all the conclusions drawn by the Commissioners, which ended in their dismissal from office, and the overthrow of their system of government. In my opinion Malabar can never be reckoned upon excepting as a country ripe for insurrection, a state in which it has probably ever been till you entered it; and whenever I hear that the force stationed in it is to be

diminished, I consider that insomuch is the chance of the permanence of its tranquillity diminished likewise.

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I have this instant heard of the peace at home. As far as we can judge of its terms they are favourable to us; but we are to admit the French and the Dutch to their settlements in India, particularly to those on the Malabar coast. Our situation in Malabar, therefore, becomes still more critical than it was, and all our measures in that country must be still more decided, though cautious, than they have been even lately.

#### 55. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Amount and distribution of force required in Mysore, Soonda, and Wynaad.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Hutty Hilly, 24th Jan., 1802.

As it is probable that the presence of the Company's troops will not be required in this district for a much greater length of time, and that you will then be desirous that they should be distributed in quarters, I proceed, in obedience to your former orders, to state my opinion, first, regarding the force which ought to be in Mysore, including Soonda and Wynaad; secondly, regarding the places at which the troops ought to be stationed.

There ought to be in Mysore one regiment of dragoons, one of Native cavalry, three companies of artillery, two regiments of European infantry, if possible, and eight battalions of Native infantry.

The stations which it is necessary to occupy are, Hullihall, in the province of Soonda, with one battalion; Nuggur with one battalion; Chittledroog with one battalion; Nundydroog and its dependencies and Paughur with one battalion; Wynaad one battalion; Seringapatam one regiment of Europeans and three battalions.

The dragoons ought to be cantoned at Sera, the Native cavalry at Santa Bednore, and the other regiment of European infantry might be at Bangalore. The largest body of them ought to be collected at Seringapatam for the sake of practice, and there ought to be detachments from this body, one at Chittledroog, and another for a brigade of guns at Hullihall in Soonda. These

ought to be relieved frequently. The surplus two battalions of the infantry ought likewise to be at Seringapatam.

The principles upon which I have made this calculation and distribution are as follows :

There are certain points in Mysore and places upon the frontier which it is absolutely necessary to occupy with troops. These are, 1st, Hullihall in Soonda, where there must always be a battalion on account of its vicinity to the Mahratta frontier, its distance from, and its local situation relative to other posts.

2nd, Nuggur : to which place some of the reasons apply which apply to Hullihall, and this additional one, viz. that it is a place of great riches, which would certainly be plundered by some of the marauders upon the frontier if it were not held by the Company's troops. A smaller garrison, however, than a battalion has held it, particularly when troops have been in the field on the northern frontier ; and, if this distribution should be adopted, I propose that for this year the battalion of Nuggur should furnish a detachment for the Bullum country.

3rd, Chittledroog : this place is important both in regard to its local situation and its great strength. A much larger garrison than one battalion would be required for it ; but it has been found so unfavourable to the health of Natives as well as Europeans, its means of supply are so barren, and its inhabitants so unwilling to afford the assistance which would be required in case of the necessity of moving troops from thence, that I have preferred to place the disposable force in another situation.

4th, Nundydroog : this fort is in the centre of a Polygar country. One battalion stationed here keeps the Polygars in order from the frontiers of the Carnatic to Sera.

5th, Wynaad : a battalion in this district will be for some time absolutely necessary. It lies on the back of the most disaffected districts in Malabar ; and our troops stationed there not only give us an opportunity of curbing the disaffected in that province, but if we don't occupy it in strength they will fly into it. An equipment and a body of troops must then be fitted out to drive them from thence.

6th, Seringapatam : till Seringapatam is repaired and its works reformed it is necessary that the guards should be very numerous, and consequently the place requires a large garrison. Besides, this garrison furnishes a detachment for the Rajah at Mysore, a guard at Cancancotta, a company for the Resident, guards for the public elephants and cattle, and constant detachments with



treasure and stores to all parts. It is, however, very evident that about 400 European infantry, one company of artillery, and one complete battalion, will do the duty of Seringapatam; and those troops would be sufficient for its security if a body of troops were in the field in the Mysore country or in any of the neighbouring provinces.

In all these newly-conquered territories, where there are necessarily a number of weak garrisons, particularly in Mysore, which country is bordered by the Mahrattas, is full of Polygars, and is surrounded by provinces in which there are numbers of the same description, it is impossible to be certain of tranquillity unless there is a force which is disposable, and can be put into the field at a short notice without inconvenience or danger to the garrisons which are to be occupied permanently.

The disposable force in Mysore would be :

One regiment of dragoons; one of Native cavalry; two companies of artillery; one of European infantry, if a second regiment of European infantry can be spared; two battalions of Native infantry; and the detachments of Native infantry which might be drawn from other posts without endangering them, as there would be in that case a body of troops in the field.

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The whole of the artillery ought to be decidedly at Seringapatam, where the arsenal and stores are; and the two battalions of Native infantry ought to be there likewise. When their services will not be wanted in the field they will give such strength to the garrison as to make its duty easy, and the discipline of the troops can be carried on. On the other hand, if they are to take the field, they will be at the spot from whence they and all the troops must be equipped with everything.

#### 56. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*Settlement of Bullum. Strength of the country. Difficulty of seizing the Rajah.*

Camp, 2nd Feb., 1802.

Since I wrote to you last the pursuit of the Bullum Rajah has been continued till he has been driven quite into the Ghauts, with about half a dozen followers. The Rajah's troops are in possession of all the villages in the neighbourhood of the jungles in which the Bullum Rajah is supposed to be, so that unless he is

favoured and assisted by the Canara aumildars he must starve. We have caught many of his principal people and relations, some of whom must, I imaginè, be executed ; and Purneah has collected in this camp the patels of the different villages to the number, he says, of 250.

The Sampighee Ghaut is opened, and the Company's pioneers and a Native corps and some of the Rajah's bildars are employed upon the Bissolee or Soobramany Ghaut. I am now in the neighbourhood of two other Ghauts, the Hubby Nala and the Scisul Ghaut, which I propose also to open.

The country is settling fast ; the inhabitants are in their villages, and have made some progress in dismantling them. They have likewise delivered in some of their arms and ammunition. Purneah has assembled the gours here in order to complete the settlement, that they may witness the execution of some of the Bullum Rajah's adherents who have been caught, and that he may secure the persons of some who, it might be expected, would renew the rebellion if the force in the country should be weakened. He talks with confidence of getting from them the revenue of the two last years.

Although we still continue the pursuit of the Rajah, I am not very sanguine in my expectations of success. The whole of the western face of the Ghauts, from Soopah to Palghautcherry, is covered with a thick short jungle, which appears impenetrable, and we have no intelligence to what quarter he is gone. All the villages in the country, particularly those in the neighbourhood of the Ghauts, are held by the Rajah's troops, who are at the same time kept in motion both in the upper country and in Canara ; but it is very evident to me that if he can get food he will remain in those jungles to all eternity, notwithstanding our efforts to catch him, or drive him out, unless some of his few people should quit him and give us intelligence of the exact spot in which we may find him.

These efforts, however, shall be continued, and everything shall be done which I can devise to bring the business to that best of all conclusions. In the mean time, I have strongly urged Purneah to insist upon the performance of all the terms of the cowle as a certain mode of keeping the country quiet, whether the Rajah is caught or not. I don't think that I ever saw a country naturally so strong as this is, and to the strength of which so many additions have been made by the natives themselves. Every village is a strong fortification, of which it would require good troops

to get possession; and in some cases ten or a dozen of these villages are connected by natural or made defences of great strength. Within these defences the inhabitants have all that they want; and here they would hold out for ever against the troops which the aumildars might bring to force them to pay the revenue. The only mode, therefore, of settling the country permanently, even supposing the Rajah should be caught, is to destroy its strength and to force the inhabitants to give up their arms.

I shall be glad to hear the result of Malcolm's mission. I think Lord Clive will stay.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 57. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*The Province of Malabar ought to be an entirely separate command.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 9th Feb., 1802.

I should recommend that the province of Malabar may be an entirely separate command; it is fully enough to occupy the attention of any one man, and will be more interesting when the French and Dutch return to their settlements. No additional expense would be incurred by this arrangement, as the troops in Canara might report directly to the commanding officer in Mysore. Indeed, the communication between Seringapatam and all parts of Canara is so much shorter than between Cannanore and the same places, that this arrangement would be a more convenient one in every respect.

#### 58. To Purneah.

*Systematic plan for maintaining order in Bullum.*

(Extract.)

10th Feb., 1802.

In my opinion it will be proper that for some time some of the Rajah's troops should remain in every village, at least until the inhabitants shall have cut the hedges and levelled the ditches which surround them. Afterwards they may by degrees be withdrawn from the smaller villages; but there ought to

be detachments in those whose names are in the margin during the rains. Besides this, there ought to be a post on Beemana Hill, and one at the top of the Bissolee, the Sampighee, and the Seisul Ghauts.

In order to support and give strength and confidence to these small, dispersed parties, there ought to be a party of 500 of your best infantry collected in one body under an active sirdar. He should keep in motion from place to place, in communication with, but at a distance from, Captain M'Farlane's party; and as soon as he should hear of any disturbance anywhere, he ought to fly to that place.

The remainder of the troops might withdraw.

In sundry conversations and by letter I have pointed out to you frequently the mode which in my opinion ought to be adopted to bring this country to a regular state of subjection to your government. The fortifications of the villages must be destroyed, or an army will be required to collect the revenue, and you must make the people give up their arms. Orders are given to the Company's officers and pioneers to destroy the fortifications of the villages effectually. The next business will be to prevent the people from constructing them again.

For this you have nothing to depend upon but the vigilance and the activity of the person whom you leave here as aumildar. He ought to be particularly instructed upon this subject. In those villages in which your troops will be stationed he cannot fail to obtain a knowledge of it, in case any designs should be entertained which may be injurious to your authority; but he should endeavour to establish a channel of intelligence from every part of the country. As soon as he hears of any design of that kind he should proceed immediately to the place himself with the utmost celerity, and punish the guilty with the rigour which they will deserve. On these occasions everything will depend upon his activity, and he cannot be too quick.

When the rains will be over, it may be expected that some of the trees which we shall have cut down will have grown again. The aumildar, or some person immediately under him, ought to force the inhabitants to cut them again, and he ought not to withdraw his troops from the village till the roads to it are laid open, and in the state in which we shall now leave them. I need not point out to you the necessity that there is that the person to whom you will give charge of this district should be one of sound discretion, in whom you can place the

utmost confidence. It is absolutely necessary that he should possess your confidence and have your full support in all he does, and that he should understand clearly that he is certain of remaining in his situation as long as he conducts himself well.

In case, notwithstanding all our exertions and precautions, there should be disturbance in this country again, and the communication should be cut off between the Mysore country and the posts upon the Bissolee, the Sampighec, and the Seisul Ghauts, I write to the Company's officers in Canara to desire that they will take care to keep them supplied with provisions and everything they can want. Those posts, therefore, must be kept at all events.

59. Memorandum.—Instructions for Captain M'Farlane.

*The same subject.*

(Extracts.)

10th Feb., 1802.

It has been proposed to dismantle the fortifications, and to cut the jungle and level the ditches which surround the villages in this country; and the inhabitants have been ordered to carry into execution these works. In some cases they have made some progress, in others but very little: it is therefore desirable that Captain M'Farlane should proceed with the bildars and pioneers to the places mentioned in the enclosed paper, and lay them open in such a manner as that the villages will be accessible to any, the worst species of troops that the aumildars can employ, and that it will not be possible for the inhabitants to fortify them again without the knowledge of the aumildars, and without giving them time to put a stop to their work before they can have made any considerable progress in it.

It will probably be impossible to lay open any village entirely, but it will be possible to level the ditches which surround them and to cut through the jungle one or two broad ways into each, from which the roots of the trees ought to be taken.

\* \* \* \* \*

If there should be any such disturbance or opposition, or if Captain M'Farlane should receive notice from the aumildar or principal person employed in the district on the part of the Sircar (who will receive directions to communicate with him constantly) that there is an appearance of disturbance in any part,

he will move thither directly, and will take the most prompt and efficacious measures to put an end to such disturbance, and to punish those who may have ventured to oppose the authority of government. Five companies of the 5th regiment and seven companies of the 10th regiment will be encamped at Bailoor. In case of such disturbance as is above supposed, Captain M'Farlane will give immediate notice thereof to the commanding officer of these troops, who has orders to move in the most expeditious manner into the Bullum district to such place as Captain M'Farlane may point out.

The posts ordered to be constructed at the head of the Bissolee, the Sampighee, and the Seisul Ghauts, are to be given over to the Rajah's troops as soon as they are completed.

The great object in leaving Captain M'Farlane in this district is that he may see the plan above mentioned carried into execution, and that the inhabitants may not lose the impression which they have received of the activity and vigour of the operations of a body of British troops. The first object is, as he will perceive, to lay open the country so that the aumildar's peons and troops may at all times go to all parts of it; the next is, that in case of opposition, or the slightest appearance of disturbance, he should collect with the greatest celerity, and appear in force at the spot where such opposition may have existed or disturbance may have been threatened, and that he should then act with the utmost vigour and despatch.

It is unnecessary to recommend to Captain M'Farlane a constant communication with and a conciliating conduct towards the natives and the servants of the Rajah's government. All his intelligence of the country will depend in a great measure upon it, and he will succeed in nothing excepting he adopts such a line of conduct.

#### 60. To the Deputy Adjutant-General.

*Reduction of the Bullum country. Capture and execution of the Rajah.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802.

In pursuance of the intention of which I apprised you in my letter of the 17th January, I opened a road from the forest of Arrekeery towards the Ghauts, which was carried in the first

instance to the head of the Sampighee Ghaut, which is some distance from that which leads into Canara by the Soobramany Pagoda. I preferred this line, as I understood that the Bullum Rajah had at Cagenkeerah, on the top of this Ghaut, a stronghold, which it was necessary to destroy. After the road into Canara was completed by this Ghaut, I commenced upon that by Bissolee and the Soobramany Pagoda, to finish which I left the great body of the pioneers and the 1st battalion 1st regiment, and I marched with the remainder of the detachment to the northward of Munserabad, where I laid open another road through the Bullum country, and into Canara, by the Seisul Ghaut.

In the mean time the Bullum Rajah had been pushed so hard that he had been abandoned by nearly all his followers. Many of his relations and principal people had fallen into our hands, and he had taken refuge in the extensive jungles which cover the western face of the Ghauts. To pursue him in these jungles would have been useless unless we had had accurate intelligence of the spot in which he had concealed himself; and I therefore thought it best to disperse the troops of the Rajah of Mysore in all the villages on the borders of, as well as in, the jungles, in which provisions could be got, in hopes that we should in this manner either find out where he was concealed, or force him to fly to another part of the country, in which we might have a better chance of procuring intelligence of his motions. On the 9th instant the Bullum Rajah sent for provisions to a village which was occupied by some horsemen in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, who in consequence received intelligence of the spot where he was concealed, and went into the jungles dismounted, and took him and the people who were with him. He was executed on the 10th with six others, some of whom were with him at the time he was taken, and others had afforded him assistance since they had been pardoned by the Dewan.

While these operations were going on, other measures were adopted to prevent the possibility of the renewal of the rebellion even if those taken to secure the person of the Bullum Rajah had failed. All the villages in the Bullum country are surrounded by a strong jungle and ditches. In some instances several of these villages are connected within what may be called one line of defence, the inhabitants having inside all that they want, and by means of which they had secured a communication with the Western Ghauts and the sea. The country, naturally strong, was

so much strengthened by these defences that none but the best troops could penetrate it; and consequently, whatever might be the fate of the Bullum Rajah, it was to be expected that as soon as the season should oblige the Company's troops to withdraw, the rebellion would be renewed. I therefore prevailed upon the Dewan to take advantage of the impression which had been made by the success at Arrekeery, and to offer cowle to the inhabitants upon the terms of their destroying the fortifications which surround their villages, delivering up their arms and ammunition, and paying the arrears of the revenue. These terms have been accepted, and a commencement has been made to carry them into execution in all parts of the country. Besides this, the principal people of the country, to the number of 300, were assembled in my camp with their families, and the Dewan had determined to detain as hostages those who had been principally concerned in the late rebellion, and to suffer none to depart till they shall have delivered in all their arms, and should have paid the arrears of the revenue.

#### 61. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The same subject. Activity of Purneah and his troops.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hassen, 13th Feb., 1802.

It will have given you pleasure to hear from Piele of our complete success in the Bullum country. We took the Rajah on the 9th, and hanged him and six others on the 10th, and matters are brought to such a settlement that I have broke up the detachment, and am on my return to Seringapatam.

I have opened three roads into Canara, one by Bissolee and the Soobramany Pagoda, another by the Sampighee Ghaut, a third to the northward by the Scisul Ghaut. I have built a redoubt on the top of each of these for the Rajah's troops, and one on the heights of Arrekeery. The fortifications round all the villages in the country are destroyed, and the Company's pioneers remain to complete this work, with a small light detachment under Captain M'Farlane, to keep alive the terror which we have inspired, and to give confidence to the Rajah's servants.

Purneah's troops have been indefatigable. They ran the Bullum Rajah into the jungles on the western side of the Ghauts,



into which it would have been useless to follow him if we could not have got intelligence of the place in which he was concealed. I therefore placed them in small parties in every village in the country in which it was possible for the Rajah to procure provisions. I sent some of them into Canara, and I kept Mr. Ravenshaw's peons and aumildars upon the look-out. My intention was to force the Rajah out of the jungles to a part of the country in which I might have a better chance of intelligence of his motions, or if he remained in them, to find out where he was concealed.

On the 9th he sent into one of the villages for provisions. The families of the principal inhabitants had been seized, and they promised to show where he was concealed if their families were given back to them. The horsemen went into the jungle dismounted, and caught the Rajah and all his people.

Purneah contrived to collect in my camp 300 of the patels. You must recollect enough of the politics of Bullum to know that they are the leaders of all the mischief. They witnessed *the suspension* of the Rajah and their brethren.

Purneah proposes to detain some of them, and the families of others entirely; to suffer none to depart till they shall have delivered in all the arms, ammunition, and property of which we got an account from the Rajah before he was hanged, and shall have paid the revenue of two years and a half, which he has demanded from them. Purneah's abilities have astonished me; he is so different from another man of the same kind whom I before dealt with, I mean Ball Kishen Bhow. He has done everything that I could wish him to do.

## 62. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Why General Stuart leans to the police. Their operations ought to be submitted to the commanding officer.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 14th March, 1802.

I think I understand the cause of General Stuart's opinion regarding the police. He knows well the jealousy at home and among some in this country of military power and military expenses, and he knows also that the former is necessary for a government which exists only by the sword, and that the greater part of the latter is occasioned by that necessity and by the constant support given to the civil by the military power. Lat-

terly the complaints of the growth of the military expenses have been more frequent than usual ; and inasmuch as they have been likely to occasion a very great diminution of the numbers and strength of the army, it is probable that they will do much mischief. General Stuart, therefore, is glad to avail himself of anything which does not create a military expense (that is, an expense paid by the military paymaster), which will perform some of the service required from the military, and will give some support to the civil government. The police in Malabar is of this description, and that is the reason why the General wishes that it should be maintained. What you say, however, regarding the operations of this police is very true. These ought to be submitted to the commanding officer, particularly if they are of any consequence, before they are attempted, otherwise he may be unexpectedly involved in hostilities of the most extensive and serious nature. I will give a hint to Macleod upon the subject, which I am convinced will be sufficient.

Your ideas and mine regarding the powers of the military in the common affairs of police agree entirely.

### 63. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles.

*Renewed rising in Wynaad. Prompt and thorough measures to be taken. Censure of a 'supine' officer.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 18th Oct., 1802.

As far as the information which you have transmitted to me goes, it does not appear that there has been any act of insurrection anywhere excepting at Pancoorta Cottah.

\* \* \* \* \*

If the insurrection should be only partial, and confined to the surprise of the post at Pancoorta Cottah, it appears that you have adopted the measures most likely to check it. In addition to these measures, however, I should wish you to send into Wynaad a company of Europeans, and to order Major —— forthwith to encamp his battalion, and to prepare to fall upon the insurgents wherever he may hear that they are collecting.

I beg you also to call upon him for an account of his conduct in having omitted this obvious measure the moment he heard that the post at Pancoorta Cottah was attacked.

An officer within nine miles of him suffers himself to be

surprised, and with his whole detachment is cut off; and Major ———, instead of putting the battalion under his command into camp, and moving quickly upon the rebels, sits quietly in his cantonment and takes no one step to oppose or stop the insurrection, or for the security of the troops or district under his command. I declare that after such supine conduct, to say no worse of it, I should not be astonished if I were to hear that Major ——— and the remainder of the battalion had been cut off likewise.

This is not the mode in which the former rebellion in Wynaad and Cotiote was suppressed; it is not that in which this insurrection is to be stopped; but it is the certain mode of continuing it as long as a British soldier remains in that part of India.

Tell Major ——— that the troops lately sent to his assistance are not to be kept in a fort or cantonment; they are to be in the field in one or more bodies, according to his information of the strength of the enemy; and let him know that whatever may be the enemy's strength at present, I expect that when he will be joined by these reinforcements he will move out and attack him, and that by his future activity he will remove from my mind the impression which has been made upon it of the certain evil which the public interests will sustain from his late supineness. The unarmed Nairs must not be suffered to pass our posts in Cotiote towards the Ghauts. At all events, whether this insurrection is only partial or likely to become general, it must be a warning to every officer in Malabar of the danger which must always attend the want of precaution in military men; and I shall take an early opportunity of drawing their attention to it in this point of view.

In the mean time I request that you will take into your immediate consideration the state of the posts mentioned in the margin; that you will fix in your own mind the number of troops that are absolutely necessary for their defence in case of a general insurrection, and that you will see that each has in it six months' provisions for that number. I beg you to bear in mind that the great difficulty under which we laboured at the commencement of the last rebellion was to be attributed to our having shut up in Montana, by mistake or accident, a larger number of troops than we had provisions there to feed, or than were necessary for the defence of the post. In case, therefore, of this supposed general insurrection, I beg you to have no more troops in each of these small posts than are absolutely

necessary, and to keep every man you can for active and offensive operations.

#### 64. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles.

*The wrong and the right way of dealing with the insurrection in Wynaad. Neglect of the master's lessons.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 20th Oct., 1802.

I have received your communications upon the subject of Wynaad and Cotiote, sent to me and Captain Barclay, and I approve of all the measures you have taken to be prepared with your force. I wish I could say as much of the conduct of the officers under you; but that is impossible. I declare that I cannot bring myself to send their reports to be laid before the Commander-in-Chief; they are so different from those which I have always been accustomed to send, and they show so little animation or activity in the officers in a cause in which success depends almost upon those qualities alone.

In the report you have lately sent me from Captain —, he informs you that the communication between Cotaparamba and Montana is cut off; he does not tell you how he comes by that intelligence, in what manner, or by whom this communication is cut off; and above all I observe that he omits to tell you that he proposes to move out to ascertain these points, or to endeavour to re-establish this communication. The other reports are nearly in the same style; every thing that is bad is taken for granted, and every body appears determined to remain in his post on the defensive.

Consider, my dear Sir, how different the situation of our affairs is now from what it was in the years 1800 and 1801. Then the insurgents were in force, and had long been prepared for us; they had all the strong posts and holds, and every thing above the Ghauts; they were all well armed and were accustomed to success, and we were obliged to confine our feeble efforts to completing the roads to our posts, and to keeping them supplied with provisions, and we had no knowledge of the country. They were beaten, however, upon that occasion, and their chief became a wanderer; and the efforts which he has since made to re-establish his cause in a manner similar to his late attack upon Pancoorta Cottah have uniformly been defeated by

the activity of the officers and troops. The consequence was, that till a week ago we were in quiet possession of Cotiote and Wynaad ; we had posts established in both those districts, well supplied with provisions and every thing they wanted ; we had good communications between these posts and the sea, between each other, and through the hills into the upper country ; we had a knowledge of the country : on the other hand the rebels have no strong hold, they are not armed (I understand that those who attacked Pancoorta Cottah had only bows and arrows), they cannot be organised, and they have experienced more than one defeat. Under these circumstances for what reason are we to remain even for a moment upon the defensive ?

During the former rebellion I saw many accounts of the Pyche Rajah's strength, and I declare that not one of them ever made it amount to 2000 men. It is said that he is now collected in great force in Wynaad. I should like to know who has seen that force, and who knows that it consists of a larger number than the few assassins who surprised Captain Dickenson ? Has he got his old 2000 men or not ? If he has, how does he feed them, how are they armed, and have they any ammunition ?

But if he has this large force in Wynaad, he cannot have it also in Cotiote, and it would be surely worth while for somebody to try the strength of the party below.

I beg that you will urge the officers to active measures. Let them put their troops in camp forthwith, excepting the number of men that may be absolutely necessary for the defence of the small posts against surprise. If the rebels are really in force, let a junction be formed, and then not a moment lost in dashing at them, whatever may be their force. If the rebels are not in strength, let the troops be kept in constant motion in different directions, and let the alarm be kept up, and they will never be in strength. At all events let them make long and frequent marches, and let them move, not in the column style, but with the flanks covered, particularly where danger is apprehended ; and when an attack is to be made in paddy grounds or other places where the enemy may be posted, let a party get round upon their flank.

If something is not soon done, the rebellion will become regularly organised, and will get ahead, and then the system of warfare must be changed, and will become more tedious.

## 65. To Major Macleod.

*Presence of the civil magistrate necessary to the tranquillizing of Wynaad.*

Seringapatam, 24th Oct., 1802, 9 A.M.

I have just received your letter of the 22nd. The experience which I have had of insurrections, similar to that now in Wynaad, makes it clear to me that the presence of yourself, or of some person possessing the supreme civil authority in that district, is essentially necessary to settle it. The first operations must depend upon the troops. Either the rebels must be beaten, or they must be dispersed; and at the moment at which either of those events takes place the presence of the civil magistrate is necessary in order to reap the good consequences of the success of the troops. If the civil magistrate be present, he will immediately re-establish the civil organisation of the district, will recall the tahsildars and aumildars of districts and villages to perform their functions, the inhabitants will return to their homes, the whole will regain confidence, and the troops will enjoy the benefits of the resources of the country; but if the civil magistrate be absent, whatever may be the success of the troops, the country will not settle, there will be no communication between the inhabitants and the commanding officer, the villages will remain deserted, and the troops, instead of enjoying the benefits of the resources of the country, and being thereby enabled to continue their active operations against, and pursuit of, the rebels, must forthwith turn their attention to procuring subsistence, which must be drawn from a distance.

The consequence therefore of the absence of yourself, or of some person possessing the supreme civil authority in Wynaad at present, may be that, even if the troops should be successful, of which from the latest accounts I have not the smallest doubt, the rebellion may still exist, the contest will be lengthened, and will be concluded at last only by the arrival in the district of a person having civil authority, whom I now urge you to send there.

In opposition to this request you state the inconvenience which will be the result of your communication with the other districts being cut off. Upon this subject I have to observe, firstly, that it is not likely that it will be even precarious, as soon as the

troops commence their operations in Wynaad, particularly if the country be settled as they get on ; secondly, that even if it should be so, the inconvenience, loss, and expense to the public will not be so great as they will be by the lengthened contest in consequence of your absence.

Upon the whole, therefore, I most earnestly urge you to reconsider this subject, and, if you should not think it proper to enter Wynaad with the troops yourself, at least to send there Mr. Wilson and Mr. Warden, with full authority and instructions from you to settle the country.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 66. To Captain G. Gurnell.

*Rapid and cautious advance of troops into Wynaad insisted upon.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 24th Oct., 1802.

Recollect, however, that not only your success, but even your safety, depends upon the rapidity and length of your movements, and I strongly recommend you not to remain more than one day in any place.

On your marches you must always cover your flanks by parties ; and in your attacks of the enemy, which will probably always be in a jungle, you must push parties through the jungle upon the flanks of the enemy, at the same time that you make your great attack ; and in passing paddy-valleys, in particular, great attention must be paid to occupying the sides of the valley with your parties before the main body enters it.

#### 67. To Major Macleod.

*Feebleness and unpopularity of the movement at present. Danger of neglecting it. Civil authority indispensable to prevent its spreading.*

Seringapatam, 3rd Nov., 1802.

I imagine that you will by this time have arrived at Calicut, and I therefore write to inform you of the state of affairs in Wynaad.

Captain Gurnell was opposed in crossing the nullah at Sangaloo, on the borders, by some Nairs in a stockade ; but he suc-

ceeded in carrying it with the loss of only one man wounded by crossing the nullah on both flanks, and thus entering it. The Nairs sustained some loss. He marched on the following day, the 28th, from Sangaloo to Manundwaddy, seventeen miles. He was opposed in many places, and the opposition appears to have been brisk, but we lost only one sepoy wounded. The Rajah's horse sustained some loss in killed and wounded, and some followers were killed; but I attribute this to the badness of the road and its narrowness, which obliged them to extend their line, and prevented them from effectually covering their flanks. This they were prevented from doing also by the nullahs, which were full, and across which the Nairs fired at them.

A party went on the 29th to attack a pagoda, about three miles from Manundwaddy, but the Nairs had left it. On the 30th five companies of the 1st of the 8th marched back from Manundwaddy to Sangaloo to escort the Rajah's horse, which were found to be useless, as the country was so wet, and to procure supplies of provisions. They were not opposed on their march, and they were to return to Manundwaddy yesterday.

I have not yet had from Captain Gurnell any accurate account of the numbers of the enemy, which can enable me to form an opinion of the extent of the insurrection, or of the measures which must be ulteriorly taken to suppress it. I have, however, called for the troops which will be necessary in case we must proceed in force, and I shall be ready for operations before the season will be sufficiently advanced. I am clearly of opinion that before any farther expense is incurred, it will be worth while that you should take a trip to Wynaad. All accounts, public and private, agree that although the inhabitants are still in their villages, they fly from them upon the approach of our officers and troops: they hold no communication with us, we have no intelligence, and they afford us no supplies.

The reason is that which I before gave you in my public letter, the civil organization is destroyed; but your arrival in the country with your Cutchery would set all that matter to rights directly. It is obvious from what has passed already that a battalion can march anywhere without loss; but till the country is resettled the communication will be interrupted, that force will be put to shifts for its subsistence, and in the end the insurrection will get so far, so many people will be embarked in it, that we must proceed regularly to work with a large force.

I have information from Wynaad by means of the woodcutters.



I hear that the insurrection is by no means pleasing to the majority of the inhabitants, and that the common cry is for you to return. Indeed our government must be strangely odious to the people if it were otherwise, as I understand from you that they have paid their revenue, which cannot, therefore, be very burthensome on them, and it is not possible that they can already look to the permanence of the power of the Pyche Rajah, considering that the insurrection is only a fortnight old.

Allow me to entreat you, then, to go into Wynaad. But if you cannot go yourself, send there a sensible, discreet man, with full powers and instructions, and, above all, the Cutchery. By means of that alone will you communicate with the inhabitants.

When I hear next from Gurnell, I shall probably be able to decide what is to be done further in a military way. If I send more troops, I shall go with them. But I am so sensible that nothing can be done by any military men unless the country is settled as they go on, that I have determined not to go in till your people are prepared to accompany me. I arranged the settlement of Wynaad upon this principle before, and I have always acted upon it in Soonda, in the Mahratta country, and in Bullum, and I may say in the Ceded Districts, which were taken possession of by troops sent in by me, and by my plans.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

By the bye, I hear that since Major Drummond has been released from Kyde, he says that the insurrection is nothing at all.

#### 68. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

*Precaution against failure of provisions.*

(Extracts)

Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1802.

By all accounts I judge that our first object in Wynaad must be to secure the subsistence of the troops. I have no doubt whatever of being able to effect that object most amply from this country, provided we can bring forward to the troops the cattle and people in safety. The communication appears to be safe on the side of Malabar, but interrupted on this. However, you will

observe, by the enclosed instructions to Captain Gurnell, that I have taken measures to cover and secure the communication.

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If you should find that your provisions are running short, you will do well to order some of the troops to approach the magazines in Malabar, and to retain no more in Wynaad, till you have plenty of provisions, than are necessary to keep up the terror of the insurgents. But the troops which, under this suggestion, may thus approach the magazines, are not to remain below the Ghauts, or even on the borders, for any length of time, but they are to return to the scene of action as soon as they will have received the provisions which they will require.

## 69. PROCLAMATION.

*Appeal to the peaceable inhabitants, in the cause of order.*

Major-General Wellesley, commanding the troops in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, &c., has heard with concern of the renewal of the disturbances in Wynaad, which have been the cause heretofore of such loss to the inhabitants of the country, and the occasion of the dreadful but well-merited punishments which they have witnessed. In the force now collected for the purpose of reestablishing tranquillity, the peaceable inhabitants of Wynaad must see the means of their own safety and the determination of the government to subdue the insurgents with celerity, and to bring them to the punishment they deserve.

Major-General Wellesley, therefore, calls upon them to return to and remain in their villages; to communicate with and give intelligence of the haunts of the insurgents to the commanding officers of the troops; to supply them for payment with the produce of the country; and to wait in security under the protection of the Company's arms till they receive the orders of Major Macleod, the principal collector.

## 70. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Reasons for employing a small force in Wynaad.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 9th Nov., 1802.

Since I wrote to you on the 31st October I have commenced the operations in Wynaad, by means of which I propose to throw

into that country the supplies, of Mysore, without stopping the pursuit of the rebels by the troops in order to form escorts, &c. &c. If Major Macleod will enter the district, I think it possible that everything may still be settled without employing more troops; and if I should find that to be the case, I will order the companies of the 33rd and the 1st battalion 14th regiment to halt for your farther orders.

The great object is now to supply the troops who are already in Wynaad, and I hope that may be effected, and I am certain will be so without employing a larger force if Major Macleod will come up; and although I am clearly of opinion that in this species of warfare it is better to have too many than too small a number of troops, yet as soon as we find that the insurgents are so far subdued or terrified as that small parties of our troops can march through the country, and that all that is required is to secure their baggage and provisions and their communication with their rear, which the settlement of the country with the other measures adopted will effect, it is better to pause a little and to omit to collect more troops for this service. There are two considerations which have much effect on my mind on this occasion: one is that of expense, which will certainly be much increased by every increase of our force; the other is that of our credit. Although we must take care to have a body of troops fully sufficient to crush this rebellion at once, it will not be very creditable to us, particularly in the eyes of foreign nations, who will be witnesses, that it should be necessary that we should have a large army to cope with a few Nairs.

I have made preparations to throw a large quantity of rice from this country into Wynaad at a small expense, viz. half a pagoda a bullock load; at the same time I have arranged the business in such a manner with the bullock-owners as that, if they are wanted, I shall have all their bullocks in the service. Thus I have provided for the present exigency at a small expense; and if events should oblige me to go into the country in force, I have at command the cattle by means of which I shall be enabled to move from hence on the day after the troops sent by you will arrive.

**71. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.**

*'A smart action with the Nairs.' Their repulse.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 14th Nov., 1802.

I have the honour to enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Anderson upon the subject on which you wrote to me on the 6th instant.

Since I wrote to you on the 9th instant a detachment of the 1st battalion 8th regiment has had a smart action with the Nairs in Wynaad, in which they sustained a considerable loss. They had marched to Manundwaddy with a despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, and on their return were attacked near a swamp at which the battalion had been hard pressed heretofore. The Nairs took the advantage of a nullah which was impassable, across which they fired at them, and killed nine and wounded eighteen. The officer in command of the battalion, however, at Sangaloo, sent out three companies to the support of the other detachment, and the Nairs were driven off with considerable loss. Many of those on this side of the nullah were put to death in the road. By all accounts the troops behaved remarkably well upon this occasion.

We are continuing the plan of operations which I mentioned in my letter of the 9th. All that is wanting in Wynaad is provisions, and the presence of the collector. I believe they have troops enough, if not to check, at least to prevent the insurrection from spreading.

**72. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.**

*Precautions against needless loss.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 15th Nov., 1802.

While encamped in the neighbourhood of this swamp, I wish that you would reconnoitre and ascertain whether there is not some mode of turning and avoiding it; or if not, whether it would not be possible, by taking possession of some of the hills in the neighbourhood, to command the ground from which the Nairs fire on the parties who may be passing the swamp.

I trust that you have taken measures to construct the post which I recommended between Manundwaddy and Sangaloo.

## 73. To Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

*Promiscuous destruction of deserted villages forbidden.*

Seringapatam, 16th Nov., 1802.

I have received your letter of the 15th. I conclude that Captain Barclay's letter of yesterday will have prevented you from marching, and that you will have received mine of yesterday in the course of this day.

I leave it to you to fix on the spot which you think will answer best for the post between Manundwaddy and Sangaloo ; but it appears to me that it would be desirable to fix one post in the neighbourhood of the swamp in question.

I have taken into consideration your proposal to destroy the villages which you may find deserted, to which I cannot consent for the following reasons : It is probable that the inhabitants of the villages in question have been forced by the rebels to join them, and their own safety requires that they should remain with them till our superiority is so decided as that they may remain in their villages in safety under our protection. The fact you mention, that Chuttoo is with Captain Watson, at the same time that the inhabitants of the villages on his estate fly upon the approach of our troops, is a strong proof that this is the case ; even his influence cannot prevent them from adopting that line of conduct, which it appears their safety absolutely requires.

Before the villages are destroyed, when the inhabitants are found to have quitted them, it will be necessary that the superiority of our arms should be established, and that the civil authority should make an effort to settle the country again. If the inhabitants then remain away, their spirit of disaffection will be manifest, and that will be the time to lay waste the country, and destroy the property within it.

The case of Coongan Nair's property, however, is entirely different ; he is a proscribed rebel, and ought not to have been allowed to hold any property after he had been proscribed. The proper measure to be adopted with his property would be to confiscate it ; but as it is probable that you would not find any person to take charge of it, the best thing to do would be to destroy it entirely ; and I authorise you to destroy the houses and property you mention belonging to this man lying between Poollingal and Manundwaddy.

It will be necessary, however, that before you destroy those houses you should ascertain from Mr. Riddle that the owner of them is really the proscribed Coongan Nair.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 74. To Colonel Montresor.

*Conciliation of the military with the civil authority.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 30th Nov., 1802.

You will find Macleod a good, an able, and a zealous servant of the public; candour and firmness on your part will beget the same on his, in all his communications with you; and you will find him not disinclined to your opinions upon all subjects relating to his duties, provided he finds them to be formed on your own observations, and not on the reports of others, who he must know to be his enemies. When I write this to you, I beg that you will not imagine that I think you have formed any opinion on these subjects, grounded in the manner that I deprecate; for you have positively told me in your letter of the 26th that you have not. But you must attribute it to the real motive, my sincere desire that you should succeed in all your objects, and my knowledge of the great use which you can be to the public by the adoption of the line which I recommend.

#### 75. To Colonel Montresor.

*Casual origin of the Wynaad insurrection. Not due to Macleod's revenue system. His character and achievements. A friendly caution.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 27th Dec., 1802.

In respect to the present disturbances in Wynaad, as far as I have it in my power to form a judgment, it is my opinion they are to be attributed to accident, and the circumstance of the Rajah and some of his principal adherents being still at large. I have been informed that the insurrection began by an accidental murder and riot, subsequently to which the party concerned in them went to surprise the post and murder the officers at Pancoorta Cottah. The troops did nothing to revenge this loss,

and Coongan Nair, who was at the head of those who performed these feats, issued a proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants of Wynaad to meet him at a pagoda in the neighbourhood of Manundwaddy, where they did meet him to the number of 5000, and they have been in rebellion ever since. At the time when this insurrection broke out the revenue year was closing, and not one farthing of the revenue remained unpaid. There had been no symptoms of disaffection before; and if there had, Captain Dickenson, who was well acquainted with the affairs of the country and the disposition of its inhabitants, would not have been surprised in his post: and upon the whole, I am induced to believe that accident alone was the original cause of an insurrection which has grown to be a rebellion from the subsequent inactivity of the troops. Indeed, one strong proof to my mind that it cannot be attributed to the officers of the revenue, is, that it broke out after the revenue of the year had been realized, and at so late a period of the monsoon that it was every day probable that the country would be in such a state as that our troops would carry on operations against the insurgents. If the oppression of the people had been the cause, it would have commenced before they had paid their money, and at an earlier period of the monsoon. This being the case, candour would induce me to pause before I formed a decision respecting the system of management of any man who might have had in his hands the civil and financial government of that district; and I should certainly not decide that the insurrection is to be attributed to him unless conviction was produced upon my mind that it was so, not by any single detached fact, much less by rumours and reports, but by a careful examination of the whole question, and every circumstance relating to it. This would be my mode of proceeding if any man were collector of Malabar and Wynaad, but I shall consider it particularly necessary to adopt this mode when called upon to form a decided opinion in a case where Major Macleod is concerned.

This gentleman was originally selected by Lord Cornwallis as one of the agents to introduce the British government into the Barahmahal when that district was conquered from Tippoo. If Lord Cornwallis has one quality as a man at the head of a great government more conspicuous than another, it is the talent of choosing proper instruments to be employed in the different departments under him; and this is so well known, that to have been selected by Lord Cornwallis for any situation is

strong presumptive evidence' in a man's favour that he is fit for it.

\* \* \* \* \*

When it was thought proper to try a new system of government for Malabar, Major Macleod was the person fixed upon to carry it into execution, and he undertook the duty, to my certain knowledge, much against his inclination. The result of his administration in Malabar has been, first, that the revenue has been increased 1 lac and 20,000 pagodas, and has been realized ; secondly, that a saving has been made of civil expenses to the amount of 70,000 pagodas *per annum* ; thirdly, that a saving has been made of military expenses to the amount of 1 lac of pagodas *per annum* ; making Malabar, upon the whole, a better concern to the Company than heretofore by nearly 3 lacs of pagodas *per annum*. This saving of military expenses is not of those which ought properly to be called military : they are those on account of sebundies, peons, &c. &c., who attended the government of the Commissioners, who were actually useless in a military point of view, and with whom the military commanding officer had nothing to do, and which ought never to have been carried to the head of military charges.

I contend, therefore, that it is peculiarly due to Major Macleod to examine with minute care and attention all points relating to his management before any decided opinion is formed and delivered upon that subject.

I don't mean, my dear Colonel, to insinuate that you have formed any opinion upon this subject on light grounds ; but I am perfectly aware of the strange and improper conduct of some in Malabar, and of the dangerous steps taken by them against Major Macleod and his system. I know the advantage which such a party would derive from the sanction of the opinion of a person of your character in your situation, and the pains they would take to convince your mind of the truth of those statements and reports which they are putting in circulation. I have therefore written thus much to warn you upon this subject, to urge you again to an unreserved communication with Major Macleod on all points, and to avoid forming any opinion either regarding his character or his system of management not founded upon your own observation, your complete knowledge of facts, and your own reasoning upon them.

In respect to Major Macleod's conduct in Wynaad, as alluded to by you in your letter of the 19th, I have to observe that it is



natural he should have no knowledge of the interests of the inhabitants of that district, and no influence over them, because till now all of them have declined to have any communication with him. The same cause must prevent his inquiries into their grievances and the sources of them. But you have entirely mistaken the character of Major Macleod, or he must be strangely altered, if you suppose that he is not a candid man with the natives, is unwilling to enter into inquiries, or is a character to which the natives of any part of India will ever have an antipathy.

It is notorious that Major Macleod is the most elaborate inquirer in this part of India, and he is so happy as to enjoy a mildness of temper and of manners and a patience which are supposed to be the qualities which have never failed to conciliate the natives of India. I have known him for many years, and I declare that in my opinion he possesses the qualities which I have above stated to be notorious; and if I were called upon to state what I thought the fault of Major Macleod's character as a public man, I should say that he had too good an opinion of the natives in general, and that he paid too much deference and attention to what they said to him.

76. To J. G. Ravenshaw, Esq.

*Exportation of grain from Canara to be discouraged—for  
the present.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 11th Jan., 1803.

In a private letter from you, which General Stuart has sent me, you inquire whether it would be desirable that you should prevent the great exportation of grain from Canara in this season, in order that you may provide for the possible demands of the army. One of the consequences of the exportation of grain from Canara is that much grain is carried from the rice countries of Mysore, bordering on the Western Ghauts, into that province, particularly since the settlement of the disturbances in Bullum. This trade is highly beneficial to Mysore, and it is very desirable that in general it should be encouraged; but under present circumstances, as the army must depend in a great measure upon Mysore for its subsistence, and as every drain from this country will lessen the chance of procuring it

with ease, it is better that this trade should cease for the present; and as the best mode of putting a stop to it, that the markets in Canara should be kept full by a general discouragement of the exportation of grain for some time. I know that the trade can be prevented in some degree by other means, and I have urged the Dewan to prevent as much as possible the exportation of grain by the western passes. But the best mode of putting a stop to it will be to deprive those who carry it on of all prospect of advantage by keeping the markets in Canara tolerably well supplied by a general discouragement of exportation.

Another reason for which I am desirous that the exportation of rice from Canara should be discouraged is, that I have recommended to General Stuart the formation of a *dépôt* of rice, by means of the Bombay government, at one of the Mahratta ports, opposite the island of Bombay or Salsette. In case he should adopt this plan, I apprehend that the government of Bombay must draw the supplies of rice which will be required from Canara, and they will not be available unless the exportation is discouraged immediately.

#### 77. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*'Some prospect of tranquillity in Wynaad.'* Colonel Montresor's measures, in concert with the collector.

Seringapatam, 19th Jan., 1803.

I have received letters from Colonel Montresor, by which it appears that there is some prospect of tranquillity in Wynaad. He had continued the system of calling upon the inhabitants to return to their habitations, and to hold communication with and lay their complaints before the collector; and he had moved through the district in different directions, and had destroyed the houses and property which he had found abandoned. Many of the principal inhabitants had met him; and in his last letters he told me that he was about to march to a central position in the district, from which he would be better able to communicate with the inhabitants of all parts.

The rebellion, however, still exists, and the rebels plunder and destroy the property of those who communicate with the British officers as soon as the troops are removed to a short distance.

## 78. To Major Macleod.

*'Approaching tranquillity in Wynaad.' Flight of Coongan Nair. The country important as a military position. Delicate suggestion to the Collector.*

(Extract.)

25th Jan., 1803.

It is long since I have heard from you, but I think it proper to write to congratulate you upon the prospect of approaching tranquillity in Wynaad. Colonel Montresor informs me that excepting in the districts in which Yeman Nair's estates are situated, the inhabitants have returned to their villages, and have communication with him, and that they have manifested a disposition to submit themselves to government; he also says that Coongan Nair has retired to the Ghauts, with about 200 followers. You will now have an opportunity of effecting a settlement of Wynaad, which I hope will be lasting, and will insure its peace. Upon this occasion I wish to recall to your recollection that the district of Wynaad is no object to the Company as one from which revenue is to be drawn. It is essential to us to hold it as a military position, which awes the whole of the province of Malabar; but it will fail entirely of producing that effect, if, in order to hold it at all, we are obliged to keep in that district all the troops which can be spared from the general service for the defence of Malabar and Canara. I wish you to keep this in mind in making the settlement in Wynaad.

I hope that you will not conceive that I have travelled out of my line in writing you the above, or that I entertain the opinion which has been industriously circulated, and as firmly combated by me, that the late insurrection in Wynaad is to be attributed to your revenue arrangements, or to the faults of your revenue officers. I assure you, my dear Macleod, that I entertain no such opinions, and I believe that I have successfully exposed their fallacy to those who have entertained them; but feeling strongly the benefits of the possession of Wynaad, particularly if we can keep it in peace, and knowing that it is most likely that it will be kept in peace if the people residing in it have a practical knowledge of the benefits to be derived from living under the British government, such as they would have if they should find that they pay less to the Company than they would to their own Rajah, I take the liberty of an old friend to recall these principles to your recollection. At the same time I

well know how difficult it is for a man in your situation, who must have based his former arrangements and settlements upon facts, which facts he must have reported together with the settlements founded upon them to his official superiors, to alter those settlements without adducing any material alteration of the facts originally brought forward in their support. I am also aware of the difficulties of this nature with which a man of your profession, in particular one holding a revenue employment, would have to contend. However, upon this point I have to tell you that if you should think it desirable to yourself in any point of view that I should put in a public form what I have herein written privately, as a ground for which you should depart from your former settlement in Wynaad, I will do it with pleasure; nay, more, I will send a copy of my proposed letter to you to the Commander-in-Chief, and obtain for it the sanction of government. Let me hear from you upon this subject as soon as you can, as I am very anxious about it.

#### 79. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Rising in Malabar; a contre coup of the Mahratta crisis.  
Reinforcements to be sent into Wynaad.*

(Extract.)

Serlingapatam, 1st Feb., 1803.

I am sorry to have to inform you that the disturbances which have prevailed in Wynaad have spread into Malabar. The inhabitants of the district of Corumnaad are in rebellion, and I enclose the copy of a letter upon that subject, which Colonel Montresor has received from the collector.

It appears that Captain Leighton had been in Corumnaad with a detachment of the 2nd of the 4th; and upon first hearing of these disturbances, Colonel Montresor detached Major Drummond with a force from Wynaad to his assistance. Captain Leighton was, however, attacked on the day that Major Drummond joined him, and lost a considerable number of men, as by the enclosed copy of the return of killed, wounded, and missing upon this occasion. Colonel Montresor, therefore, informs me in a letter, of which I enclose a copy, that he proposes to proceed immediately into Corumnaad. He leaves the troops in Wynaad under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence.

I don't give much credit to private accounts received from

Malabar, because I know that the writers of them are much prejudiced, and have lost all recollection of the state of affairs in that province from the time that it first came under the government of the Company. They all agree, however, that it is probable that the insurrection will become more general; that the inhabitants look forward to the prospect of the troops on this side being engaged in the Mahratta territory, and that they will have to oppose those only which are usually placed in the country as the ordinary guards.

I cannot forget that, till within these few years, the province of Malabar has always been in a state of either partial or general rebellion; and the opinion which I have formed, that nothing but a force which will be formidable to its inhabitants can keep them in subjection.

Under these circumstances, I think it advisable that the 2nd of the 1st should be sent into Wynaad. There is no doubt whatever that the inhabitants of that district, as well as of Malabar, have talked of the war with the Mahrattas for a length of time; and Major Macleod, in his private letters, has more than once stated his fears of an increase of the rebellion as soon as the accounts should arrive in Malabar of the march of the troops from this place. The arrival of a corps from this side therefore will have the very best effects upon their minds, and will show them that the government is able to send troops to keep them in order notwithstanding its exertions against a foreign enemy, besides the great additional strength which it will give to Colonel Montresor.

I have written to Colonel Montresor to inform him that I had applied to you for this corps; and I had desired him to make it public that he expects it, and even to make preparations for its reception.

#### 80. To Major Macleod.

*Topics of consolation from retrospect of Malabar affairs.*

*Advice to live down misrepresentation.*

Camp at Beroor, 18th Feb., 1803.

I ought before now to have answered your letter of the 2nd; but it arrived at the moment when I was marching from Seringapatam, and I have been so much occupied ever since that I have not had time to write to you.

It gives me pain to observe that you feel so strongly the various disagreeable circumstances attending your situation in Malabar. I

cannot deny that they are of a nature to distress you to the greatest degree ; but I urge you most earnestly to bear up against them. You are certain of the approbation and support of the government, and of the good wishes of every honest and unprejudiced man concerned in the administration of the affairs of Malabar, or interested in them, or who may turn his attention to that subject. You have also to reflect that, however bad the situation of affairs in that province may be at present, however general the disturbances, and however disaffected the people, the general situation of the province is mended even in those respects since you took upon yourself the administration of its affairs, and that this must be allowed by every man who knows anything of the subject, and is not unwilling to give a fair and candid opinion.

I cannot forget that in the year 1800 I was obliged to go in secret to Cotaparamba to view the roads then making by my directions from that place forward towards Montana and Canote ; that with this view I left my staff behind me, and went with Captain Moncrieff alone ; at the same time no gentleman either in the civil or the military service could move 100 yards from his station unattended by sepoys or armed police, even although that station was upon the sea coast ; and as for the interior of the country, we saw it, and knew it existed, but no man had ever ventured into it. In the southern districts, supposed to be the most civilized and those in which our government was best established, the civil and military servants were shot at in that very year more than once ; they and their escorts were attacked and were driven by the rebels, nearly in the same manner that these have since been driven by us. At that time the force in Malabar was much stronger than it is now.

Disaffection, disturbance, and rebellion exist in Malabar now in some parts ; but I should like to know whether the country is not upon the whole more civilized, more quiet, and more submissive to government than it was in March, 1800, previously to the last rebellion of the Pyche Rajah ? I beg also to ask those who are most loud in their animadversions upon the administration of civil affairs, whether they have not foreseen, at least have not repeatedly foretold, that the rebellion could not be considered at an end so long as the Pyche Rajah was alive and at large, that it would be renewed as soon as the force in Malabar should be weakened, and particularly so if there should be employment for the troops in the Mysore country ?

Without blaming the executive government in Malabar, those

about me know well that this has always been my opinion, as I believe it has that of every well-judging man; and I have given proofs that I held this opinion upon the occasion of every proposition that has been made for the reduction of the force in Malabar.

All these considerations must be gratifying to you, and should induce you to bear up against an adverse turn in the state of affairs, which, after all, can be but momentary.

It is true that you have a formidable party against you; but when you are to adopt any measure of consequence, when that occupies your attention, allow me to advise you never to take into consideration what that party may think, say, or do upon the occasion; do not allow yourself to think that they exist, and do your duty as you would if they were where they ought to be, and I dare say will be hereafter. It is impossible, and not perhaps very proper, that you should be ignorant of what they are doing against you; but I recommend you not to allow any man in Malabar to know that you even suspect it; and if government does not deliver you from this intolerable grievance, for which end I am about to exert myself, you may depend upon it that the party will not long hold together. Let me hear from you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHIUR WELLESLEY.

### 81. To Lieut.-Colonel Montresor.

#### *Provisional plan for arresting the insurrection in Malabar.*

Camp at Kandegy, 16th March, 1803.

I received yesterday your letter of the 5th. Notwithstanding that my attention is much occupied by other objects, I have for some time been turning over in my mind the state of our affairs in Malabar; the subject is not new to me, and I am fully prepared to give you an opinion upon it. It appears now that, notwithstanding the reinforcements which have been sent into Malabar (and which have consisted of all the troops that could possibly be spared), and the exertions of yourself and the officers under your command, the rebellion has continued to increase, and there is every appearance of its becoming general throughout the province. The European settlements upon the coast have been threatened, and the efforts of the troops will be required in a

great measure to keep them in safety during the monsoon. The utmost length of the season which now remains for operations is two months from this time ; and supposing the earliest and most favourable termination of the operations which have brought a great portion of the army to the northern frontier, or even if a part of that army could be spared immediately for the service in Malabar, it would not be possible for it to arrive in the disturbed districts so as to effect any benefit before the commencement of the rainy season.

We must, therefore, immediately turn our thoughts to the adoption of such measures as will secure to us some essential points, in case the state of the Company's affairs in general should allow of the employment of a large force for the suppression of the rebellion in Malabar at the opening of the next season. To do anything else will be useless, and to attempt it may prevent you from providing effectually for the security of those points which, in this view of the case, will be necessary to us hereafter. With this view, you ought, in my opinion, first to provide for the safety of Cannanore, Tellicherry, Mahé, and Calicut, and, as far as possible, for the communication along the coast ; secondly, you ought to have posts at Ercoor and Cotaparamba, and, if the southern districts should be disturbed, at Angarypur ; thirdly, you ought to occupy Manundwaddy in Wynaad, and the heads of the Ghauts ; and, fourthly, the posts at Montana, and Canote, and Pereweil, in Cotiote, if possible. I am not so anxious respecting those, however, mentioned in the fourth instance, although they are of importance in respect to Cotiote, because I know that, even if we hold them, we must still cut our way through that district, which never can be subdued or kept in tranquillity excepting by a commanding force in Wynaad above the Ghauts. That is the outline of the disposition of the troops which I would recommend to you for the monsoon. Your nearer view of the subject may enable you to form a better, but this embraces all the great points of our situation in Malabar, and provides some resting-places for us at the opening of the next fair season.

I recommend that of the posts mentioned in the third instance, you should make those at the heads of the passes the strongest, in order that they may be enabled to detach to the rear of the rebels defending the pass when the troops from below will have to attack it in front.

After you will have determined the number of troops you will



have in each post, I recommend you to throw into each post eight months' provision for them. I need not give *you* the caution which I gave to one of your predecessors under similar circumstances three years ago, for want of attention to which we lost many men.

Your whole efforts ought now to be directed to supplying the posts with provisions, ammunition, and medicines; to putting them in a state of decent repair; to destroying the posts which you will not occupy; and to removing or destroying the stores they contain. Let the sea coast, Cotaparamba, Ercoor, and Angarypur be the last provided for, as they are nearer the source of supply, and the communication with them will never be very difficult. While you are making these arrangements in your posts preparatory to the monsoon, you might keep a corps in motion in the lower country, in order to prevent the rebels from meditating anything against the settlements upon the coast before you have made your arrangements for their safety during the monsoon. But the former is the chief object, for the attainment of which every effort ought to be made.

I am getting on as well as I could expect. I wish that the task you have in Malabar was not attended with more difficulties than I have yet met with.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 82. To Sir W. Clarke, Envoy at Goa.

### *Suppression of piracy.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

Nothing can be more scandalous than the system of piracy which has long been carried on on the coast of Malabar; and I am convinced that the measure which I have proposed to the Rajah is an expedient which will answer the purpose expected from it, only for a time. I indeed doubt much, whether the Rajah of Kolapoor or the Bhoonslah have the power, supposing them to have the inclination, to prevent piracy; and that object is, in my opinion, to be effected only by severe instantaneous punishments of pirates on their coasts, and in sight of their own people; and if it should still be persisted in, by sending strong armaments within all the creeks and rivers, with orders to destroy boats, vessels, the fortifications which protect them, and even the

habitations of the pirates. In this manner the business would be done effectually, otherwise nothing less than the occupation of the whole coast by the Company's troops would answer the purpose.

\* \* \* \* \*

In the present state of the Company's power, the Rajah of Kolapoor cannot be considered a formidable enemy; but it may be observed of him, as well as of others, that he is formidable, or otherwise, in an inverse proportion to the arrangements made for bringing the Company's power into action. The contest with him would be long, and possibly some of its effects doubtful, if he were to be attacked by a small force; and very probably it would be but momentary, if the circumstances of the time should permit the government to bring to act upon the Rajah the disposable forces which must be in his neighbourhood.

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The question is, whether the mode proposed by the agreement will prevent piracy? My opinion is, that after the soucar, who is to be security, shall have paid the value of one or two captures, he will declare that he can be security no longer; and for this reason, I deem the measure only an expedient which will afford leisure to the government to consider of others which will be more permanent. Still, if the soucar should withdraw his security, it will be in the power of the government of Bombay to blockade his ports again; and in the meantime, the inconvenience, the expense, and the risk of that measure, which after all is not effectual, will be avoided.

#### IV. THE NIZAM.

##### 83. Memorandum on the French Force at Hyderabad.

*Danger to the Company from the French force at Hyderabad. How it may be destroyed. To what extent it should be superseded by a British force. Financial and political difficulties connected with the establishment and service of such a force. Plan for obviating these difficulties. Military adventurers not to be encouraged.* [1798.]

For some time past a very extraordinary, and, to the Company's interest in this country, a very dangerous influence has existed at

the Court of Hyderabad. M. Raymond, a Frenchman, who, I am informed, was originally encouraged to go there by the British Government, in the view of getting the command of a small body of troops, increased it to the number of 14,000 well-disciplined infantry, commanded by European officers, and paid by the produce of a country given over to the collection of M. Raymond. In proportion as the number of his troops increased, he shook off his allegiance to the British Government; and he latterly adopted all the violent republican doctrines of his countrymen. Of these sentiments there are several signs, viz. the use of the national colours and cockades; and from these, as well as from his conduct at the durbar of the Nizam, there does not remain a doubt of his enmity to the English interests, nor of his wishes to gratify it if an opportunity offered. He uniformly acted in a contrary interest at Hyderabad: he held communications with Tippoo, with Scindiah, and even with Zemaun Shah.

The weakness of the Nizam's government has suffered this power to grow up in the heart of his state, and his ministers have been at a loss in what manner to get rid of it, or, at least, to counterbalance it. For this purpose they have had in the Deccan two battalions of the Company's sepoys. These, however, notwithstanding their insufficiency effectually to oppose and counteract the views of M. Raymond, have been sent away, and then again demanded, according as the influence of M. Raymond or of the Nizam's minister became most powerful. These are there at present, and are alone what the Nizam has to depend upon.

M. Raymond, whom I have above described as being at the head of that system, which has by degrees been introduced into the Deccan, is now dead, and it is reported that the officers under him have elected \_\_\_\_\_<sup>1</sup> to succeed to his command. The Nizam has nominally appointed him to the same situation. This man is a violent democrat, and one who, it is imagined, from his violence and folly, will overturn the system established by his predecessor; but whether he does so or otherwise, the existence even for a short time of such a power as Raymond established in the Deccan may be fairly stated as almost incompatible with the existence of the British power in the Carnatic. It is more fatal to it than if the Nizam were inimical to us. It might be expected that his enmity might be qualified by motives of personal interest, by the recollection of former defeats,

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<sup>1</sup> Blank in MS.—*Ed.*

by the chance of his being attacked by the Mysoreans, or Mah-rattas, whilst engaged with us; and, above all, by the ruin to his country attendant upon a state of war: but such a man as \_\_\_\_\_ at the head of such a force, when supported by the opinions and advice of his countryman established at Pondicherry, would be actuated by no such considerations, or indeed by no considerations excepting such as regarded his personal interest, his own glory, and the interest and glory of his countrymen. The chance of defeat would not be considered, as it would not be his loss, but that of the Nizam; and even if it were considered, it would be more than balanced by the certainty of ruin to the British interest from being involved in a war at all.

All this leads me to the conclusion that it is essentially necessary to annihilate this power as soon as possible. It appears that this cannot be more an object to the Company than it is to the governing power at the Nizam's Court. They (the prime Minister Azim ul Omrah in particular) have long been desirous that the detachment of sepoy's should be increased, and since the death of M. Raymond, have anxiously pressed for British assistance to remove those dangerous troops which he had collected and disciplined. There cannot be a doubt of the propriety of granting it; and the only question is, in what manner.

The question whether Raymond's power is to be annihilated is entirely distinct from that of the propriety of establishing a similar one in the Deccan ourselves. I shall canvass that by and by.

The first step must be to enable the Nizam to dismiss this force without danger to himself or to his court. This must be done by sending to his assistance such a body of sepoy's as must keep them in awe, and which may be afterwards withdrawn or otherwise, as may be found necessary.

The question then arises, whether it will be proper to keep in the Deccan a force which will answer all the purposes which it was intended that that of Raymond should answer. The Nizam's states, being surrounded by Tippoo and all the tribes of Mah-rattas, are liable to invasion on all sides. If the Company furnish a force to defend him on all sides, they must be paid in the same manner as that of Raymond is; by the assignment of the revenue of a certain district, to be collected by themselves: otherwise their payment will become uncertain, and they will in that case be involved in every war which the ambition, either of the Nizam or of any one of his restless neighbours, may occasion. I consider that the territory which might be assigned to pay

these troops would soon be considered as part of the general dominion of the Company; its produce would be considered as part of the general revenue, instead of something to be applied particularly to the payment of this force; and the Company's Government would think it as necessary to involve itself in a war in its defence as in the defence of any other portion of their dominions. For this reason I object to taking territory as a security for the payment of the troops employed in the Deccan. On the other hand, there will be no reason why the Nizam should be involved in our wars; and thus we shall gain a long defenceless frontier to preserve, without the advantage of assistance in the moment when those territories in which we are most interested may be attacked. It is, therefore, not advisable to assist the Nizam in the way of sending him sepoys to a much greater extent than he has been assisted already; I mean, if territory is to be taken by the Company as a security for their payment.

If it were possible to extend the influence of the Company to the Mysorean, it might become a question whether it would not be advisable to hire our troops to the Nizam, and to hire, or, in other words, to make them subsidiary to the Company's Government; but as that cannot be expected, and considering the topographical as well as the political situation of the Nizam's country, to run the risk of involving the British nation in all the wars to which he may be stated to be liable cannot be advisable. If the Company do not give him the assistance of their own troops, is it advisable to encourage any British or other adventurer, under the protection of the Company, to raise a body of troops for the service of the Nizam, upon the same footing as those of Raymond?

The Nizam's country is more exposed than that of any of his neighbours; his own great age, and the consequent intrigues and divisions in his durbar, have occasioned a weakness in his government which has pervaded all departments of the state. His troops are the most wretched of Hindustan, and he depends for his preservation upon that force of Raymond's, and upon the assistance which the Company has afforded him. If, then, he is deprived of that, and another is not substituted in its place, it may be said that he will fall an easy prey to some one of his ambitious neighbours.

Necessary as the preservation of the independence of the Nizam's power is to the Company, I cannot recommend that encouragement should be given to any British adventurer to

raise and discipline a force for his service. It must be recollected that Raymond went to Hyderabad originally under the British protection; and although it may be said that he was a Frenchman, it cannot be said that similar danger is not to be apprehended if an Englishman were employed in a similar situation. Those to whom that confidential situation might be given would not be men of the best character, and it is well known that none but men of the best character could be trusted with the species of power which must be given.

The question then arises, is the Nizam to be abandoned to himself? From what I have above stated it appears that I am fully aware of the danger and impolicy of such a measure, and therefore I decide that question in the negative, and proceed to state the nature and extent of the assistance which ought to be afforded to him.

Raymond's force consisted of 14,000 men: that was employed partly in the defence of the country, and partly to oppress the Nizam's durbar, and to oppose the English interest. A corps of 5000 sepoys, and a small body of the Company's artillery, would be fully adequate to the defence of the country, which is all that could be wanted. These ought to be in the Company's service: they ought to be relieved occasionally, and be removed entirely if the Government thought it necessary. They ought to be paid by, and be under the orders of the Nizam; and it should be stipulated, that in case they are suffered to fall in arrear, they are forthwith to be withdrawn.

The practices of the country governments are so unsafe where troops are concerned, that I fear that it would be necessary, in order that the troops may receive their pay regularly, and consequently be always in a sufficient state of discipline, that the revenues of certain territories should be assigned for their payment. The danger which I have before stated of taking territory as security is, that the Company's Government may consider it as part of the general dominion, and may think it necessary to involve themselves in a war in its defence, in the same manner as in the defence of the other territories more immediately belonging to them. But I cannot see the danger or the impropriety of taking the revenues of certain districts as security for the payment of troops, if it can be clearly understood that they are for this purpose only; and that the jurisdiction of the Company's Government, and consequently the necessity of protecting them, does not extend to them.

This force I presume to be sufficient to repel any attack which might be made by any one of the powers which border upon him ; and if it is not, or if he should be the object of any combination, it will become the interest of the Company to support him in the same manner as it is their interest at this moment. Thus, however, it will not be necessary that they should be involved in a war whenever he, or the Mahrattas, or Tippoo, think fit ; nor will they be deprived of his assistance when their dominions may be attacked by either of those powers. On the other hand, his government will be entirely under the control of that of the Company : the threat to withdraw troops, or the more forcible one, to make them act in his country, must keep him in awe at all times. For this purpose the revenues ought to be assigned to the commanding officer of those troops, who ought to be personally responsible for their regular payment, in the same manner, and at the same times, as if they were within the Company's provinces. This commanding officer ought to be removable at the pleasure of the Company and of the Nizam. It should be particularly understood that the Company have not over him, in his capacity of collector of these assigned revenues, any control, excepting that which is necessary to insure the payment of the troops and of the military services. For this purpose he ought to be obliged to send a monthly account to the Government, and a certificate that the amount has been paid. If it should be clearly made out that the produce is not equal to the expense, to get the assignment of more territory must become the subject of a future negotiation.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**84. Memorandum of Conversations which passed between Seyd-oo-Dowlah, Captain Ogg, and Colonel Wellesley, and between Meer Allum and Colonel Wellesley.**

*Meer Allum's views on the Treaty of General Defensive Alliance, and its tendencies.*

(Extract.)

Dummul, 26th Sept., 1800.

A conversation then followed upon politics. Meer Allum said that the great object of the Nizam and of the minister was to amass money ; that for this object they would sacrifice everything, and that for this they had lately made the treaty by which they were to cede all the Nizam's territories south of the Toombuddra and the Kistna. He said that, owing to their own bad

management and the weakness of their own government, the troops kept by the jaghiredars who held jaghires in those countries were useless to his Highness, and therefore he gained by the treaty all the money which he had before paid to the British government for our troops, and the service of as many more troops as the treaty should give him.

That he besides would gain our protection against the Mahrattas ; and Meer Allum said that, if we were not very cautious, the Nizam's government would involve us in a war with the Mahrattas before it was long.

Colonel W. said that he was indifferent upon that subject. He was ready then, and would engage to beat all the Mahrattas in Hindustan, and to feed his army even if it were to march to Delhi. Meer Allum asked, 'Can you feed the Nizam's army? Ask Lord Cornwallis who fed the Nizam's army in the former Mysore war? Ask yourself who has fed it in the last campaign? If you are to go to war with the Mahrattas, you must be prepared to feed not only your own troops, but the Nizam's, for there are no magazines in this country, no preparation of any kind, although a war with the Mahrattas is constantly expected and now wished for.'

Colonel Wellesley then asked Meer Allum what was the strength of the Nizam's army? Meer Allum said, after the territory would be ceded, and the jaghiredars would have discharged their troops, the Nizam would have no infantry, and only about five thousand horse ; that he would depend upon us for protection, not only against his foreign enemies, but against the host of discontented and idle people created by the late treaty, and by his having already disbanded nearly all his troops.

He said that he had always looked upon a treaty such as that about to be concluded as very impolitic for both parties ; that it deprived the Nizam of territory, reputation, and power, and gave the English nothing but the burden of defending their ally against the Mahrattas and against his own discontented subjects, and would, at some time or other, infallibly create a division between the two courts.

He said that he had often represented this to Captain Kirkpatrick, ever since his last return from Madras ; but that now that he was so completely under the influence of the minister it was to be expected that he would attend more to the objects of the Nizam's court than to those of his own government.

Here the conversation ended.



## 85. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Probabilities as to Meer Khan entering the Nizam's service.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

It is very probable that Meer Khan intends to enter the Nizam's service : but he found the durbar rather dilatory in giving an answer to his proposals ; and although he said that he had desired to be dismissed from Holkar's service, it is probable that he delayed to express that desire till he should be certain that he was to be received by the Nizam, with the number of followers that he should think proper to bring with him. Indeed, I think that, if he should quit Holkar's service, he will not take a formal leave : in the mean time, so long as he remains in it, it is natural that his troops should be enumerated amongst the forces of Holkar, and that the hircarrahs, who report what they hear, or the more numerous people who report what they invent, should detail the intended operations of that body as well as of the others.

## 86. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Expediency of the Nizam taking Meer Khan into his service.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

I have received several letters from Col. Stevenson upon the subject of the negotiation between the officers of the government of his Highness the Nizam, and Meer Khan, to take that chief into his Highness' service. It appears that his Highness consents to take into service only 3000 men, whereas the number of Meer Khan's followers amounts to 25,000, according to his statement.

From my experience of these Native armies, I doubt whether Meer Khan will produce, at muster, more than double the number of men that his Highness consents to receive ; but, when I am considering the means of defending his Highness' long line of frontier from the plunder of a light body of horse, I cannot refrain from recommending that, whatever may be Meer Khan's numbers, his Highness should take them into pay. If hostilities should be commenced, the expense will be more than repaid to him, and the people under his government ; and the very circumstance of the purchase of the service of a chief, commanding so large a body of horse, of such repute as Meer Khan, and much in

the confidence of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will certainly shake the general confidence of his army, and may have the effect of preventing the threatened hostilities.

87. To Lieut.-General Stuart.

*Sly attempt to pledge the English Government to the payment of half the cost of Meer Khan's subsidy.*

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

After the Nizam's officers had informed Col. Stevenson that Meer Khan, with his whole army, was to be taken into the service, and that the expense was to be paid equally by the Company and the Nizam, they came forward on the following day with a paper, which they said required only the Colonel's signature, in order that they might conclude with Meer Khan. The purport of this paper was, that the Colonel engaged that the British government would defray half of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan and his troops. Col. Stevenson refused to sign this paper, and there the matter rested. In the mean time, he received a letter from me, of the 25th, in which I enclosed the copy of a report of moonshee Uzzeez Oollah, stating that the Nizam's minister had declared that Col. Stevenson had engaged that the British government would defray half the expense; and I desired Col. Stevenson to set the Nizam's servants right upon this subject.

The Colonel then drew from them a paper, being a copy of their letter to the minister, from which it appears clearly, not only that Col. Stevenson never did enter into these engagements, as stated by the Nizam's minister, but that his Highness' servants never thought that he did, and never wrote that he had. It appears, therefore, that the whole has been a trick, in which the Nizam and his minister have been concerned, and his officers the instruments to endeavour to draw some Englishmen into an engagement to pay half the expense of hiring Meer Khan; and then to take advantage of our scrupulous adherence to our good faith, to make the government adhere to this engagement. However, it has entirely failed; and I think there is reason to hope that Col. Stevenson will not have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, which I yesterday reported to you that he had written. I think we are not getting on so quickly at this durbar as we hoped we should. None of the sirdars have yet been satisfied, although great promises have been made.

## 88. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Instructions for the frustration of the above attempt.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Poonah, 31st May, 1803.

What has passed is now all well ; particularly if you have not sent your letter to Meer Khan. It ought, however, to be a lesson to us to beware not to involve ourselves in engagements either with, or in concert with, or on behalf of, people who have no faith, or no principle of honour or of honesty, or such as usually among us guide the conduct of gentlemen, unless duly and formally authorised by our government.

If you should have dispatched the letter to Meer Khan, the letter which I desired you to write to him will set all matters right, as far as the British government may be concerned. It will rest with the Nizam's servants, either to abide by the agreement made in that letter, or not, as they may think proper. For the sake of the Nizam's territories, I hope they will abide by it ; but if there should be the most distant hint, or even idea, that the British government is bound by your letter to Meer Khan, I hope that you will have written him a second letter, as directed by me in my letter of the 29th.

## 89. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*The Nizam probably in connivance with Holkar.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 2nd July, 1803.

The truth is I believe, that the Nizam's government, nay, the Nizam himself, encouraged Holkar and Amrut Rao to invade the Peshwah's territories, and the object was either to make of Holkar a permanent balance against Scindiah, or to give the latter a temporary employment, and thus divert his views from the Nizam's country. Nizam Nawaz Jung and his brothers and relations were, I imagine, the medium of the communications between the Nizam's government, and Holkar and Amrut Rao.

There is no doubt of the bias of the Nizam's government in favour of that party in the Mahratta empire, and it appears clearly from the recommendation sent by the Azim ul Omrah to the Governor-General, soon after Holkar's success in the neighbourhood of Poonah. I know also from other quarters that the Nizam's government did give Holkar great encouragement. But

it frequently happens that when a particular scheme of politics has been adopted by a government, and fails from any cause, all the instruments who have been employed in carrying that scheme into effect are sacrificed. This is particularly the case in India, where the governments are all weak, and their instruments generally comparatively powerful; and these are commonly more interested in the success of the scheme, and persevere longer than suits the views of their principals. I imagine what I have above stated to be nearly the outline of the history of the disgrace of the family of Nizam Nawaz Jung; and I am farther convinced that I am right, because the Nizam's government, as far as I know, have never fully explained the ground of their complaint against that family, and most probably never could explain it without implicating the Nizam.

I think still that we shall have no war. But we have not altered our system. Indeed no system will answer with people who have seated themselves upon the Nizam's frontier, except that of determined opposition till they remove from their position.

#### 90. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*The same subject. Fate of inferior agents engaged in the intrigue.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 13th July, 1803.

In my opinion Fukker u Deen would never disclose the circumstances of the intrigue which I mentioned to you, because, in the first place, it ought never to have existed, and in the next, if it did exist, and came to his knowledge, it was peculiarly his duty as a British agent to give notice of it to his employer. He cannot now disclose it without acknowledging that there was an intercourse between his family and Holkar, which it is his object to deny, and without at the same time acknowledging a breach of trust in himself.

I have the very best authority for saying that Holkar and Amrut Rao were encouraged by the Nizam's government, and that this family were the medium of the communication. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that inquiry ought to precede punishment; but it must be recollected that the punishment in this instance does not come from us, but from the Nizam's government, and if we were to interfere so far in the interior government of His Highness as to inquire for what reason he thought proper to dismiss one of his servants, still more if we

were to desire that that inquiry should be entered into before English gentlemen, we should go a step farther than is allowed by our treaties with His Highness. This state of affairs as affecting this family is to be regretted, but cannot be remedied.

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I am for the principle of amnesty, as referable to all inferior agents; I have recommended it strongly to the Peshwah's durbar, and I am convinced that if it had been adopted at an early period, the critical circumstances of the present moment would not exist. It is the principle upon which we have settled Mysore and the Ceded Districts, and that upon which we have made our way to this place. Eternal enmity against every petty agent concerned against us or our allies will never answer, and in my opinion we ought rather to rejoice when we see one of them employed in the service of a friend: it is then at least possible that he may not be serving our enemy.

#### 91. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Misconduct of the killadar of Dharore. The Nizam's ministers to be urged to insist on the friendly co-operation of his commandants with the Company's troops.*

Camp, 16th Sept., 1803.

I have received a letter from Major Hill, by which I learn that the killadar of Dharore would not allow him to encamp in the neighbourhood of that fort, so as to derive any protection from it for his convoy. This conduct is of little consequence at present, as the enemy have been obliged to draw off to the northward; but it might have bad consequences hereafter, particularly if it should be imitated by the killadars of other forts.

I have written a letter to the killadar of Dharore, in which I have enclosed a copy of the Soubahdar's letter to me, by which his Highness has given me authority to issue orders to the civil and military officers in his service, and I have desired the killadar to allow the British troops to encamp near his fort, and to give every protection and assistance in his power to the convoys of which they shall have charge. But as no attention has been paid, indeed no answer has been returned to letters which I addressed above a fortnight ago to this and other killadars, in which I desired them to store grain for the use of the troops, I suspect that no attention will be paid to this letter; and I

therefore request you to apprise the durbar of the conduct of the killadar of Dharore towards Major Hill, and urge the Soubahdar's ministers to send positive orders to the killadars of all his Highness' forts, and the commanding officers and heads of all his walled towns and villages, to give all the protection and assistance in their power to the Company's troops and their convoys passing in their neighbourhood, and to communicate, to the officer commanding a detachment, any intelligence they may have of the enemy's motions. If we are not considered and treated as friends in the Soubahdar's territories, we shall find it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring up any important convoy, and his Highness' interests must suffer materially.

92. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Unfriendly conduct of the Nizam's servants towards their English allies.*

Camp at Assye, 27th Sept., 1803.

I am concerned to be under the necessity of making a formal complaint of any of the officers in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, but justice to the troops under my command, and to the service, the conduct of which is intrusted to me, obliges me to do so.

Some time ago, having observed that the city of Aurungabad was by no means in a state fit for defence, and as it was probable that the course of the operations of the war would draw the troops to a distance from it, I desired Col. Stevenson to remove the hospital to Dowlutabad, and to place the sick in the lower fort. Application was accordingly made to the killadar, in my name, by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to admit the hospital into the place proposed for them, and he positively refused to receive them.

Rajah Mohiput Ram has made a report upon the subject to the durbar, and possibly orders may be sent in consequence of this report. But I think it proper to mention the subject to you now, as the consequence of this refusal to admit the sick and wounded troops into Dowlutabad at present is, that I must either send them to Ahmednuggur, and thereby delay my operations for a month, or I must leave these brave men exposed in an open place to the violence and ferocity of a barbarous enemy. I have also with me above 70 pieces of brass ordnance, having

destroyed the iron ordnance captured. These must likewise be sent to Ahmednuggur, or I must leave them exposed to be retaken in Aurungabad.

While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you that I am by no means satisfied with Rajah Sookroodoor. He throws all kinds of difficulties in the way of my people sent into the districts under his management to purchase supplies of dry grain ; he has not yet taken any steps whatever to collect the magazines which I requested him to prepare in different situations in the end of last month ; and when I spoke to him upon the subject, he sent me a paper which contains an account of the value of grain which he says the Soubahdar's government have laid in at different forts, no part of which, however, can be got for the service of the troops.

I have also to mention to you, that there is a man in charge of this part of the country, on the part of Rajah Ragotim Rao, by name, I believe, Anund Rao, whose conduct, if it were guided by Scindiah's ministers, could not be more inimical to us than it has been. It is reported that this man has fled with the enemy's army ; and I sincerely hope that he will not return.

We may win battles, and may drive the enemy before us ; but all that I can do will not save the Soubah's country from destruction, if his servants are not true to his cause, if they do not exert themselves in his service, if the British troops are not treated with confidence as friends, and if they do not enjoy the resources which the country can afford.

### 93. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*The Nizam bound to do his utmost to help us in a war essential to his security.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Adjunttee, 25th Oct., 1803.

3. The war in which the British government is engaged is in support of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Mahratta Chiefs to remove from his Highness' territories the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein ; but however desirable in other respects to the British government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential

object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment.

4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness' interests, in which the greatest exertions have been made by the British government, and the most complete success has attended them, his Highness has not calculated how far the terms of the treaty with the British government are to bind him. I do not recollect the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, protection on the part of the British government, which his Highness has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance into his Highness' forts of our small detachments and convoys is an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the terms of the treaty to give.

#### 94. To Major Kirkpatrick.

##### *Defensive imbecility of the Nizam's government.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Waukode, on the Payen Gunga,  
19th Nov., 1803.

6. No sooner, however, have I begun my march, than the amildars, killadars, &c. &c., in all parts of the country have called out for assistance, not against the common enemy, but against the freebooters who have long been in the frontier, and who have been kept out of the Ahmednuggur districts by the collector's peons, with very little assistance from the battalion in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. The amildar at Bheer, in particular, has desired to have one of the Company's battalions of sepoys placed in garrison at Bheer, in order to defend that place against this rabble.

7. It is distressing to witness the state of the Soubah's territories for want of the common means of defence. In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General, I observe that you have urged the Soubah's ministers to take measures to drive the enemy's amildars and troops from those districts; the revenues of which have heretofore been collected partly by the Soubah's government, and partly by that of one of the confederates.

8. Instead of taking any measures to effect this object, which



is one of great importance, they have not even taken possession of their districts bordering upon the Godavery, from which we drove the enemy's amildars 2 months ago, and I cannot prevail upon them to entertain peons to keep possession of the valuable towns and districts of this quarter, from which my detachment daily drive the enemy.

9. In order, therefore, to secure these places from falling again into the hands of the enemy, by which he could have an opportunity of annoying my communication, I have been obliged to call in the freebooter Ghazy Khan, and to give him possession of the places which I take from the enemy.

**95. Remarks upon Major Malcolm's Memorandum on a proposed Treaty of Peace.**

*Necessity of strengthening the Nizam's government, and of British arbitration on the Peshwah's claim to choute from him.*

(Extract.)

23rd Nov., 1803.

The next plan is to increase the subsidiary force, and to keep a body of horse. My object in proposing a plan for obliging the government to have some force, was, that I felt severely, in carrying on the war, the want of it; and I wished not to increase the dependence of the government upon the British power, but to create some force in the state which could carry it through ordinary events. Without such a force in the state, all will look well at Hyderabad and in a dispatch from the Resident to the Governor-General, but really, and at bottom, all will continue to be weakness and confusion; and in the end the Nizam's government will fall to pieces.

If such a force is not established in the state, in my opinion, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled; and there ought to be a body of horse besides: and, moreover, the British government will be involved in constant warfare and constant expense to support the Nizam's government in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Let Major Malcolm come into the country, and he will soon perceive the truth of this statement.

In respect to the Peshwah's claim of choute, it is one, as I understand, founded on treaties; and the British government is bound, by treaty to both parties, to arbitrate and decide it according to the principles of justice, on the ground of the treaty of Mhar.

There never was such an opportunity for a government to show its justice and its power; and surely that opportunity ought not to be lost. But the fact is, that choute is collected in all parts of the Nizam's territories at this moment; and when Major Malcolm shall come here, he will know it. The strongest advocate for the Nizam ought, therefore, to wish that that question should be decided.

Major Malcolm says that the Nizam has claims upon the Peshwah for expenses incurred in restoring his government. That is a point for the justice of the British government to decide, and is no argument at all against canvassing the question. He then says that the Peshwah might be induced, by some concession or consideration, to give up his claim of choute upon the Nizam. In my opinion it would not be right to urge him to do so; as, if that is done, there will be no other mode of satisfying the claims of the Nizam under the peace. But, supposing the Peshwah could be induced, by any concession, to give up his claims of choute upon the Nizam, the Governor-General has to choose between the Attavesy and Bundelcund. I shall deliver no opinion upon this subject, excepting that I consider the Attavesy as no object for the defence of Surat; and that I consider Bundelcund as a great object for the defence of Benares.

#### 96. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*The Nizam's army ought to be placed on a respectable footing.*

(Extract.)

Camp 21st Dec., 1803.

In the present state of the war, it is, in my opinion, a matter of immaterial importance whether the Soubah's army is increased or not; but I consider it as one of very great importance, with a view to the future settlement and management of his territories. These objects cannot be attained without a large body of effective troops in the service of the state, or the assistance of the subsidiary force. If the latter are required for the support of the internal government upon all the occasions that must be expected to occur, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that its number must be doubled at least; the forts must be delivered over to the British government, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered. This would certainly end in the annihilation of the Soubah of the Deccan. If the government are willing really to have in their service a body of effective troops, for the purpose

of the support of the internal government in time of peace, and to act with the British troops in time of war, their own system in regard to their troops must be in some degree altered ; the state must have troops paid by the public resources, through the medium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jag-hiredars. This last system appears to me to be most consistent with the Governor-General's views and liberal policy ; and I think it probable that he will be desirous of seeing the Soubah's army placed on a respectable footing. If you should be of this opinion, I anxiously recommend to you to turn your attention to this subject : and as, from the disposition already manifested by his Highness, it is not probable that he will spontaneously adopt the measures which are necessary in order to give him an army, I suggest for your consideration the propriety of continuing to press upon his ministers the breach of the treaty by his Highness, in not producing the requisite force, as a ground-work of an amendment of the treaty of defensive alliance in this point, before the territories ceded by the enemy at the peace are given over to him.

#### 97. To Lieut.-Col. Close.

*Inconvenience and danger to the Company's government of the disordered state of the Nizam's and Peshwah's dominions.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, bottom of the Badlowly ghaut,  
10th Jan., 1804.

I must get farther to the southward, and see the real state of the country of the Soubah of the Deccan, which I am informed is chaos itself. We must introduce a reform into that government ; we must give it some public force, and establish that force on permanent principles, otherwise the government must fall to pieces. Six British battalions are not equal to keep in subjugation and tranquillity a country 600 miles long by 400 broad. Its disturbances will at some time or other prove fatal to our military operations : they would have distressed us much, if the late war had continued ; and even now that we have made peace, I much doubt whether I shall not be obliged, in consequence of their existence, to draw the troops to the southward to insure their subsistence.

\* \* \* \* \*

What is to be done about settling the Peshwah's countries?

My opinion is, that until his Highness raises sebandy to take and keep possession of his tannahs, and puts his government into some kind of regular train, the British government ought not to take the trouble of interfering in the business. Any interference, unless he should take these previous steps, will be entirely useless. Either our troops must be scattered up and down the country to garrison mud villages, and the officers to carry on the amildary ; or the mud villages must remain without tannahs, and the amildary in the hands of the thieves who now hold it, unless the Peshwah should put his government into some form. The first will be insecure, and, indeed, impracticable ; and the last will incur disgrace, which we must by all means avoid. I should, therefore, think it best to withhold all assistance, and to remain neutral, till we shall see what steps the Peshwah will take, or whether it is possible to throw his government into any form ; therefore, in order that the troops might not suffer want from the existence of this confusion, and that they might not be involved in it, I shall recommend Ahmednuggur as their station, at least for some time.

#### 98. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Military reforms desirable in the Nizam's state. Their introduction ought not to compromise our character, and so weaken us with the natives.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Waroor, 16th Jan., 1804.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the best plan would be, that the Soubah of the Deccan should have a moderate establishment of infantry, possibly but little stronger than that which he is required by the treaty of defensive alliance to supply. But this establishment ought to be kept complete, and in the immediate pay of the government ; and not made up, as at present, of 60 or 70 men, or possibly as far as a battalion, in the service of each chief who commands a body of horse. It is obvious that as long as that system shall continue, the government cannot command the services of these people ; they are never paid, as the jaghiredars have not the means of defraying their expenses upon distant expeditions, and are totally unfit for the purposes of external war.

In respect to regular cavalry, it is my opinion that it ought not to be attempted. The formation and discipline of a body of

cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it. After all, it is doubtful whether they will succeed, and whether the body of cavalry thus formed will be worth the expense of maintaining it ; for at the same time that nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless, than a body of regular cavalry half and insufficiently disciplined ; I should therefore recommend that this may not be attempted.

In respect to cavalry, I should recommend that the Soubah might have in his own immediate service, and paid by the treasury, either silladar or Pagah horse, to the full amount of the number which he is obliged by treaty to furnish, in a joint operation with the British government. I should prefer silladar horse : 1st, because the employment of these will give subsistence to a greater number of people ; 2ndly, because they are more useful, and better troops ; and, 3rdly, because they are less dangerous, and, being more divided, less liable to create disturbances by mutinies and sedition.

The question respecting the jaghiredars comes next to be considered. There is certainly no mode by which the revenues of the state can be increased, excepting by depriving the jaghiredars of their jaghires. The necessity of increasing the revenues of the state may be doubted, considering the addition to his Highness' territories and revenues, consequent on the late war ; and considering the vast increase which may be given to these revenues by inspecting closely the conduct and the accounts of Ragotim Rao, and the management of all the persons on the frontier employed by that person.

From what I have seen, I have no scruple in declaring that I am convinced that, with proper management, the Soubah of the Deccan will gain, by the peace, the whole amount of revenues of Berar on this side of the Wurda ; for, as far as I have been able to gain any knowledge of the facts, his share of those revenues has heretofore gone to the Rajah of Berar, has been dissipated in the country by the amildars, the creatures of Ragotim Rao, or has gone into Ragotim Rao's pocket. It may be a question, therefore, as it will not be necessary, whether it will be proper to encourage the resumption of the jaghires.

The British government has been left, by the late war, in a most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators,

by treaty, of the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before known in India: all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the institutions, and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness and security which they enjoy. But the resumption of these jaghires will bring ruin and distress on many noble families and ancient servants of the Nizam's government. Some of these may possibly have assisted in the different wars in which the British government have been engaged, and in the establishment of the present happy state of affairs; and all the odium which the measures must produce will not fail to fall upon the British government. I think, therefore, that it is advisable to avoid it, if it should be possible, and, at all events, that the British government should not appear in the execution of the measure.

#### 99. To the Governor-General.

*Shuffling conduct of the Nizam's servants in arranging the details of the peace.*

Camp at Yailum, 26th Jan., 1804.

I have the honour to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, and the copy of one which I have written to that gentleman, which explains my sentiments upon the subjects to which Mr. Elphinstone's dispatches relate.

It is impossible for persons to have behaved in a more shuffling manner than the Soubah's servants have in every transaction relative to the peace. Their conduct has been entirely inconsistent with every principle of policy or good faith; they have withheld from me information upon every point, particularly upon the subject of the revenues of Berar. only with the miserable view of delaying the cession of the districts near the hills, in order that they may have an opportunity of plundering them for some time longer; and at last, after delaying the decision on this question for nearly 6 weeks, for want of the accounts, I am obliged to decide it on this day, fixed by myself, on the accounts of the revenues produced by the Rajah of Berar. After all, I suspect that I shall be obliged to make use of the British troops to put the Rajah in possession of those districts.

## 100. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*The Nizam's agent to be punished for disobeying General Wellesley's orders for the execution of the articles of the peace.*

Bombay, 25th April, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., and I insert in the margin the dates of all the letters received from you of a date posterior to the 1st Feb.

Gungaram Pundit may have given over the districts ceded by the 5th article of the treaty of peace, since the 1st April; but the arrangement respecting those districts was concluded in the beginning of February, and he was then ordered to deliver them up. He omitted to do so, till he found that his disobedience of orders was not likely to be supported at Hyderabad, and retained the districts for six weeks at least. I cannot, therefore, acquit him of disobedience of my repeated orders. As far as I am personally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me whether he is punished or not; but if it is to be a principle of British policy to introduce among the Native powers, the allies and dependents of the British government, the principles of good faith and political moderation; and if it is intended effectually to check the depredations of the Mahratta powers not connected with the British government, and of all freebooters, it is necessary to begin by preventing the nominal servants of our allies from infringing the treaties of peace, and from committing hostilities, and carrying on petty warfare under the shadow of the British power, in direct disobedience of orders. This object can only be effected by punishment, where it is deserved.

In respect to villages and districts in Berar, seized by the Rajah's servants, I know of none, excepting those for which Rajah Mohiput Ram gave sunnuds. If the result of an inquiry into the subject should be, that they have possession of such villages for which they had not sunnuds, it will be easy, by a correspondence with Mr. Elphinstone, to procure their release of them. I beg to observe, however, that the Peshwah has some villages in Berar which are held by the Rajah's servants, for which, of course, they have no sunnuds from any authority acting on the part of the Soubah of the Deccan.

## V. MAHRATTAS.

## I. ANTECEDENTS OF THE TREATY OF BASSEIN.

## 101. Observations respecting Scindiah's position at Poonah.

*Legal impediments to counteracting Scindiah's influence at  
Poonah in favour of Tippoo.*

[1798.]

It appears by the letters from Major Palmer that Scindiah is inclined to prevent any arrangement which, in consequence of our interference, may be made to restore to the Peshwah his power, and therefore a question arises whether this Government is legally entitled to make war upon Scindiah, in order to force him to suffer the Peshwah to reassume such power in the Mahratta State as will enable him to render us assistance in case of a war with Tippoo Sultaun.

The Act of Parliament says that war is not to be declared nor hostilities to be commenced against any native Prince or State, excepting where preparations are made against the British nation, or against one of their dependents, or against one whose territories the Company have guaranteed or are engaged to defend; nor is any treaty of guarantee to be made, nor any treaty for commencing hostilities, excepting in the cases above mentioned.

The Company is bound by treaty to defend the dominions of the Nizam and of the Peshwah against Tippoo, as these are to defend it against him; but there is no treaty which binds the Company to defend the Peshwah against Scindiah; and therefore to make war against him upon the grounds of his attack upon the Mahratta States, is against the words and spirit of the Act of Parliament.

The next question is, whether, if Scindiah have made a secret engagement with Tippoo Sultaun, and in consequence thereof by his position prevents the Mahrattas from rendering the Company the assistance for which they are bound in case of his meditated attack, he is not to be considered as an enemy, and is not to be attacked. If he be secretly in alliance with Tippoo, and makes his attack upon the Peshwah in consequence thereof, we are bound to assist the Peshwah against him, as much as we should be if Tippoo himself made the attack; but it must be clear that



the alliance exists, and must not be a mere surmise. In consequence of the meditated attack of Tippoo, it is in the power of the Government to make a new alliance with the Peshwah. In that treaty a stipulation cannot be made that Scindiah shall be attacked by the English if he does not quit Poonah.

The Act of Parliament allows the Government to make treaties for guaranteeing the possessions of a country, prince or state, in case of preparations of hostilities against the Company. But the Act says that a treaty shall not be made to guarantee possessions, or to make war against any other prince or state than that which has commenced hostilities, or made the preparations. Therefore, even in case of hostilities commenced by, or in contemplation of, Scindiah against the Mahrattas, the Government cannot in a new treaty make an engagement to attack him. It is true that this almost entirely annihilates the power of making treaties; but I imagine that to have been the purpose and intention of the Act of Parliament.

The insertion of an article that the Company shall attack Scindiah in a treaty of defensive alliance against Tippoo, will make the treaty a double one; and it cannot therefore be argued that, the Act not pointing out what stipulations shall be made in a treaty, the Governor may subscribe such articles as he may find necessary.

Upon the whole then, I consider that in any case the Government cannot attack Scindiah excepting he be secretly allied with Tippoo to attack the Peshwah, and that in a new treaty an article against Scindiah cannot be inserted excepting upon the grounds that by the old treaty the Government was bound to defend the Peshwah against him in consequence of his (Scindiah's) alliance with Tippoo Suldaun.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

102. To J. Uhthoff, Esq.

*The Peshwah's power desirable as a counterbalance to the possible hostility of the Nizam.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Gram, 19th Nov., 1799.

Matters cannot last long as they are at Poonah: the Peshwah's Government must either fall to pieces or he must accept our support. If he should still be obstinate, out of his ruins some power may be formed whose authority it may not be difficult for

us to secure, and afterwards to enlarge to such a degree as we may think proper; but until time and the common course of events bring about his ruin, I don't conceive that it is either consistent with the British character in India, or safe, to give assistance to any inferior member of the Mahratta empire.

There may be some who imagine that the best thing that could happen to us would be to see the Mahratta government crumble to pieces, and upon its ruins the establishment of a number of petty states. With those who think thus I differ entirely. Not only we should not be able to insure the tranquillity of our own frontiers, and could not expect to keep out our enemy, but we should weaken the only balance remaining against the power of the Nizam. This, it is true, is contemptible at present, but in the hands of able men might be turned to our disadvantage; and as I conceive that we ought never again to be involved in a country war, we ought to have such a balance as would always keep the Nizam's state in order. With this view the Mahratta power, as it stood prior to Lord Cornwallis's war, ought to be preserved if possible, and we ought with equal care to avoid its entire destruction and the junction in one body of all the members of the Mahratta empire.

I have written more upon this subject than I originally intended; but what I have said will show you that I have not been inattentive to it, and will prove that the best method of treating these offers from the Mahratta chiefs is not to negotiate, but to refer all to Poonah, and at the same time to maintain an intercourse upon which a treaty may be grounded, whenever circumstances may induce Government to think that it would be consistent with the British interests.

### 103. To Lieut.-Col. Palmer.

*Dhoondiah Waugh's progress favoured by private war in the South Mahratta country. Necessity of a strong government there; and plan for establishing one.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

It appears to me very clear that Dhoondiah's power and former success are to be attributed originally to the weakness of the government at Poonah, but immediately to the contests between the different jaghiredars and chiefs upon the frontier, and their consequent weakness. It is almost certain that Dhoon-

diah's force will be dispersed, and it is possible that his person may be in my power; but in the one case there is no security that his force will not assemble again the instant I retire to the Mysore country, under the same leader, or in the other case under another, perhaps equally daring and with more ability. Under these circumstances, in order to insure the tranquillity of our own territories, it will be necessary that we should take some steps to remedy the deficiency in the government of our neighbours, which has endangered it, and has been the cause of the expense which has been incurred in the assembling of the troops under my command.

It will perhaps be scarcely practicable to remedy the first great cause, viz. the weakness of the government at Poonah, but it may be practicable in some degree to remedy the second.

The history of Dhoondiah's progress is as follows. Appah Saheb, who, as the representative of Pursheram Bhow, I understand to be the jaghiredar of Savanore, was involved in a war with the Rajah of Kolapoor. Dhoondiah entered into the service of the latter, but soon became too strong for him, quarrelled with him, set up for himself, collected about him the disaffected and discontented of all parts of India, and took advantage of the absence of Appah Saheb and of Goklah (who I understand to have been a jaghiredar under Pursheram Bhow and his son) at the siege of Kolapoor, to seize the strong places in this country, and to establish himself in it in such manner that no force which they could bring could ever drive him from it. The quarrel, then, of the Rajah of Kolapoor and Appah Saheb, and their weakness, have brought forward Dhoondiah, and we must get the better of him and of such as he is, by reconciling these two chiefs, and by establishing one strong government on this frontier. To do the former may not perhaps be a matter of much difficulty, as, from all the inquiries which I have made, I find that the quarrel, originating in the confusion at Poonah, in which Pursheram Bhow unfortunately took part, has been continued for various bad reasons, and particularly because Pursheram Bhow was killed in a battle which was fought in consequence of it. The Rajah of Kolapoor has sent a vakeel to my camp, and when he arrives I shall endeavour to make peace between the Rajah and Appah Saheb, of course without pledging our government to any thing. In this probably you may be able to give some assistance at Poonah. I certainly disapprove much of the government of Appah Saheb, and if it were possible to give over

the country to another without a further convulsion and consequent weakness, I should be glad to do so : but as that is impracticable, I should propose that Appah Saheb should become the sole jaghiredar or jemidar of the Savanore and Darwar countries, that all the strong places should be given over to him, and that all the other jaghiredars and officers of the Mahratta government should be under him.

#### 104. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer.

*Scindiah's formidable strength, ambition, and covert hostility to us. We ought to raise a barrier against him, by inducing the Peshwah to restore their possessions to the Bhow's family. A Mahratta war looming in the distance.*

(Extract.)

Camp on the Malpoorba, opposite Hoobly,  
16th Aug., 1800.

If I should have it in my power to withdraw from these countries, and should be obliged to leave matters in the unsettled state in which they are at present, it is more than probable that Scindiah will possess himself of the provinces of Kittoor, Darwar, and Savanore, and that he will become our neighbour on this frontier. I conceive that this object, or at least that of preventing us from making such an arrangement of the countries which may pass through our hands in consequence of our success in the present warfare as may be consistent with our interests, is the secret motive of the increase of his forces which I am informed has been made, and of their advance towards this country. The objects of our arrangements are avowedly, and our practice has been, to restore the country which we have conquered to the rightful possessor, and to establish for him a government of such strength as that he will be able to prevent his subjects from disturbing the tranquillity of ours or of the subjects of our allies. In order to prevent our carrying into effect these objects, Scindiah brings an army with which, if he do not take the countries to himself, he will give them to one of his dependents. In my opinion the extent of the influence and territory of this one man becomes a matter of anxiety to every friend to the British interests in India. He now embraces the whole extent of our frontier and of that of the Nizam, and in his person we experience that which we learn that all our policy ought to be directed

to prevent, viz. one man holding and exercising nearly all, if not all, the power of the Mahratta empire.

It is surely desirable that we should exert ourselves to prevent this; and there appears to me no method so certain of preventing it as that of urging the Peshwah to establish the Bhow's family in their ancient possessions, and to force the Kolapoor Rajah to make peace with them. They are fully aware of the benefits which they have already derived from our assistance, and we should find in them at all times zealous and probably the most useful allies that we have in India. At the same time, by establishing them upon our frontier, we secure its tranquillity, which is all that we can desire.

If Scindiah is to be allowed to ruin the Bhow's family, to seize their possessions north of the Kistna for his own use, and those south of that river probably for the same purpose, or, at all events, to deprive the family of them, and to bestow them on one of his dependents, it will become incumbent on us to look for the security of our own frontier, and of that of the Rajah of Mysore, under such an arrangement.

If we suffer it to be made, we may depend upon it that our tranquillity will be disturbed, and that, sooner or later, we shall be forced into a war with the Mahrattas, which will probably be commenced under many circumstances of disadvantage.

#### 105. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer.

*Scindiah, instead of co-operating against Dhoondiah, practically assists him.*

(Extract.)

Camp ten miles north of Badamy, 28th Aug., 1800.

In order to throw more light upon Scindiah's assurances made to you upon this subject, I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Uhthoff, in which are stated the suppositions of the Rajah of Kolapoor respecting the line which Scindiah will adopt towards Dhoondiah. From this letter it is clear that whatever Scindiah may propose to do, he has not yet adopted any plan of co-operation with me in concert with the Kolapoor Rajah; nor can he yet have opened the subject to the Rajah. But from a Mahratta letter, which I have the honour to enclose, you will perceive that not only he does not co-operate with me, but by taking advantage of the

absence of those who do co-operate with me in order to attack and deprive them of their strong places, he, in fact, assists the enemy.

The writer of this letter is a Polygar, who, at my request, placed himself upon the left bank of the Gutpurba, and prevented Dhoondiah from crossing that river. While he was employed upon this service Scindiah's army attacked and deprived him of Raibaug. I hope that through your interference this will be prevented in future, and that Scindiah will return the places which his troops will have taken from those who have been employed in giving me assistance.

In consequence of your letter I shall not interfere further between the Kolapoor Rajah and the sons of Pursheram Bhow than to recommend peace.

#### 106. To Colonel Kirkpatrick.

*The Mahratta country, reconquered from Dhoondiah, restored to those from whom he took it. Advantage of this plan. Peculiarity of the local tenures. Services and claims on us of Pursheram Bhow's family. Military importance of Darwar.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Chinnoor, 15th Sept., 1800.

The Mahratta territory is divided in an extraordinary, and, I believe, an unusual manner; and probably the information which I have obtained regarding its division may be of some use in completing the arrangements now under consideration. I will confine what I have to say to the territory in which I have been, which lies south of the river Gutpurba.

Large districts belong to Polygars, some of whom pay a tribute to the Peshwah, others to his jaghiredars. The greatest part of the Savanore and Darwar countries has been made over to the family of Pursheram Bhow, not as a jaghire, but as payment of a debt for expenses incurred by Pursheram Bhow in Lord Cornwallis's war. Those parts not thus ceded to the family of Pursheram Bhow are under tuncaws for the support of certain garrisons, and for the payment of the Mahratta army under the command of Goklah. The countries north of the Malpoorba, not in the hands of the Polygars as I have above described them to be, are the jaghires of different chiefs of the Mahratta empire, such as Rastia, Gunput Rao (who, Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer

informs me, the Peshwah intends should command his troops in this quarter), and others, all of whom either have, or ought to have, a proportionate number of troops in the Peshwah's service. I don't understand that the Peshwah has ever confiscated the possessions of Pursheram Bhow, which are situated, as I have above described those to be, in the provinces of Savanore and Darwar, viz. possessions given to them as the payment of a debt. Those which have been confiscated (in consequence, as Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer informs me, of the violence of Scindiah) are the jaghires of Meritch and Tasgaum, which are situated north of the Kistna. The arrangement, then, which I have made of the countries which have fallen into my hands, viz. to give them over to those who had possession of them before they were taken by Dhoondiah, is not likely to create doubt in the minds of the real friends of Bajee Rao regarding our object in interfering in his concerns. I have already derived considerable advantage from this arrangement: I have always had a quiet rear. I am afraid that if I were to adopt any other plan, not only I should lose that advantage when I should advance again, but there would be suspicions of my views.

From what I have above stated, however, regarding the different tenures in this country, it will appear to you that this arrangement must be as favourable to those who really wish well to the Peshwah as any other which could be made; that it is such a one as he would make himself if he had the power, and if he did justice to all parties; and, as far as it regards the cause for which we are likely to contend, it has this additional advantage, that it enables me to bring my whole force at once upon the common enemy, instead of being obliged to fritter it away in detachments to preserve tranquillity in my rear, and to keep up my communication with Mysore. From the statement which I have above made, you will perceive, first, that I have no reason to expect any supplies of money or provisions (excepting such as I shall pay for) from the countries which are south of the Kistna; secondly, that the transfer of these countries to the Company will be attended with some difficulty.

In regard to the first point, every farthing which is derived from these countries is applied to a particular purpose. It is procured from the ryots with difficulty, particularly since Dhoondiah's rebellion; and the moment it is received it is paid to the troops kept by the jaghiredars.

As usual, these troops are six or eight, and twelve months in

arrear; and instead of being able to give me any assistance in money, there is not one of the chiefs who have acted with my troops who has not called upon me for pecuniary assistance. If, then, I should require the revenues of the country, I must first use force to obtain them, which would take away so much from my disposable force in the field; and in the next place, I should lose the cordial co-operation and assistance of those whose troops depend upon those revenues for their subsistence. In regard to provisions, it is much more convenient to me to pay for them than to take them upon receipt; and paying for them has this advantage, that I am sure of getting them when I want them.

In regard to the second point, it must be observed that it will be necessary that the Peshwah should make some other provision for the payment of his debt. Powerful states may do anything, and they are not probably bound by the rules which regulate these transactions among individuals: but feeling as I do that we have derived most essential advantages in the last contest from the assistance of the family of Pursheram Bhow; that if they had been as lukewarm, or, I may say, as hostile in the cause as those more immediately connected with the Peshwah, the result would probably not have been so successful as it has turned out; I cannot but think that we shall be bound to interfere to procure for them some compensation. In all the conversations I have had with them regarding the delivery of the country and its strongholds to those who held them previous to Dhoondiah's rebellion, I have uniformly told them that if I found I was mistaken regarding the persons into whose hands the places ought to be delivered, I should have as little scruple in taking them from them as I had in taking them from the enemy, and of course I shall avoid everything like an engagement in future.

All Dhoondiah's papers fell into my hands, and they will throw some light upon his connection with Scindiah and the Rajah of Kolapoor. I shall send them to Madras as soon as they are arranged.

P.S.—Upon reading over my letter I have to add, that the Peshwah receives nothing from these countries: the peshcush due from the Polygars have tuncaws upon them, and every farthing is appropriated. I know of no way of taking possession of the country in the name of the Peshwah but that which I have adopted.



It would be convenient to me to have Darwar, the killadar of which place is a lukewarm friend, if not an enemy. I propose to write to Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer to procure an order to have it delivered over to me, and I shall inquire from him the Peshwah's opinion of the killadar. He will certainly not deliver over to me the fort; and, if I find that the Peshwah does not deem him a friend, I shall take it.

#### 107. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer.

*What circumstances would authorise military intervention at Poonah?*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hoobly, 3rd Oct., 1800.

When you wrote to me on the 7th Sept., that Scindiah had occupied Poonah, with his troops, under pretence of disarming a party of Arabs, but really to watch the Peshwah, and to prevent him from making his escape, which his Highness meditated; and when I heard from other quarters that guards had been placed over the houses and persons of all his Highness's friends and adherents; and all that could be said in regard to the Peshwah was, that he was not immediately under a guard, I concluded that the crisis was nearly arrived, and I expected every moment to receive further intelligence, which would enable me to act. But I now find that on the 15th the crisis was farther removed than it was on the 7th; and it is desirable that I should receive from you a statement of your sentiments regarding this part of my instructions.

At what time am I to understand that the Peshwah is in imprisonment? The difficulty which occurs in the decision of that question arises from the wiliness of Scindiah, and from the weakness and duplicity of his Highness's own character. When I received information that Scindiah had possession of the city, by introducing his troops there, and posting guards over the Peshwah's adherents, and had most probably taken possession of all the avenues to his Highness's palace, I should have had no scruple of acting immediately as I was instructed, only that there was reason to fear that his Highness would disavow every thing that I should do in his behalf.

I conceive that this duplicity in his Highness's character is the cause of the strictness with which my instructions are worded. In truth, if his Highness is at liberty at all, he can call for our

assistance if he wants it; and it may not be deemed assistance if it is given to him before it is called for. What, then, is the degree of *duresse* which is to constitute imprisonment? My opinion is, that, when the secret provisional commission commences to exercise its functions, when Amrut Rao and the Peshwah's friends think that it is necessary for them to take a decided part for the restitution of his authority, I ought to begin to act, whatever may be the degree of restraint in which his Highness's person is held. I do not conceive that it will be safe or proper to do so in any other case, excepting when I hear that there is actually a guard over the person of the Peshwah. I should be glad to receive your opinion upon this point.

#### 108. To Lord Clive.

*A strong force needed, if we are to help the Peshwah against Scindiah. The South Mahratta chiefs must assist us; and will not, unless we prove our determination by our military strength.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hoobly, 9th Oct., 1800.

I have had the honour of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 2nd inst., and I am prepared to proceed to whatever point your Lordship may order me, or to make such detachments as you may think proper. The acquaintance which I have obtained in the late war with the characters and views of the Mahratta chiefs in this part of the Empire, renders it my duty to state to your Lordship the effects which are to be apprehended from weakening, to any degree, this body of the troops, by whose exertions we hope to accomplish all that is wished at Poonah.

The object appears to be, to establish the legal power of the Peshwah over the Mahratta Empire. In order to effect this, Scindiah must be removed to his own territories. It is not to be supposed that he will relinquish all that he has been endeavouring to obtain for the last 4 or 5 years, without a contest; and all the chiefs of the Mahratta Empire look to the event of this expected contest with the utmost anxiety. They will join the one party or the other, according to their own ideas of their relative strength, and of the chances of ultimate success; and in case of our interference, which is not expected, the question with them will be, whether our force employed is sufficient to get the better of that which will be brought against us by Scindiah.

It therefore appears necessary that, at least at first, the interference of the Company should be by the means of a powerful body of troops, such as will convince the whole Mahratta Empire of our firm determination to attain our object, and to establish the Peshwah in the enjoyment of the whole of his legal authority. The force which I have at present under my command in the field consists of 690 European dragoons, 975 Native cavalry, 142 British artillery, 1160 British infantry, 3538 Native infantry, including sick, present and absent, of which there are but few. This force, with the assistance which may be expected from the subsidiary troops at Hyderabad, will be fully sufficient; but any diminution of it, or any detachment made to other parts of the Company's territories, will occasion doubts of our intentions to adhere steadily to our object till it is accomplished.

The assistance of the chiefs of this part of the Mahratta Empire is necessary to us for several reasons.

1st: They give protection to our convoys of provisions which must come from Mysore: if we could suppose that they would remain neuter in this contest, we should still experience great difficulty and inconvenience from the necessity of detaching our own troops from this small force, for the protection of our convoys. But they will not remain neuter. If they do not join the enemy, they will, under various pretences, render the communication with Mysore so difficult, as to be almost impracticable.

2ndly: By having them with me, the country in my rear will certainly be in tranquillity, and I shall draw from it all the resources which it can afford. The whole of the Mahratta empire is divided in jaghire among the Mahratta chiefs or polygars, as I heretofore represented to your Lordship; and each of these chiefs can command the resources of his own jaghire. The jag-hiredar or polygar, who will doubt of our success, and will wish well to the cause of the enemy, will of course impede our progress by the various means in his power. This I experienced in the late contest in several instances; and it is probable I should experience it in many more in a contest, the object of which will be, in whose hands the power of the empire should be placed hereafter.

3rdly: By having the Mahratta chiefs with me, I keep so many out of the opposite scale.

I may therefore conclude that, if this object is to be attained with celerity, we must have on our side the largest proportion of the Mahratta chiefs in this part of the Empire. They will not

come forward unless they are clearly convinced, by the efforts which we shall make, that it is our firm determination to attain our object. Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me to consider of the means of collecting a body of troops from Mysore for the Ceded countries, which will be at least equal in size to that which I should conceive myself authorized by your Lordship's orders to detach.

#### 109. To Lieutenant-Colonel Palmer.

*Scindiah's influence not our only difficulty at Poonah. It may be better for us that he should remain there. Our army must retire from the Mahratta territory.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hoobly, 20th Oct., 1800.

From all the accounts which I have received from Poonah I judge that there is a material change in the situation of affairs at that place. It appears now that it is possible, if not probable, that Scindiah will withdraw to Hindustan, and yet the Peshwah is as adverse to the British government, and to a closer connection with it, as the court of Poonah has been since its councils have been guided by Scindiah.

Our wishes and our efforts were heretofore directed to remove Scindiah from Poonah, as being the great or the only bar to their final accomplishment; our policy must vary with the change of circumstances and of sentiment which has made its appearance, and we must now direct them to other objects.

If Scindiah does not proceed to Hindustan with his army, he will probably lose his power in that quarter. A new power will spring up there, with which new political combinations may be formed, and Scindiah will be no more powerful in the southern part of the Mahratta state than any other chief. Under this view of Mahratta affairs it might perhaps be the best policy to suffer Scindiah to remain at Poonah, and to endeavour to prevent him from pushing himself to the southward too fast, but that as soon as he should have established himself thoroughly in this quarter, he should turn his views and direct his efforts again to the re-establishment of his power to the northward. It is necessary that our army should withdraw, not only because an engagement was made that it should do so as soon as Dhoondiah's rebellion should be suppressed, but because it is very clear that it is the wish of

the Peshwah and of Scindiah that we should not maintain any position within the Mahratta state.

#### 110. To Captain Kirkpatrick.

*Armed intervention in Mahratta affairs would be seasonable, and likely to succeed. But would it be legal, or just? In any case it would be right and politic that I should quit the Mahratta territory.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Mayoondie, 10th Nov., 1800.

I am obliged to you for the communication of your sentiments regarding the situation of our affairs with the Mahrattas. I agree entirely in your opinion that it is most desirable that they should be speedily brought to an issue; that the present period appears favourable to bring them to a crisis; and that, particularly at this moment, there is no reason to apprehend the consequences even of an appeal to arms for that purpose.

The only questions then are the propriety and justice of commencing a war to obtain our ends. I can give no opinion upon this point, as I am unacquainted with the particulars of the late unsuccessful negotiations; but if war should be determined on, I am convinced that we shall suffer no inconvenience from my having withdrawn from the Mahratta territory; if we are not to go to war, you appear to be of opinion that it is proper that I should withdraw without loss of time.

As to the justice of such an appeal; our governments in India are strongly prohibited from commencing wars excepting in case of attack, or preparation for an attack, by one of the Native powers. The refusal of the Mahrattas to accede to our terms of closer alliance cannot be deemed an attack, and I have not heard of any circumstances in their late conduct which can be deemed one. Hostility then on our part might be thought a breach of the laws for the government of this empire.

But not only might it be considered in that light, but as an act of great political injustice. In fact, one country has no right to commence a war upon another because at some time or other that other may form an alliance with its enemy prejudicial to its interests, and because it refuses to draw closer the terms of its alliance with the country which proposes it. The question of peace or war is not, and cannot be, only the probability of success, but must depend upon other circumstances, and in this

country must depend upon the prospect of being attacked by the power with which it is proposed to go to war.

These general principles are certain, and must be familiar to you, who are more in the habit of considering these questions. I mention them only as the groundwork of my opinion that it is proper that I should withdraw from the Mahratta territory. From these principles I conclude that we shall not go to war with the Mahrattas; and in that case you are of opinion that I ought not to maintain my position within the territories of the Peshwah. If from any circumstances in our situation it is inexpedient that we should have recourse to arms, the more plain that we make the real moderation of our views, the more we conciliate the Peshwah's government, the less likely will he be to throw himself into the hands of the French to curb our influence.

In truth, the conduct of our government in withdrawing from the Mahratta territory, after having had possession of a great part of it, is unexampled, and will be a lasting argument to those about the Peshwah who, however disinclined they may be to a closer connexion with us, may be still more so to see the French established in the centre of the Mahratta empire. We ought, therefore, to withdraw as soon as possible.

If, however, the wisdom of government should decide that it is proper to go to war, I am fully prepared.

### 111. Memorandum upon operations in the Mahratta territory.

*Reasons for beginning the war in the monsoon. Plan for a steady advance, and solid occupation. Topographical information, and suggestions for the conduct of particular operations. Co-operation of the Nizam's army. Why the defence of Mysore should be included in the plan.*

[Sept., 1801—Jan., 1802.]

As before long we may look to war with the Mahrattas, it is proper to consider of the means of carrying it on. The experience which has been acquired, in the late contest with Dhoondiah Waugh, of the seasons, the nature of the country, its roads, its produce, and its means of defence, will be of use in pointing them out. I shall detail my observations upon each of these points, for the benefit of those, in whose hands may be placed the conduct of the operations of the army, in case of such a war as I have above supposed we may expect. The season at which it is most convenient to commence a campaign with the Mahrattas, is

that at which the rivers, which take their rise in the western ghauts, fill. This happens, generally, in the month of June. In this year, the Toombuddra was not fordable after the 14th June, the day before the army reached Hurryhur ; and in other seasons, I understand that that river fills nearly at the same time. The reasons why I think that the most favourable season for operations against the Mahratta nation are as follow :

1st. The Mahratta army is principally composed of cavalry, and their plan of operations against a British army would be to endeavour to cut off its communication with its rear, and to impede the junction of its supplies from the Mysore country. As the rivers are not fordable, as there are no bridges, and no means of passing them, excepting by basket boats, which it is difficult, and might be rendered impossible, to procure, the fulness of the rivers operates as a barrier. It is certain, that the enemy cannot pass them in large numbers, and it is probable that they would not venture to throw across a small body, or rather, that they would not be able to prevail upon a small body to remain on a different side from the main body of their army. The inconvenience and delay which the British army experience in crossing the rivers by means of boats, when they are full, is trifling ; and, in fact, they would experience no inconvenience or delay, if good pontoons were provided, and a bridge were thrown across each river for the passage of the army. The communication might afterwards be kept up by means of the common basket boats. If the army should be thus equipped with a bridge, the Mahrattas would never dare to detach a body across any river, for the purpose of annoying our communications. Thus, then, we should enjoy all the advantage of a river not fordable, to shorten the line of our communication, which river our enemy could not pass with a large body of troops, and over which he would not dare to detach a small body ; and we should have it in our power to pass it with as much ease, and with as little inconvenience and delay, as we should experience if the river were fordable.

2dly. The Mahratta country in general is but ill supplied with water. The rains which fill these rivers, although not heavy at the beginning of the rainy season, are sufficient to fill many nullahs ; and an army has at this time some chance of being supplied with water, of which, in the dry season, it is certain it would never find much, and frequently none. The inconvenience to be apprehended from the rains is trifling. It is true, that heavy rain

would ruin the cattle of the army, and would put the roads in such a state as to render them impracticable for wheel carriages. But heavy rain for any long continuance is not to be expected in the Mahratta territory; and particularly not early in the season. During the last season, which was extraordinarily severe upon the coast, we had only two days of distressing rain; but we had some rain nearly on every day.

The Mahratta country is in general a fine black soil, very fertile, and highly cultivated. The roads are all excellent, excepting when the rain is heavy. At that time the black cotton mould becomes a swamp, through which it is scarcely practicable for a man to move; the wheels of the carriages sink to their axletrees, are clogged with mud, and it is impossible for the cattle to draw them. The produce of this fertile country is jowarry principally, and other dry grains, but no rice. This is the great difficulty with which our army would have to contend. The rice which must be procured for them must be brought from the distant rice countries in Mysore, or from Canara, with which country, in the rainy season, it is impossible to keep up a communication. The army also might depend upon procuring some sheep and bullocks in the Mahratta territory; but if its European force should be large, it will certainly require supplies of the former from Mysore, and, in any case, supplies from thence of the latter. It is well known that jowarry straw is the best kind of forage for horses and cattle, and of this there is an abundance everywhere; and besides this forage, it seldom happens that green forage cannot be found.

The means of defending this country are trifling; and it must depend upon the strength of the army which is in it, compared with that of the British army. All the strong places are liable to be carried by assault, excepting, perhaps, Darwar or Kooshgul; and it is doubtful whether these last might not be thus taken, if attacked by resolute troops.

Having thus detailed my observations on the Mahratta territory, with a view to operations within it, I come to state those which I would recommend, and the preparatory steps to be taken, in order to have the means of carrying them on with vigour, celerity, and effect. The first object in any Mahratta war, commenced in the season which I think most favourable to a British army, would be to push the enemy across the Kistna, and to establish ourselves firmly on that river as a barrier, from which we could advance to their capital, or to suit other ulterior



objects as might be held out. I would propose, then, to assemble the troops at Chittledroog ; but they must be provided with every necessary before they arrive there, as nothing at all useful to military operations can be procured at that place.

The army ought to be provided with pontoons and other materials for building a bridge. On account of the difficulty of procuring rice and arrack in the Mahratta territory, a large store ought to be collected and kept at Chittledroog, and another at Hurryhur. This last place ought to be repaired, and put in a defensible state for a small garrison, as well for a point of communication with the Mysore country for the army when it should be advanced into the Mahratta territory, as for a post to guard the basket boats, &c., which must be made use of to convey over the Toombuddra the supplies which must follow the army. The fort at Hullihall, in Soonda, ought also to be put in repair. Granaries and storehouses, for arrack and for military stores, ought to be built at this station. Large stores of rice and arrack for the supply of the army, when it should be advanced into the Mahratta territory, and certain military stores, ought to be collected at Hullihall. This post, if strengthened, would be an excellent depôt, and would be supplied at all times without difficulty, from Bombay by Goa.

The army, being assembled at Chittledroog, should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur. Its first object should be to drive the enemy across the river Werdah, and to establish itself between these two rivers. After this shall be effected, it might cross the Werdah. The best place for this will be between Deogherry and Savanore. It must be recollected, that, although the army will cross this river by its bridge, it will still be necessary that it should be provided with basket boats, in order that its supplies may cross the river likewise. These, or materials to make them, cannot be procured at or near Deogherry, and the boats must, therefore, be brought from the Mysore country. The boatmen must likewise come from the Mysore country. It will be necessary to establish a post upon the Werdah, as a guard for the boats, which, otherwise, it would be in the power of the enemy to seize or destroy, as a link in the communication with Mysore, and in order effectually to establish the British power in the country between that river and the Toombuddra.

The next object would be to get possession of Darwar. The straight road to that place, by Savanore and Hoobly, is the best. If the rains should have been heavy, the road to Darwar should

be from Savanore to Bindigherry, and along the Soonda hills. The soil near these hills is red, and the roads are practicable, even in rainy weather. In my opinion, Darwar can be taken by a *coup de main*. The attack ought to be made on the south-west side. Means might be adopted for keeping down the fire of the besieged, by one of cannon from two hills, on which the Bhows and the British batteries were erected in the former war, and by an enfilading fire from a height above a tank on the north-west angle. The assailants might move, under cover of the back of that tank, to the foot of the glacis, where they would be covered from the fire of the besieged. They might move along the foot of the glacis till they should come opposite the hills above mentioned. They ought then to possess themselves of a square and a round work in the glacis, by turning them by the covert way. They ought to be provided with fascines to fill a part of the ditch, and they might escalate the outer wall, taking care to carry over some ladders for the purpose of escalating the inner wall.

After having got within the outer wall, they should turn to their left, and proceed to a tank between the two walls. Along the back of this tank, it is said, there is a passage over the inner ditch to a gateway. At this gateway the wall is not more than 20 feet high, and might easily be escalated. This passage is represented as being an aqueduct from the tank outside, on the north-west angle of the fort, into the body of the place. There is a passage for water from this tank through the glacis, and it is probable that it leads over both the ditches. At the same time that this attack should be made, another ought to be directed against the gateway, which is on the south-east face. There are other gates. The party which should proceed on this attack might also get under the glacis, by the back of the tank above mentioned; only it should proceed along the northern face, and round to the gateway by that route. After blowing open the gates in the outer wall, it is said that the inner wall, near its gate, is not more than 20 feet high. This party ought also to be provided with scaling ladders.

If the attack should fail, or if, from any reason, it should be thought advisable to attack the place regularly, and to effect a breach in the walls, the only mode of doing this is, by erecting the breaching battery on the crest of the glacis. The face to be attacked will be the same. The troops would establish themselves under the glacis, and in the round and square works within

it, as I have above recommended. These works would be excellent flanks to the trenches under the glacis. The troops would have to work back to the hills above mentioned, on which the Bhow's batteries were erected in the last war; and at which would, of course, be collected the reserve for the trenches.

Having, by one of these modes, got possession of Darwar, but particularly if by assault, all the other places in the country would fall of course. The first object would be to establish a garrison and the depôts in that place.

The garrison, &c., might be moved forward from Hullihall, which ought still to be held by a small force, as a post of communication with the sea coast. The enemy should then be driven across the Malpoorba, and the country between the rivers should be cleared entirely. Boats should be made and prepared, and the army should cross the Malpoorba between Doodwar and Moorgoor. A post should be established on the river for the care of the boats.

The river Malpoorba is more rapid than the Werdah or the Toombuddra, is more liable to rise and fall suddenly, and therefore the enemy would be more likely to return from the country between that river and the Gutpurba, than from that between the Malpoorba and the Werdah. The only place which, on this route, is worthy of attention, is Belgaum: this place has a wet ditch, but I am informed that it is dry in parts, and that the place is otherwise liable to be taken by assault. Belgaum lies to the westward of the high road to the Kistna, and is situated in a rice country. It might be possible to draw supplies from this country; and, with this view, it might be desirable to have a garrison of British troops in Belgaum: otherwise it will be useless.

The fort of Badamy, which is esteemed of some strength, lies north of the Malpoorba, but about 70 or 80 miles from the road to the Kistna. Unless it was found that the enemy hung about this fort, it would be better not to lose any time in going to attack it, until they are all driven across the Kistna. If they hang about Badamy, it must be attacked. Badamy ought, more properly, to be called two forts than one. There are two forts on two separate hills, and a fortified pettah between them. It appears to me that the hill forts might be taken by storm, by approaching them from the westward.

After the enemy should have been driven across the Gutpurba, this river ought to be crossed in the same manner as the Mal-

poorba, somewhere near Gokauk, and a post ought to be established upon it.

*Jan. 1802.* Since the commencement of this Memorandum was written, the Company have got possession of the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra, which river has become their northern boundary ; and it may, perhaps, be thought that the plan of operations, in case of a war with the Mahrattas, ought to be altered. There are several reasons, however, for which they should continue to be the same.

Firstly : The treaty, by which the countries to the southward of the Toombuddra have been ceded to the Company, has allied it more closely with the Nizam, whose interests now appear to be inseparable from those of the Company. The quarrel of the Company, therefore, with the Mahrattas, which may create a necessity for any military operations, will equally involve the Nizam ; and it will be necessary that measures should be taken, either by himself or by the Company, to defend the Dooab from the incursions of the Mahrattas.

Secondly : The defence of the Dooab will provide for that of the Ceded districts, which that country covers entirely. If the Nizam's army is collected at Copaul, and Moodgul is occupied with strength, it would be impossible for the Mahratta army to make any impression of consequence on the Dooab, or to penetrate the Ceded countries in any strength. It may be a question whether, when the British army should cross the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, the army of the Nizam should not immediately cross the Kistna, and guard his Highness's frontier to the northward of that river, if they should not operate offensively upon the enemy. At all events, they ought to cross the Kistna as soon as the Mahrattas begin to retire from the countries to the southward of the rivers which fall into the Kistna. But it may be said, as the Company have now got possession of extensive countries immediately to the southward of the Toombuddra, and in the neighbourhood of the Mahratta territory, they ought to carry on their operations from thence, and leave Mysore to its own defence. There are several objections to this measure, which I will detail.

1st. Mysore is very defenceless towards the Mahratta territory ; a body of Mahratta horse would overrun the whole of the rich province of Bednore, would plunder Bednore itself, and might push their devastations to within 60 miles of Sreringapatam, without the chance of danger or molestation.

2ndly. They would immediately connect themselves, and act in co-operation with the polygars along the range of the western ghauts, as far as Koorg; and probably the provinces of Malabar and Canara would be the scene of their intrigues, and the Company's dependants in those provinces would take arms.

3rdly. The countries into which they would thus push themselves are those from which supplies of rice for the army must be drawn, when it enters the Mahratta territory; and thus rice must come by the road of which the enemy would have possession.

4thly. The first step to be taken, after crossing the Toombuddra (supposed at Anagoondy), would be to clear out the countries beyond the Werdah, of the detachments of the enemy which would have entered them, and thus much valuable time would be lost. Therefore, there is no doubt but that it would be best to assemble the troops at once at Chittledroog, and to cross them quickly over the Toombuddra at Hurryhur, by which measure a stop will be immediately put to the operations of the enemy in that quarter.

In case it should be determined to enter the enemy's country by Anagoondy and Copaul, either with the whole British army, leaving Mysore defenceless, or with the Nizam's army in co-operation with the British troops collected in Mysore, the first place of consequence which will be met with is Dummul. This is a stone fort, the walls of which are above 35 feet high, with a dry ditch of unequal depth. On the south and west sides there is the flank of a tank, and some rough ground and buildings which give cover to the near approach of a body of troops. In the centre nearly of the south side there is an old gateway, now blocked up, where the place may be escalated with ease. There is a trench cut across the road that used to lead to the gate, which, however, may be easily passed. The gateway, also, on the north face leading to the pettah, may be attacked with advantage.

The road from Dummul to Hoobly and Darwar is good in dry weather; but during the heavy rains it is impassable, as there are about 20 miles of the black cotton soil which I have above mentioned. If the rains should be heavy, the best road for a body of troops, marching from Dummul to Darwar, would be by Sirhitty, Luckmaisir, and Savanore, and along the Soonda hills.

Kooshgul lies not far from the direct road from Dummul, by Hoobly, to Darwar. This place is strong, from its situation and its works. It is situated in the middle of a plain of cotton ground.

There is no water within several miles of it for the supply of an army; and it is surrounded by 2 walls, 2 ditches, a covert way, and glacis. The ditches, however, though deep, are very narrow, and might easily be filled up, particularly that one in the glacis. On the east side of the south face there is a dam of some water across the outer ditch, over which it would be very practicable to pass; and it appeared to me that it would be most easy to assault the inner fort on the same side. It is to be recollected, however, that, after having passed the outer ditch in the glacis, the assailants would have to pass into the covert way, an inner ditch, the outer wall, and afterwards the inner wall, to parts of which there is no ditch. It is clear that this place can be taken by a *coup de main*, and probably in no other manner; but I strongly recommend that it should be avoided if possible, and that its fall should be considered as dependent upon that of Darwar.

#### 112. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The natural tendency to anarchy in the Mahratta government, exemplified in the contest between Baba Saheb and Goklah.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 30th March, 1802.

I hope that there will not be much longer delay in the course of your negotiations at Poonah. It is very desirable that they should be brought nearly to a close before the Republicans come to India.

I don't understand exactly the nature of the present dispute between Baba Saheb and Goklah, but they are fighting daily; hitherto their skirmishes have tended to the advantage of the latter. You know that the claim of the Bhow's family to the Savanore and Darwar countries is grounded upon their charges for the expenses of Lord Cornwallis's Mysore war. It appears that those countries were given over by the Peshwah to Hurry Punt to pay the expenses of his and the Bhow's army; Hurry Punt could come to no settlement with the Bhow, and at last gave him over the countries in liquidation of his claim.

In these countries thus given by the Sircar in jaghire, or in payment of debts due by the state, it is usual, I believe, for the Sircar to hold the strong places, and to keep the revenues of certain districts to pay the troops which may be employed in the countries ceded. Goklah's troops are immediately in the

employment of the Sircar, and he depends for their payment on the revenues of the districts thus held by the Sircar. The Savanore and Darwar countries have been so frequently overrun by armies that it stands to reason they cannot be so productive, although certainly in a high state of cultivation, as they have been heretofore. It is probable, therefore, that Goklah finds that the districts belonging immediately to the Sircar, which have been given to him for the payment of his troops, are not sufficient for that purpose, and that he is desirous of encroaching upon the other, who stands in the light of a public creditor. I suppose he uses the old argument: the public force must be paid first, and next the public debts. This I imagine to be the groundwork of the present dispute, and I dare say that it is kept alive by the intrigues at Poonah.

After a consideration of the arguments for and against Seringapatam, it has been determined to keep it, and repair it.

### 113. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Goklah disposed to be true to the Peshwah. The Putwourduns waiters on Providence. Holkar's reported intentions.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 4th Dec., 1802.

It gives me great pleasure to be able to send you so immediately a satisfactory account of the sentiments of the Mahratta chiefs on the frontier. I had a conversation again this morning with Goklah's vakeel, the purport of which was as follows: He says that Bappojec Gonceish Goklah was the person who arrested Holkar, afterwards put to death by order of the Peshwah: as consequence thereof he has nothing to expect from Jeswunt Rao Holkar: that he is determined to be faithful to the Peshwah, whose troops he commands, and he wishes to know what orders I have to give him.

\* \* \* \* \*

I took an opportunity this morning of entering into a general conversation regarding the views and objects, and probable line of conduct, of all the Mahratta chiefs in this part of India, in the present crisis of Mahratta affairs. It is obvious that Goklah must be very decided in his conduct: he has no favour to expect from Holkar; and this is probably the reason for which he, so immediately after his success, dispatched this vakeel to me.

The vakeel says that the Putwurdun family (Pursheram Bhow's) are exactly in the state in which you could wish them to be, viz. in anxious expectation of future events, and intending to adopt a line of conduct suitable thereto; or, in other words, to take part with the strongest. He says, that it is reported that Holkar intends to place on the musnud a son of Amrut Rao; and that, if he adopts that line of conduct, and places some power in the hands of Amrut Rao himself, the minds of people, in general, may be more reconciled to him than they are under the existing order of things: for that, at present, every man is doubtful, and determined to take part with the strongest. He says that Goklah, although he has no hopes from Holkar, will hold his ground, if power should be thrown into the hands of Amrut Rao. I questioned him regarding the strength of the chiefs at present: he says that Goklah's body of troops consists of 4000 horse, and 3000 foot, with some guns. He says the horse are 2000 good, and 2000 indifferent; that 500 of the good are pagah, and 1500 silladar; 1000 of the foot are good, commanded by 2 European officers, 1000 are Arabs and Rohillas, and 1000, I believe, of the ordinary peons of the country. This state of Goklah's force I believe to be true: it is nearly the same as I recollect it to have been in 1800.

The Putwurdun have 4 bodies of troops, nearly of the same strength and description as Goklah's; and they are situated, for the present, in the neighbourhood of the Kistna. One commanded by Appah Saheb, another by Baba Saheb, and another by Dada Saheb, being 3 brothers, and sons of Pursheram Bhow, and a fourth by Chintomeny Rao, who is the son of Pursheram Bhow's brother, and is, in fact, the head of the family. I have no doubt that all these chiefs will join you forthwith; but I propose to send a man into that country to find out their intentions exactly, and the strength of their troops, and to discover the intentions of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and of the Rajah of Kittoor. Both these chiefs have now bodies of troops on foot.



## 114. To Major Malcolm.

*Our action, and the amount of our force, must depend on circumstances. Hence, in case of a Mahratta war, the Governor-General must come to Madras.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 11th Dec., 1802.

If the war is to go on, on the great scale for which preparations are making, the Governor-General must come round to Madras. All the reasons which operated to induce him to come to Madras at the commencement of the war with Tippoo exist at present, and there are others which did not exist at that time. You are well acquainted with the state of the government of Madras at present: Gen. Stuart I consider as the heart and soul of it, and, as soon as he shall depart to take the command of this army, the whole will fall to pieces, and a scene of confusion will follow, which must be disastrous to the army in the field.

I don't know enough of Mahratta politics to be able to give an opinion as to the necessity of the great preparations which are making. I understand that the object is to support the Peshwah in his government; and that operation, supposing that hereafter it should be deemed advisable to undertake it, may or may not require a very large army, according to the real strength of the power in rebellion against the Peshwah. It appears to be imagined now that there is a chance that Holkar and Scindiah will unite against us and the Peshwah, if we should interfere in his affairs. It is possible that the disunion of those Chiefs may be more advantageous to us than any arrangement we could make with the Peshwah, and that we ought not to interfere in such a manner as to induce them to unite. If that should be the case, it will be proper to pause for a time; and the great preparations at present making will not be necessary.

It is possible that the Peshwah's authority at Poonah may be restored by the natural cause [course?] of the contest between these two Chiefs, and that will be the time for us to conclude our arrangements with his Highness to lodge our subsidiary force at Poonah. The Governor-General alone can decide upon these questions, and many others connected with this subject. But it is possible that the nature of them will change every day; and he will have much earlier intelligence of every event at Madras than he can at Calcutta. Besides, if the General takes the field, nothing but his presence can keep the government of Madras in the direct line. I wish that you would urge him upon this subject.

**115. Message delivered by Suddasheo Rao, vakeel from Goklah, to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.**

*Profession of personal devotion to General Wellesley.*

Seringapatam, 16th Dec., 1802.

As it is probable that Sree Munt Bajee Rao will claim the protection of the English, Goklah has a great desire to join their army, and to act in their cause; and Goklah wishes to make known to Gen. Wellesley, that, should he receive orders from Sree Munt Bajee Rao, it is his intention to acquaint him (the General) with the nature of those orders, to take his advice on the subject, and to act accordingly; and, should he receive any from Amrut Rao, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar, he will act in the same manner; as it is his particular desire to act agreeably to the General's wishes upon every occasion, let his orders from the people above mentioned be what they may.

Goklah wishes that the friendly communication, which at present exists between him and the General, may continue; and he will make known to him, in his correspondence, every circumstance, of a public nature, which may occur in the Mahratta country; and he hopes that the General will be kind enough to let him know any of importance, that may be determined on, relative to arranging the affairs of the Mahratta empire.

Goklah has sent his vakeel, Suddasheo Rao, to Gen. Wellesley, not only to request a place for his family to remain in, but also to cultivate his friendship.

**116. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.**

*Turbulent state of the South Mahratta country. Consequent danger of losing our communications with Mysore. Project of a new base near Bombay.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 1st Jan., 1803.

I have not yet had any satisfactory communication from the Putwurdun family, of their intentions upon the present occasion: it appears that they and Rastia's family are leagued against Goklah, whose troops they are driving from the Kistna towards the Toombuddra. It is possible that, when they shall see our army in the field, they may be induced to join our standard, but at present I very much doubt their intentions. It will not be very practicable to make great progress through the southern Mahratta territories, with such a heavy equipment as Gen. Stuart

has proposed, if the chiefs of this family and Rastia are united against us.

At all events, at present, owing to the confusion at Poonah, and the delay in assembling our troops on the frontier, the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra are in a sad state of disorder. The heads of districts and of villages have seized the supreme authority, and have raised troops, and are carrying on against each other a petty warfare, which will be as destructive to our supplies and our communications with Mysore as it is to the country itself. Unless, therefore, the Putwurdun, and all the chiefs in this part of the empire, join cordially with us, and take advantage of our presence to settle the country, it is very obvious that we shall lose our communication with Mysore on the day we shall quit the Toombuddra.

These circumstances have made me turn my mind seriously to a project, which the great distance between Mysore and Poonah had induced me before to take into consideration; viz. to establish a depôt, by means of the Bombay government, either at Panwell or Bassein, or some other place on the coast opposite to the island of Bombay, or Salsette, of not very difficult access from the ghauts: this post to be occupied by the Bombay troops, and to be filled with rice, arrack, salt provisions, and military stores for a field train, if we should have fought an action. By this arrangement we should carry on the war at Poonah with an army provided with cattle, &c., from the eastern side of the peninsula, and with the resources of Bombay; and we should shorten our line of communication many hundred miles.

## 2. FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY TO THE RUPTURE WITH THE CONFEDERATES.

### 117. Lieutenant-General Stuart to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

*Major-General Wellesley's course, in case of opposition by the Southern Jaghiredars.*

(Extract.)

Hurryhur, 9th March, 1803.

I have not noticed, in the foregoing orders, the conduct to be observed, on your part, in case of the opposition of any chieftain; and, in particular, of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, from whom we are led to expect most opposition to your proceedings.

The instructions of the Governor-General and Lord Clive contain no orders, and afford no positive rule, to guide my determination on this important head. I infer, however, from the spirit of those instructions, that, if the majority of the southern jaghiredars, and the sentiments of the body of the people, are found to declare in favour of the restoration of Bajee Rao, the British detachment ought to persevere in the endeavour to re-establish his authority; and should the detachment, during the prosecution of that endeavour, encounter the hostility of any individual jaghiredar, that they are to employ, in concert with the well-affected jaghiredars, every practicable means to overcome his opposition. In the event, therefore, of any single feudatory opposing resistance to the restoration of the Peshwah, after you have ascertained that the sentiments of the majority of the chieftains are favourable to that measure, I am of opinion that the instructions which I have received justify me in authorising you to compel his submission.

This authority must, however, be understood to apply to the case only of your experiencing hostility from any of the Mahratta chiefs, for the principle of his Excellency the Governor-General's policy is, to avoid a war; and as his Excellency has directed me to bear this principle in mind, as the rule of our conduct on every emergency that may arise, you will carefully forbear from the adoption of any measure that is likely to involve the occurrence of hostilities with any of the parties of the Mahratta empire.

#### 118. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Prevalence of private war in the South Mahratta country. General Wellesley appeases it; and induces the belligerents to co-operate in the Peshwah's cause. Good military results.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Erroor, on the Kistna, 1st April, 1803.

Since the year 1800, when I was in this country before, it has been one continued contest for power and plunder between the different chiefs who have armies under their command; between the Putwurdun's (Pursheram Bhow's) family and Goklah, in the countries bordering on the Toombuddra, Werdah, and Malpoorba; between the Putwurdun and the Rajah of Kolapoor in those bordering on the Gutpurba and Kistna; between Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, and the Rajah of Kittoor;

between Goklah and the Rajah of Kittoor, and Goklah and Bappojee Scindiah ; besides various others of inferior note, either immediately employed under these, or for themselves, under their protection. I have prevailed on all these chiefs to cease their contests for the present, and to join this detachment with the troops, which would otherwise be employed in the plunder of the country, or in the prosecution of their private quarrels, and to co-operate with me in the service of the Peshwah. They have also allowed me the use of the supplies of the countries under their management or protection, on payment ; and have protected the people belonging to my camp in their passage through their countries.

For the further protection of the people with supplies, who are on their road to join this camp, I have placed posts on the Werdah, the Malpoorba, Gutpurba, and Kistna, at the places at which it will be necessary to have posts hereafter, if this detachment should be in advance of the army, when the rivers shall fill which rise in the western ghauts. I have been joined by the troops of Goklah, of Bappojee Vittell, of Appojee Rao Nepauneekur (commonly called Appah Dessaye), of the Putwurdun family, of the Rajah of Kittoor, and of Bappojee Scindiah, the killadar of Darwar, whose son is in camp.

I expect to be joined at Meritch by the troops of Prittee Niddee, of Rastia, and some others. It is impossible to say to what number the whole will amount, but I imagine not less than 20,000 horse.

#### 119. To the Governor-General.

*Partial and hesitating co-operation of the South Mahratta Jaghiredars. They distrust, hate, and fear the Peshwah, and are jealous of our alliance with him. But they look to, and help, us. Their conduct will depend on the Peshwah's.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Aklooss, 15th April, 1803.

My march to this place has been unopposed, and I have received from the country all the assistance which it could afford. I have been joined by some of the southern jaghiredars, and of the Peshwah's officers, who quitted him, by his desire, at Mhar, after he had fled from Poonah ; but there are many of both descriptions still absent. The jaghiredars who have joined are principally those who served with the troops under my command in the campaign of 1800 ; and the sirdars are those lately raised by

the Peshwah to high offices in the state from very inferior situations. In all it is easy to observe a want of attachment to the cause of the Peshwah ; but, particularly in the jaghiredars, I have observed not only a want of attachment and zeal, but a detestation of his person, and an apprehension of his power, founded upon a long series of mutual injuries.

None of these persons have ever hinted to me the nature of our engagements with the Peshwah, or their sentiments upon them : as, however, these engagements may affect the interests of some, and the objects of ambition of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that they view them with jealousy. I am far from thinking, however, that if, in consequence of these engagements, we should be attacked by any thing like a confederacy of the greater Mahratta powers, we shall have to carry on this contest unassisted by these chiefs ; but the number of those who will assist us, and the degree of assistance which they may give, will depend much upon the Peshwah.

We have, undoubtedly, an influence over those chiefs, one which is daily increasing, to which I attribute our successful progress to this moment. This influence is founded, in some degree, upon their fear of our power, but much more upon their hope of our support in forwarding their views, and of our protection against the violence and oppression of their own government, and the greater Mahratta powers. Here we must depend upon the personal character of the Peshwah, and upon the manner in which the new treaty will work : upon which points I shall defer to write any thing until I am better informed.

*Why the alleged confederacy should be promptly dealt with, by requiring Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda ; and why, if he does so, our army should be broken up.*

(Extract.)

Same date.

The question, whether the supposed confederacy will be formed, and whether we shall have to contend with it, ought to be brought to a decision as soon as possible :

1st. Because, if we are to have a war, we shall carry it on with great advantage during the rainy season.

2ndly. Because we are ready, and the supposed enemy are not ; and every day's delay after this time is an unnecessary increase of expense to us, and an advantage to them.

3rdly. Because we shall immediately ascertain the views and intentions of the Peshwah regarding the alliance in general ; and

we shall leave no time for intrigues among the jaghiredars in his and our interest.

4thly. Because nothing but our determined and early opposition to the confederacy can save us from it, supposing it to exist. To withdraw from our engagements with the Peshwah will rather accelerate its attack, with the addition of the Peshwah's force.

In order to bring this question to a decision, the Peshwah should be urged immediately (if possible before he should arrive at Poonah) to desire Scindiah to recross the Nerbudda. This chief ought at the same time to be pressed upon this point by our minister at his camp; and all the screws, menaces, &c., might be brought to bear upon him, upon his Frenchmen, and upon the Rajah of Berar.

If Scindiah should cross the Nerbudda, and our minister is kept in his camp, we shall know upon what to depend. We ought immediately to break up our army in this country, taking care to have at Bombay a sufficient number of Europeans to reinforce the Poonah detachment, whenever their services shall be required, and to keep our north-west frontier of Mysore and the Ceded districts in strength. My reasons for thinking that the army here ought to be broke up, if Scindiah goes across the Nerbudda, are :

1st. That it does not weaken us, because the same number of Native troops as we have at present will be at Poonah; we shall have the Europeans and train of ordnance at Bombay, to join the Poonah detachment; and the cavalry in the Ceded districts can always join the Hyderabad detachment in a short time.

2ndly. Because the corps at Hyderabad and Poonah, thus reinforced, can join as soon as Scindiah shows an intention to cross the Nerbudda.

3rdly. Because, by breaking up the army, and leaving nothing more at Poonah than the usual detachment, the jealousy of our strength will cease in a great degree, and we may then see in what manner the new treaty will work.

I think it probable that a system of menace towards Scindiah, his Frenchmen, and the Rajah of Berar, will put a stop to the negotiations for the formation of the confederacy, to which there are already many natural obstacles, particularly as we and the Nizam are prepared, and already in the field. But if Scindiah should refuse to give an unequivocal symptom of his good intentions by retiring across the Nerbudda, I can have no doubt of the confederacy; and, for the reasons I have above stated, we ought

to attack it without loss of time. The operations in this event will be of a nature so general, that it is difficult to give an opinion concerning them. The battle must be fought either on the Nizam's frontier, or near Poonah, by these troops; but the impression which will put an end to the contest, like that which will prevent the confederacy, must be made from the northern frontier of Bengal, and from Midnapoor.

**120. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.**

*Diplomatic precautions to prevent the burning of Poonah.*

(Extract.)

Somergaum, junction of the Neera and Kurrah,  
17th April, 1803.

You will observe the communication to Lord Wellesley of the intention of burning Poonah. With a view to prevent the execution of this plan, I have written a very civil letter to Amrut Rao, to announce my approach, in which I have stated that I shall take measures to ensure the safety and tranquillity of the city on my arrival there. I think it possible that this letter may draw from him an answer, and that he will send me a vakeel; and if he does, and remains at Poonah, I shall keep up the correspondence till I get within reach of Poonah with the cavalry, when I shall move forward briskly to prevent the execution of this horrible plan.

**121. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.**

*Warm eulogy on Collins' diplomacy. Importance of Scindiah's declaration. The Nizam's troops not to go to Poonah.*

Camp at Somergaum, at the junction of the rivers  
Neera and Kurrah, 17th April, 1803.

After so much time has elapsed since I have had any communication with you, it gives me the most sincere pleasure to commence one by the expression of the great gratification which I received in the perusal of your despatch to the Governor-General of the 25th ultimo, a copy of which reached me yesterday from Colonel Close. In the important conference of which you therein give the details, it appears to me that you have displayed the moderation, the candour, and the dignified firmness which ought to be the characteristics of the diplomatic agents of the British nation in India; you spoke as a man ought who is



sensible of the justice of the cause which he is urging, and who is certain of being supported; and notwithstanding the chicane of his ministers, you drew from the Prince with whom you were sent to negotiate a declaration which must be considered as formal, and to which must be attributed the future peace of India, if he should act in conformity to his declaration.

You will have heard from Colonel Close that I am advancing towards Poonah with a detachment of the army, which is so well equipped and composed, that I should not be apprehensive of the consequences if it were opposed by all the forces of Hindustan. I am now within a few marches of Poonah, where I expect to arrive on the 22nd or 23rd. Colonel Stevenson, with the subsidiary force in the service of the Nizam, reinforced by me by one European regiment, together with His Highness's contingent, is on his march up the Beemah, towards Gardoon; he will leave there, within the Nizam's frontier, all His Highness's troops, and will take a position with those of the Company upon the Beemah, between Poonah and Gardoon.

I had determined upon this disposition of part of the troops under my orders before I had seen your letter to the Governor-General, in which you mention the desire of Scindiah that the Nizam's troops should not be brought to Poonah, because it holds out a probability that all the troops will thereby procure some forage; but I inform you of it that you may make such use of the information as you may think proper.

I at the same time tell you that I do not propose to bring the Nizam's troops within the Mahratta territory, unless it should be absolutely necessary.

My first object after I shall reach Poonah will be to bring up the Peshwah from Bassein, for which I have arranged a plan, and have communicated it to Colonel Close. According to this plan he ought to arrive at Poonah at the end of this month. But I cannot answer for the movement of His Highness's person, and therefore cannot say when he will reach that city.

I shall afterwards take such a position as will appear most likely to enable the troops to subsist with facility in an exhausted country, and to form a junction if that measure should be necessary, in which I shall wait the result of the pending negotiations.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 122. To the Governor-General.

*Forced march to Poonah. Unresisted occupation of the city. Military advantages of the position. The step justifiable on the ground of the imminence, in any case, of a Mahratta contest. The Governor-General should not be anxious about the criticism of 'little minds.'*

Poonah, 21st April, 1803.

I arrived here yesterday with the cavalry of my division, and the Mahratta troops under Appah Saheb, Goklah, and others of the Peshwah's officers.

I had received repeated intimations from Col. Close, that Amrut Rao, who still remained at Poonah, intended to burn that city, when I should approach with the British troops; and, at last, a request from the Peshwah, that I would detach some of his officers with their troops, to provide for the safety of his family. It was obvious, that, even if I could have prevailed upon these officers to go to Poonah, their force was not of the description, or of such strength, as to prevent the execution of Amrut Rao's design; and I, therefore, determined to march forward with the British cavalry and the Mahrattas, as soon as I should arrive within a long forced march from Poonah. In the mean time, I received intelligence that Amrut Rao was still in the neighbourhood on the 18th; and that he had removed the Peshwah's family to Sevaghur, a measure which was generally supposed to be preparatory to burning the town; and I marched on the 19th, at night, above 40 miles to this place, making the total distance which the cavalry have marched, since the 19th in the morning, about 60 miles. Amrut Rao heard of our march yesterday morning, and went off with some precipitation, leaving the town in safety. It is generally believed here that he intended to burn it, and that it was saved only by our arrival. The infantry will come here to-morrow.

I received a very civil letter from Amrut Rao, in answer to one which I wrote to him. He says that he will send a person to talk to me upon his business. I consider it to be very important that he should be brought in, and I will do every thing in my power to induce him to submit to the Peshwah's government.

Matters in general have a good appearance. I think they all will end as you wish. The combined chiefs, of whom we have

heard so much, have allowed us to come quietly, and take our station at this place; and, notwithstanding their threats, have taken no one step to impede our march, or to divert our attention to other objects. Here we are now in force, in a position from which nothing can drive us, and in which we shall gain strength daily. On the other hand, they have not yet made peace among themselves; much less have they agreed to attack us, or on any particular plan of attack. If I should be mistaken, and that, in opposition to the conclusions of reasoning upon the state of our affairs with each of the Mahratta chiefs, who, we are told, were to combine to attack us; and, upon a comparison of our means of annoying each and all of them, with theirs of annoying the Nizam (which is all that they can do), we should still have a war with them, you will have the satisfaction of reflecting, that, in consequence of the course of measures which you have already pursued, you have removed the seat of war to a distance from the Company's territories; and that you have the means of carrying it on in such a state of preparation, as to insure its speedy and successful termination.

In thus reasoning upon the subject, I conclude that we should have had to contend with this confederacy at all events; or, at least, that we should have had a war with the Mahratta powers, in some shape, even if this treaty with the Peshwah had not been concluded. Upon this point I have only to observe, that the establishment of Holkar's power at Poonah, founded, as it was, upon repeated victories over Scindiah's troops, would probably have occasioned demands upon the Nizam. But, supposing that I may be mistaken, I declare, that, from what I have seen of the state of this country, it would have been impossible for Holkar to maintain an army in the Deccan without invading the Nizam's territory. They have not left a stick standing at the distance of 150 miles from Poonah; they have eaten the forage and grain; have pulled down the houses, and have used the materials as firewood; and the inhabitants are fled with their cattle. Excepting in one village, I have not seen a human creature since I quitted the neighbourhood of Meritch: so that the result of your omitting to make some arrangement for the Peshwah, which was to occasion the re-establishment of his power, must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if only for the subsistence of those multitudes in Holkar's suite, or their march to the countries to the southward of the Kistna. This last course might have procrastinated the evil, as they might, in

those countries, have found subsistence for another year; but then their next step would have been to seek for it in the Company's territories, the very sources from which we should have been obliged to draw our supplies in the contest which must have ensued.

Supposing, therefore, that you should be blamed for adopting a course of measures, in which there is a distant risk that you may have a contest with the Mahratta powers, you have the satisfaction of reflecting, that, in consequence of those measures, the scene of action must be at a distance from the Company's territories; and that you are in such a state of preparation as to insure its speedy success: at all events, it is probable that, if you had not adopted those measures, either the Company or their ally must have suffered all the evils of war, without having the same means of averting them, or of limiting their duration.

In all great actions there is risk, which the little minds of those who will form their judgment of your's will readily perceive in that which I am now considering; but their remarks ought not to give you a moment's uneasiness; and I have, in this letter, made you acquainted with a fact which must silence every objection to your measures, and which I shall take care to send in an official form, through the channel which I believe to be the source of the croaking which I hear.

### 123. To Colonel Stevenson.

*The Confederacy probably not concluded; but reported in order to alarm the Nizam. The Resident with him should not encourage such reports.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

The fact is, here I am at Poonah, unopposed, and in strength; and the Resident knows, or ought to know, that those chiefs, who are supposed to intend to combine against us, have not yet made peace, and cannot have settled any plan of operations. It is true, that, as we have taken into our hands the bone for which they have been contending for some years, not one of them is very well pleased; and each gives out that the whole will combine against us. But there are many considerations which must be maturely weighed, by at least two of the parties, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, before they will venture upon a war with the English, particularly when we are prepared, and they are not.

It may be asked, why they give out that they intend to combine? I answer, because they know that some of us are, like other men, to be frightened by their threats; that, particularly, they have their effect at the Nizam's durbar, in which they are daily brought forward; and for this reason it is that our Resident at that durbar, instead of listening to the fears of that Court, and propagating them, ought, above all other men, to inculcate the improbability of this combination; or its certain failure, if it should ever be attempted.

#### 124. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The Peshwahi's Sirdars hold off; and he does not seem to favour the Faghiredars, whom our influence has attracted.*

Camp at Poonah, 23rd April, 1803.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th. You will have been informed, by mine of yesterday, that Appah Sahab will remain in this neighbourhood; and that it is my opinion he will be satisfied with a very moderate settlement of his differences with the Kolapoor Rajah. In respect to the Peshwah's interference in those affairs, I have to observe, that the Putwurdun must be considered as his subjects; and that they have a right to expect that he will interfere to afford them a protection, which it is his duty to give them.

According to the instructions I have received, I have entered into no engagements; but I have promised generally, that those who should join this army, in their master's cause, should be recommended to his favour. From respect to the British nation, and I may almost call it a personal attachment, the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, and Goklah, have joined us; but not a chief belonging to the Peshwah, excepting Bappojee Vittell. Indeed, as appears by the enclosed letter from Col. Stevenson, some of these are employed in the plunder of the Nizam's country. If our recommendation of these chiefs, who have joined us, is to be unattended to, we must expect, not only that they will leave us, but that no others will ever join us. Soobarow Mooty showed me the Peshwah's sunnuds: they may be forgeries, but I have him here, and you will judge for yourself.

I wrote to Mr. Duncan this day, respecting his forwarding to us certain of the stores, as my carriage bullocks are so completely done up, that, if I attempt to send them down the ghauts till they have had some rest, I shall lose them all.

## 125. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Improbability of the Confederacy. Holkar not likely to become Scindiah's tool. The Mahratta Chiefs aware of our power and resolution. They have not threatened British agents, only their native servants, and the Nizam's Court.*

Camp at Panowullah, 10 m. from Poona,  
27th April, 1803.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 19th last night. I have great hopes, notwithstanding the threats held out at Hyderabad, that the combination of the northern Chiefs will end in nothing.

The Governor-General has a strong check upon Scindiah to the northward, and another upon the Rajah of Berar; and it is not very probable that these Chiefs will involve themselves in a war in which they must be certain losers, merely for the pleasure of plundering the Nizam's country.

The result, then, of the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and of this combination, may be, that Holkar will be made the tool to annoy the Nizam: but, supposing that to be the case, against which there are many probabilities, the enemy, although not to be despised, will not be very formidable. But I should doubt Holkar entering, immediately, so far into the views of his rival as to undertake to conduct this contest, as principal, merely for the gratification of his feelings of disappointed ambition. It is much more probable that Holkar will avail himself of the moment of peace to gain possession of the territories belonging to his family, which will probably be ceded to him. Upon the whole, therefore, I think that, although there will be much bad temper and many threats, there will be no hostility.

I have observed, from the commencement of the negotiations with the Peshwah to the present moment, that no British agent has ever been threatened with this combination. We have heard of it principally from the Court of Hyderabad, and from the Native servants in the employment of our Residents, upon which description of people threats are supposed to have some effect; but these threats have never been held out to Major Kirkpatrick, Col. Collins, or Col. Close, in their communications with the servants of the principal Mahratta chiefs, or the principals themselves. Amrut Rao's vakeel, with whom I had a long conversation the other day, never hinted that there was an idea of a combination

of the Mahratta chiefs. I do not conclude, from this silence of theirs towards us, that they have no such idea, because I know it is the common conversation; but I conclude from it, that they are well aware that we are not people to be frightened by threats; and that they know that, as soon as they should hold out this threat, we should immediately take some steps to ward off its effects. They know well that we have it in our power both to defend ourselves and annoy them, of which I believe them to be much more afraid than we are of their combination.

I have heard frequently of the supposed combination of different Mahratta chiefs; but when the nature of our situation upon the frontiers of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar has been explained to them (of which they are in general very ignorant), and they have been informed of Scindiah's answers to Col. Collins, they will be satisfied that the combination, if ever formed, will not do us much harm. I marched this morning with an idea of procuring forage with more ease.

#### 126. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Proposed military movements in case of Scindiah's advance to Poonah, or junction with Holkar, and attack on the Nizam's country. His approach would probably lose us the support of the Southern Jaghiredars.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Panowullah, 3rd May, 1803.

It is my opinion that it is by no means certain that Scindiah will advance to Poonah, and it is most probable that the report of his intended march has been circulated for the purpose of intimidating us, or the Nizam: however, it is as well to be prepared with a consideration of the measures to be adopted in case Scindiah should advance to Poonah.

I have no doubt whatever but that the force which will be here when the Peshwah shall arrive will be more than equal to contend with his, of which I enclose you an account: I am also of opinion that Col. Stevenson's force with the Nizam's army are fully equal to the defence of the Nizam's country against either Holkar or Scindiah. If both should unite in an attack on the Nizam's country, Col. Stevenson and I must co-operate or join in the defence of it, leaving at Poonah a sufficient force for the protection of the Peshwah's person against straggling parties: on the other hand, if both should approach Poonah, Col. Stevenson must come nearer to me.

You will probably be desirous that I should give my opinion regarding Lieut.-Col. Close's proposal contained in the enclosed paragraph of his letter. In the event of Scindiah's advance, our military position ought to be such as to give confidence to those connected with us, and to show the wavering, and our enemies, that we are really in strength. It would not answer to move at once to Hyderabad, as you would thereby leave open the Rajah of Mysore's country, and the Company's; and would remove the check upon the southern jaghiredars. But if you were to cross the Toombuddra, and move to Moodgul, you would be nearer the scene of action at Poonah, within 12 or 14 marches from Hyderabad, and close upon the southern jaghiredars. You would also be in a better situation to defend the Company's frontier.

In 6 weeks from this time the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will fill. I know that Native armies are then very incapable of carrying on their operations; and you will be so near the Kistna, that you can decide whether you will cross it, and at once carry your decision into execution. We are upon very good terms with those of the southern jaghiredars who are with us. I have prevailed upon Appah Saheb to remain here till the Peshwah shall arrive; and in consequence of a letter from Col. Close, in which he communicates the desire of the Peshwah that I should distribute 30,000 rupees among his officers who may be most distressed for money, to be repaid on his Highness's arrival at Poonah, I have advanced 20,000 rupees, at two different times, to Goklah. He also appears in very good temper. It is very probable, however, that, in case Scindiah should advance towards Poonah, the jaghiredars will become at best neutral, and will return to the southward under various pretences; and if there should be nothing to check their enterprises, their neutrality would very soon degenerate into enmity.

#### 127. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Our advanced military position may avert war. To abandon it, and our engagements with the Peshwah, would be dangerous both to us and to the Nizam.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 3rd May, 1803.

A war with the Mahrattas must have been the consequence of the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October and November last, and the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of its operations.



The advantageous military positions which we have taken up in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended at all events, will considerably alleviate their evil ; but this must depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are much mistaken if we suppose that, to depart from our engagements with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed intentions of the northern Mahratta powers to go to war, or will save the Nizam's territories. Such a line of conduct not only would expose his Highness' interests and power, but those of the Hon. Company, to the most imminent danger.

128. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Inherent weakness of the Confederacy. Our best means of dissolving it. Circumstances favourable for Colonel Collins' negotiation with Scindiah.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 9th May, 1803.

The confederacy against which, according to appearances, we may have to contend, is composed of persons and powers among whom there can be no common interest excepting that of plunder, and there are many sources of jealousy and enmity. They will soon find that they have everything to lose by hostilities with the English government, and such is the state of our military preparations in this quarter that they have but little hope of gain. Some of them, also (please God), may come in for harder blows than they expect, and upon the whole we may reasonably look for the speedy dissolution of this confederacy.

But there are two modes of pressing upon it, or rather the one must be the immediate consequence of the other : I mean, negotiation and arms. By the position of our forces in this quarter we must deprive our enemies of the only hope for the attainment of which they have formed this confederacy, viz. the plunder of the Nizam's country. By the operations of those in Bengal we must show them that they have something to lose ; and we must press these points upon their minds by means of the ability and diligence of our diplomatic agents.

The Prince at whose court you have resided is one of the principal members of the confederacy ; he has most to lose and

least to gain in the contest, because, whatever may be the success of this plundering expedition, his troops are not of that description to partake of its benefits in proportion to their numbers and importance, and his territories are most exposed to our invasions. His mind also appears to be adverse to the course of measures which his ministers have adopted; he is of a disposition to take sudden measures in consequence of the failure of the military operations, against those who advised them; and it appears that he has a great respect and regard for you. Under all these circumstances I anxiously hope that he may have endeavoured to prevail upon you to remain with him, and that you may have stayed.

#### 129. To the Governor-General.

*Danger of Scindiah's marching to Poonah. Colonel Collins does not see this. Desirableness of one decisive local authority, under the Governor-General's instructions.*

Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

I received, this day, your letter of the 22nd April; and I shall immediately write the dispatches which you have desired I should. As, however, appearances are doubtful to the northward, as you will perceive by Col. Collins's late dispatches, I cannot fix the time at which the troops can return to their stations; but I still think we shall not have a war.

We are playing a little at cross purposes here. Col. Collins encourages Scindiah to march to Poonah, or rather does not object to that march, which ought to be done at present. Col. Close and I think that the Peshwah ought to write to Scindiah, to inform him that he has regained his power, and that he must not come here; and that I ought to write a letter to Scindiah, in similar terms. The consequence of his coming will be a contest, preceded by a long Mahratta negotiation, in the course of which he will intrigue with all the Peshwah's chiefs, shake their allegiance, and throw the country (which is getting into order) into a new scene of confusion. It is better, by far, that the contest should be at a distance; but there is a far better chance of avoiding it entirely, if we keep him away.

We ought to have some authority here to settle matters with all these chiefs, under some general instructions from you. The state of affairs varies daily; and, before orders can come from

Bengal upon any question, the circumstances which ought to guide the decision have entirely changed. Besides, the fact that Col. Collins does not object to Scindiah's march to Poonah, and that Col. Close and I think it necessary to object to it, shows the propriety of vesting some person with authority to direct all our affairs in this quarter.

Malcolm is not very well, and is gone into Poonah; but I have proposed to him to go to Bengal, to point out to you the state of affairs in this quarter, and to urge the adoption of this measure.

You will hear, from Col. Close, how the Peshwah is going on. As soon as he makes his entry into Poonah, and I shall have settled, at that place, the detachment which may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his person, I intend to move towards the Nizam's frontier.

### 130. To Lord Hobart, Secretary of State.

*Retrospect of measures for the restoration of the Peshwah. Military dispositions for the defence of the Nizam's and the Company's territories, and of Mysore. The Peshwah's government settling fast: he appears decided to abide by the Treaty. Without it, a Mahratta war must have occurred, which it may prevent.*

Camp at Chinchore, near Poonah, 10th May, 1803.

In consequence of orders from his Excellency the Governor-General, of which I enclose a copy, I transmit to your Lordship an account of the proceedings of the British troops under my command, to this date.

You will have heard from the government that I was detached in the month of March from the army assembled on the frontiers of Mysore, with about 9000 men, to effect a junction with the Company's troops subsidized by the Nizam, and his Highness's army assembled on the western frontier; and then to proceed to Poonah, in order to assist in the restoration of the Peshwah to the exercise of the power of his government. I marched nearly 600 miles through the territories of the Mahrattas, not only unopposed by them, but receiving all the assistance which their country could afford. As the country, however, through which I marched since I crossed the river Kistna had been the scene of

the horrid depredations of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's troops, I could not draw much from it.

I was joined on my march by several of the jaghiredars in the southern districts, principally those who served with the British troops under my command in the year 1800; and by the Peshwah's officers who had quitted his Highness, by his desire, when he fled from Mhar, after the defeat of his army by Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in the neighbourhood of Poonah. At length I formed a junction with the subsidiary force and the Nizam's army, to the northward of Punderpoor, on the 15th April.

Jeswunt Rao Holkar quitted Poonah in the end of March, and went towards Chandore, a fortress in his possession to the northward of the river Godavery. His detachments, which had been as far to the southward as the neighbourhood of Meritch and that of Beejapoor, fell back as I advanced, and at length went off to the northward when I formed the junction with the Nizam's army. I was thus enabled to make a disposition of the troops which would provide for the security of the Nizam's frontier; and for that of the march of the Peshwah from Bassein to his capital. Accordingly, having reinforced the subsidiary force by a regiment of European infantry. I broke up immediately again and moved upon Poonah, with my own division and the Mahrattas, where I arrived on the 20th April; and I left the Nizam's troops upon his Highness's frontier.

From thence, in the neighbourhood of Gardoon, our line extended to the western ghauts, and the troops could subsist with ease, and could assemble at any point at a short notice. After I had made this disposition, I learned that Jeswunt Rao Holkar had entered the Nizam's territories in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, that he had surrounded that city with his troops, and had demanded large sums of money from the inhabitants.

The Peshwah was not arrived at Poonah; but as he was attended by a detachment of the Bombay army, consisting of the 78th regt., 5 companies of the 84th, and a battalion of Native infantry, with artillery, under Col. Murray, there was every appearance that his march to his capital would be uninterrupted.

On the 28th April, I ordered Col. Stevenson, the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, to move to the northward with that force and the Nizam's army. I expected that Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whom I apprised of these orders, would draw off, as soon as he should find that Col. Stevenson was approaching him, and he has done so. Col.

Stevenson is now posted upon the river Seenah, about 50 miles to the northward of Gardoon ; from which place he can protect the Nizam's frontier as far as Aurungabad, or he can move towards Hyderabad, or can join with my division, as may appear advisable.

The Peshwah arrived at Chinchore, about 8 miles from Poonah, on the 7th inst., and his Highness proposes to make his entry into his capital on the 13th inst. By that time the detachment from the Bombay army, under Col. Murray, will have got possession of the fort of Carnallah, in the Konkan, the killadar of which refused to deliver the fort to his Highness the Peshwah ; and I shall then move towards the frontier of the Nizam.

It is impossible to obey the orders conveyed in the second and third paragraphs of the enclosed copy of a letter from his Excellency the Governor-General, for reasons connected with certain political events which have occurred since the probable date of his Excellency's dispatches to your Lordship. At that period the Governor-General must have received the accounts from the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; from which there was every reason to believe, from his own declarations, that that prince was satisfied in his own mind that the treaty of Bassein contained no stipulations injurious to his interests, and that he would not endeavour to prevent the parties from carrying it into execution. But by dispatches written to the Governor-General by the Resident with Scindiah, on the 25th April and the 1st and 2nd inst., copies of which I have perused, it appears that the disposition of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam is not so friendly as might have been expected, and that that prince intended to march from Burhampoor on the 4th inst. I am doubtful of the direction of his march ; but it is reported that he intends to approach the Nizam's frontier, to meet there the Rajah of Berar.

Your Lordship will observe, that I have already taken measures for the defence of the territories of his Highness the Nizam ; and that I propose to march to that quarter with my own division, as soon as the Peshwah shall have entered Poonah, leaving at that city such a detachment of the Bombay troops as may be deemed sufficient for the protection of his Highness's person. These measures, as they must preclude all hopes of forming an establishment within the Nizam's frontier, or of any very lucrative plunder, in the short space of time between this and the period at which the rivers will fill that rise in the western ghauts, may probably prevent the supposed march into the Nizam's territories.

At all events, it is my opinion that neither Dowlut Rao Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, nor Jeswunt Rao Holkar, will venture to remain within our reach, where their operations will be confined by the rivers. Therefore, the invasion of the Nizam's territories, if it should be made, will be confined to his frontiers.

Upon the whole, considering the slight hopes of advantage which these Chiefs can have in this invasion, and the certain loss to which two of them at least must be liable, from a state of hostility with the British government, with which your Lordship must be well acquainted, I cannot believe that they will venture upon a course of measures so hopeless; and it is probable that the reports of the march of the Rajah of Berar, and of the direction of the march of Dowlut Rao Scindiah towards the Nizam's territories, have been circulated with a view to intimidate the Peshwah and the Nizam. But until the views of these princes are decided, it is impossible to recommend that the army in this quarter should be broken up. In the mean time, the Peshwah's government is settling fast; and his Highness appears to be decided to adhere to the treaty with the Company, and to forward all the objects of the alliance. If, contrary to my expectations, the northern Chiefs should be determined upon hostilities with the British government, the military position which we have obtained by the treaty of Bassein, and by the rapid march of the division under my command, and the advanced state of our military preparations, afford means of protecting the territories of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

It is unfortunate that the territories of the Nizam should have suffered by the irruption of a freebooter at Aurungabad, and that they should be threatened again by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But scarcely a year has passed in which his Highness has not suffered or apprehended a similar misfortune; and there is no doubt but that he must have suffered in a greater degree in this year, if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded.

The certain consequence of the establishment of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah must have been the invasion of the Nizam's territory, if only for the subsistence of the troops. It would not have been possible to draw subsistence for those numerous bodies of horse, for another year, from the countries between the Godavery and the Kistna, through which I have marched; and they must have sought for it either in the Nizam's territories or in the countries to the southward of the Kistna.

In either case, the Nizam's territories would have been invaded; and in the latter, those of the Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

Although it is by no means certain that endeavours will be made by any of the Mahratta chiefs to interrupt the execution of the treaty of Bassein, yet, as appearances are doubtful, and the reports which are in circulation may reach your Lordship, I have thought it proper to avail myself of the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General, to make you acquainted with the real state of the public affairs in this quarter; and with the means which we have of resisting this interruption, and of defending the Company's ally, the Nizam.

### 131. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Colonel Collins' withdrawal from Scindiah's camp premature and mischievous.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 10th May, 1803.

I hope that Col. Collins will have been induced to remain in Scindiah's camp. I think that he was rather hasty in his determination to withdraw; and that, by withdrawing, on the grounds of Scindiah's altering the direction of his march, he has done no good. Scindiah's ministers will still go on negotiating with Col. Collins's Native agents, and they will persuade their master that the absence of the Colonel from his camp is not a novel occurrence, and is not a sign of war. Thus we shall lose all the advantages of the check upon them of Col. Collins's presence, and of his influence over Scindiah; and, by the manner in which he has withdrawn, he has not given Scindiah any reason to fear the commencement of hostilities with the Company.

### 132. To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

*Holkar apologises for his conduct at Aurungabad. Scindiah's inconsistency. Proposed remonstrance with him, and march into the Nizam's country. The Peshwah seems true to the alliance.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Poonah, 14th May, 1803.

Holkar, to whom I wrote a letter to desire that he would refrain from the plunder of the Nizam's country near Aurungabad, has written a very civil answer, in which he says that he went to

Aurungabad to claim some money, which the Nizam's soubahdar had received, for 5 years, from 2 villages belonging to him, in the neighbourhood of that city; that he had received part of what he wanted. and that he had done no injury to the country, and was then about to depart. It is true that he has 2 villages near Aurungabad; and I am informed that it is true that he has done no injury to the country; but I do not believe that he has moved farther than 6 or 7 miles from Aurungabad.

It is reported here, that the Nizam's soubahdar of Aurungabad invited Holkar to the plunder of that place; and I think there is some foundation for this report.

Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the 4th inst., but on the 7th he had made only one march. He waited for the Peshwah's vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, who was the person deputed by the Peshwah to communicate the treaty of Bassein to Scindiah. In fact, Ballojee Koonger was Scindiah's vakeel at Poonah, and he continued to act in that capacity after he was appointed to be the Peshwah's Dewan. He was in that situation when the Peshwah concluded the treaty of Bassein, to which he was privy. After this circumstance, and Scindiah's declaration to Collins, which you will read in the Governor-General's dispatch to the Secret Committee, it is strange that there should be now a prospect that Scindiah will oppose the arrangement. I have had more dealings with the Mahrattas than any other man now in India; and it is my opinion that they must be brought into order by an operation on their fears.

The Governor-General tells me that he is going to send me instructions, and I delay to do any thing till I hear further from him. My own opinion is, that I ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the danger of involving himself in hostilities with the British government, and to tell him that I was going into the Nizam's territories; that we are bound by treaty to defend them, and that he must expect very unpleasant consequences if I should find him there. At the same time, I should recall to his recollection his own sentiments on the treaty of Bassein; and I should press him to state openly his doubts, if he entertained any, as well as his claims upon the Nizam. If this letter should have any effect, I would press him by another to cross the Nerbudda. In the mean time, at all events, whether I write to him or not, I shall march into the Nizam's country; and if the government of Bombay supply me with a bridge of boats, for which I have asked them, I shall carry on the campaign during the



rainy season, which the Mahrattas cannot do ; and I think that a few months will entirely settle the question. I have got a fine army, in excellent order ; and I think that this combination or confederacy, with which we are threatened, will find that we can march as well as fight.

The Peshwah appears determined to adhere to the alliance, and to forward all its objects : he has written to Scindiah, and to the Rajah of Berar, to desire that they will not enter his country.

### 133. To the Governor-General.

*Failure of the Peshwah to perform his engagements to secure the Southern Jaghiredars. Their consequent absence from General Wellesley's army. Mischief of delay. General Wellesley thinks the Peshwah incapable only, not treacherous. The importance of promptly compelling Scindiah to take a decided line—increased by the news of peace in Europe. Need of special powers from the Governor-General insisted on.*

Camp at Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I marched from Poonah this morning, and shall proceed towards the Godavery. I am sorry to tell you that, notwithstanding our strong recommendation of the southern jaghiredars and the Peshwah's officers to his Highness ; his solemn promise to me that he would satisfy their claims in order to secure their future services ; and the assurances of his servants from time to time to Col. Close, that his Highness was taking measures to satisfy them, and to send out an army with me, I have not got with me one Mahratta horseman. Ragonaut Rao, however, has told Col. Close that the Peshwah will give the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb, and will not make the demand of the nuzzer. Appah Saheb has visited him, and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath is in treaty with Appah Saheb respecting the satisfaction of his other claims. But the Peshwah trusts none of his ministers, and pretends to do his own business ; although his time is much taken up by religious ceremonies and his pleasures, and he is very undecided. These faults in his character, added to a slowness natural to every Mahratta negotiator, render hopeless the conclusion of any important transaction.

In the mean time the season is advancing, the rivers which rise in the western ghauts will soon fill ; and then, if I am not on the spot to urge the chiefs, to take all the trouble, and to make all

the arrangements which are necessary to cross the rivers with the troops, months will elapse before they will overtake me ; even if the Peshwah should settle their claims, as far as to induce them to march from Poonah at all. This conduct of the Peshwah would appear like treachery ; but I declare that I do not suspect him of treachery. I really believe that he thinks his only safety is in the alliance with the Company, and that he wishes to carry into execution all the stipulations of the treaty. But he is incapable himself of doing business ; he will not trust his ministers ; and he is jealous of, and detests, his sirdars. The news which came from England yesterday makes it very desirable that we should break up in this quarter.

I have seen Col. Collins's letter to you of the 29th May ; and as I think it possible that the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah may never meet, I have urged the Colonel to press Scindiah to name a day on which he will explain his intentions ; and if Scindiah should decline to name a day, he should fix one for him, beyond which, in my opinion, he ought not to remain in his camp, if the explanation should not be satisfactory.

If Scindiah should move off, which I still think is very probable, I shall break up immediately. There must be troops in the Carnatic when the French arrive at Pondicherry. There will be none, unless Gen. Stuart's army can march to that quarter ; and if he should move before Scindiah shall have declared himself, the movement may have much effect upon Scindiah's declaration. And if there should be a war, the operations of this body of troops, at such a distance from our own frontiers, will be unpleasant, unless Gen. Stuart's force should be so posted as to preserve tranquillity in our rear, and defend the Company's territories. Upon the whole, therefore, it is absolutely necessary that Scindiah should immediately declare himself, and that, if his declaration should be favourable to our wishes, we should break up. Holkar's army is melting away : he is gone to the northward of the Taptee, and it is reported that he is going into Hindustan.

I wish that there were powers here to act at once, and to direct the negotiations with the different Mahratta chiefs to certain points as they arise. These questions occur daily, and nearly six weeks elapse before your orders can be received upon every fresh occurrence. At this moment Col. Collins ought to be ordered to press Scindiah to give an answer, particularly as he has hinted that he is wavering between peace and war ; and time, which is all that Scindiah requires, and which is fatal to us, will be gained

by the necessity of waiting for your orders, unless Col. Collins should attend to my suggestion. A communication ought also to be opened with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar, upon the subject of the treaty of Bassein, and endeavours made to separate them from Scindiah; and the Peshwah ought to be made to show his correspondence with Scindiah. I conclude, however, that Col. Close will ascertain whether his Highness has written to that chief, as he asserts he has.

#### 134. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Scindiah's language would justify immediate war. Yet he will probably yield at last. Still, both local circumstances and the prospect of renewed war with France require that he should be brought to a prompt decision.*

Camp near Charowly, 4th June, 1803.

I marched from Poonah this morning, and I shall continue my marches towards the river Godavery. Colonel Stevenson has crossed that river at Puttun.

I have just received your letter of the 30th of May, and Colonel Close has sent me that which you have transmitted to him of the same date. I am concerned that Scindiah should not have given you at once the answer which I think he will give you in the end.

I observe that in the 16th paragraph of the note of instructions to you, the Governor-General requires that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should instantly explain himself without reserve; but instead of making this explanation, he tells you that when he will meet the Rajah of Berar he will let you know whether it is to be peace or war. That very answer might justify an immediate attack upon Scindiah's possessions; but when it is connected with the probable delay of the arrival of the Rajah of Berar, and of the proposed meeting (which, after all, I believe will never take place), it appears to be absolutely necessary that there should be some farther explanation, or that, at all events, Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be called upon to fix the time at which he will give the asked for explanation. You will observe that I am directed to regulate my conduct in conformity to the instructions to you and to Colonel Close; but it is obvious that unless I am to consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah's delay to explain himself as a refusal, I cannot act; and unless he is called upon to fix the time when

he will give his explanation, we shall be obliged to remain in the situation which we ought particularly to endeavour to avoid, viz. with armies in the field incurring all the expense and inconvenience of war, without any of its honours or advantages.

You will observe that the object of all the Governor-General's instructions is to bring the question to a speedy decision, and to break up the army in this quarter. The necessity of this becomes more evident when we reflect upon the intelligence of the 11th of March received from Europe last night, from which it appears that there is a probability of the renewal of the war with France:

Believe me, & c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 135. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Stubborn facts, which impugn the Peshwah's sincerity in the alliance. Ought we not to withdraw from it, and negotiate with the Confederates on a different basis?*

(Extract.)

Camp, 8th June, 1803.

My being in the field here, without any of the Peshwah sirdars, is rather an awkward circumstance; and, in my opinion, we must immediately take into consideration the general situation of our affairs, and act in such manner as may appear best for the public interest. I have always thought the Peshwah to be incapable rather than disaffected; and I have imagined that he would send out an army with us, if he could: but two or three facts have occurred which rather warrant a conclusion to the contrary. One of these is, that he has not ordered out even Bappojee Vittell, whose troops were sent to encamp in my front, with great parade, on the day after I had the interview with his Highness; another is his shuffling backwards and forwards with Goklah and Appah Dessaye; and the third is his offer of the Zereen Putka to Appah Saheb, without the power attached to it, and, of course, without the honour. These are three stubborn facts, which we cannot conceal from ourselves, and which prove that there is something to prevent our having a Mahratta army in the field, besides his Highness's incapacity for business.

The present moment is critical. Our appearance in strength may prevent the threatened hostilities; but if it is clear that we are not strong at Poonah, which it must be to the whole world, if we continue in the field without even one Mahratta horseman, it

is obvious that we are weak, not only in appearance, but in a military point of view. There can be no doubt but that a war with these confederated Mahrattas would be rather a difficult undertaking, and attended with some kind of risk, if this body of troops be not accompanied by a corps of the light cavalry. The question is, whether, by our own influence and negotiations, we can bring forward immediately the body of cavalry, and the chiefs who came with me to Poonah, and, at the same time, keep up an appearance of an understanding with the Peshwah. If that can be effected in any manner, it is my opinion that the public interests imperiously demand it, and I shall do every thing to bring them forward. My objects in bringing them forward would be to give us such strength as would probably prevent hostilities, or, if the hostilities should take place, would give us a prospect of bringing them to a speedy conclusion. In either case, I am decidedly of opinion, that the alliance, in its present form, and with the present Peshwah, will never answer; and my efforts would be directed to withdrawing from it with honour and safety. If we cannot bring forward a body of this horse, and as, in my opinion, the alliance will not work in its present form, or at all with the present Peshwah, with whom it is not possible to have a community of interests, the question is, whether we ought not to alter the mode, and form, and object of our negotiations with Scindiah, Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar. All these questions press for immediate decision, and I put them to you and Malcolm for your consideration.

### 136. To Major Malcolm.

*Doubtful policy of the Treaty. Want of independent authority in the Peshwah. Bad tendency of subsidiary alliances, in weakening the governments subject to them. Effect of the Treaty in case of war with the French—the crucial test. It gives us a good military position; but may overbalance this by uniting the Mahratta Chiefs against us. War with France will involve war with the Mahrattas. Yet they could not efficiently unite with the French. Proposed modification of our alliance with the Peshwah. His dislike of us, and unsteadiness to it. Scindiah's hostile attitude really due to him.*

Camp at Rooie, 20th June, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 18th, with the memorandum enclosed, and I agree almost entirely in the opinions which you

have given. Till the question with the confederacy is decided we must stick to our ground in this country, otherwise the Nizam, and we, eventually, must suffer; and, even supposing that by withdrawing now we could stop the hostilities, which I doubt, we should only defer them to a period at which, probably, we should be less prepared than we are at the present moment. But as soon as there shall be no threats of the confederacy, either by the withdrawing of Scindiah, or from the success of the war, it is my opinion that we ought either entirely to new model the alliance, or to withdraw from it. You are well acquainted with my opinions on this subject.

The greater experience I gain of Mahratta affairs, the more convinced I am that we have been mistaken entirely regarding the constitution of the Mahratta Empire. In fact, the Peshwah never has had exclusive power in the state: it is true, that all treaties have been negotiated under his authority, and have been concluded in his name; but the chiefs of the Empire have consented to them; and the want of this consent, on the part of any one of them, in this case, or of power in the head of the Empire, independent of these chiefs, is the difficulty of this case at the present moment. I put out of the question the consent of the Putwurduns, Goklah, &c., because I have always considered, and it must appear to every body to be one which proceeds from causes entirely independent of the treaty, and of the circumstances which occasioned it, and of the Peshwah himself. These chiefs act under the treaty, because they had a previous acquaintance with us; and because they saw some prospect of being relieved from their difficulties by our interference, and of becoming in some degree independent under our protection. Had it not been for this hope, not one of them would have been with us, and we should have had a treaty with a cipher, bearing the name of Peshwah, without a particle of power.

Whatever may be the result of the present crisis, we shall gain nothing by the treaty. Scindiah, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, and possibly others, will be separate and independent powers in India, very probably leagued for the present in a defensive alliance. We must look to that, and must not reduce our military establishments. Is the peace of India secured? I doubt it, as far as we are concerned. Supposing there should be no war with the confederates, the first consequence of the alliance must be to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in the northern countries, then to settle the Kolapoor question, &c.; and, supposing

that we have another war with the French, there is no doubt but that we shall have a war with the Mahrattas.

One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely annihilate the military power of the governments with which we contract them; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us. This treaty with the Peshwah has certainly given us a good military position; but the question is, whether, in case the nation should be involved in a war with the French, which, in my opinion, is the hypothesis upon which all Indian politics should turn, the military position is so good that it cannot be forced; and whether we do not lose more by the risk of having all the powerful Mahrattas against us, at such a time, than we should gain by having the Peshwah certainly on our side, and by the goodness of our military position. Upon this point I have to observe, that the more I see of the Mahrattas, the more convinced I am that they never could have any alliance with the French. The French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure them; and there is not a Mahratta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling, or who would not require assistance from them.

In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up our connexion with the Peshwah, so as that he might not be trampled upon; at the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the Empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the state should be called upon to decide. In short, I would preserve the existence of the state; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty. In this consideration of the subject I have not touched upon the disinclination of the Peshwah to the alliance, of which I have scarcely a doubt, and, at all events, upon his inability to perform the conditions to which he has bound himself. But he has not even performed those conditions which must be in his power. Has he not now daily communications with Scindiah's durbar, and even with Holkar, of which the British Resident has no knowledge whatever? His very letter to Scindiah, which has been extorted from him, almost by force, contains a breach of treaty. In it, he desires that chief to remain where he is, pointedly; whereas, he

knows that the requisition of the Governor-General, and the only event which can ensure peace, is Scindiah's recrossing the Nerbudda.

You may depend upon it, that, if Collins had not pushed the negotiation as he has done ; and if Scindiah had any option besides moving into the Nizam's territories, or returning to his own to procure subsistence : in short, if he could procure subsistence where he is, he would remain there, in consequence of this paragraph in the Peshwah's letter. Besides, I see, in the ackbar, that he is going to send another vakeel to Scindiah. For what purpose ? And let it be stated for what reason the Peshwah did not give his letter to the British minister to be forwarded to Scindiah, knowing that that Chief says the last did not reach him, instead of sending it through his own vakeel, whom he must mistrust. Upon the whole, I see no prospect under the present treaty, and I should decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity may offer.

Collins is just in the right state. The fellow will explain himself, and will ask him to stay, and will pretend that he cannot move off on account of the rain, the swelling of the rivers, or because my troops are in this country ; and thus the matter may hang on for some time longer. I think that, if the war had not been still doubtful, Collins would have got an answer inimical to his memorial. The truth is, they are all shaking ; and, if the allies had come out of Poonah with me, there would be no war.

I wish you would take up money wherever you can get it, and not from me. The Company may be losers, but my treasury will be richer.

### 137. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Holkar's conduct will probably determine that of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Hence, the impolicy of threatening him with war on our part. General Wellesley's want of grain and transport. The Peshwah's faithlessness to the alliance, and his failure to provide transport bullocks. Political and military moral of the situation.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 23rd June, 1803.

I think it probable that the confederates have not yet arranged their matters, that Holkar has not yet come into their views, and



that for that reason they wish to delay the decision for some time longer. Holkar's object would appear to be to get hold of the Holkar territory, and his game to effect it by a war between Scindiah and us. If there should be no war between Scindiah and us, he will get hold of that territory, but not so certainly, either by a peace mediated by Ragojee Bhoonslah, and guaranteed by him, or by the continuation of the contest with Scindiah. Holkar's object must be, obviously, to keep himself out of the contest with us, and to urge the others into it. But it is probable that Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah perceive that inclination, and want to urge him to go hand in hand with them. They have now a fair opportunity of doing this, by apprizing him that he is to be attacked by the English; and upon this ground it is unfortunate that Col. Collins's moonshee should have said, and that the Peshwah should have written, that we intended to attack Holkar. In addition to the impolicy of such a declaration, at the present moment, it is any thing but true, and ought, in my opinion, under the instructions of the Governor-General, to be firmly contradicted. If you should be of that opinion, it would be well if you were to make a suggestion upon the subject to Col. Collins.

I apprized you in my letter of yesterday of my want of grain. I started from Poonah with 5900 bags of rice, which, upon a moderate calculation, would have lasted me 59 days, and I might have spun it out to 90 days. The losses in cattle obliged me to leave some behind in the neighbourhood of Poonah, and to consume much larger quantities than were necessary in camp; but even with these drawbacks I ought to have had now a sufficiency to last me for a month, but the brinjarries have contrived to make away with two-thirds of it.

\*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*   \*

If the answer of Scindiah to Collins should be at all peaceable and friendly, in my opinion we ought to accept it; and I ought to inform him that I intend to recross the Beemah, and to break up the army, as soon as I find that he commences to recross the Nerbudda.

What has happened already, and the situation of this body of troops, are sufficient proofs that we cannot carry on a war in this country, after having been 4 months from Seringapatam, and having marched nearly 700 miles, without having the assistance of the resources of Bombay and Poonah. The government of Bombay is unable (and always will be so with its present in-

struments) to afford us any assistance, and the Peshwah is both unable and unwilling. With half the means in their power, and without the assistance of the store collected at Poonah, it is pleasing to see how the Nizam's government have supported the army under Col. Stevenson ; but, although the provision is at their door at Poonah, and brought there without the smallest aid from them, they will not give us a bullock to remove it.

I can have but one opinion upon this subject, and that is, that, supposing the Peshwah's inability to be of the lowest kind, there must be besides an unwillingness on his part, which has contributed to prevent us from enjoying any of the resources of Poonah. It is not to be believed that there are no cattle in that city. Let a house or a shop be produced in which there is not a bullock, and I will agree that I am mistaken ; and the police can command every bullock in the place, particularly when it is known that we are willing to pay highly for all that we receive. But it is useless to search for proofs of the Peshwah's dissimulation to us, or of his unwillingness to come forward to our assistance in a contest in which we are likely to be involved from our interference in his favour. We must look for a remedy for these evils ; and I acknowledge that I see none that are not of a nature more violent than are likely to be adopted.

The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved will be an useful lesson to governments, and to us all : first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is insincerity ; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the distance of 700 miles from our own resources ; not only not having the government of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy.

### 138. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Want of communication with Holkar ; and of singleness and unity of authority in the conduct of the negotiation.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 24th June, 1803.

I think that it cannot be sufficiently lamented that we have not a communication with Holkar, or that the Governor-General is not nearer the scene of operations and negotiations, or has not empowered some person to conclude with those chiefs at

once. Our negotiators are able men, certainly: but in apparently trifling points I have observed that they have more than once deviated from the general plan of the negotiation; and when a fault has occurred, it has not been possible to apply a remedy without a reference to Bengal, which takes 2 months. That which I have above mentioned is one of those errors; and the pains which Col. Collins took for some time to persuade Scindiah to march towards Poonah is another.

### 139. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The Governor-General's instructions no longer meet the actual case. The Peshwah's misconduct alters our whole position. Hence, we ought to alter our line, and retrace our steps. The Governor-General should come to Madras.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 25th June, 1803.

In respect to your suggestion, that I should urge Col. Collins to quit Scindiah's camp, I have to observe, that I have already written to urge him to accelerate his negotiation. I have no direct communication with him; indeed, I never received from you the account of his dawd stages. The muttaseddee at Aurungabad occasionally sends me letters, but they are longer on the road than those which come by Poonah. Besides, I think it much to be doubted whether the negotiation with Scindiah, on the present footing, ought to be accelerated under present circumstances. It is true that we must go to war under any difficulties rather than lose our honour; but we must keep out of the war if it is practicable.

In my opinion, the state of affairs is much altered since the Governor-General wrote the instructions under which Collins is acting at this moment. It was then supposed that we had the Peshwah with us. I think that is, at least, doubtful at the present moment; and the question is, whether, instead of urging forward Collins's negotiation, on the footing established under that notion, we ought not rather to procrastinate it; to report the state of the case at the present moment at the Peshwah's durbar to the Governor-General, and ask for further orders. This opinion of mine, that the Peshwah is not with us, may, it is true, be erroneous. But it is founded upon the fact that his Highness has not yet taken any steps, recommended to

him by the Company's government, or which a sense of his own interests would have suggested, either to prevent the combination of the northern chiefs, or to assist us, or to enable us to carry on the contest against them, if it should be formed ; and his acts, as far as they have come to our knowledge, have tended rather to our prejudice. And if we may believe Col. Collins and the assertion of Scindiah and his ministers, the Peshwah has a correspondence with Ballojee Koonger and Scindiah's durbar, of the nature of which we are entirely ignorant. I cannot but feel that, if we are to have a war under these circumstances, it will be one much more complicated than that expected to be the result of the course of action pointed out by the Governor-General's instructions ; but one to which our resources are, I trust, fully equal. It is a duty, however, that we owe to our country, to avoid it, if we can, with honour ; and I should hope that, if timely measures are taken, it might be avoided.

Upon the ground of the Peshwah's duplicity, the question is, what line we ought to suggest to the Governor-General? The first thing he ought to do should be to come to Bombay. As for the settlement of the Mahratta question, that appears to be beyond a possibility : in that case the best thing we can do is to restore matters nearly to the state in which they were when we entered the country, and allow them to fight out their own quarrels. The very hint of our taking this step would dissolve the confederacy at once. We should then have to defend the Nizam's country and our own territories, which, probably, they would never attack.

#### 140. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*War to be avoided, if possible. The Mahratta Chiefs jealous of us, but also of each other ; and more afraid of us than of each other. Profit and loss to them from the Treaty of Bassein. Why they affect to be united, while they are probably not, nor will be. We ought to avert war by acting on their fears, and lessening their hopes of gaining by it. Course suggested to accomplish this.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 29th June, 1803.

I proceed to give you my opinion on the present state of our affairs. I think it is much altered in many respects since the Governor-General wrote the instructions under which you have

been acting lately. You will perceive by late letters from Lieutenant-Colonel Close, that it is probable that the treaty of Bassein will not work as was expected even in the Peshwah's durbar; and, on the other hand, the intelligence received from England in the beginning of June gives great reason to believe that the war with the French may have been renewed. Every circumstance, therefore, points out the necessity that, if possible, the war with the northern Mahratta chiefs should be avoided.

The question is, in what manner is this desirable object to be attained? I have long been accustomed to view these different Mahratta governments as powers not guided by any rational system of policy, or any notion of national honour, but solely by their momentary fears of loss or hope of gain. Since the fall of Tippoo there is no doubt but that they have viewed the British power with jealousy and apprehension, and various endeavours have been made to unite their discordant politics in one object, that of attacking and lessening it; but these endeavours have constantly failed, not because each chief was not sensible of the greatness of the British power, but because each wanted confidence in his neighbour, each felt that he had more to apprehend immediately from him than he had from the British government, and that he ran less risk of loss from a contest with his own neighbour than he did from one with the British government.

Upon this view of our situation in respect to the Mahrattas the treaty of Bassein was concluded. This treaty does not deprive any of the northern chiefs of anything excepting of two objects of ambition: one, the power of the government of Poonah; the other, the benefit resulting from the claims of that government upon the Nizam, which would be naturally in the hands of that chief who should have the power of the government of Poonah. Under every other point of view the treaty of Bassein is beneficial to each of the northern chiefs. It secures to each, under the guarantee of British faith, not only the possessions which have long belonged to his family, but likewise those which he may have usurped from the weakness of the Peshwah's government during the last six years of troubles, occasioned by the contests of these very chiefs for the power of His Highness's government. They could not have this security under any other possible establishment of the Peshwah's power. If it should be established by means of any one of them, the others know well that they would lose their possessions; and if

it should be established by means independent either of any of them or of us (of which I see no probability), the possessions of these chiefs, at least those which they have usurped from the weakness of the government, would be lost.

The motive for war, therefore, with these chiefs at the present moment cannot be the fear of the immediate, or even remote, consequences of the establishment of our power in the government of Poonah, but it must be a desire to regain that object of ambition for themselves. Here I might enter into an argument upon the improbability that these chiefs would ever unite for the purpose of regaining that power for any one of them; but these topics have been already adverted to in some degree, and are, besides, well known to every body. But I should wish to know, is it true that they have united? Are there any signs that Scindiah and Holkar have made peace? Is there any confidence between these chieftains? Or dare either of them trust himself in the camp of the other, or in an operation in which their mutual safety depends upon their mutual assistance? Whatever each of them may hold forth, therefore, I contend for it that they are not united, and that their fear of danger is not from us, but from each other.

It may be asked, if they are not united, why should they declare they are, and risk a war with the power of the British government? In answer, I say that they know our moderation, and that as long as they refrain from hostility, they do not risk a war. They are not unacquainted with our fears of a war with a Mahratta confederacy, and they hope by their threats to frighten us or our allies, and to induce us to abandon our situation at Poonah.

Upon the whole, then, I am convinced not only that the confederacy is not, but that it will not be formed.

But the question whether there will be peace or war does not, in my opinion, depend upon the fact whether the confederacy is formed or not, or upon any political question, excepting upon the hope of advantage or the fear of loss entertained by the chiefs in the camp with you. To withdraw from the alliance with the Peshwah, if it were practicable after what has passed, would affect this question only in this manner: it would give reason to our enemies to suppose that we wanted confidence in ourselves, and that their menaces had had their effect; and their hope of advantage from the war would be increased.

In my opinion, therefore, our course of action at this moment

ought to be calculated in such manner as to increase their sense of danger, and decrease their hope of gain from the war, as the best means of preserving the peace. There is no doubt but that at this moment Scindiah's territories on this side of the Godavery and at Baroach are exposed to certain loss, and that those of the Rajah of Berar bordering upon the sea coast are in the same situation. On the other hand, there is no hope of immediate gain. Holkar has passed the Taptee, and cannot return in time to assist the other two, supposing them to be united; and the Nizam's army in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad is fully equal to defend His Highness's territory north of the Godavery till I shall be enabled to cross that river. This, therefore, appears to me to be the time best calculated for bringing these chiefs to a decision on the question of peace or war.

On this ground I would immediately send a memorial to Scindiah stating the earnest desire of the British government to remain at peace. I would explain the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein, the security it affords to the territories of each of the chiefs, and the provision it makes for the peace of India. I would point out the right which the Peshwah had to conclude that treaty independently of Scindiah.

I would repeat his declared approbation of the measure in his letters to Colonel Close. I would advert to the fact that neither he nor his ministers have ever made any detailed objection to any part of the treaty, I would recall to his recollection his friendly declaration to yourself, and I would contrast that declaration with his recent declared doubt whether there should be peace or war.

I would call upon him to perform his engagement to explain that doubt in three days from the delivery of that paper, and I would announce my intention of departing on that day if I should not then receive his explanation; at the same time I should call upon him to act in conformity with his declarations, and if he were inclined for peace that he should withdraw his army from the Nizam's frontier into its usual stations, and allow us also to withdraw our troops to our own territories.

If Scindiah should not give the explanation which you require, and should not act in conformity to his declaration, you cannot stay in his camp one moment after the time fixed by yourself for your departure.

You will observe that my object is the preservation of peace. If I saw the smallest prospect of avoiding the war by any poli-

tical negotiation, I should recommend you to enter upon it ; but under present circumstances nothing can be done till the Rajah of Berar and Scindiah will have withdrawn from the Nizam's frontier.

I have, &c.,  
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 141. To the Governor-General.

*Time lost through Col. Collins' mistaken belief in peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and the Peshwah's plausible inactivity. 'General Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations.'*

(Extract.)

Camp at Peepulgaum, 8th July, 1803.

Holkar has crossed the river Taptee, with his whole army, and appears disinclined, and I hear has positively refused, to trust his person in the same camp with Scindiah.

Notwithstanding Col. Collins's assertion, Indore has not been given over to Holkar ; and I believe that the peace which the Colonel supposed to have been concluded is only a cessation of hostilities, which Scindiah has been prevailed upon to grant by Ragojee Bhonslah, in order to gain time for the negotiation of a peace ; and of which Holkar has taken advantage, in order to place the Taptee between his army and that of Scindiah.

In the mean time, we, who were ready on the 4th June, have lost that month and part of this for our operations ; and, unless Col. Collins has attended to a second representation, which I made to him in the end of June, we are as far from our point as we were in the month of May. The Colonel has gone upon a false notion from the beginning. He has supposed that peace was concluded between Holkar and Scindiah, because Scindiah's ministers had told him so ; and he has had no other information, and has never produced any one proof of the fact, the truth of which he believed, and invariably asserted. Under this notion, he has been timid, and has afforded them time to conclude the peace, and to intrigue, which is all that they desired.

Matters also at Poonah are nearly in the same state in which they were when I marched. The Peshwah promises every thing, and performs nothing. The Mahratta sirdars are still in that city, excepting Goklah, who is encamped at a small distance from me. The Peshwah has not satisfied them, and they wait



to see the result of the first operations against Scindiah, and who has the upper hand. They are prevented from joining the confederates at present by Gen. Stuart's position at Moodgul in the Dooab. I observe, however, that Gen. Stuart is inclined to withdraw from this position, in consequence of the arrival of the French at Pondicherry. But I have written to represent to him the advantage which we all derive from it. I have shown him that he keeps in tranquillity the territories of the Nizam and Hyderabad, notwithstanding his Highness's sickness, the probability of his death, and the absence of all his troops beyond the Godavery; that he awes Poonah, and keeps in tranquillity all the Mahratta territory south of the Beemah, notwithstanding the conduct of the Peshwah, which must appear to his subjects like treachery, and a desire to break his treaty with the British government; that, by threatening Meritch and Darwar, he secures at least the neutrality of the Putwurduns, and the continuance of the cessation of hostilities between that family and the Rajah of Kolapoor, which is so necessary to the existence of my communications; and that he defends the Company's territories, and those of the Rajah of Mysore, and secures their tranquillity. At the same time, in the event of the Nizam's death and consequent disturbance of Hyderabad, he can reach that capital in a few marches; or in the event of any accidents happening to the troops in this quarter, he has equal facility in moving to Poonah. In short, I may call Gen. Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations; and it is that which, in case of a war with the Mahrattas, will prevent a general insurrection in the territories of the Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and the southern Mahratta Chiefs. It was with a view to these advantages that I first recommended to Gen. Stuart to take it up; and every day's experience has shown the benefits which we have derived from it.

#### 142. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*War with Holkar to be avoided, if possible. Goklah restless and dissatisfied.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Baungaum, 10th July, 1803.

Goklah has just paid me a visit. He has expressed a most anxious desire to hoist the Peshwah's colours in a village called Mandegaon, belonging to Holkar, and one of the ancient possessions of the Holkar family. I have requested him most earnestly

to desist from this measure for some days, as I wish to be at peace with Holkar, and do not intend to attack that chief, unless he should attack the Company or their allies.

Goklah is rather anxious upon this subject, as he received the Peshwah's orders to hoist his colours in all the possessions of the Holkar family, near which he should march. I wish that you would explain that I have prevented him from taking possession of this village. Goklah is also very anxious respecting his pay. I wish that you would urge the durbar to make some permanent provision for him. If they would promise that we should be repaid the sums which we should advance him, we might contrive to keep him afloat, by means of bills upon Bombay or Bengal, upon which he would be able to get money. Consider this subject, as it is really very desirable that we should have this body of troops paid.

143. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Intimation of his intention to countermarch the British army  
when the Confederates withdraw theirs.*

Camp, 11th July, 1803

As I have not received an answer to the letter which I wrote you on the 29th June, I much fear that it may have missed you, and I send you a duplicate of it.

I have seen your letter to the Governor-General of the 6th. It occurs to me that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar may be inclined to withdraw to their own capitals, if they should be assured that we would withdraw likewise. I certainly propose to repass the Beemah myself, and to order Colonel Stevenson to repass the Godavery, as soon as I find that those chiefs commence their march towards their own territories; and I shall break up the army in this quarter as soon as I shall be convinced that they no longer threaten the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and are settled, the one to the northward of the Nerbudda, the other at Nagpoor.

I communicate to you these intentions, in order that you may make such use of them as you may think proper.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 144. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*The language of the Confederates inconsistent with itself and with their conduct. The latter hostile. They are finessing to gain time, and to secure Holkar, and a better season for war. They must at once be brought to the test of action—must retire, or have war.*

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 6th inst., and I have taken into consideration the subject upon which you have desired that I should communicate to you my opinion.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared, in their letters to the Governor-General, that they have no intention to obstruct the arrangement concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah; and that they are desirous of maintaining the relations of amity which so long subsisted between the British government and them, and that they will not ascend the Adjunttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah. I am sorry to observe, however, that they still intend to advance with their armies to the Adjunttee ghaut, upon the Nizam's frontier, notwithstanding their peaceable declarations. These declarations have been preceded by others of a directly opposite tendency. The chiefs have declared that they were united for the purpose of attacking the British government and their allies; and Scindiah, in particular, has said that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the English. Is the advance to the Adjunttee ghaut, which is the acknowledged boundary between the Mahrattas and the Nizam, consistent with the hostile or with the pacific declaration? Upon this point there can be no doubt; there can be no use in assembling an army upon the Nizam's frontier, particularly at the present moment, when their services must be required elsewhere, excepting to attack the Nizam.

But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs endeavour to deceive the British government, if their intentions are hostile? To this, I answer, that their measures are not prepared; they have not yet brought Holkar into them; the British troops are prepared for action, and they are not; some vulnerable points in Scindiah's territories are exposed to the attacks of the British troops; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are defended at present at all points. By the delay of the com-

mencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better prepared ; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories ; and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them at the present moment. Therefore, I conclude that the advantage of delay is theirs ; that they have made their pacific declarations in order to gain time ; and that their real intentions are to be known only from their actions.

If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented us from viewing, with indifference, the assembly of their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, and the British government must have insisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam ; nor can they, in that at present under consideration, particularly as I have, above, pointed out the great advantages which those Chiefs will derive from delaying to commence hostilities.

I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that, if the Rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack them without loss of time. Accordingly, I have written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a translation of it.

If you should find that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar remain encamped in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, I request you to deliver that letter, unless you should be of opinion that a verbal communication from yourself of my sentiments and intentions would be more likely to induce that chief to withdraw ; or unless you should have other solid grounds for believing that he is sincere in his last declaration, and that his intentions are pacific. But, in my opinion, his declaration and his intentions cannot be trusted, unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his march to Nagpoor.

## 145. To Lieutenant-Colonel Closen.

*The Peshwah sends only a fraction of his stipulated contingent ; provides no adequate means for paying this ; and diverts it from the general objects of the armament. Explicit remonstrances to be addressed to his ministers.*

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire, and that, when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah's sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness's sunnuds torn. He said that the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah. He had been obliged to discharge, and pay the arrears of, all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of serinjaumy lands ; and that, in order to pay those arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession. That, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds ; and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no benefit from them for some time ; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem* to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghire. They had consented to his proposal, but, hitherto, they have paid him nothing.

I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah's ministers, whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees *per mensem*, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghire. If they did, I beg of you to urge them to pay him the money. At all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence ; and I request you to urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available. If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged

Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops, till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghire; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will endeavour to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him. I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness's troops.

In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer, to proceed, in concert with Bappojee Goncish Goklah, to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck, and to go as far even as to the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

I beg you to remind the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops; instead of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them,

1st. That, when a large body of the enemy's troops are assembled upon the frontiers, and when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness's musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced.

2ndly. That, as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontiers, his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle, his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to, and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized.

3rdly. That no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighbourhood; but that this expedition against Amrut Rao's troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah's.

4thly. That the only chance of success against the hostile

armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in the front.

5thly. That many rivers will divide these detachments with Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops; that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable; and that, upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goncish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao: although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage. I propose, however, to endeavour to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprize the Peshwah's ministers.

#### 146. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

*You have pledged your word for peace. Yet you have threatened war, both in word and deed. This has required counter precautions. You must be the first to withdraw—then I shall. Otherwise, I shall attack you. Your condition—that we shall respect Treaties—is otiose.*

Camp, 14th July, 1803.

In consequence of the reports that you had confederated with other chiefs to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein, between the Hon. Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; of your military preparations, and your advance to the frontiers of the Nizam; and, above all, of your declaration to the British Resident with your camp, that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the Company; I received the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General to move with the troops to the frontiers, to take means of precaution, and to be prepared to act if you should carry your threats into execution.

The treaty of Bassein has since been communicated to you, and you must have observed that it provides amply for your security; and that, in consequence of this instrument, you will hold your territories in the Deccan by the same secure tenure that you have long held those in Hindustan, bordering upon the Company's frontier, notwithstanding your absence from them with your armies.

I perceive, by your letter to his Excellency the Governor-General, of which Col. Collins has communicated to me a copy,

that you have declared that you have no intention to commence hostilities against the Company or their allies, or to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein by the parties who had a right to enter into it.

I have, accordingly, the greatest pleasure in contemplating the probability of the duration of peace between the Hon. Company and your government, which has long subsisted with much benefit to both parties. But, if you are sincere in this declaration of your friendly intentions, there appears to be no occasion for assembling your army, and joining it with that of the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier. That measure, uncombined with other circumstances, would, at any time, render necessary corresponding measures of precaution, the result of which would be either your removal from the frontier of the Company's ally, or an appeal to arms; but when it has been accompanied by declarations of an hostile nature, when you have declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war between the Company and your government, it becomes more necessary that you should remove your troops to their usual stations.

Whatever respect I may have for your word, so solemnly pledged, as it is, in your letter to the Governor-General to which I have alluded, common prudence requires that I should not trust to that alone for the security of the Company and their allies, which has been given to my charge. Accordingly, I call upon you, if your professions are sincere, to withdraw, with your troops, to their usual stations across the river Nerbudda.

You were the first, by your hostile measures and declarations, and the expression of doubts of the duration of the peace between the Hon. Company and your government, and by the movement of your troops, to render necessary corresponding measures of precaution by the Company's government; and you ought to be the first to withdraw your troops, if your intentions are really as pacific as you profess them to be. When you shall have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I also shall draw back those under my command to their usual stations.

But if, unfortunately, I should have learnt that, after the receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies



in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility; and I shall immediately carry on those operations against you which are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of the Company's armies.

In your letter to the Governor-General, you have declared that you do not intend to oppose the arrangement concluded at Bassein, provided the arrangements of the Peshwah with you and Ragojee Bhoonslah, and other chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, are respected. The treaty of Bassein secures your interests; and it is not consistent with that treaty, or with the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty: you may, therefore, be satisfied on that head.

#### 147. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

*Your interests are secured by the Treaty of Bassein, of which I send you a copy. Hence, I have little doubt that you will remain at peace with the Company, which is your best course.*

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

Much time has elapsed since I have had the pleasure of hearing from you, although I am anxious to cultivate the good understanding which has subsisted between the Hon. Company's government and you. With this view, I now send you a copy of the treaty concluded at Bassein, between the Hon. Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; from the general defensive tenor of which you will observe that the peace and security of India are provided for. You will also perceive, that the 12th article provides effectually for the security of all the great Mahratta jaghiredars, and that those of the Holkar family are particularly named. This article will satisfy your mind, notwithstanding the endeavours which have been made to raise your doubts; and you will see that the interest and security of your family are connected with this treaty, and that, in fact, they can be provided for in no other manner. That being the case, whatever others may do, I have little doubt but that you will conduct yourself in the manner which your own interests will dictate, and that you will continue in peace with the Company.

I send this letter in charge of Kawder Nawaz Khan, a respectable officer, who enjoys my confidence, and who will explain any thing you desire to know respecting my wishes.

## 148. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Why no day named for Scindiah's countermarch.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

I have not fixed when he should withdraw: 1st, because I wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities will be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary: 2ndly, there is every reason to expect instructions from the Governor-General, applicable to the present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe.

## 149. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Scindiah may send a news-writer, if he retires—not otherwise.  
Why no day fixed for his retiring.*

Camp, 17th July, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 13th instant, in which you communicate the wishes of Dowlut Rao Scindiah that a news-writer on his part should be permitted to reside in this camp, and that a dawk should be allowed to run from thence to him.

Provided Dowlut Rao Scindiah is determined to preserve the relations of amity, and to remain at peace with the Company, and if he withdraw his troops from the frontiers of His Highness the Nizam, and proceed with them towards his own territories, which is the only proof I desire, or can admit, of his amicable intentions, I have no objection to his sending here a newswriter, or to his communicating with him in any manner that he may think proper. On the contrary, I wish him to be made fully acquainted with all that passes here, as I am certain that the more his people see of us the more convinced they will be that the British government have no intention to injure them.

But if Dowlut Rao Scindiah perseveres in retaining his hostile position upon the Nizam's frontier, and does not withdraw to his own territories, I must consider him in a state of hostility with the Company. I can allow of no communication between my camp and his by the means of newswriters, and it will be useless for him to send a person of that description to this camp.

I have perused a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Close's letter to you of the 15th. The only difference between the letter which

I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and that which Colonel Close proposed I should write is, that I have not fixed a day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall depart. My reasons for preferring the mode which I have adopted are, that it leaves me the choice of the day on which to commence my operations, supposing them to be necessary; it renders greater the probability that I shall strike the first blow; and it leaves matters open so far as that, if the Governor-General should alter his plan, I can alter my proceedings. On the other hand, to fix a day for his departure has an appearance of harshness and hostility which is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of the Governor-General's instructions.

I mention these circumstances lest you should suppose that there is any difference of opinion between Lieutenant-Colonel Close and me upon the main point.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 150. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Instructions to insist on the immediate countermarch of the Confederates, as an ultimatum; and to leave Scindiah's camp unless they comply. Information to be obtained about their forces.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

I have the honour to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have received from his Excellency the Governor-General, from a perusal of which you will perceive that his Excellency has been pleased to intrust to me extraordinary powers, for the purpose of concluding whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. I request you to be so kind as to communicate this circumstance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

You will be so kind, at the same time, as to inform those Chiefs that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests, and to enter into negotiations with them upon objects by which they may suppose those interests to be affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up on the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan and Berar respectively; and, on my

part, I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. You will point out to those Chiefs, that, as they have declared they have no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw their troops to their several stations is only consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they are sincere. On the other hand, to retain their position upon the Nizam's frontier is the strongest proof they can give of the insincerity of those declarations. You will, therefore, again call upon them to retire, as being the only measure by which the peace between the British government and them can be preserved.

It may happen that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will urge the difficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, as an excuse for not withdrawing his troops at the present moment; that excuse will not apply at all to the Rajah of Berar, to whose return to Nagpoor there are no impediments whatever, and therefore his march to his capital is indispensable. It might be disputed in respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; for it is certain, that the passage of the army of that chief over those rivers will be attended with some difficulties. Those difficulties, however, are to be surmounted; and, at all events, there is nothing to prevent his retiring to Burhampoor, and commencing to send his troops across the Taptee, and making arrangements for sending them across the Nerbudda. If he should urge these difficulties, you will make known to him my sentiments upon them as above stated, and you will require him to give a proof that his declarations are not insincere, by falling back to Burhampoor, and by commencing to pass his troops over the Taptee, and his arrangements for crossing the Nerbudda.

If the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpoor, and Scindiah should adopt the measures above pointed out, as preparatory to his crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, I shall be satisfied. But if you should find those chiefs obstinately determined to remain in their positions upon the Nizam's frontier, you will be so good as to inform them, that I have requested you to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, accordingly, you will leave it on the following day.

\* \* \* \* \*

Before you quit Scindiah's camp, it would be very desirable that you should endeavour to ascertain the general position of his troops, and the numbers and description in each station, and by whom commanded. Indeed, this measure would be desirable

at all events, whether that chief consents to retire or not; as, supposing that he should retire, you cannot be certain that he will have withdrawn all his troops, unless you are acquainted with their numbers, and the stations they at present occupy.

I request you also to endeavour to ascertain the same circumstances respecting the troops of the Rajah of Berar, and to communicate the intelligence you will receive regarding the troops of each chief to Col. Stevenson, as well as to me.

#### 151. To the Governor-General.

*Report of proceedings relating to the Confederates. Advantage in case they comply with our ultimatum. The weakness of the Peshwah's government, the state of the country, and the wavering disposition of the chiefs—our great difficulties. The state of the Guickwar's government, and the Nizam's failing health, also inconvenient. An European war cannot shake our strength in India. Success in the war not doubtful. The difficulty of reconciling the Peshwah to Amrut Rao. Intercourse with Holkar.*

Camp at Sangwee, 24th July, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your Excellency's letters of the 26th and 27th June.

Before they had reached me, in obedience to your Excellency's orders of the 8th and 30th May, and in consequence of a reference made to me by Col. Collins, I had written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to require that chief to separate himself from the Rajah of Berar, and to retire with his troops across the river Nerbudda. A copy of that, and a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 14th inst. to Col. Collins, have been already transmitted by Lieut.-Col. Close, to be laid before your Excellency.

From the day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah was called upon, in the name of your Excellency, to declare his views in his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that he was urged not to advance to Poonah, it was obvious that his only design was to gain time. He had not concluded his negotiations with Jeswunt Rao Holkar till a late period in this month; and he, as well as the Rajah of Berar, saw clearly the disadvantages under which they would commence hostilities during the season in which the rivers are full. Those disadvantages were so great, particularly as the troops of Jeswunt Rao

Holkar were to the northward of the river Taptee, that it was probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar would separate, and order their troops to their usual stations. In this they incur the risks of those evils which must result from the commencement of hostilities at that moment. I therefore thought it proper to urge forward the decision, whether there should be peace or war; and at the same time that I gave Dowlut Rao Scindiah every assurance of the pacific views and intentions of the British government, I called upon him to adopt that measure, which your Excellency conceived would give the British government a security that the peace would last.

On the 18th I received your Excellency's letter of the 26th June; and I wrote a letter to Col. Collins, of which I enclosed a copy, in which I desired that officer to apprize Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the powers with which your Excellency has been pleased to trust me. I requested him again to call upon those chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to their usual stations; and to inform them that, if they refused to do so, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the following day. Since I have written that letter, I have received your Excellency's letter of the 27th; and I am induced to hope that you will approve of all the steps taken till that moment, to bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

I have perused a copy of Col. Collins's dispatch to your Excellency, of the 18th, which contains a recognition on the part of Scindiah of the benefits which he will derive from the treaty of Bassein, and other symptoms of a change of councils in the durbar of that chief. But, notwithstanding the contents of that dispatch, the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah cannot be considered pacific, unless they shall separate, and each shall withdraw his troops to their usual stations. I have therefore made no alteration in the instructions which I gave to Col. Collins on the 18th, and he will certainly depart from Scindiah's camp if he finds that the chiefs will not retire.

If, however, they should retire, I consider that the British government will have security for the duration of the peace, as amply as it can have while the power of these chiefs shall last. On the one hand, it will be obvious that fear of the power of the British government was the cause of their retreat; on the other, it will be equally obvious that the power which will have removed these formidable armies to a distance must increase; that no circumstances of distress from European enemies can prevent the

growth of the strength of the British government in this quarter, and therefore that an attempt to attack it hereafter must be hopeless.

The difficulties under which the force of the British government labours at the present moment, and which give the greatest encouragement to the confederate chiefs, are the state of weakness and confusion of the Peshwah's government; the general unsettled and ruinous state of the country; and the wavering disposition of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, who alone preserve the appearance and relations of fidelity towards the Peshwah.

The weak and confused state of the Peshwah's government is to be attributed principally to his personal character, but also, in a great degree, to the rebellions and disturbances which have prevailed throughout the Mahratta Empire for the last 7 years. It could not be expected that even a government regularly organized would be able to resume its functions and its powers immediately after a revolution such as that effected by the victories of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preceded as they were by the long usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, much less one conducted by a man so weak as Bajee Rao. But it may be reasonably expected this state of affairs will improve with the assistance of the British government, and that the Peshwah will have an authority for which there will be some respect.

The whole of the Mahratta territory is unsettled and in ruins. Holkar's armies consumed the produce of the last year, and, owing to their plunder and extortion, entire districts were depopulated, and the habitations of the people destroyed. But it is obvious that, for a series of years, the government, and even jaghiredars, can have received but little, if any, revenue; and both have been obliged to wink at, and even authorize, the plunder of their own territories, for the subsistence of their troops. The consequence is, that every man is a plunderer and a thief; and no man, who can find any thing to seize or to steal, will cultivate the land for his subsistence. The jaghires and forts, many of them close to Poonah, are in the hands of the adherents of Holkar, who are rebels to the government of the Peshwah. His Highness has passed orders for the resumption of these forts and jaghires; but there is no strength to carry them into execution; and thus a set of rebels and adherents of the confederate chiefs are in the midst of his possessions.

The state of affairs must improve, indeed it has improved already in those parts of the country in which the British army

has been ; and where the necessity of employing the troops to oppose the confederate chiefs will no longer exist, it will be possible to enforce the Peshwah's orders for the resumption of the forts and jaghires, and to place in them those who will be faithful to his Highness's government. But the possession of these countries by the adherents of the Peshwah's enemies, at the present moment, must encourage the confederates.

The chiefs of the Mahratta Empire have been accustomed to look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them, as a force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success against the British government in former times, and they anticipate the same success in the expected contest. They do not compare the strength of the British government at this time with its former weakness ; nor do they consider the difficulties under which the British government laboured at the time of the former contest ; nor do they compare their own strength at that time with their weakness at the present moment.

The southern chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, wish well to the British government, and see clearly that the only chance of security they have is in the establishment of the power of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the power of the confederated chiefs, and fear to venture into the contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The first success in the contest will bring those forward who may not be rebels to the Peshwah's government ; and will preserve Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they can make terms for themselves. But if the confederates should withdraw, the southern chiefs will be convinced that the northern chiefs have no confidence in their own strength, opposed to the British government ; and in case of any future contest, they will not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to which they will attribute many of the advantages which they might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its orders than it has at the present moment ; and they will be more fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern chiefs, and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war.

Another circumstance of difficulty, at the present moment, which probably could not exist hereafter, is the state of the Guickwar government. The rebels have only lately been expelled from that country, and the government has not yet had



time to gain strength. The hopes of the confederates must be founded, in some degree, upon the certainty of a renewal of the rebellion in the case of a war.

The precarious state of the Nizam's health is another circumstance of encouragement to the confederates, which it is probable would not exist at any future period. It does not weigh as a difficulty upon the British force now, and Major Kirkpatrick writes with confidence, that Hyderabad will not be disturbed if his Highness the Nizam should die. But in the event of a war, particularly if there should not be speedily a signal success on the part of the British troops, it must be expected that the Nizam's death will be attended by the assumption of independence by some of his chiefs, and by confusion and disturbance in parts of his Highness's territories. It may be very certain that the confederates will encourage any symptoms of these evils; and that the hope of success in producing confusion in the Nizam's territories is one of the principal inducements to go to war at the present moment.

Your Excellency will observe, in this view of the question, the improvement of the British strength in this quarter will be owing, and in proportion, to the improvement in the state of the government of the allies, to that of the country, to that of its interior state, and to the confidence which the southern jaghiredars will have in the superior strength of the British government, from contemplating the effect which that strength will now have upon the northern confederated chiefs.

No war in which the British government can be involved with an European power can shake this strength. As long as the British troops maintain their formidable position in the territories of the Peshwah, the Nizam, and Guzerat, it must increase with the strength and prosperity of those governments to which it gives protection; and there will be daily a smaller prospect that the northern chiefs will venture to confederate against it. The breaking up of the confederacy, therefore, as it will add so much to the strength and reputation of the British government, will be the best security for the duration of the peace.

Although, in considering the various advantages which must result from the retreat of the confederates, and must add to the strength of the British government, I have pointed out to your Excellency certain disadvantages under which we labour at the present moment, I do not wish to impress your Excellency with the notion that I consider them to be of such magnitude as to render doubtful the event of a contest. They are certainly inconvenient,

and we should be stronger if the Peshwah's government was in strength : but if we can strike such a blow during the rains as will give us the superiority, and keep our rear in tranquillity, we shall not probably feel those inconveniences further than in the want of pecuniary resources by the Peshwah's government.

Lieut.-Col. Close has laid before your Excellency the correspondence which passed between Amrut Rao and me, since my arrival at Poonah ; and the memorandum which he proposed to the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness should give to me, by which his Highness was to consent to give to Amrut Rao a revenue amounting to 4 lacs of rupees *per annum*. The Peshwah would not agree to the proposed arrangement, but, on his departure to Wahy, referred the subject to his ministers, who made a proposition to Lieut.-Col. Close respecting Amrut Rao, which he will have laid before your Excellency. This proposition appeared to me inadmissible : it went to place Amrut Rao in the state of a prisoner, under the most degrading circumstances ; and I was convinced that, if I had communicated it to the vakeel of that chief, he would have instantly joined the confederates. In the mean time, however, this vakeel pressed me for a decision on his employer's case. He urged that, at my desire, Amrut Rao had separated himself from the councils of Holkar and of Scindiah nearly 3 months ago ; that those chiefs were become his enemies ; that, in his position beyond the Godavery, he was liable to be attacked by them ; and that he was not at peace with the Peshwah.

As, in the Memorandum received from the Peshwah's ministers, they consented to give 4 lacs of rupees *per annum* to Amrut Rao, (although the gift was to be attended by conditions to which Amrut Rao would never consent,) I thought it proper to write that chief a letter, of which the enclosed is a translation, in which I gave him assurances that the British government would take care that he should have a provision which would be agreeable to him.

I am convinced that, excepting in the event of the retreat of the confederates, Amrut Rao will not be satisfied with a jaghire of that amount ; but I am also of opinion that nothing will induce him to come forward in support of the British government, excepting his conviction that, in case of a contest with the confederates, the former will be successful.

The promise of some provision will be sufficient to keep him in a state of neutrality for a time ; and hereafter, (when it shall

be certain that he will come forward in support of the British cause,) will be the proper season to fix the amount of the jaghire which he is to have.

I enclose the translation of a letter which I sent to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with a copy of the treaty of Bassein. I sent this letter by soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan, of the Native cavalry, with orders to write to Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Amrut Rao's camp, to inform him that he had a letter from me, which he would deliver in person, if Jeswunt Rao chose to receive him. I instructed the soubahdar to tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar that the British government had no intention to injure or interfere with him; that I was much pleased at his having crossed the Taptee, and that I should be still more pleased to hear that he had gone across the Nerbudda into the territories of his family.

#### 152. To Colonel Collins.

*Excuses of the Confederates for not retiring, futile, and justify our course. Unless they withdraw, if still in their camp, leave it at once.*

(Extracts.)

Rooie, on the Seenah, 31st July, 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th inst. I am concerned that there should have been any fresh delay on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to engage to depart with his troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, and particularly that the ministers of that Chief should have given such futile reasons for refusing to comply with my requisition that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should retire.

\* \* \* \* \*

I have observed that the Chiefs have declared that they would not ascend the Adjunttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah, or attempt to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein; and they are satisfied with the assurance which I had given them, that the British government has no intention to interfere with them, and will never encourage or give support to the breach of treaties by the Peshwah, or by any of its allies. They now pretend that they want the same assurance from the Peshwah, although they must know that his Highness has no power to do them any injury, excepting that which he derives from the support of his government by the British troops.

In respect to the treaty between Scindiah and Holkar, notwithstanding the boasted union, it now appears that the peace is

not yet concluded. But that can be no reason why Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should be allowed to remain encamped in a position in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier; on the contrary, it ought to be a reason for which Scindiah at least should be induced to move with his troops into those territories which he ought to guard against Holkar's depredations. These futile reasons for remaining with their troops in their positions on the Nizam's frontier are the strongest proofs of the insincerity of the declarations which the Chiefs have made; and I hope that, if they should not have satisfied you in your interview, you would have withdrawn from their camp, according to the request conveyed in my letter of the 11th inst.

But in case you should still be in their camp when this letter shall arrive there, I repeat the request which I made in my letter of the 29th, that you will withdraw forthwith, if they should not commence their march, with all their troops, towards their usual stations. The fact that Scindiah has not concluded his peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which is now acknowledged, is the strongest reason for pressing forward at the present moment the decision, whether there shall be peace with security, or war: besides, it is in conformity with the instructions from his Excellency the Governor-General.

### 153. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Underhand dealings of the Peshwah with the Confederates, and insidious advice of his ministers to Col. Collins. The drift of the Peshwah's negotiations to be ascertained by remonstrance or by paying his ministers for the information. This may enable us to settle the Poonah government on a better footing.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug., 1803.

The enclosed paper is probably an answer to that letter, written by Salabut Khan, and what I have above stated will account for part of its contents. But that is not the most material part; for it likewise contains intelligence that the Peshwah is treating with the enemy. I should pass unnoticed this intelligence, if I had not observed that Salabut Khan's correspondent in Ragojee Bhoonslah's camp is far more intelligent than the general run of these news writers; and I know that he writes accounts of almost every thing that passes in the durbar of that chief. But whether the intelligence is true or false, it is very certain that we have not the smallest knowledge of the nature or

the objects of the communications between the Peshwah and Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar ; notwithstanding the obvious necessity that we should have that knowledge, as well as the stipulations of the treaty which provide for it. Indeed, the Peshwah's ministers in Scindiah's durbar, instead of acting in co-operation or communication with the British Resident, have recommended to Col. Collins a line of conduct which, in the opinion of all the persons employed by the British government, must lead to a war, to be carried on under very disadvantageous circumstances.

I most earnestly request you to adopt all means in your power to find out what passes in the Peshwah's durbar; and particularly the nature and objects of his communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If representations founded on the treaty will not produce the effect of disclosing what we must know, let other means be adopted; let expense be incurred to gain the necessary intelligence; and if you should find that Ragonaut Rao will not disclose to you all that he knows, it is my opinion that you ought to hold no further communication with him, as it is very obvious that he has no influence over his employer. If he does not disclose all, he is not honest to the British cause; and his communications have uniformly been found to be false.

I am aware that, although you may make a friend of Ragonaut Rao, and even of Suddasheo Munkaiseer, you will not be able to guide the Peshwah's councils; because, in fact, he is guided by nothing, excepting his own caprice and resentment. But you will have intelligence of what is passing in the durbar, upon which we can rely, instead of groping our way in the dark, as we do at present. If the Peshwah should be really carrying on a correspondence with Scindiah, in breach of the treaty, we may in this manner have it in our power to lay hold of it, and thus have a ground for making a solid arrangement of the Poonah government.

#### 154. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The same subject. Answer to objections against buying the secrets of the Peshwah's durbar from his ministers. Our relations to him and to the Nizam contrasted. Necessity of doing in the former case what would be inappropriate in the latter.*

Camp, 5th Aug., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd. It is very desirable that we should have the Governor-General's opinion on the

proposition which I made to you ; but time must elapse before we can receive it, and the critical moment will pass by, in which we should derive all the benefits that I expect from the adoption of the measure. You have stated two objections to it : one, that Ragonaut Rao has never made any advances, since you informed him that the British government would reward his services ; the other, that the ministers at the Nizam's durbar were pensioned, with the knowledge of his Highness, from which I conclude that you are of opinion that the same course ought to be adopted in respect to the rewards to be given to those of the Peshwah.

In respect to the first objection, I have to observe that Ragonaut Rao has lately urged a request that he might be considered by the British government, in case his enemies should prevail, and should drive him from the situation which he at present fills ; but, supposing that he had not urged this request, it is not possible that a better opportunity should offer of bringing this subject forward, than that which suggested it to me some days ago.

You might, in my opinion, communicate to Ragonaut Rao the ackbar from Scindiah's camp, which states that the Peshwah had written a letter to that Chief, and that which I sent to you, which states that he was dissatisfied with his alliance with the British government ; the uneasiness which I, and every person concerned on the part of the British government, felt upon this subject ; particularly, as we all observe that there was a constant, nay, a daily intercourse, between the Peshwah and the northern Chiefs ; and that, notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, not only we were unacquainted with the nature and objects of these communications, but we could get no account whatever of them from the Peshwah or his ministers. On these grounds, in my opinion, you might urge Ragonaut Rao to a disclosure of the objects of this correspondence ; and might tell him that you should reward him, if you found that he was so far a friend to the alliance, as to make you acquainted with all that passed at the Peshwah's durbar, of which you ought to have a knowledge.

It will not be objected to this measure, that a Mahratta, bred at Madras, particularly after he has solicited the rewards of the British government, will be hurt or offended at this proposition : but you may be of opinion, that as he knows that you have promised him a reward, and that he must be equally satisfied with that engagement as he would be with the possession

of the reward, to give it is attended with risk, and may produce no benefit. In answer, I have to observe that no Native ever trusts to a promise; and, as the bribery of the ministers of a Native durbar is so very common, it is astonishing that you should have been able to transact any business at the Peshwah's durbar to this moment, without having had recourse to it.

In respect to the example of the Nizam's durbar, it is my opinion that, in the whole of the transactions at Poonah, we have adhered too closely to what has been done at Hyderabad. The constitution and customs of two governments cannot be more different than those of Poonah and Hyderabad are; and they differ materially in the circumstances which ought to guide our decision upon this question.

In the Nizam's durbar, the minister has all the power; and it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is favourable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce that result; and the Nizam has been told that that pension is the sum which the minister would have received from the southern districts, if they had not been ceded to the Company. The Nizam also, it is to be supposed, is so well satisfied with the administration of the government by his minister, and with the tranquillity which it enjoys, that he entertains no jealousy on account of the receipt of this pension.

But how is it with the Peshwah? He has no minister; no person has influence over him, and he is only guided by his own caprices. He cannot be paid, in order that he may conduct his government according to our views; and it would be useless to pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no corresponding service. But, although they cannot conduct him and his government, they can let you know in what manner he conducts it, and for that they ought to be paid. That for which they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every thing that passes that comes to their knowledge; in order that you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of its stipulations. But, if they are to be paid with his knowledge, it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes you should not know; and that he will, in fact, have two sets of ministers, one set to deceive the British Resident, and another to conduct the real business of his government. Upon the

whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the Peshwah's durbar ; that it is not possible that you should have that knowledge without paying for it ; that you will not obtain it if you pay for it with the consent of the Peshwah ; and that you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao.

In my last, I believe I told you the reason for which I attended to the news sent by Salabut Khan's writer. He has always given accurate reports of what passed in Col. Collins's conferences with the northern chiefs, and of other matters, which I knew to be true ; I therefore conclude that he has some good source of intelligence. I do not think it possible to find out the foundation he has for writing the story. If you should send this letter to the Governor-General, I recommend that it should be by a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be to consider it.

**155. To Ramchunder Pursheram.**

*An earnest remonstrance against defection.*

3rd Aug., 1803.

I am concerned to find that, notwithstanding you were satisfied on all the points which you referred to me at different times, in your march in company with the troops under my command from the river Kistna to Poonah, and your repeated promises to Major Malcolm, conveyed to me from time to time, stating that you would march from Poonah to join me, you have hitherto remained behind : and at last you have moved to the southward, to a greater distance from the city ; and, in disobedience of the orders of his Highness the Peshwah, in breach of your promises to me, and in opposition to the remonstrances of Lieut.-Col. Close, you intend to return to your residence in the neighbourhood of the river Kistna. You know well that there is no occasion for your presence in that quarter ; because, since I have interfered between you and the Rajah of Kolapoor, all matters there have been in a state of greater tranquillity than has been known for years : your presence in that quarter, therefore, may be more hurtful than beneficial to your own interests.

But that consideration is trifling in comparison with the evils which your interests must sustain from a breach of the solemn promises you have made to me. A performance of these would



insure to you, at all times, the powerful protection of the Company's government: your interests would always be considered as their own, and, as their friend in this state, you must have risen to the honours which your ancestors enjoyed. But the crooked policy which you appear disposed to adopt must preclude all hope of those advantages; and, on the other hand, you are much mistaken if you suppose that it can lead to your advantage, under any contingency. Therefore, for your own sake, I most anxiously entreat you to review your situation; to consider well your own interests and future prospects; and adopt at once a decided line of conduct, and join this army. I write to you as a friend who knows your interests well, and also has an anxious desire to see your affairs prosper.

#### 156. MEMORANDUM.

*Resort to war vindicated by a retrospect of the negotiations with the Confederates, from the Treaty of Bassein to the rupture.*

6th Aug., 1803.

His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein, with the Hon. Company, a treaty, by which the British government bound itself to defend his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should attack him.

The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this treaty, which is purely defensive; and it contains an express stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to attack the great Mahratta jaghiredars, unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British government to give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud: subsequently, when informed that the relations between the Hon. Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd March, to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities against the British government or its allies. Notwithstanding this declaration, accounts reached the British government, from various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined with the Rajah of Berar, and with other chiefs, for the purpose of hostility against the British government and its allies.

The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th May; and that Chief was called upon to state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and other chiefs; and was called upon to retire with his troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to the British government or its allies.

In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British Resident, that, until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, he could not decide whether there should be 'peace or war;' but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united Chiefs, as soon as their meeting should take place.

The Chiefs met in the neighbourhood of Mulcapoor on the 3rd June; and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just demands of the British government till the 8th July.

Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or their allies; or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the Hon. Company would not prevent the execution of the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and those Chiefs: they still, however, manifested an intention of advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his Highness's boundary.

Major-Gen. Wellesley, therefore, on the 14th July, wrote a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprised that Chief, that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the Rajah of Berar, and if both Chiefs did not retire with their troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when the united chiefs should have retired: but he informed them, that, if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain with their troops in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, Major-Gen. Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their possessions; an event which he most anxiously deprecated.

Major-Gen. Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut

Rao Scindiah, 'that it was not consistent with the treaty of Bassein, or the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty;' and, therefore, he might be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his government.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared themselves to be satisfied with this declaration; and the former acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major-Gen. Wellesley, that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they usually occupy: but, instead of retiring with their troops, these Chiefs have persevered in retaining the position which they took up for the purposes of hostility against the British government and their allies; and they have written letters to propose to Major-Gen. Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Serin-gapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the rights and territories of the allies; while they should keep their troops united in the neighbourhood of the Nizam's frontier, and in readiness to take advantage of the absence of the troops of the British government and its allies, to carry into execution their hostile designs.

Major-Gen. Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar peace on terms of equality, and honourable to all parties: they have preferred war, and they alone must be considered responsible for the consequences.

Under these circumstances, Major-Gen. Wellesley is obliged to commence operations against them, in order to secure the interests of the British government and its allies.

#### 157. To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

##### *Declaration of War.*

6th Aug., 1803.

I have received your letter. [Here the contents are recapitulated.] You will recollect that the British government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British government and its allies; and, when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and, in conformity with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but, instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain, with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible; and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions. I offered you peace on terms of equality and honourable to all parties; you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences.

### 3. THE WAR WITH SCINDIAH AND THE RAJAH OF BERAR.

#### 158. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Instructions to check the advance of the Confederates, until General Wellesley can co-operate.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

If you should receive notice from Col. Collins that he has withdrawn from Scindiah's camp, you will be so kind as immediately to take up a position as near to the Adjuttee ghaut, which leads into the Nizam's territories, as the conveniences of water and forage will permit. From this position you will watch with vigilance the designs and movements of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If you should find that those chiefs attempt to ascend that, or any other ghaut, you will fall upon them immediately, before they shall have time to deploy their forces above the ghaut.

I do not, however, propose that your troops should descend the ghaut, but only that they should attack that part of the enemy which shall ascend, before the remainder can come to their assistance. It is possible that they may leave the Adjuttee ghaut, and endeavour to penetrate by the Casserbarry ghaut, towards Aurungabad. You will, in that case, move towards the latter, and place yourself in such manner as to attack them with advantage, if they attempt to pass there.

My object is to avoid, if possible, that your troops should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah's infantry, with his guns, before my operations to the southward of the Godavery shall be

so far advanced as to enable me to reinforce you. Your efforts to prevent Scindiah from penetrating by some one of the passages may not be successful; and, indeed, it is probable that they must finally fail: but the delay of a few days is all I require, and that I conceive must be gained.

I have, however, no apprehension of the result, even if you should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah's force.

#### 159. To General Lake.

*Amount and position of General Wellesley's forces, and of those of the Confederates. Proposed plan of operations.*

(Extract.)

Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.

The troops under my command are stationed as follows: the Nizam's army, including the subsidiary force, are posted at Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my immediate command, including about 3000 Mahratta horse, and 2000 excellent horse belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, are at Sangwee upon the Seenah, about twenty miles south eastward from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah; and there are 2 battalions of Native infantry under the command of Col. Murray at Poonah.

In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to make any impression on Guzerat; but since the troops in that province have been placed under my command, I have not been able to get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal entrance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our troops; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah.

The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of Holkar's army is to the northward of the river Taptee: his troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 20,000 horse, 6,000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear of the Adjuntee pass, near the Nizam's territories. Scindiah has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjuntee hills.

My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam's army on the defensive upon his Highness' frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.

As the passes through the Adjunttee hills are difficult, particularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy have, it is probable that Col. Stevenson may be able to succeed in preventing them from deploying their force on this side of the hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the Godavery.

The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and, after having got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render necessary.

#### 160. To Major Kirkpatrick.

*Importance of garrisoning the principal posts in the Nizami's territories, and of massing troops at Hyderabad; both to foil the enemy's cavalry, and to prevent disturbances in case of Nizam Aly's death.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Walkee, 1st Aug., 1803.

I think that there is some reason to hope that we may have peace, but we may also be obliged to commence hostilities: even in this event, some time will elapse before any impression can be made on the Nizam's territories; but, as I observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are sending away their infantry to Hindustan, and retaining, with their camps, only their cavalry and some of their guns, it is probable that, if there should be a war, they will carry on their operations with those troops only. Even if this should be their plan, I have no apprehensions for the result of the contest; but it becomes more necessary to guard against all sudden attacks on points of importance. Notwithstanding the best intelligence of the enemy's designs, and the best arrangements, it is obvious that a body of cavalry may pass one of our armies, and that much mischief may be done before a remedy can be applied, unless every point of importance

is in some degree guarded. If places of this description should be guarded and prepared for their defence at all, this mode of operation, which I have supposed that the confederates have in their contemplation, cannot have any permanent effect, and will do but little temporary injury to the country.

I therefore most earnestly recommend that garrisons, even of peons, should be placed in all the principal posts and forts in the Nizam's territories, particularly Aurungabad, Moongy Puttun, Kurdlah, Bheer, Perinda, Beeder, &c. &c., and that a body of troops should be collected at Hyderabad. Even if the enemy should be able to pass our armies, the adoption of these means will prevent them from gaining any thing by this invasion: the village peons alone will render their subsistence difficult and precarious, and they will be obliged to retire.

But I recommend these measures not only with a view to the defeat of the enemy's designs, but to insure the tranquillity of the country in the event of the Nizam's death. The establishment of the British troops at Hyderabad has been the cause of a great diminution of the numbers of his Highness' army, and many, who subsisted on the pay they received in his Highness' service, have been obliged to look for subsistence in other employments not so agreeable to them. There must be many discontented people in those countries, all of whom would be ready to join the standard of any chief who might be desirous to take advantage of the weakness of the new government, and of the moment in which the British troops and those of his Highness should be employed against the enemy upon the frontier, to assume independence. Considering the ambition of the Natives in general, it will not be denied that there may be chiefs disposed to adopt this line of conduct; but the measures of precaution which I have recommended will give employment to a great proportion of the military classes of the community, and will prevent such chiefs from finding instruments to carry their purposes into execution.

#### 161. To the Governor of Bombay.

*Desirableness of authorising the collectors to raise sebandy corps, for time of war; and of treating the Bheels in a conciliatory and forbearing manner.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Walkee, 2nd Aug., 1803.

14. \* \* \* These small detachments are ruinous to the discipline and spirit of the troops; they weaken the corps to such a degree,

that they are unfit for service in the field, and they answer no adequate purpose. In my opinion, in time of war, and particularly in such a war as one with the Mahrattas, it would be best to authorize the collectors to raise sebundy troops for these services: the expenses would be but trifling, and, in fact, cannot bear a comparison with the benefit which must be derived from the measure.

15. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which have belonged to the Mahrattas, there is a numerous class of people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the government of those countries to the Company; and they are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in the armies of our enemies: these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long residence and service within them, and they become, in fact, our most dangerous enemies.

24. It is true that, in the absence of the detachment from either the northern or the southern division, that in which there are no troops is in some degree liable to be injured by marauding horse. That is an evil which cannot be entirely avoided, so long as the British armies are composed entirely of infantry, and those of the enemy of cavalry; but, if the forts in the country are kept up, and in times of war the sebundy of the country are hired and paid, even that evil must be of short duration, as it is well known that no number of horse can find their way into a fort without the assistance of guns.

34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels: these appear to be a race of the same description with those who inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and refraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove our best friends; and a contrary line of conduct will make them our worst enemies. It must not be expected that we should involve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for tribute.



**162. Proclamation by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley.**

*The people not to be molested, if they remain quiet ; otherwise to be treated as enemies.*

Camp near Ahmednuggur, 7th Aug., 1803.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having threatened with hostilities the British government and their allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun, and the Nabob Nizam Aly; and, in pursuance of those threats, having advanced with their large armies to a position contiguous to the frontiers, and having refused to depart from it, notwithstanding the repeated representations and entreaties of Major-Gen. Wellesley, as the only mode of preserving peace, he at last finds himself obliged to commence hostilities against those Chiefs. He does not, however, intend to make war upon the inhabitants; and, accordingly, all amildars and others are required to remain quietly in their stations, and obey the orders they will receive; and if they do no injury to the British armies, none will be done to them. But notice is hereby given, that if any of the inhabitants of the country either abandon their dwellings, or do any injury to the British armies or their followers, they will be treated as enemies, and suffer accordingly.

**163. To the Governor-General.**

*Capture of Ahmednuggur. Military importance of the place.*

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug., 1803.

The weather cleared up so much on the 7th inst. as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had, in the morning, dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender his fort; and, on my arrival in the neighbourhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Scindiah's regular infantry and a body of horse, encamped in an open space between the pettah and the fort.

I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regt., under the command of Lieut.-Col. Harness; in another place, with the 74th regt. and 1st batt. of the 8th, under the command of Lieut.-Col. Wallace; and, in a third, with the flank companies of the 74th, and the 1st batt. 3rd regt., under the command of Capt.

Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart: so that, when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand; and the Arabs, who occupied the towers, defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy.

At length, they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Scindiah's regular infantry also attacked our troops, after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy's loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours; and, on the night of the 8th, all that part of their force which was not required for the defence of the fort went off to the northward; including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther than the fort.

On the 9th, I reconnoitred the ground in the neighbourhood of the fort; and, on that evening, Lieut.-Col. Wallace, with 5 companies of the 74th regt., and the 2nd batt. 12th regt., seized a position within 400 yards of it; on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for 4 guns, to take off the defences on the side on which I proposed to make my attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th; and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer, I told him that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it; but that I would listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate. Yesterday morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property.

Although I consented to this proposal, it was 5 in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the troops under my command took possession of it.

In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands: our loss

since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

I have to draw your Excellency's notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut.-Cols. Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches; Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery; Capt. Johnson, of the engineers; and Capt. Heitland, of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered, in this country, as one of the strongest forts; and, excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

I shall hereafter have the honour of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which it contains.

I propose to cross the Godavery immediately; and I shall, in a future dispatch, lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah's possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing their resources for the use of the British troops.

Return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, during the siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur, on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Aug., 1803.

|                           |             |   |                   | Captains.  | Subalterns. | Serjeants. | Drummer | R. and F. |
|---------------------------|-------------|---|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------|---------|-----------|
| 19th light dragoons . . . | } Europeans | { | Killed . . .      | 2          | 2           | 1          | 1       | 12        |
| Artillery . . . . .       |             |   | Wounded . . .     | —          | 2           | 1          | —       | 58        |
| H. M. 74th regt. . . . .  |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
| 78th . . . . .            |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
|                           |             |   |                   | Soubahdar. | Havildars.  | Naiks.     | Sepoys. |           |
| 5th regt. cavalry         | } Natives   | { | Killed . . . . .  | —          | 1           | 1          | 10      |           |
| 1st batt. 2nd regt. N. I. |             |   | Wounded . . . . . | 1          | 7           | 3          | 39      |           |
| 1st 3rd do.               |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
| 1st 8th do.               |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
| 2nd 12th do.              |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
| 2nd 18th do.              |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |
| 1st Pioneers do.          |             |   |                   |            |             |            |         |           |

## 164. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*The Confederates not likely to succeed in a predatory warfare with us.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 15th Aug., 1803.

The Mahrattas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us: they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the Mussulmann in the last century, they cannot expect much success from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the Chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act; and still less of the British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests.

## 165. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*A bold offensive our true policy, and guarantee of success in the war.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

I have received rather unpleasant accounts from Col. Stevenson. On the 13th he heard that a party of horse was passing the Adjuttee hills, but, instead of dashing at them, he called in a battalion of infantry and some horse which were in his front: he afterwards, however, countermanded these orders, and sent forward Salabut Khan and Noor ool Oomrah, and intended to move out with the piquets on the 14th. He had a variety of plans in contemplation, of none of which I entirely approved, because they led him into a long defensive operation, in which he must be a loser. I have therefore desired him to move forward himself with the Company's and the Nizam's cavalry;

to leave the infantry in a central situation for his supplies to collect upon; and to dash at the first party that comes into his neighbourhood. In this manner he will, at all events, have his supplies, and if he cuts up, or only drives off, a good body of horse, the campaign is our own.

We must get the upper hand, and, if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.

### 166. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Political expediency ought to overrule the Peshwah's private feelings, and induce him to be reconciled to Amrut Rao; our engagements with whom were the result of the Peshwah's non-fulfilment of the Treaty.*

(Extract.)

Camp, N. of the Nimderrah ghaut, 18th Aug., 1803.

The Peshwah's feelings respecting the proposed meeting with Amrut Rao are unpleasant; but I do not think that, under present circumstances, the meeting can be avoided. His Highness must recollect that he was repeatedly informed that the British government would be obliged to adopt the measures which might appear necessary for its own security, unless he should perform his treaty, and this agreement with Amrut Rao is one of those measures. His Highness has no ground on which he can found an objection to this agreement, excepting one sought for in his own implacable resentments. I can never admit these as rational grounds either for the adoption, or for the rejection, of any political measure. The benefits or the evils which the public interest will derive or suffer from such a measure are alone what must decide whether it is to be adopted or rejected.

But in his Highness's conduct respecting Amrut Rao, there appears to be caprice as well as resentment; for it must be recollected, that, when his Highness was at Basscin, he offered to be reconciled to his brother. It is true that Amrut Rao then rejected the offer, by which his Highness's feelings may have been wounded: but, considering the reconciliation as a measure of political expediency, and putting private feelings out of the

question, I think it full as necessary at this time, as it was when his Highness was at Bassein ; and, excepting that the reconciliation was then refused by Amrut Rao, there is nothing in it more injurious to his feelings at the present moment than there was at that period. However, all that is asked from his Highness is to refrain from hostility against Amrut Rao, and not to increase the number of his or our enemies. I will engage for Amrut Rao's conduct ; and I will take care in my intercourse with that Chief to do nothing which is inconsistent with the treaty between the British government and the Peshwah.

- 167. To the Governor of Bombay.

*Reasons for resigning the control of operations in Guzerat.*

Camp, 29th Aug., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 23rd inst.

2. When I proposed, for your consideration, a plan for the military organization of the troops in Guzerat Proper, and the Attavesy, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda ; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary force in Guzerat, such as at this moment is in force in respect to the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you approved of that plan ; and you desired that I would recommend Col. Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it ; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

4. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous, indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

5. At the same time, I have to observe to you, that the com-

munication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and, therefore, I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference to me.

6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.

#### 168. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The same subject. Mr. Duncan's unintelligible hair-splitting.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug., 1803.

Mr. Duncan, after having acquiesced in the plan suggested by me for the organization of the troops, and the plan of operations in Guzerat, has informed me that 'acquiescence' did not mean 'approbation'; and he has detailed his objections to the general system, as well as to the particulars of the plan, which go to fundamentals. He has, however, informed me that I may take upon myself to order its execution, if I think proper. I cannot understand the nice distinction between the 'acquiescence' of a Governor in a plan for the defence of the provinces under his government, and his 'approbation' of that plan. However, be that as it may, I cannot take upon myself to order the execution of measures which circumstances may render unfortunate, even if they should be regulated as I wish, but to which I am certain that every opposition in the power of every officer in the government will be given, particularly after I have been informed that those measures are decidedly disapproved of by the Governor. Neither can I, at this distance, undertake to conduct the details of a piece of machinery so disjointed as would be the military duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy, under the separated authorities of the Resident at Baroda and the Committee of Surat: I have, therefore, requested to be relieved from all interference in those concerns.

## 169. To Colonel Stevenson.

*Plan of combined operations explained and accounted for.*

Camp near Unterwarry, 31st Aug., 1803.

I marched here this morning, with a view to check the operations of the enemy to the southward. I rather believe that he was encamped yesterday at Caulaygaum, to the south of Jaulna. He did not march before 12. I have not heard from his camp since. We must endeavour to drive him out of the Nizam's country, or he will certainly oblige us to draw nearer to our supplies. More pindarries will follow those already come in. They will penetrate to the south of the river; and then I, at least, must recross to subsist. I do not expect that we shall be able to bring the enemy to an action, but we must try to keep him in movement, and tire him out.

I cannot permanently move to the eastward at present, for several reasons: one of the most pressing is, that I am obliged to look out for a battalion marching from the Kistna with bullocks, treasures, &c., &c. Besides, I do not think it impossible but that Holkar may come down and increase the number of our enemies; and I must return to impede his progress. I propose, therefore, to leave my baggage and heavy stores here in an intrenched camp, with a battalion, and to move forward with a light army. I shall march upon this plan on the day after to-morrow; and I shall keep as nearly as I can, in a due E. direction from hence, between Jaulna and the river. I recommend that you also should march with your cavalry only, if you think yourself sufficiently strong in that description of troops, and a battalion with its guns, on the same plan, on the day after to-morrow. You might direct your march immediately upon the enemy: we shall frighten him, at least, if we do not hurt him; we shall drive him from the territories of the Nabob, and oblige him to retire into those of the Rajah of Berar. If we succeed in this plan, the parties will possibly become tired of the game; and, at all events, we shall have gained time by it for my supplies to come up.

Your infantry might remain in your camp at Donegaum, for your treasures, &c., to collect upon; and they would be a check upon the return of the enemy to this quarter. Keep your intentions secret. None of the Natives can be trusted with the secrets of our plans in this war, till our success is decided.



## 170. To Major Malcolm.

*Narrative of the opening operations of the war. Holkar's designs uncertain. Gen. Wellesley's precautions against him; and intention of invading Berar. The Rajah the instigator of the war. Good marching trim. Reasons for resigning the command in Guzerat.*

Camp, 6th Sept., 1803.

I have not written to you for some time, but I have had much to do, and I knew that you would see the letters which I have written to Col. Close and Mr. Duncan. I shall, however, endeavour to give you, in this letter, an idea of our situation.

The enemy deceived Col. Stevenson in the march they made to the eastward on the 20th and 21st of last month; and, finding that they had induced him to pass Jaffierabad, they returned to the westward on the 22nd, and ascended the Adjuttee ghaut on the 23rd and 24th. On the 23rd, Col. Stevenson sent a patrol down the Badowly ghaut, which picked up some bullocks and horses loaded with grain; and on the 23rd, at night, he had intended to go still farther to the eastward, in quest of a detachment, under a relation of the Rajah of Berar, which had gone that route. I did not receive his letters written about that time; and I cannot say exactly what he was doing between the 23rd and 29th; but the enemy penetrated into the country, and passed between him and Jalnapoor; and I have seen letters from his camp, which say that one of the brigades lost its baggage on the march to Jaffierabad; that the pindarry horse were very troublesome, and that the Moguls did not behave as they ought. This is probably true; otherwise the pindarries would not have come near the troops a second time.

On the 28th, a party of pindarries came to Aurungabad, but were driven off by the Nizam's infantry stationed there; and, on the 29th, I arrived at Aurungabad. Scindiah was at that time at Jalnapoor, a fort and district belonging to himself, about 40 miles east from Aurungabad; and he tried, whilst there, to plunder Budnapoor, a fortified village of the Nizam, from which he was beaten off. As soon as he heard of my arrival at Aurungabad, he marched off still farther to the eastward and southward, and went to the neighbourhood of a place called Purtoor, belonging to Soubahan Khan. Col. Stevenson moved down to Jalnapoor on the 1st, and took it on the 2nd; and I moved to

the southward, towards the Godavery, on the road to Hyderabad, having found that, contrary to all former experience, at this season of the year, the river had fallen, and was fordable in many places. We were all stationary on the 3rd and 4th. Scindiah has evidently been waiting for Begum Sumroo's infantry, and, they say, the brigade under Pohlman: the former of which has certainly come up the ghaut, and, it is supposed, the latter. He has made various detachments towards this body, and at last moved himself yesterday to Jalnapoor, leaving Ragojee about 5 coss in his rear, with the little baggage they have, and a body of horse.

Col. Stevenson moved yesterday also towards Aurungabad, as he tells me, in order to meet Rajah Mohiput Ram; but it is either to be hoped or feared that this movement may be considered as a retreat, and will encourage the enemy to come to an action. At all events, it ensures the secure junction of the campoos.

I made a march yesterday, and another this day, to the eastward from Rackisbaum; and I am now about 6 miles north of the Godavery, and shall have a fair start with the enemy for Hyderabad. The enemy have done but little mischief hitherto to the country. The pindarries have been driven away from many villages; grain is very dear in their army, which is a certain sign that they get but little plunder; they are terribly alarmed, and, I am told, much dissatisfied. They certainly intend to avoid an action with either of us, if they can, unless Col. Stevenson's movement of yesterday towards Aurungabad should encourage them to come to blows with him; and I believe it is their intention to cross the Godavery, now that the river is fordable, and to make a dash to the southward, although it is certain that they do not like my position upon that river, and my readiness to cross with them. They know that the river must rise again, and they do not like to be cut off from their own countries, and all assistance.

Whether they go to Hyderabad or not, I have determined to commence an offensive operation against Berar; and I have accordingly arranged that Col. Stevenson shall march with his corps towards Ellichpoor, and thence to attack the Rajah's fort of Gawile, or Gawilghur, and possibly plunder Nagpoor. If they should march upon Hyderabad, I intend to reinforce Poonah with 3 battalions, and move to Hyderabad with the remainder of my corps. If they do not, I shall endeavour to bring them to an

action on this side of the river; and if I find that they lead me far to the eastward, I shall still detach to Poonah.

Holkar has not yet come down, and you will observe that he has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to him; and that he wrote him the letter about the 7th or 8th Aug., after he must have heard that Collins had come away from Scindiah's camp. It is impossible to be certain what a fellow of this kind will do, but I augur well from this circumstance; and I met this morning the Nizam's vakeel returning to Hyderabad from Ragojee Bhoonslah, (from his conversation, I suspect him to have been Major Kirkpatrick's intelligencer,) who told Govind Rao that Scindiah had not yet settled his affairs with Holkar.

If Holkar joins, Poonah will be safe with 4 battalions and 5 companies of Europeans; but the countries thereabout will be exposed to his ravages, while I am engaged with Scindiah and Ragojee towards Hyderabad. But I think it better to risk that, than to remove Gen. Campbell's corps from Moodgul towards Hyderabad. The consequence of that would be the invasion of the Ceded districts, and probably Mysore, by the Putwurduns and Holkar, who, we must expect, would be able to pass by me, notwithstanding all my efforts to prevent it. By keeping Gen. Campbell at Moodgul, we certainly have a check upon the Putwurduns; and it is possible that Holkar would not much like to leave behind him the force at Poonah, and move down upon Gen. Campbell.

I have some hopes, however, that the invasion of Berar will check the expedition to Hyderabad. Collins, whom I saw at Aurungabad, declares that Ragojee is the only one of the three who cares one pin about his country, or who has any thing to lose by an invasion of it; and I declare that, from what Collins told me, I am of opinion that we are involved in this war because Ragojee saw plainly, that, if the Mahratta armies did not subsist this year in the Nizam's country, they must have subsisted in his.

As I have before me such active operations, you will be glad to hear that I never was in such marching trim. I marched the other day 23 miles in 7½ hours; and all our marches are now made at the rate of 3 miles an hour.

You will have seen, by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I have relinquished the command in Guzerat. Mr. Duncan 'acquiesced' in my arrangement; and although he stated some objections to it in his private letters, I concluded that he 'approved' of it; for it never occurred to me that it was possible for a Governor to

'acquiesce' in a proposed system of military operations, for the defence of provinces under his government, of which he did not 'approve.' However, he afterwards informed me that he did not approve of my propositions, and he entered into detailed arguments against the principle, as well as the execution, of them; but he told me that I might order that they might be carried into execution if I should think proper. Without flying in his face, and being guilty of the greatest presumption, I could not give such orders; and at this distance from Guzerat, and with such imperfect, and so long a communication, I could not take upon me to conduct a machine so complicated and disjointed as the military commands of the Committee of Surat, and the Resident of Barōda, and I therefore resigned the whole concern. I was much annoyed, for several reasons, at finding myself obliged to take this step; but I found that to keep the command would have involved me in constant hot water, would have taken my attention away from other objects here, and would have answered no good public end whatever.

I have received the copy of a public letter from the Governor-General to Gen. Lake, from the tenor of which I fear that he does not approve of my letter to him of the 24th July. I wish you would let me know what Shawe says about that letter. I hope you are getting better, and that you will soon come back. If Holkar negotiates, I should wish to send you to him with *carte blanche*.

We are again unlucky in the early fall of the Godavery, and in the enemy having contrived to pass to the southward and eastward of Col. Stevenson; particularly if it be true that the Moguls have not behaved well. Otherwise our affairs are in a good state. I have Appah Dessaye and Goklah with me, and have promised to pay them. This will be one lac of rupees *per mensem*. Amrut Rao and followers will probably cost half a lac more. Besides these heavy drains, Col. Stevenson has no money, and the Nizam's troops begin to call out for pay. All this is bad; but I have taken measures to increase our supplies of cash from Poonah, and I have written both to Madras and Calcutta for supplies. Griffiths and Hill are getting on well, and will be in safety at Dharore in a few days. Amrut Rao is not come yet, but you will observe what his vakeel and Kawder Nawaz Khan said about his troops.

## 171. To Major-General Campbell.

*Wavering disposition of the Southern Mahratta chiefs. Importance of General Campbell's position as a check upon them and the Nizam's officers.*

(Extract.)

Golah Pangree, 20th Sept., 1803.

7. All the southern chiefs have written me friendly letters, in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation, in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur; and, at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

8. These Chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves, that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these Chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride to oppose the British government, in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Mahrattas.

9. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interest depends in a great measure upon the success of the British government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates, ready to fall upon and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates, and their notions of family and national honour, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

10. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to con-

tend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

11. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops, in the position occupied by the division under your command, is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company's territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume independence.

## 172. To the Governor-General.

### *Battle of Assye.*

Camp at Assye, 24th Sept., 1803.

I was joined by Major Hill, with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna, on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forward towards the enemy, who had been joined, in the course of the last 7 or 8 days, by the infantry under Col. Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander<sup>1</sup> I have not ascertained. The enemy's army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad.

I was near Col. Stevenson's corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy's army with the divisions under our command on the 24th, in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Col. Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna.

On the 23rd, I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about 6 miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and, having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

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<sup>1</sup> M. Dupont.

I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighbourhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual : accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Mahratta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel to it. The Mahratta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna, on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack : it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna ; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regt., which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regt., at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry ; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

Lieut.-Col. Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired, and was formed again, in which operation he was killed ; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven.

The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands 90 pieces of cannon. The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive, by the enclosed return <sup>1</sup>, that our loss in officers and men has been very great; and, in that of Lieut.-Col. Maxwell and other officers, whose names are therein included, greatly to be regretted.

I cannot write in too strong terms of the conduct of the troops; they advanced in the best order, and with the greatest steadiness, under a most destructive fire, against a body of infantry far superior in number, who appeared determined to contend with them to the last, and who were driven from their guns only by the bayonet; and, notwithstanding the numbers of the enemy's cavalry, and the repeated demonstrations they made of an intention to charge, they were kept at a distance by our infantry.

I am particularly indebted to Lieut.-Col. Harness and Lieut.-Col. Wallace, for the manner in which they conducted their brigades; and to all the officers of the staff, for the assistance

<sup>1</sup> A return of the killed, wounded, and missing at the battle of Assye, against the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd Sept., 1803.

|                      |  |  |  | F. O.     | Cap. | Sub.   | Serj. | Drum. | R. & F. | Horses. |   |     |    |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |
|----------------------|--|--|--|-----------|------|--------|-------|-------|---------|---------|---|-----|----|---|---|----|----|---|-----|---|
| II. M.'s 19th Lt. D. |  |  |  | Europeans | {    | Killed | 1     | 6     | 7       | 9       | — | 141 | 77 |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |
| 1st bat. Madras art. |  |  |  |           |      |        |       |       |         |         |   |     |    | 3 | 6 | 20 | 33 | 6 | 343 | 3 |
| 2nd do. do.          |  |  |  |           |      |        |       |       |         |         |   |     |    |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |
| Det. Bombay do.      |  |  |  |           |      |        |       |       |         |         |   |     |    |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |
| II. M.'s 74th regt.  |  |  |  |           |      |        |       |       |         |         |   |     |    |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |
| 78th do.             |  |  |  | —         | —    | —      | —     | 8     | —       |         |   |     |    |   |   |    |    |   |     |   |

|                    |  |  |  | F. O.   | Sub. | Jem.   | Havil. | Trum. | R. & F. | Horses. |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
|--------------------|--|--|--|---------|------|--------|--------|-------|---------|---------|---|-----|-----|----|----|----|---|------|----|
| 4th regt. cavalry  |  |  |  | Natives | {    | Killed | —      | 5     | 3       | 13      | — | 224 | 228 |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 5th do. do.        |  |  |  |         |      |        |        |       |         |         |   |     |     | 12 | 16 | 39 | 6 | 1138 | 75 |
| 7th do. do.        |  |  |  |         |      |        |        |       |         |         |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 1st bat. 2nd N. I. |  |  |  |         |      |        |        |       |         |         |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 1st do. 4th do.    |  |  |  |         |      |        |        |       |         |         |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 1st do. 8th do.    |  |  |  | —       | —    | —      | —      | 18    | —       |         |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 1st do. 10th do.   |  |  |  | —       | —    | —      | —      | —     | —       | 1       |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| 2nd do. 12th do.   |  |  |  | —       | —    | —      | —      | —     | —       | —       |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |
| Pioneers.          |  |  |  | —       | —    | —      | —      | —     | —       | —       |   |     |     |    |    |    |   |      |    |



I received from them. The officers commanding brigades, nearly all those of the staff, and the mounted officers of the infantry, had their horses shot under them. I have also to draw your Excellency's notice to the conduct of the cavalry conducted by Lieut.-Col. Maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons.

The enemy are gone off towards the Adjuttee ghaut, and I propose to follow them, as soon as I can place my captured guns and wounded in security. Col. Stevenson arrived this morning at Bokerdun, and I imagine that he will be here this evening.

**173. Extract from a letter by Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Colin) Campbell relative to the Battle of Assye, written at the time of the transaction.**

*Battle of Assye.*

The detachment waited for several days near the Godavery for supplies, which joined us on the 19th September. On the 21st we marched, and encamped near Colonel Stevenson at Budnapoor, where General Wellesley had a conference with that officer, and it was agreed that the two detachments were to march by different routes upon the enemy, whom they expected to come up with on the 24th. There was a range of hills between us and the enemy. Colonel Stevenson marched by the western pass and General Wellesley by the eastern on the 22nd, and encamped about eight coss asunder at the two extremities of the range of hills. On the 23rd we again marched, and came to our ground about 11 o'clock (and supposed that the enemy were about ten or twelve miles off by the information from our hircarra). The General was with the advance; and some dragoons, who were covering the Quartermaster-General, brought in some brinjarry men with bullocks, who said that the combined armies were encamped about two coss off; that part of their cavalry had marched that morning, and that their infantry was to follow; that if the General would go to the rising ground in front, he would have a view of their camp.

The General immediately formed his plan. As he thought there was not a moment to be lost, and was suspicious that the enemy would make off and not stand an action, he wrote a note, on the first intimation he had of the enemy, to Colonel Stevenson, who, he expected, could not be far distant. He ordered on the cavalry, followed by the infantry piquets under the command of Colonel Orrock, and reinforced the rear-guard with a battalion

under Colonel Chalmers, to protect our stores, camp-equipage, &c. At the village where we had intended to encamp we came in sight of the enemy's camp about one o'clock ; our cavalry drew up near a large body of the enemy, who had come out to reconnoitre us. The General, on seeing their camp, immediately determined to attack their left, where their campoos with their guns were. Their position seemed very strong : a deep rocky nullah in their front and another in their rear, which nullahs joined a little below the village of Assye and protected their flank. They appeared to be in three different encampments : Scindiah, with all his cavalry, on the right ; the Berar Rajah in the centre ; campoos on the left of them ; the two nullahs ran along all their front and rear, and their camp extended from five to seven miles.

We moved forward to the attack with the 74th and 78th regiments and four battalions of sepoys. The piquets led, and our cavalry brought up the rear to protect us from their horse (our whole force brought into action did not amount to 5000 men). They fired at us when at a considerable distance, and did some execution ; but by the time we came to the first nullah they had got our range completely, and opened a most tremendous fire on us, which galled us much. We were detained by our guns for a little time at the nullah, and when we crossed we were obliged to bring up our right shoulders to attack their left flank. The enemy, upon this, were obliged to change their front, which they did with the greatest regularity and precision. We were now getting very near them. They advanced with their guns upon us. The line was ordered to form. Colonel Harness's brigade at this time were only across the nullah, and the 74th regiment, of the 5th brigade, which brigade was ordered to form a second line, and the 74th regiment to support the piquets on our right, and to keep two or three hundred paces in their rear ; the cavalry formed a third line. During these formations we lost numbers of officers and men, as the enemy fired mostly grape and chain-shot. The village of Assye was on our right ; the piquets were ordered not to go too near it, as there appeared to be some infantry in it, and, in advancing, on no account to incline towards it. The line was ordered to advance. The piquets at this period had nearly lost a third of their number, and most of the gun-bullocks were killed ; some of the corps, I think, waited too long, wishing to bring forward their guns, which could be of no service. The line moved forward rapidly (I may say without firing two rounds) and took possession of the first line of guns, where many of the enemy

were killed. They then moved on in equally good order and resolution to the second line of guns, from which they very soon drove the enemy; but many of the artillery, who pretended to be dead when we passed on to the second line of guns, turned the guns we had taken upon us, which obliged us to return and again to drive them from them. Things at this period did not go on so well on our right, owing to some mistake of the piquets in having, when ordered to advance, inclined to their right, which brought the 74th regiment into the first line. Major Swinton went to the piquets, and asked them why they did not move on? On his return to his regiment he found that numbers of his officers and men had fallen. He immediately moved forward. At this period the cannonade was truly tremendous. A milk-hedge in their front, which they had to pass to come at the enemy's guns, threw them into a little confusion; but they still pushed forward and had taken possession of many of their guns, when the second line, which opened on them, obliged them to retire from what they had so dearly purchased. The numbers of the 74th regiment remaining at this period were small; on their returning some of the enemy's cavalry came forward and cut up many of the wounded officers and men. It was at this critical moment that the 19th charged, and saved the remains of the 74th regiment. General Wellesley at the same time threw the 78th regiment forward on their right, to move down on the enemy, who still kept their position at Assye. This movement and the charge of the 19th light dragoons made the enemy retire from all their guns precipitately, and they fled across the nullah to our right at the village of Assye, where numbers of them were cut up by the cavalry. It was in this business that Colonel Maxwell fell. It was unfortunate that the cavalry were obliged to be introduced into the action, as it rendered them unfit for pursuing the enemy. We began to advance a little after three, and the action was not entirely over till near six o'clock. We were all greatly fatigued, having marched by the perambulator that day twenty-four miles to the first nullah.

The General was in the thick of the action the whole time, and had a horse killed under him. No man could have shown a better example to the troops than he did. I never saw a man so cool and collected as he was the whole time, though I can assure you, till our troops got orders to advance, the fate of the day seemed doubtful; and if the numerous cavalry of the enemy had done their duty, I hardly think it possible that we could have

succeeded. From the European officers who have since surrendered, it appears they had about twelve thousand infantry, and their cavalry is supposed to have been at least twenty thousand, though many make it more. We have now in our possession one hundred and two guns, and all their tumbrils. The remains of the enemy's infantry deserted after the action.

Your dear son was killed near the milk-hedge; I cannot yet for certain ascertain whether when advancing or returning, but I think the former, as he was shot in the breast by a grape; he had no other wound. Major Swinton talks of him in the highest terms for his conduct on that day. He informs me that he was the last officer of the regiment killed. The last time I saw him was when forming in rear of the piquets; he was obliged to dismount, as his horse became unruly. He was then, poor fellow, in high spirits, and we had a short conversation. He had a biscuit, which he divided with me. Poor M'Leod was at this period killed. Lorn<sup>1</sup> was twice wounded in the legs, but persisted in going on; he at last, poor fellow! I believe, fainted, and was left behind when the troops were retiring, and cut up by the cavalry. These are all the particulars I have been able to gather of these gallant youths.

We remained by our arms that night in the field, and in the morning our baggage came up.

Colonel Stevenson, with part of his detachment, joined us in the night of the 24th. He had been led astray by the guides or hircarrahs, and if we had deferred the action a day he would not have been with us. The enemy that night retired twelve miles in the greatest confusion, and on the 24th descended the Ghauts. Colonel Stevenson pursued them on the 26th, and found some of their guns, &c., on the road. He has since taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur, with the loss of only five or six men, and is now following Scindiah into Berar.

(Signed)

COLIN CAMPBELL,

Brigade Major to General Wellesley.

174. Marquess Wellesley to Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

*The same subject.*

Fort William, 27th Oct., 1803.

MY DEAR ARTHUR,

You will conceive the pride and delight with which I received the details of your most splendid victory of the 23rd September;

<sup>1</sup> The brother of the writer of this account.

you will also feel my disappointment at not having received them from yourself; the interruption of the dawk through Cuttack induced the collector to embark all your despatches down to the 3rd of this month, and not a syllable from yourself has yet reached me of any date between the 12th of September, and the 3rd of October.

But from various quarters the particulars of your glory have reached me, although not in a form which can yet admit of a Public Order, (beyond the honours of a salute,) yet in substance sufficiently solid to found the basis of hopes as auspicious, as your fame must be durable, and, in India, unrivalled. With much solicitude for the success of your operations on public grounds, and with every additional anxiety, which affection could inspire, I have fixed my attention on your progress, from the hour of your departure from General Stuart's camp, to the moment of your action of the 23rd of September; and I declare to you most sincerely, that you have infinitely surpassed all that I could have required from you in my public capacity; and have soared beyond the highest point, to which all my affection and all the pride of my blood could have aspired, in the most ardent expectations which could be suggested by my sentiments of respect and love for a brother, who has always held the highest place in my heart and in my judgment.

Your battle of the 23rd (of which I have seen plans) is equal in skill and fortitude to any of which the account exists in history. Your loss certainly was dreadful (if not exaggerated to me) —the result must I think reduce the enemy either to peace, or to the condition of mere freebooters; accompanied as your success is by such a crowd of victories, as, I believe, never before were condensed in so small a space of time. You may be assured, that your reputation is of the first lustre and magnitude; and splendid, matchless, as was your victory on the 23rd, it was not more than was expected from you; nor in my judgment does it excel the honour you have acquired in conducting your army from Mysore to Assye, and in accomplishing all the great objects, which were finally secured on the 23rd of September.

I am in hourly expectation of your despatches, and therefore I shall not write more at present; you will be glad to receive this short note, and when you reflect on the troubles by which I have been surrounded, you will pardon my long omission of private letters.

I enclose two notes; one containing the general outline of

the reports of your victory as they have reached me; another some hints respecting peace. God protect you my dear Arthur, and preserve you for your country, and for your most affectionate brother<sup>1</sup>,

WELLESLEY.

**175. Memorandum on the Battle of Assye. Subsequently transmitted.**

1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out Natives in the Company's service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

2. All the hircarrahs reported that the enemy's camp, which I had concerted with Col. Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun. I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted; and Col. Stevenson their right. Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above 6 miles to Assye, where was its left: it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

3. My march of the 23rd was so directed as that I should be within 12 or 14 miles of the enemy's camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within 6 miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnaitred. I could not have reconnaitred without taking the whole of my small force; and, when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, 3 or 4 times my number of infantry

<sup>1</sup> The 'hints respecting peace,' and a 'Note respecting the victory' have been omitted.—*Ed.*

only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning, according to the plan.

5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day; and, as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it. During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was; and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Col. Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night. I therefore determined to make the attack.

7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy's position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd, with my camp, baggage, &c.

8. The enemy's first position was as shown in the plan. The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaum and Waroor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy's left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaum. I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye; but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaum: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye

must fall when the right should be beat. Orders were given accordingly.

11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye: the 74th regt., which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support the piquets, followed them. There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regt. we sustained the greatest part of our loss. One company of the piquets, of one officer and 50 rank and file, lost the officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy's cavalry hanging upon our right; and, luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

13. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

14. The annexed plan is correct, excepting in the following instances: 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward (it ought to be where I have marked in pencil). 2ndly, the formation of the Mahratta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna; and the 74th was not in an *échelon*, as represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

N.B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.



## 176. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro.

*Theory and practice of successfully arresting predatory warfare.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 1st Oct., 1803.

I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter upon the subject of offensive and defensive war : however, I think that you are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive measures, a predatory war, carried on by horse only ; indeed, I have done it already in this campaign. The fact is, that a predatory war is not to be carried on now as it was formerly. All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that fortifications are of no use) ; a few peons keep the horse out ; and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing they get is very dear ; besides, this necessity of seeking subsistence in the camp prevents them from extending their excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury.

The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind must subsist must be rather heavy : besides, there are great personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other sewary ; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such a camp must consequently be very large.

Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well combined movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to prevent the execution of any favourite design, or its mischievous consequences, soon bring them to their bearings : they stop, look about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off. In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, which they certainly intended : they were obliged to return, and bring up and join their infantry ; and you will have heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole army, with one division only, on the 23rd Sept., I completely defeated them, taking about 100 pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Burhampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight ; and what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the greater part of India at the present day.

## 177. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*Alleged cruelty of Scindiah's English officers.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 3rd Oct., 1803.

I have some reason to complain of Scindiah's English officers, and I shall bring the subject forward publicly as soon as I can ascertain the matter more completely. My soldiers say that after they were knocked down by cannon or grape shot, they were cut and piked by the horse belonging to the campoos, which indeed is perfectly true, and that horse was cut to pieces by the British cavalry. But they say besides that they heard one English officer with a battalion say to another, 'You understand the language better than I do: desire the jemidar of that body of horse to go and cut up those wounded European soldiers.' The other did as he was desired, and the horse obeyed the orders they received.

It is bad enough that these gentlemen should serve the enemies of their country, particularly after the British government had offered them a provision; but it is too bad that they should make themselves the instruments, or rather that they should excite the savage ferocity of the Natives against their brave and wounded countrymen.

As soon as the soldiers are sufficiently recovered from their wounds, I shall have them examined particularly respecting this report; and if I find it is substantiated, I intend to make a public report on the subject to government, with which I shall send a list of names of the officers engaged in this battle, and I will request that the whole may be made public, that they may be held up to the execration of their country and the world.

## 178. To the Governor-General.

*Irregular and abortive attempt at negotiation.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 6th Oct., 1803.

It is impossible to say whether the object in making the proposition contained in the enclosed papers was really to commence a negotiation for peace; or to raise the spirits of the enemy's troops, by showing a British officer in his camp, respecting whom it would be industriously reported that he had come to sue for peace. I rather believe that they had both objects in view, as Capt. Johnson, the Persian interpreter to the commanding officer

of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, whom they have expressed a wish to see, is an officer much respected by the Natives, particularly by Salabut Khan, who has been heretofore connected in friendship with the Rajah of Berar; and it is probable that the enemy would not have particularly desired his attendance, if they had not intended to commence a negotiation for peace. However, the desire that he should go there is expressed in so extraordinary a manner, and as there is no mention made of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar for writing at all; and above all, as I am convinced that the presence of a British officer in the enemy's camp at the present moment would tend to raise the spirits of their troops, and to keep their army together, I have thought it proper to decline to send one.

In my answer to Ballojee Koonger, I have thought it necessary to explain once more the cause for which Col. Collins quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, as your Excellency will observe that he alludes to the manner in which he quitted it, in his letter to me; and I know that the enemy have been very busy in circulating reports on that subject among the servants of the allied governments, equally distant from the truth, and prejudicial to the British government. In refusing to send a British officer to the enemy's camp, I have deemed it proper to point out the mode in which they might open a negotiation for peace, if they wished it; upon which I have only to observe, that if they should send here a sirdar, the exertions of their troops hereafter will be but trifling.

### 179. To Major Shawe.

(1) *The weakness of the allied governments hampers the conduct of the war.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Adjunttee, 8th Oct., 1803.

On the other hand, these things called allied governments are in such a state of deplorable weakness, they depend so entirely on us for the defence of their territories, and their power is so feeble over their own servants, who have so much connexion with, and even dependence on the enemy, that I have not means to move forward, at once, upon Asseerghur with my whole force; although I know that if I could take that step with safety, it would put an end to the war. But not one of the Soubah's forts is sufficiently

garrisoned. He has not a soldier in the country, excepting those belonging to the Company; and his killadars and amildars would readily pay the money they may have just to be allowed to sit quietly in their forts and towns. As for the Peshwah, he has possession of his palace at Poonah, and nothing more, and he spends the little money he receives either upon the Bramins or upon women, rather than give any to his troops, or even to his menial servants.

The consequence, then, of my proceeding to the northward with my whole force might be, that the enemy would get possession, or levy contributions upon some important place belonging to the Nizam; or they might move down upon Poonah itself. They would certainly stop our supplies, and the consequence of such a movement might thus be fatal to us. In this manner does the radical weakness of these governments operate against us.

(2) *Complicated claims of the Mahratta Chiefs on the Rajpoots. Our protection of the latter may involve us with Holkar.*

I wish you would let me know, at an early period, what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. This is important, because our engagements with them must have a great effect on the negotiations for peace. By the by, does the Governor-General know that the peshcush, paid by the Rajpoots, does not belong to Scindiah only, but to the Peshwah and the Holkar family? Of every rupee paid, 6 annas belong to the Peshwah, 5 to Scindiah, and 5 to Holkar. It is true that, for these many years past, Scindiah has collected and applied the whole to his own use: but he has lately consented to allow Holkar to collect his own share and half the Peshwah's; and I understand that the dispute between these Chiefs, and the cause of Holkar not joining the confederates, is that Holkar claimed the right to collect all the peshcush for the number of years that Scindiah had received the whole. He refused to join, unless Scindiah acquiesced in the exercise of this right, or paid him the sum of money which he ought to have received, as peshcush, from the Rajpoots, for the number of years that Scindiah had collected the whole. If this story be true, and I believe it is, the protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us with Holkar. However, on the other hand, should Holkar be really inclined to remain at peace with the English, which I think he is, we may be able to satisfy him upon that point.

180.    **To Colonel Stevenson.**

*Three lines of operation open to Colonel Stevenson in dealing with the enemy. Relative advantages of each.*

Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct., 1803.

I have reason to believe that the enemy have not come through the ghaut; and it is possible that they will now return to attack you, with all the force they can bring. Your first object will of course be to beat the campoos, before the cavalry under Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar can join; or to drive them across the Taptee, and to such a distance, as that they cannot come back so quickly as to join with the cavalry in an attack upon you, before I can reinforce you. If, however, they should be able to join before you can attack the campoos, you must decide what line you will adopt. There are three lines of operation to be adopted: to attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to draw off towards me.

In respect to the first, it is impossible to say what quantity of cannon they may have collected at Burhampoor; or what their real force may now be. I recommend that you should adopt this with caution, and only in case of necessity.

In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than the first; as, unless you intrench your position, which I should recommend, if you adopt this line, your inferiority of cannon will tell against you still more than it would in the case of your attacking the enemy.

In regard to the third, it might be attended with risk, and even loss, excepting in this case. When I shall descend the ghaut, which I shall on the 4th, after leaving this, you might make two marches towards me, which would bring us within one march of each other. Till they are prepared for their attack, which, as they are very slow, will take some time, they will not stay nearer to you than at the distance of two marches; and supposing them to be able to make two in one day, I shall have joined you before they can do you any mischief.

Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access; for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear

that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage, and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march ; they will not have time to form, which, being but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle ; a part of their troops only will be engaged ; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground.

There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep constantly in motion ; but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the beating they received on the 23rd Sept., they are not likely to stand for a second ; and they will all retire with precipitation. But the Natives of this country are rashness personified ; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23rd Sept., even if attended by such a gain. Therefore, I suggest to you what occurs to me on the subject of the different modes, either of bringing on, or declining the action which it is possible, although by no means probable, that they intend to fight. I shall march the moment I hear that they have moved to the northward. I have many people out for intelligence. Your hircarra, however, who brought the account that it was reported in their camp on the 7th that I had come this way, was premature, as I did not show any inclination to do so till the 9th.

#### 181. To Major Shawe.

*Capture of Allyghur, an extraordinary feat. Speculations on Holkar's movements and intentions.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct., 1803.

I think that Gen. Lake's capture of Allyghur is one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, viz. to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded. I have always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this instance. I hope soon to hear that the General has again returned from Delhi. We must watch Holkar closely. His sudden march to the northward shows no good intention ; and it may be depended upon that he will enter into the war, if

he should see a prospect of advantage. Holkar has now a stake in India, which depends upon the existence of his reputation as a soldier; and I think that he will not venture to risk it, by crossing the Jumna or the Ganges, and being on the same side of these rivers with Gen. Lake. But how is your province of Bahar defended? That, in my opinion, will be the point to which he will direct his march, in case he should enter into the war.

### 182. To Lieutenant-Colonel Munro.

*Answer to Munro's first criticism on the battle of Assye. Col. Stevenson's not a detachment, but a separate corps. Gen. Wellesley was misled as to the enemy's position. Why he preferred to attack at once. An officer's mistake doubled our loss, and prevented immediate pursuit. Causes of Col. Stevenson's late co-operation. His subsequent movements, and those of Gen. Wellesley and the enemy.*

Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov., 1803.

As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter<sup>1</sup> of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor-General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th September. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary; first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to be apprehended that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have

<sup>1</sup> The letter referred to will be found in Sir Thomas Munro's Life by Mr. Gleig, vol. iii. pp. 177-179. It is there dated 14th Oct.—*Ed.*

passed to the southward while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or, probably, avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than eight miles apart.

As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous that, without an army, their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who are accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun.

I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprised Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been



attacked there in the morning ; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it was : I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw the guns, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on ; but some were, and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its actual amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village : instead of that, he led directly upon it : the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time ; by which the corps which I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day, lost many men, and its union and efficiency. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded ; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated ; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was

not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuttee Ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off, and never stopped till they got down the Ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the Ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry Ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad: I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, descended the Adjuttee Ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st October; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

I ascended the Ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If this be the case, I

shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnapah Pundit.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 183. To Major Malcolm.

*The Bombay Government a prey to factious disputes. Danger of political connexion with petty chiefs. Costly requirements of the Governor-General, unsustained by remittances.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 11th Nov., 1803.

I see now that Col. Murray has involved himself in a dispute with the Paymaster and Military Auditor Gen. at Bombay. There are two parties throughout the Bombay establishment, and these are—the civil and military services; and the latter are divided into two parties—those in the King's and those in the Company's service. The disputes of these parties are the sole business of every man under the government of Bombay; and they are maintained by the system of encouragement given to correspondence, and the perpetual references to individuals by government. In short, I see clearly that nothing can succeed with those people as it ought; and I wish to God that I had nothing to do with them.

The Dhar man ought to be encouraged; and if he should be of any service to us, or even if he decidedly keeps away from Scindiah, a stipulation shall be made in his favour, that he shall receive no injury from Scindiah for his conduct during the war. But we must be cautious in all our proceedings with these fellows, otherwise we shall be burdened with the defence of a pack of rascals of inferior rank, but of the same description with their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah. Ragojee has turned to the northward. Scindiah is still in the valley of the Poorna, to the east of Mulcapoor. It is said that the former, as well as the latter, is going to Nagpoor. God send it may be true. If it is, we shall destroy him entirely. Amrut Rao is at no great distance from me, and, I believe, is coming in.

In respect to money from Bombay, you are mistaken as to the

amount which it was expected that Presidency should supply. I told Mr. Duncan that I thought we should require 16 lacs of rupees. Gen. Stuart told him that we should require double that sum. If 4 lacs coined from dollars belonging to the government of Madras be taken out of the account, I believe that we have not received the first sum ; and certainly not to the amount of the last. It is true that Mr. Duncan may include in the expenses of this army all those of Col. Colman's detachment, all those of the troops in Guzerat, and all those of Bombay, civil and military ; as he did in the account of the consumption of rice by this army, the consumption of all the troops stationed in those places, at Fort Victoria, &c.. and that of the populace at Bombay.

However, there is no doubt whatever, whether it was foreseen or not, that the calls upon the resources of Bombay have been very heavy, and that they must increase. Upon this subject I have written repeatedly to Bengal, and I have received no answer upon that or any other matter, upon which I have addressed either the Governor-General or his secretary.

I particularly requested that 7 lacs of rupees, in Bengal mohurs, might be sent to Bombay for my use, as long ago as during the siege of Ahmednuggur ; to which request I have received no answer. Then the Governor-General writes the most positive orders to spend money to draw off sirdars and horse ; to pay Amrut Rao ; to entertain 5000 horse under the modified treaty of Bassein ; to take Meer Khan into the service of the Company and the Nizam : and, on the other hand, he sends no money, and orders the government of Bombay not to make a loan, and the government of Madras to have an enlarged investment : these orders are not consistent, but who can alter them ?

#### 184. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Motives for agreeing to a suspension of hostilities with Scindiah.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Rajoorah, 23rd Nov., 1803.

My motives for agreeing to this suspension of hostilities are ;

1st ; That I have no power of injuring Scindiah any further. I have taken all he had in the Deccan ; and the troops in Guzerat cannot advance upon Ougein, for the reasons stated in a late dispatch to the Governor-General, of which I enclosed you a copy. His army now consists of horse only ; and in order to distress that, it will be necessary to follow it to a greater distance

from our sources of supply ; which, considering the distance we are from them already, becomes a matter of some consequence ; and from our operations upon the Rajah of Berar, which are most likely to bring about a peace.

2ndly ; Scindiah's horse might do us much mischief, and might derange our plans against the Rajah of Berar, supposing them to be at liberty to act. The Rajah of Berar's infantry, and a corps of cavalry, both under Manoo Bappoo, are encamped not far from Gawilghur, the place which Col. Stevenson has been ordered to attack. It is probable that both he and Scindiah would retire upon Col. Stevenson's advance ; but they would attack Col. Stevenson during the time that he might be employed at Gawilghur : or, possibly, Scindiah would make an irruption into the Soubah's territories, to draw me off to a distance, and Manoo Bappoo would attack Col. Stevenson.

3rdly ; Bappojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan to defend Ougein against our troops, supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. There is already at Ougein some infantry, which have not been engaged, and the defeated infantry are on the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find Col. Murray necessarily engaged with Canojee Rao Guickwar, and Dohud held only by one battalion, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is prevented by the cessation from hostilities. Guzerat, instead of being our strongest, is, by far, our weakest point in every respect.

4thly ; By leaving the Rajah of Berar out of the arrangement, Scindiah's interests become separate from his ; all confidence in Scindiah, if such a thing ever existed, must be lost, and the confederacy becomes, *ipso facto*, dissolved. I see no inconvenience that can result from the measure, particularly as I have the power of dissolving the agreement whenever I please. I acknowledge that this cessation of hostilities is against all the rules ; but, in this instance, I think they are rules of which the breach is more likely to be beneficial to the public than the observance.

#### 185. To the Governor-General.

##### *Battle of Argaum.*

Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov., 1803.

Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories ; that the body of troops he had with him was but small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much

mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to support and cover Col. Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur, in Berar. Col. Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined on the 24th by the brinjarrics, and other supplies which had been saved from the enemy by Capt. Baynes' affair at UMBER; and he marched forward on the 26th.

Your Excellency has been informed that, on the 23rd, I had consented to a suspension of hostilities with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz. 'that Scindiah should occupy a position 20 coss to the east of Ellichpoor,' had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about 4 miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter, of cavalry, and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah's regular infantry; and a large proportion of artillery.

In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah; and none with Scindiah, till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

Col. Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having, with great prudence and propriety, halted on the 28th at Huttee Andoorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped; and, from a tower in Parterly, I could perceive a confused mass, about 2 miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march. The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it proper to pursue them; but, shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argam, immediately in

front of that village, and about 6 miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry. The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light troops. Their line extended above 5 miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argam; and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by watercourses, &c. I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced, in order to press upon the enemy's left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regts. were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the 1st batt. 6th regt., which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands 38 pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Mahratta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy's confusion. For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till late in the day; and, unfortunately, sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

I have the honour to enclose a return of our loss in this action. The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery.

The 74th and 78th regts. had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Col. Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him; to the Hon. Lieut.-Col. St. Leger, for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry; and to Lieut.-Cols. Wallace, Adams (who commanded Lieut.-Col. Harness' brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major Huddleston, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; to Major Campbell, commanding the 94th regt.; to Capt. Beaudeman, commanding the artillery with the divisions under my immediate command; to Capt. Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah's troops. The Mahratta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place<sup>1</sup>.

### 186. To Major Shawe.

*Capricious misconduct of the Company's troops at Argaum.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec., 1803.

If we had had daylight an hour more, not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time, if my Native infantry had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the

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<sup>1</sup> Return of the killed and wounded at the battle of Argaum.

|         | <i>Europeans.</i> |      |       |         | <i>Natives.</i>               |
|---------|-------------------|------|-------|---------|-------------------------------|
|         | Cap.              | Sub. | Drum. | R. & F. | Non-Com. Officers & Privates. |
| Killed  | —                 | —    | —     | 15      | 31                            |
| Wounded | 3                 | 6    | 6     | 145     | 148                           |
| Missing | —                 | —    | —     | —       | 5                             |

N.B. The Officers being British are included under the head of Europeans.



cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly 3 entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broken and running off, when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from 6 in the morning until 12 at night.

187. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*Importance of Gen. Campbell's position, in securing the tranquillity of Gen. Wellesley's rear.*

(Extract.)

Camp before Gawilghur, 9th Dec., 1803.

In respect to General Campbell's advance, I have frequently considered that subject; and notwithstanding all my difficulties on account of the want of a reserve on the Godavery to keep the enemy in my front, I have always decided that General Campbell's corps could never be so well posted as in the spot originally pointed out for him. The foundation of all our success here, the destruction of the enemy's views, and our hopes of peace, depend upon the continuation of tranquillity in the Company's territories and in Mysore. That tranquillity might continue if those troops were ordered forward, but I am not certain that it would. I am certain it will as long as they remain in their position, because they are superior to all that can be brought against them, and they threaten the safety of all the strongholds of the southern chiefs, if these should presume to declare themselves the enemies of the Company. This was the case before our last success, and my present operations, which go to Ragojee Bhoonslah's existence, had brought that chief out of the Nizam's territories.

But now that friends and enemies and neutrals are all in Berar, I don't want a reserve on the Godavery; the removal of General Campbell's corps would be useless, and all the chances of its being prejudicial to us still exist.

I was the person who first suggested the position at Moodgul to General Stuart; every day's experience shows the benefit

which we have derived from occupying it; and I have contended for keeping it against my own inclinations, and my sense of my own ease and advantage, with Close, Malcolm, and every body who has considered the question at all. In fact, whenever the troops are withdrawn from thence, as they were when General Stuart crossed the Toombuddra, and lately when General Campbell made a march to Raichore, the first knowledge I had of their march was the account of a disturbance in the countries situated among the rivers, which has regularly ceased when the troops have returned. After considering all this, I think you will agree in opinion with me that, till we have peace, General Campbell ought to remain where he is.

### 188. To Colonel Murray.

*Proper way of treating the Bheels.*

(Extract.) Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec., 1803.

I had always the idea of the Bheels stated in Col. Anderson's letter. The Bheels (properly so called) are the uncivilized race who inhabit the hills, and rob and plunder every body indiscriminately. The Rajahs, in and bordering on the hills, have great influence over these people, and are besides formidable in themselves, on account of the natural strength of their countries, and the numbers of armed men they can bring into the field for their defence. Both would be our best defence against the attack of a Native army; and the adoption of a liberal policy towards them at once will secure them to us for ever. The way of securing the uncivilized, or thief Bheels, would be to conciliate the Rajahs, and then we shall be secure. I recommend that, of all other things, we should avoid any interference in their individual quarrels; or the consequence will be, that we shall be involved in a system of hostilities, more destructive than that which would attend an attempt to subdue them to the British authority.

### 189. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*The Bombay Government perhaps judged too harshly. Personal friendliness to the Governor.*

(Extract.) Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804.

In the course of the correspondence which I have had with your government during the war, I observe that there are some

subjects upon which my opinion is different from yours. But I assure you that nothing could ever alter the sentiments of respect which I have always entertained for you, or of gratitude for the kindness which I have always received from you.

I don't know whether I ought to regret the disposition which I feel to consider nothing impossible, to suppose that everything can be effected by adequate exertions, and to feel deeply and to complain of the disappointments which must be met with in carrying on such a service as I have had in hand. But I really believe that I may sometimes have complained without much cause, and you will see by my public letter of this day that I can do justice to the persons acting under your orders at Bombay.

**190. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.**

*Recognition of the services of Bombay officers.*

(Extract.)                      Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan., 1804.

I take the liberty of adverting to the great assistance which I have received from Bombay since the troops under my command have been in this part of India.

I should do injustice to the officers under your government if I did not report to you that I have had occasion to observe in them the most anxious and zealous desire to forward the service the conduct of which has been intrusted to me, and to obey the orders they received from you. In the course of operations of such extent and difficulty, and in the transaction of business so novel at Bombay as the equipment and supply of an army so numerous as this is, I must at times have been disappointed in my hopes of assistance, and I may have acquainted you with my disappointment; but I must say that I have ever had reason to be satisfied with the exertions of the officers under your government acting under your orders.

**191. To Major Malcolm.**

*Justification of the levying of a contribution on Burhampoor.*

(Extract.)

Camp on the top of the Badowly ghaut,  
13th Jan., 1804.

I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenham, written by the Governor-General's order, from which I perceive

that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety of demanding the contribution at Burhampoor, the report of which had reached the Governor-General through a private channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham's letter to prove to me that no suspicion is entertained, that the questions upon the subject are asked merely for information; but those very pains prove the existence of the suspicion, and in fact, why is he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon which information must be given, unless some suspicion is entertained?

I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the increase of my expenses, by measures not mine; by the total want of funds provided for this army; by my being left to chance; and by the Governor-General having employed the frigate sent to Bengal for money; and by not paying my bills at Benares, and not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay, there was every reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of funds to carry it on; and that, in fact, I could not have paid the troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of money raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of goods captured at Asseerghur.

I have told the Governor-General that if he disapproves of the measure, he may order the money to be restored; but I have warned him, that if he does give those orders, Scindiah will certainly put the money into his pocket. In fact, if I had not exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, what would have become of the campaign? Where would have been the national honour or character, if the campaign had been lost?

## 192. To Major Shawe.

*The same subject.*

Camp, 13th Jan., 1804.

I received last night Mr. Sydenham's letter of the 4th Dec., which I take the earliest opportunity of answering.

When I sent a division of the army to Burhampoor, I determined to raise a contribution upon that city. My reasons for this determination were: 1st; I had reason to believe from Col. Collins's report, that Burhampoor was an open town, which it would not be possible for me to retain; and, therefore, to levy the contribution was a likely mode of distressing the enemy, who, in fact, did give orders upon that city to part of his troops for

their pay: 2ndly; although I was not in immediate want of money, I had the prospect before me of an approaching want.

The expenses of this army had been vastly increased, 1st; by the course of the campaign, and the increased distance of our operations from the sources of supply: 2ndly; by the increased price of every article of consumption, particularly of grain for the horses of the cavalry: and 3rdly; by the necessity of paying the Peshwah's troops, and at times those of the Rajah of Mysore, when their money had not arrived. I had, besides, every reason to hope that Amrut Rao would join; and, by arrangement made with the Peshwah, 5000 men were to be raised, 3000 of which were to serve with my army, and to be paid by me.

The rough estimate of our expenses would then stand thus:—

|  | Rupees.   |
|--|-----------|
| My own division . . . . .                              | 400,000   |
| Col. Stevenson's . . . . .                             | 300,000   |
| The Peshwah's . . . . .                                | 100,000   |
| The Rajah of Mysore's . . . . .                        | 80,000    |
| Amrut Rao and part of the 5000 troops, about . . . . . | 150,000   |
|  | 1,030,000 |

To answer these demands no fund had been provided, excepting what I could get at Poonah for bills upon Bombay and Bengal, and what Major Kirkpatrick could get at Hyderabad. In respect to the supply from Poonah, I have to observe, that, besides my expenses, it was to pay those of the troops there, and at Ahmednuggur; and also that not a post came in that I was not informed, either directly by Mr. Duncan or by Major Malcolm, that the government of Bombay could supply me no longer. Mr. Duncan had been obliged to insist that we should draw at 30 days instead of 8 days; and then we could get no more money for our drafts; and nearly at the same time we received accounts from Benares, that our drafts upon that place had not been paid. In the mean time, no money came from Bengal, and the frigate which Mr. Duncan sent round for specie was detained for another service. The supply from Hyderabad was likely to be more plentiful, and has proved to be much so; but still the supply was liable to many accidents, from the number of desperate thieves who infest the roads.

Besides all these demands upon me, compared with my means of answering them, the Governor-General had desired that any chief, who offered himself from the enemy, should be taken into

the service, and particularly Meer Khan, the Patan chief in Holkar's service. This expense would also have fallen upon me, as the Nizam government have not supplied one farthing; and I have lately been obliged to lend Rajah Mohiput Ram  $3\frac{1}{4}$  lacs of rupees, to prevent a mutiny among the troops usually in his service. But I do not mention this circumstance as a reason for levying a contribution upon Burhampoor, as I was not aware of it at the time I ordered that measure. I knew that the moment at which I should cease to pay the troops regularly would be the date of the commencement of the disasters of the campaign in this quarter; and, therefore, I conceive that I should have neglected my duty to the Governor-General, if I had omitted to take any measure which could avert or procrastinate that evil day.

In respect to the amount raised at Burhampoor in this manner, I did not order that any particular sum should be raised. I desired Col. Stevenson, generally, to raise a contribution, if he should be of opinion that the inhabitants would pay it. The most he first demanded was 10 lacs of rupees. Upon finding that sum could not be paid without difficulty, and without resorting to measures which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lacs; and the inhabitants who had been charged to collect the money then paid 75,000 rupees more, which they had levied beyond the reduced sum. This is the fact related to me by Col. Stevenson, and I have every reason to believe it is correct. You have now the whole story, and the Governor-General may form his own judgment upon it. I should have reported it before now, as I am desirous that this and every other part of my conduct should be investigated; only that I did not know the result of Col. Stevenson's measures at Burhampoor till after he joined me at the battle of Argaum: and I did not know the exact sum which had been levied until a few days ago, when he was about to leave the army, and gave me the receipt of the Paymaster. But I had intended, and shall still make a regular report to the Governor-General, upon this subject, as I have upon every other, either to him or to Gen. Stuart.

The Governor-General has trusted me to carry on an extensive service here; and I conceive that my duty to him requires that I should omit nothing which can insure its success. It would have been no excuse to him, or to the world, if I had been obliged to give it up for want of money; and yet I must tell you, that if it had not been for this money levied at Burhampoor, and from the

produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, I should not have been able to have paid the troops in December, and I should not be able to pay them now, but for the sales of property captured at Gawilghur. There is to the value of 2 lacs of rupees of plate captured at Gawilghur, which, unless I get up money from Poonah or Hyderabad, is my only resource for next month.

It is impossible to reason on the effect on the national character of levying a contribution, because no facts can be produced by which a judgment can be formed. I know that to levy a contribution is common in India and in Europe; that I should have levied one at Oomrawootty, and another at Nagpoor, if the Rajah of Berar had not made peace; and that it would have been much more disgraceful and disastrous to have lost the campaign from the want of money, than to have insured in this manner the means of gaining it.

I believe I am as anxious as any other man that my character should not suffer, I do not mean in the mouths of common reporters and scandal bearers, but in the eyes of a fair judging people. I declare that I think that I have done what is right; but if the Governor-General thinks it was wrong, it is easy to return the money to the people of Burhampoor. However, if he does this, he returns the money into Scindiah's pocket, for he will take it immediately. I have many other important matters to write to you upon; but as nothing can go on smoothly till this matter is explained, I have thought it best to begin with this, and to send off the letter without delay.

P. S. At the same time with Sydenham's letter of the 4th, I received yours of the 8th, and also his of the 9th, enclosing the commencement of the Governor-General's instructions upon the peace. As far as I can judge from his notes, in the margin of the sheets transmitted by you, I believe I have made a better peace than he expected. At all events, the Governor-General's mind will very soon have been relieved from all anxiety respecting the junction of the interests of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhonslah, as he must have received my letter on the subject of the suspension of arms with Scindiah.

I have received Mr. Edmonstone's letters with the accounts of the negotiations with the Rajahs, &c., and I think there is every reason to believe that they have not been concluded by treaties. I hear that Meer Khan is gone towards Bundelcund: if that report be true, he must have done so in communication with Ambajee.

**193. To the Secretary of Government, Military Department,  
Fort William.**

*Satisfaction at the approval of the requisition. Employment  
of the money.*

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letters of the 12th and 16th of April, and I shall proceed immediately to carry into execution the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General. I am much gratified by the approbation of his Excellency the Governor-General of the measure of levying a contribution upon the city of Burhampoor. I always considered that I was fully justified in using the advantages which the bravery of the troops had put into my hands to increase the resources applicable to the purposes of the war, and to diminish those of the enemy.

To restore the money levied upon the inhabitants of Burhampoor would be a measure of generosity and of good policy, if it were practicable; and as the restoration has been preceded by the approbation of government of the measure of levying the contribution, it would not afford ground for belief among the Natives that the conduct of the officers who authorised and levied it had been disapproved of by his Excellency. But it is not known from whom the money was taken; and supposing that any measure could be devised by which it could be restored to the original proprietors, I doubt whether Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not immediately deprive them of it. However, his Excellency the Governor-General must be the best judge upon this subject, and I request to have his orders.

The money levied at Burhampoor has been applied to the payment of the troops.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**194. To Colonel Murray.**

*A friendly rebuke and frank warning to a disputatious officer.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 21st Jan., 1804.

I mention these subjects to you, because I think it very desirable, as well for yourself as for the public service, that you should draw well with the government and its servants. For my part, I



shall shortly resign my charge in this part of India ; and, excepting as far as my wishes may go, I shall be indifferent to what passes. But I shall ever be sorry to hear that you misapply your talents by entering into these questions and disputes, and that you have thereby tired the government, and put it under a necessity not to employ you.

**195. To the Hon. H. Wellesley.**

*Conduct of the Deccan war after Assye ; and of the Pacification.*

Camp, 40 miles N.E. from Ahmednuggur,  
24th Jan., 1804.

I have not written to you, I believe, since I sent you the account of the battle which I fought at Assye on the 23rd Sept. last, although many interesting events have occurred since that time ; but the fact is, that I have not had leisure ; and I knew that you would learn these events from the public dispatches. I propose, however, in this letter to give you an outline of our operations in this part of India, which have ended in treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

After the battle of Assye, those two Chiefs fled into Candeish with their armies in great confusion ; Scindiah's in particular was almost entirely disorganized, and vast numbers deserted him. Col. Stevenson followed them down the Adjuttee ghaut. They fled to the Taptee, along which river they marched to the westward. As soon as I had placed my numerous wounded in security, I marched with my division to Adjuttee, and ordered Col. Stevenson to advance towards Burhampoor, and levy a contribution upon that city, and to lay siege to Asseerghur.

Upon my arrival at Adjuttee, I found that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had quitted the Taptee, and had moved to the southward, apparently with an intention of passing out of Candeish through the hills situated north of the Godavery, and of invading the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and all the remains of the defeated infantry had been sent across the Taptee towards Hindustan. This movement was intended to divert my attention from the siege of Asseerghur ; or, if I should persevere in that operation, the confederates would have invaded the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would have entirely destroyed the rich provinces of the latter, upon which I depended

for resources of grain to enable me to carry on the war, and would, at all events, have cut off or impeded the communication which I had with Poonah and Bombay by Ahmednuggur. I therefore determined to leave the siege of Asseerghur to Col. Stevenson's division, and to march myself to the southward, in order to follow the motions of the confederates.

On the 11th Oct., I arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and there remained till the 15th. On that night I received most accurate accounts of the disposition of the enemy's army, from which I was of opinion that they intended to move upon Col. Stevenson, in order to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, and I returned immediately towards Adjuttee. I arrived there on the 18th, and descended the ghaut into Candeish on the 19th. Scindiah, who had returned to the northward, then halted his army at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, within three marches of Burhampoor.

Col. Stevenson arrived on the 15th at Burhampoor, of which place he took possession; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, drove in the enemy, and took possession of the pettah on the 18th, by which means he had a fine situation from whence to carry on his attack against the fort; he broke ground on the 19th, and the fort surrendered on the 21st. I did not receive intelligence of the surrender, on which I could depend, until the 24th, in the evening; and at the same time I learnt that the Rajah of Berar, who had separated from Scindiah when he had marched to the northward for the relief of Asseerghur, had passed through the hills which form the southern boundary of Candeish, and was then encamped between the hills and the river Godavery. There was no longer any reason for remaining below the ghauts, and I therefore determined to re-ascend them. I sent orders to Col. Stevenson to re-equip his division for the siege of Gawilghur, in Berar, from the stores in Asseerghur; and while he was making the necessary arrangements for that purpose, to watch the motions of Scindiah's army, and prevent him from undertaking any thing of importance.

I arrived at Adjuttee, on the top of the ghaut, on the 25th, marched on the following days to the southward, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th. The Rajah of Berar, in the usual style of a Mahratta, had spent his time, after he had come out of Candeish, in plundering the country, and negotiating with Amrut Rao, who was encamped on the Godavery, to induce that Chief to join him. The Rajah was still, on the 29th, between Aurung-

abad and the Godavery, and I hoped to have been able to attack him. He marched, however, on the night of the 29th, and between that time and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which I was in his neighbourhood, he marched with his camp five times. On the 31st, in the morning, he detached a body of 5000 horse to attack a large convoy on its march from the southward to join the troops on the frontier, the arrival of which had been delayed by the obstinacy of the officer who commanded, before it crossed the Godavery, and which river it crossed only on the 30th. The Rajah's troops were beat off with considerable loss, and the convoy joined me in safety on the 1st Nov.

The necessity of taking care of this convoy was unfortunate. If I had not been under the necessity of directing the movements of the troops in such a manner as to protect it, at the same time that I pushed the Rajah, I should have had it in my power to have destroyed him between the 29th and 31st Oct. But all the subsequent solid operations of the war depended upon the arrival of that convoy, and it was more important to secure it, than to gain a victory over a body of horse; in the attempt to obtain which I might have failed, and then I should have lost the convoy.

The troops had now been in march nearly every day, from the beginning of October, and it was necessary to give them some rest. Accordingly, I left the Rajah to go off to the eastward, towards Berar, and I halted till the 4th, in the neighbourhood of Umber.

Immediately after the battle of Assye, I had received from the confederates a variety of propositions tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace: they were all made in the usual Mahratta style, in such a manner, that it was possible either to deny that they had been made, or to continue the negotiations founded upon them, as it might suit the interests of the confederates. In answer to them all, I said that if the confederates, or either of them, wished for peace, they might send a vakeel to my camp with proper powers, who should be received with the respect due to his rank and character; and that I would listen with attention to what he might have to communicate, and would give him a distinct answer.

The result of the different propositions, and a variety of messages, was, that on the 6th Nov., a vakeel from Scindiah arrived in camp. His name was Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a nephew of the celebrated Morari Rao. He was received with due respect,

but when we began business, it was found that he had no powers, and then we came again to a stand. However, I allowed him to remain in camp for a few days, till he should receive his powers, which shortly afterwards arrived. In the mean time, Amrut Rao, with whom, I believe I before informed you, I had made a treaty in August, joined me on the 12th Nov. According to the Mah-ratta custom, after making this treaty, he had waited to see which of the parties was likely to succeed in the war; and he had not decided this question in his own mind, till after the battle of Assye and its consequence, the fall of Asseerghur. As soon as Goorparah received his full powers, the first measure he proposed was a suspension of hostilities between the confederates and me. I refused to suspend hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, but agreed to suspend them with Scindiah, in the Deccan and Guzerat, upon certain conditions, which appear in the treaty of which I enclose a copy<sup>1</sup>.

\* \* \* \* \*

I concluded this treaty on the 23rd Nov. While all this was going on, I was advancing gradually towards Berar, and pushing the Rajah before me to the eastward, and annoying his rear with my Mysore horse.

Towards the middle of November, Col. Stevenson had completed all his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, and was enabled to quit Burhampoor. He marched up the valley of the Poorna river to Ballapoor in Berar, where he arrived on the 23rd, and he was joined on the 24th by the convoy which had been saved from the Rajah of Berar by Capt. Baynes's affair at Umber, on the 31st Oct., and my march to the southward. As soon as I found that the Rajah of Berar's march was decided, I determined to go into Berar to support and cover Col. Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur. Scindiah had moved to the eastward in front of Col. Stevenson, and towards the end of November had encamped in the neighbourhood of an army commanded by Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the brother of the Rajah of Berar, consisting of the greater number, if not the whole, of the Rajah's regular infantry and artillery, and a large body of cavalry. Thus, in the end of November, no less than 4 armies were assembled in

<sup>1</sup> The omitted passage is a brief statement of reasons for granting an armistice to Scindiah, which are more fully detailed in an extract already given.—*Ed.*

Berar. A happy circumstance for the Rajah, who is supposed to have planned the confederacy.

The united armies of Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah were between Col. Stevenson and the fort of Gawilghur, and it was necessary to beat them before the siege of that fort could be undertaken. Col. Stevenson and I joined on the 29th Nov., at Parterly, about 17 miles north of the Poorna river, and I attacked the enemy that afternoon on the plains of Argaum, about 6 miles from that village, and gained a complete victory with but small loss on our side, having taken from them all their cannon, ammunition, &c., numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, &c. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin the action till late in the day, and not more than 20 minutes' sun remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge: but they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight; and all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the night. I do not send the detailed account of this action; I think it probable that you will have received it before you get this letter.

It was an extraordinary and fortunate circumstance, that after Col. Stevenson and I had been separated for above 2 months, at a distance of nearly 300 miles, I should have joined him on the very morning of this engagement; and that, in order to enable me to join him, he was not obliged to halt more than one day. But the operations of this war have afforded numerous instances of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining intelligence, and, above all, of movement. Marches, such as I have made in this war, were never known or thought of before. In the last 8 days of the month of October, I marched above 120 miles, and passed through 2 ghauts with heavy guns, and all the equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency of the army; and in the few days previous to this battle, when I had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than between 17 and 20 miles, and I marched 26 miles on the day on which it was fought.

After the battle at Argaum, I moved on the 1st Dec. with the 2 divisions in 2 columns, towards Gawilghur. I arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th, and established there an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum. On the 7th, both divisions moved to take up the ground for the siege of Gawilghur. Col. Stevenson's division, which had been equipped for the siege of Asseerghur, was destined to make the principal attack on the northern face;

while that under my immediate command, with all the cavalry (British and Native), should cover the siege, and co-operate with Col. Stevenson as far as might be practicable, by attacks to the southward and westward. The march of Col. Stevenson's division through the mountains, to the northern face of the fort, was one of the most difficult, and, in the success of the execution, extraordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the troops over high mountains, through valleys and ravines, for nearly 30 miles from Ellichpoor, by roads made by themselves with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were equal. They were enabled to break ground on the 12th, and on the same night I commenced an attack upon the southern face.

On the 15th, in the morning, Col. Stevenson had effected a breach in the outer walls of the fort, and we determined to storm. While he attacked the breaches on the northern wall, the infantry of my division were to attack the western and southern gates. There remained a third wall, which had not been breached, and this the troops escalated, and we were shortly in possession of the place. Our loss on this occasion was not great, but that of the enemy was immense. The killadar, all the principal officers, and the greater part of the garrison were killed.

During the siege, the negotiations for peace were going on briskly, particularly with the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, who had arrived in camp on the day after the battle of Argaum. I concluded a treaty of peace with him, of which I enclose you a copy, on the 16th Dec., and signed it on the following morning, previous to my march towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impressions under which it was evident that it had been concluded.

I halted, after making 3 marches towards Nagpoor; as I found that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and I saw that if I marched forward I should destroy his government entirely. I received the ratification on the 23rd Dec.

You will have observed, that after I had concluded the treaty for suspending hostilities with Scindiah, I had fought his army at Argaum on the 29th Nov. At that time he had not ratified the treaty, and he had not performed any one of its stipulations; and I gave notice to his vakeels that I should attack him if I should meet his army. After the battle he did ratify the treaty, but he did not perform the condition which required that he

should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor. However, he did not interfere in the siege of Gawilghur, and did not take advantage of my being employed in that operation, to attack the Peshwah or the Nizam.

As soon as he found that the Rajah of Berar had made peace, he began to be a little alarmed respecting his own situation ; and the negotiations for peace with his vakeels, in which no great progress had been made, then took a favourable turn.

On the 23rd, the day on which I received the Rajah's ratification of his treaty, Scindiah's 2 principal ministers, Eitul Punt and moonshee Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp to conclude the treaty of peace. On the same day I gave them notice, that, on the 27th, if the treaty of peace should not then be concluded, hostilities would no longer be suspended ; and on the 24th I returned to the westward, and joined Col. Stevenson (who had only then come out of the mountains from Gawilghur), on the 26th, to the westward of Ellichpoor.

On the 28th I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's ministers, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th ; and on the 5th Jan. I received Scindiah's ratification of the treaty. I enclose a copy of this treaty, and copies of my letters to the Governor-General upon this treaty, and that with the Rajah of Berar.

I have now brought you from the battle of Assye to the conclusion of peace, and my hand is almost tired ; but I have other circumstances to mention to you, and if I do not continue now, it is possible that I may be delayed for another week before I shall be able to finish this epistle, the first page of which was written, as it appears, on the 24th Jan., and the remainder on the 1st Feb.

Since the peace I have marched to the southward, and am now encamped between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah. A banditti were on this frontier, whom I intended to destroy, but they have dispersed, and I propose to break up the army almost immediately. Malcolm is at Scindiah's durbar, endeavouring to arrange the defensive alliance, in which he has not made much progress. Mr. Elphinstone is with the Rajah of Berar. The Governor-General is well pleased with the treaty with the latter, and has ratified it : he has sent me copies of your letters of the 30th Aug.

## 196. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Efficiency of the bullock establishment:—a novelty in our Indian experience. The new system should be retained.*

Fort St. George, 2nd Aug., 1804.

I have the honour to inform you, that if you should have no objection to the measure, I propose recommending to the Governor-General, to give a gratuity of one month's pay to the persons belonging to the Public Bullock department, who served with the troops under my command, during the late war. These persons marched from Seringapatam with the troops; they served throughout the war in a country in which grain, when cheapest, was in the proportion of 12 to 1 dearer than in Mysore; they always did their duty without grumbling; and I do not recollect an instance of desertion. They were necessarily present in the actions which were fought; some of them were killed, and others desperately wounded.

Upon the occasion of laying before you my intention to recommend this description of the public servants of the army to the favour of his Excellency the Governor-General, I cannot avoid drawing your notice to the benefits which have resulted from the establishment to which they belonged. It must be recollected, that in former wars, the utmost exertion which it was possible for the army to make, was to draw its train of artillery to Seringapatam. It was not possible, and never was expected, that the guns and carriages which were drawn there, should be brought away again; and accordingly, notwithstanding the undoubted talents and the great reputation of the officers who have at different times led British armies to that place, it has invariably happened, that by far the greater part of the train and carriages have been left behind when the army marched away. Those who have seen the mode in which those armies made their marches, and were acquainted with the system under which cattle were, and must necessarily be, procured for the service, will not hesitate to allow, that the slowness of all our operations, and the necessity to which I have above alluded, of leaving our guns after they had been drawn above 300 miles, were to be attributed entirely to the faults of the system under which the cattle were procured for the service.

But although I am addressing myself to an officer whose



experience reaches beyond the times to which I have alluded, it is only necessary that I should advert, in proof of my assertion, to the circumstances of the late war. From a variety of causes, it was necessary, at the commencement of the war, to hire cattle to draw the train from Madras to the frontiers of Mysore; and you will recollect the difficulties under which you laboured; and that in fact you could not have brought your carriages to the frontier without the assistance of the public cattle sent to join you; and that if the circumstances of the times had required that the whole army should have advanced to Poonah, you would probably have thought it proper to have taken with you those carriages only for which you might have had a sufficient number of the public draught cattle.

All the carriages attached to the division under my command were drawn by the public cattle; and I shall advert to a few facts, to point out the difference between this part of the equipment of the troops in the late and in former wars.

We marched to Poonah from Seringapatam, the distance being nearly 600 miles, in the worst season of the year, through a country which had been destroyed by Holkar's army, with heavy guns, at the rate, upon an average, of  $13\frac{1}{2}$  miles a day; and if the 12 days on which we halted upon the Toombuddra for orders be included, we arrived at Poonah in 2 months from the time we marched. On this march we lost no draught cattle. I remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in a country which deserves the name of a desert, for 6 weeks; and then marched again with the train, in the same state, as to numbers, as when it left Seringapatam, and the troops and cattle were in the field during the monsoon.

It is needless to advert to the distance marched during the war, or to recapitulate the events, all of which must show the efficient state of the equipments; but it has been frequently necessary for the troops to march, for many days together, a distance from 15 to 20 miles daily; the heavy artillery always accompanied them, and I always found that the cattle could go as far as the troops. Upon one occasion, I found it necessary to march a detachment 60 miles in 30 hours, and the ordnance and provision carriages, drawn by the Company's bullocks, accompanied this detachment. Instead of being obliged, as the Commanders-in-Chief of armies in former wars have been, to leave guns and carriages behind, such was the state of efficiency of this department throughout this severe service, that I was able, but with little assistance, to draw away the guns which the troops took.

After all this service, in which so much country has been marched over, the number of cattle which have died is, I believe, really not greater than it would have been at the grazing ground ; and the department is at this moment in a state of great efficiency. It would not be difficult to prove, that in point of actual expense, this establishment is cheaper to the public, than to hire cattle in the old mode ; but the consideration respecting a public establishment of this description, is not referrible entirely to cheapness.

It must be obvious to every man, that in a war, such as the late war, there could be no success, unless the officer commanding the troops was able to move, at all times, with the utmost celerity of which the troops were capable, and to continue his movements so long as was necessary. Rapid movements with guns and carriages cannot be made without good cattle, well driven, and well taken care of ; and without advertng to what passed subsequently, it is more than probable, that if I had had the service of such cattle only, as served Lord Cornwallis and Gen. Harris in former wars, I should never have reached Poonah, and that I should have been obliged to find my way back without the wheel carriages, in the best manner I could.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending this establishment of cattle to your protection. It is founded upon the most efficient and most economical principles, and will never fail the army, so long as it is superintended and conducted as it has been hitherto.

197. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, detailing the system for regulating the supplies of an Army in the Deccan, a copy of which was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, &c.

Fort William, 3rd Nov., 1804.

After every inquiry I have been able to make, I cannot learn the mode in which the system of supplies is conducted by the Commander-in-Chief. I rather believe, however, that the whole rests in the hands of Capt. Morrison, who is superintendent of supplies of the army.

Without local knowledge, it is impossible for me to say whether that mode is a good one ; I shall, however, detail that in use with all the armies in which I have commanded in the Deccan, and which has succeeded in enabling me to go to a very great distance from the sources of supplies.

There are in every army four descriptions of persons or animals, to be supplied with food, viz.,

i. European soldiers. ii. Native troops. iii. Horses of the cavalry. iv. Followers of all descriptions, including horses, cattle, servants, &c., of officers, departments, soldiers, &c.

1st. To feed the European soldiers, a Commissary of provisions is appointed. The quantity of provisions necessary for the number of men for any given period of time (2 or 3 months) is issued to him from the public stores, or he purchases them, according to the orders which he may receive. Carriage is allotted for this provision, either carts or bullocks, &c. In this quantity of provision, the Commissary of provisions has only 5 days' grain, and the carriage allotted for that quantity; and he indents on every fifth day on the Commissary of grain for that grain which will be necessary for the European troops for the following 5 days. The object of this arrangement is to keep the account of the grain clear, and that it may always be known what length of time the quantity of grain in camp will serve for the whole army.

2ndly. The Native troops receive grain only.

When the army is assembled, a quantity of grain which will last the troops, including the Europeans, a given period of time (2 or 3 months), is issued from the public stores to the Commissary of grain. Carriage is allotted for it; viz., bullocks, either the property of the Company, or hired for the purpose, and under the immediate charge of the Commissary of grain. When the Commissary of grain makes an issue, he replenishes it, either by drawing again upon the stores, if he can communicate with them, or by purchases in the country, or the bazaar, according to the orders which he may receive from the officer commanding the army.

3rdly. The horses of the cavalry.

When the number of horses to be fed is ascertained, a quantity of grain is issued from the public stores to the Gram agent general, to last them for a given number of days; viz., 40, 50 or 60. The quarter-masters of the regiments of cavalry have under their charge a bullock for each horse in the regiment, which bullock carries grain to last the horse 15 days. He receives this grain from the Gram agent general. The Gram agent general has under his charge and superintendence bullocks in sufficient number (either hired, or belonging to the Company) to carry the remainder of the gram. When he makes an issue to the quarter-master, he replaces it either by drawing again upon the stores, or

by purchases in the bazaar or the country, according to the orders which he may receive from the commanding officer of the army.

4thly. Followers of all descriptions.

These persons live by the daily purchases they make in the bazaar, the supply of which becomes an object of the greatest importance. What follows is the mode of supplying the bazaar which I have seen practised. The bazaars are placed under the charge and superintendence of an officer called the superintendent of supplies, and in him the whole business of the internal police and supply of the camp rests. The following modes are adopted to supply the grain required for it.

1st. Brinjarries. These are a class of carriers who gain a livelihood by transporting grain or other commodities from one part of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly in the same manner as they do in common times of peace. They either purchase grain themselves in the country with their own money, or with money advanced to them by the Company, and sell it in the bazaar at the rates of the day on their own account, or they take grain at the Company's stores at certain reduced rates, and sell it on their own account in the bazaars; or they take up grain in the Company's stores, and carry it with the army, and receive a sum of money for every march they make, and the grain is sold in the bazaars on account of the Company; or they hire their cattle by the month to the Company, and take up grain from the public stores and carry it with the army, where it is sold in the bazaars on the account of the Company. It is the business of the superintendent of supplies to settle all these various accounts, and to see that the brinjarries get fresh loads as fast as they empty them, and to know always, as nearly as possible, the quantity of grain which this description of people have got.

2nd. Biparries. This is another description of dealers. They do not go in large flocks like the brinjarries, and to such distances, to look for grain. They are generally attached to the camp bazaar, and they go out to the villages and towns in the neighbourhood of the camp, and purchase grain, and bring it in immediately for sale. These are a more civilized, industrious, and useful people than the brinjarries; they are much more active, and if the country is open, the supply which they bring is more plentiful.

3rd. The Biparries of the country. These are of the same class with the second, only not immediately attached to the

camp. They bring grain to the camp from the neighbouring villages, when ordered by the amildars and government, or excited by their own interests ; but their attendance is not so constant. Besides these three principal descriptions, there are others, but they may all be classed under one of the three general heads.

From this statement it is obvious, that when the communication between the army and the country is not free, that alone upon which the bazaar can depend is the brinjarries, who are generally assembled in large numbers, and attend it when the campaign is opened. It frequently happens, as was the case with me in the last campaign, that the brinjarries desert the army. The communication with the country may be cut off from many causes ; the enemy, the swelling of a river, bad roads, rainy weather, &c. On the other hand, the army may outmarch the supplies which might be expected from biparries, &c. In any of these cases, it is usual for the commanding officer of the army to order the Commissary of grain to issue to the superintendent of supplies any quantity of grain that may be required to supply the consumption which falls upon the bazaar. The Commissary of grain makes his purchases again from the bazaar when it fills. The Gram agent general also issues, by order, gram to the superintendent of the bazaar when that article is wanted for officers' horses and cattle. He frequently issues it by order, to the agent for the public draught bullocks, when the supply of grain in the bazaar is not sufficient for the cattle in his department.

In this manner, the army can never be in want. The camp stores are always kept complete, and supply the bazaars occasionally ; while the bazaars, in more plentiful times (which, under good arrangement, must occur frequently), supply the camp stores.

**198. Memorandum on the system adopted for regulating the Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command of Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley.**

Fort William, Nov., 1804.

One of the great difficulties of war in this country is to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements and intentions sufficiently early to take advantage of them. The following modes of pro-

curing intelligence were adopted in the late campaign in the Deccan, and were generally successful.

1. Three distinct departments for intelligence were formed in camp, the head of each of which communicated directly with Major-Gen. Wellesley. To each department was attached such a number of intelligence hircarrahs, as rendered it certain that one would come into each department from the enemy's camp on every day.

2. The heads of the intelligence departments reported immediately on its arrival, the intelligence received, and questioned the hircarrah particularly regarding the hour at which he had quitted the camp. His intelligence was then compared with that brought in by the other hircarrahs, as received from other quarters, and a tolerably accurate opinion was generally formed of the facts reported.

3. Great care was taken that the persons employed in one department should not be known to those employed in the others, and that they should not communicate. The hircarrahs were highly rewarded, besides receiving monthly pay, particularly when they brought any intelligence on which an operation could be founded; and were punished and turned out of the service when they brought any which was known to be false.

4. The intelligence departments were kept, one by the Dep. Adj.-Gen., one by Mr. Elphinstone, who acted as Persian interpreter, and one by Govind Rao, a servant of the Rajah of Mysore, who was used in the communications with the Native sirdars.

5. Besides these departments for intelligence, a constant communication was kept up and encouraged with the Native vakeels. They came every evening to Major-Gen. Wellesley; he communicated with them personally, and learned all that they had heard in the course of the day.

6. A correspondence was also kept up with the amildars of the country, and measures were taken constantly, by means of the Mysore sirdars and horsemen, and their communications with the heads of villages, &c., in the neighbourhood of camp, to find out the reports of the country, and every thing which could throw light upon the enemy's designs.

199. To the Right Hon. Robert Dundas<sup>1</sup>.

*Character, influence, and formidable military position of Amrut Rao, during the Mahratta war. His good service in detaching Holkar from the Confederacy. The arrangement with him desirable, and its terms not extravagant.*

(Extract.)

London, 27th March, 1808.

Amrut Rao was the adopted son of the Peshwah's father Ragoba. He was a very able man in the civil and political affairs of the Mahratta empire, and had been deeply concerned in all the intrigues and disturbances which had taken place since the death of the former Peshwah. His reputation for ability was higher than that of any other Mahratta, principally because all the adherents of the late Nana Furnavees, in other words, all the people of business in the country, were attached to him; and he had uniformly been opposed to the government of the reigning Peshwah. He had been a principal in Holkar's rebellion and short occupation of Poonah; he had conducted the civil and political affairs of the state while it existed; and it had been intended by Holkar to place his son on the musnud as Peshwah, if the British government and the allies had not interfered in consequence of the treaty of Bassein. When Holkar was obliged to retire from Poonah in April, 1803, by the advance of the British corps under my command, Amrut Rao was the last who retired from that city, and he was hard pressed by my light troops.

When I arrived at Poonah and had brought back the Peshwah to resume the exercise of his government, the first object of my attention was to give him and his government such strength as to enable him to carry on its ordinary operations without having recourse to us. It appeared to me and to the Resident that we could not effect this object better than by reconciling Amrut Rao and the Peshwah, for which we had an opening in a negotiation which the former had commenced under the pretence of recovering some property which had been taken from him by my light troops in his retreat from Poonah. This negotiation was carried on much against the inclination of the Peshwah, who feared and detested his brother; but we still considered it so important to secure the neutrality or support of Amrut Rao

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<sup>1</sup> President of the India Board.

in the contest, which even at that time we thought a possible event, that we persevered so far as to ascertain his terms, upon which we made a proposition to the Peshwah.

These turned principally upon what he had had previous to the treaty of Bassein, and what he had lost by that arrangement; and we thought it reasonable that we should secure to him, by any settlement which we should make, an income at least equal to that which he had previous to the treaty of Bassein.

By a reference to the whole of the letters from me, quoted in the paper to which I refer, and above all (if you have it) by a reference to my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, it will be seen that Amrut Rao's jaghire upon the Godavery was worth four lacs of rupees *per annum*; and what he had lost in Savanore (which province was then to have gone to the Company) and near Surat, and what he still had depending upon the fort of Poonadur, near Poonah, was worth more than three lacs in addition to that sum. The demand, then, upon the Peshwah for a jaghire of four lacs for Amrut Rao, on the commencement of the negotiation, which was suspended upon His Highness's unreasonable demand that Amrut Rao should be put in confinement as soon as he should have received this jaghire, must have been and was in addition to the jaghire of four lacs which he still retained upon the Godavery.

The negotiation, thus suspended, was kept on foot, as much by the inclination of Amrut Rao to connect himself with the English, as by ours to attach him to the cause of the Peshwah, till the war broke out in 1803, and then I found it necessary to take decided steps to bring it to a conclusion, which I did, as well as I recollect, on the morning after I took the fort of Ahmednuggur. The writers of the paper to which I refer give me credit for the necessity which they say might have existed on military grounds, for concluding that negotiation by the treaty which I signed, at the same time that they dispute the probability that Amrut Rao could have had a force which could give me any apprehension at that time. You will see in my despatches to the Governor-General and the Resident, to which the Court have referred, that they have not taken into consideration the extent of the military inconvenience resulting from the position of Amrut Rao's force, which is stated in the despatches; much less have they adverted to the advantage to be derived from any arrangement with Amrut Rao, which I have detailed in this letter, or to other facts bearing upon this subject



which appear in my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, and with the Governor-General at that time.

Amrut Rao had placed himself, in July and August, 1803, in a position near the hills, towards which I could not approach in that season without risking the loss of the health of my troops. In proportion as I advanced and carried my operations across the Godavery (and by reference to the correspondence it will be seen I was not one moment too soon), he would have been behind me, and would have operated upon my communication with Poonah. Admitting his corps to have been as small as it is stated by the Court, it would have been materially inconvenient and dangerous ; but led by a man of the rank and influence of Amrut Rao, by one who it appears by the same correspondence had great influence over the southern jaghiredars, through whose countries I kept up my communication with Mysore, it was most important that, as I could not destroy it, I should have it on my side. Besides these considerations, and those of a political nature to which I have adverted at the commencement of this letter, to induce me to conclude this treaty, I must mention that Amrut Rao performed a service nearly about this time which never ought to be forgotten.

By reference to the records of the day, it will be seen what pains were taken by the confederates to bring Holkar's army into active operation in the Deccan ; and if that chief had performed his engagements with Scindiah, I cannot pretend to say that I should have brought the army through its difficulties. Amrut Rao intercepted a letter from Scindiah to the Peshwah, in which Scindiah urged His Highness to break his alliance with the English, and promised that, as soon as we should be defeated, he (Scindiah) would join with the Rajah of Berar and the Peshwah to destroy Holkar. Amrut Rao sent this letter to Holkar, and the consequence was that Holkar, after he had made two marches to the southward with a view to co-operate with the confederates, returned and crossed the Nerbudda, and, in point of fact, never struck a blow ; on the contrary, he was in friendly communication with me throughout the war.

I think I may conclude that I did right in making some arrangement with Amrut Rao, and what I have above stated shows that seven lacs *per annum* was a fair stipend.

#### 4. PACIFICATION AND RESULTS OF THE WAR.

##### 200. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The Nizam ought to have no part of the Ahmednuggur district.  
A promise may be given to the Peshwah that he shall share it.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

I know well that the Mahrattas have a particular aversion to the Nizam's government; and I thought it not improbable but that the Peshwah and all the Mahratta chiefs would feel very uncomfortable under the notion that the Nizam was to get any territory so near to Poonah as Ahmednuggur is; particularly as this territory is forced from one of their own chiefs by a body of troops acting in the name, and on the part, of the Peshwah. Although, therefore, the benefit of the war must be divided, according to certain principles, among the allies, and the Nizam will undoubtedly be entitled to a better share of the spoils than the Peshwah, I cannot think that it would be politic, or consistent with the attention which we ought to have for the feelings of the Mahrattas, to allow the Nizam to have any part of Ahmednuggur. He might have compensation elsewhere, either to the northward or the southward. On this ground it is that I have kept his name out of sight all along in my transactions here; and on this ground I should have no objections, if you find it necessary for the satisfaction of the Peshwah's mind, to assure him that he shall hereafter enjoy a share of this conquest, and that he shall see the account of the manner in which the present profits resulting from it are disposed of.

##### 201. To the Governor-General.

*Why the Nizam's name was not inserted in the proclamation  
issued on taking possession of Ahmednuggur.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Senboogaum, 21st Aug., 1803.

Although his Highness the Nizam, or his representative, the present Soubahdar of the Deccan, would have a better claim, from the exertions which that government has made to produce

an army in the field, than the Peshwah, to a share of the benefits to be expected from the successful prosecution of the war, I have not included his name in the proclamation by which I have taken possession of the country : because I was aware of the jealousies of the Mahrattas respecting the possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, and of the countries depending upon it, so immediately in the neighbourhood of Poonah, which I was desirous not to excite. And as it will remain in your Excellency's power to dispose of the fort, the districts, and their revenue, in any manner you may think proper, it is a matter of immaterial importance to the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, whether his Highness' name is included in the proclamation, although to have inserted it would certainly have excited the jealousy of the Mahrattas.

## 202. To the Governor-General.

*Objections against assigning Asseerghur to the Nizam. Policy of cessions to Scindiah in Berar. The Nizam, though he has not fulfilled the terms of the alliance, should share conquests, on consenting to an improvement of those terms. Suggestions to that effect, for strengthening his government. What his share should be. How the Peshwah's claim to choute from the Nizam should be settled. The Peshwah has no valid claim to share conquests ; but may be allowed to do so, on consenting to new terms of alliance similar to those to be imposed on the Nizam.*

(Extract.)

Jaum, 11th Nov., 1803.

The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to the Soubah of the Deccan ; and, from what I have seen and experienced of his Highness' government, I think there are weighty objections to the increase of his Highness' territories on his northern frontier.

His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the exertions of the British government. The system of operations on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature of his Highness' government, from the deficiency of his means of defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps which the British government can allot in case of war to give him assistance. But in proportion as the distance of the frontier is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise.

The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it; and as for the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on the extreme frontier, for the defence of which it would be necessary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the means provided by the treaties with the British government for carrying on operations in the field. Another reason for ceding these territories to Scindiah is that, unless they are given to him, he has no motive for making peace. This reason is likewise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat.

I have also to observe that, as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not be weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to preserve a part of Scindiah's strength, to enable him to support himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, and of the Company's territories on the Toombuddra, will be in a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories which he will cede to the British government in the north of Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the Company all the territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the war against the Rajah of Berar. This will make Scindiah more powerful against Holkar and the Rajah of Berar than he was before the war: it will probably induce him to conclude the peace immediately; at the same time that, relatively to the British government, it will not alter the state of his power. However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great difficulty in obtaining the other objects.

If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company; but, upon the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of the benefits of the peace.

However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage

ought to be taken of his Highness's breach of his engagements, to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some security in future for the due execution of its most material articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, would alone provide a sufficient security for this object; but the Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the British government have in their preservation; they will for ever depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honour of the British government for their support, and will never make any exertion, the object of which is to provide for their own security, so long as they have the support of the British power.

I would therefore recommend the following amendments to the treaty of defensive alliance, which will ensure the existence of some strength in the government of Hyderabad.

1st; That the British Resident should have the power of mustering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness's government exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the Soubah.

2ndly; That for every horseman found absent at muster his Highness should pay 50 rupees *per mensem*, and for every foot soldier 20 rupees *per mensem*, till the numbers of each description should be complete.

3rdly; That the British Resident should have the power of sending persons into the forts on his Highness's frontiers to inspect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled with grain, according to the tenor of his Highness's engagement with the Company.

Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength to enforce obedience to its orders, and to preserve tranquillity in the country, besides the Company's troops stationed at Hyderabad.

If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness will have Jalnapoor and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjunttee hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I believe it is above 3 lacs of rupees *per annum*.

I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency to

take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah's claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If the result of the discussions on that subject should be to substantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company the satisfaction of the claims of the Peshwah; and this might be done, either by restoring to his Highness the territories in the west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. According to this plan, his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the Mahrattas.

If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have a claim. As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests; and if he had under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your Excellency from the necessity of giving him any thing. However, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy some of the advantages resulting from the war; and the cession of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to be kept in the hands of the British government until all these arrangements shall have been completed, and your Excellency shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work.

## 203. To Major Shawe.

*The Mahrattas should be allowed to retain Europeans. For without them, their armies would be more formidable—as cavalry, in the old Mahratta style of warfare.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 18th Nov., 1803.

It appears, however, that the Governor-General is desirous that they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition will go to their having no infantry or artillery, and this is a point which I think deserves consideration.

Scindiah's armies had actually been brought to a very favourable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of the European officers in his service; but I think it is much to be doubted whether his power, or rather that of the Mahratta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British government, if they had never had an European, as an infantry soldier, in their service, and had carried on their operations, in the manner of the original Mahrattas, only by means of cavalry. I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes; at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Mahrattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the contest, and to the re-establishment of peace: because, having made them the principal object of their attention, (which they must do, in order to have them at all,) and that part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they become also the principal reliance of the army; and, therefore, when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will not act.

Two questions occur here: one is, whether the Mahratta cavalry were ever better than they now are: if they were, whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establishment were to be destroyed? I believe they were formerly better than they now are. In regard to the second point, I have to observe, that if there were no infantry in a Mahratta army, their cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which

they were formerly so famous; and although I am aware of the greater difficulties they would now have to encounter than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is universal in the Deccan, and, I believe, in Hindustan, of fortifying every village (and I know that these are means of opposing them successfully), I should still consider these operations to be more formidable to the British government, than any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body of infantry that they can form. On this ground, therefore, I think that they should be encouraged to have infantry rather than otherwise.

204. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Political imbecility of the Peshwah.*

(Extract.)

Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec., 1803.

The day, I hope, is not far distant, when I shall be able to resign my charge in this country, and when the Peshwah will have an opportunity of settling his countries. But how is it to be done? At present, he has not in his service a common carkoon or amildar whom he can trust with the management of a single district; he has not a sepoy or a peon whom he can place as a guard on any tannah; and not a soul in his government capable of giving a line of information upon any one point, concerning the administration of the extensive territories, the government of which is in his hands. His territories are all either in the hands of his enemies, or without managers on his part; and all those persons belonging to his state who are capable of arranging it, and of rendering its resources available for the service of his government, are either in the service of his enemies, or the greater part of them imprisoned or oppressed by his Highness's government: this is a most serious consideration.



## 205. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

*Instructions as Resident with the Rajah of Berar: as to closer alliance of the Rajah with the Company; execution of the articles of the peace; obtaining information political, military, and financial; consorting directly and constantly with the ministers; and reporting progress.*

(Extract.)

<sup>1</sup> 24th Dec., 1803.

A principal object of your attention, on your arrival in the camp of the Rajah of Berar, should be to endeavour to convince him of the sincere desire of the British government to consolidate the peace. You will omit no opportunity of assuring him that the British government is desirous that he should continue a respectable power in India; and that, if he should fulfil the articles of the peace, and perform the common duties of friendship, the British government will never break with him. If he should make any propositions, such as you have heard his vakeel make in the conferences during the negotiations, to draw more closely the alliance between the two governments, you will encourage him to speak plainly upon that subject. Inform him that it is probable his Excellency the Governor-General will be inclined to attend to his wishes, provided you are enabled to state them to him distinctly; at the same time, apprise him that all governments must consider their own interests in such a case, and unless bound by previous engagements, it might be possible that to give him assistance, in the moment of danger, might be inconsistent with the interests of the British government. On this ground, you will urge to the Rajah the necessity of providing, by previous engagements, for the support and assistance of the British government, and of his stating his wishes upon this point in the most distinct manner.

<sup>1</sup> No date in the copy; but on reference to the Wellesley Dispatches, 'Marquess Wellesley to the Court of Directors,' 21st Feb., 1804, vol. iii. p. 565, it appears that Mr. Elphinstone was dispatched by Major-Gen. Wellesley to reside at the durbar of the Rajah of Berar on the 24th Dec., 1803.—Colonel Gurwood's note.

Another object which I recommend to your attention, is to see that the articles of the peace are carried into execution.

It is not impossible but that the Rajah's amildars and sirdars in the province of Berar will be unwilling to withdraw ; and that the person appointed to take charge of it will complain to you of their delays, and of the irregularities of their troops, and of those of the Rajah upon the borders. In every such case you will remonstrate, in the strongest manner, in the name of the British government. You will require the Rajah to give into your hands written orders addressed to the persons complained of, and messengers of his to carry them ; and you will apprise him of my determination to retaliate, in the manner which I may think most efficacious, any injury done to the territories ceded by the treaty.

I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah is sincere in his desire for peace with the British government, and that he will adhere to his treaty, even if the war should continue with Scindiah. But his treachery is notorious, and the sacrifices which he has made are very great ; and he might be induced to renew the war in hopes to regain part of what he has lost. For this reason it is necessary that you should do every thing in your power to be accurately informed of all that passes in his durbar, particularly with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, and the southern chiefs.

Endeavour to obtain an accurate account of the numbers and description and disposition of the Rajah's armies. Observe the movements of each corps, and endeavour to trace the causes of them ; and if you should find the movements of the troops to correspond with the intelligence you may receive of the intrigues carrying on in the durbar with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, you must remonstrate without loss of time, and point out to the Rajah the certain loss of his government, which must be the consequence of a renewal of the war.

An accurate knowledge of the numbers, description, and disposition of the troops will enable you to judge not only of the truth of any reports you may receive of the existence of intrigues between Ragojee Bhoonslah, Scindiah, and Holkar, and of Ragojee's intention to renew the war ; but also of the fact whether he does or does not impede the Soubah's officers in the settlement of the countries ceded by the treaty of peace.

It is very desirable also, that you should endeavour to ascertain the extent of the Rajah's resources, the amount of his revenue,

from what source it is derived, and how collected ; and the nature of his tenure of the different portions of territory still remaining in his possession. It is obvious, however, that much information upon these last mentioned extensive and intricate subjects cannot be acquired for a great length of time ; and, indeed, it does not appear to be an object of such consequence at this moment, as to obtain information regarding the communications with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the strength and position of the troops.

In regard to the modes of acquiring this intelligence, I have but little to say. You must employ those which your own experience and discretion will suggest ; and as I know that no intelligence can be gained without expense, I beg you to incur such as you may think absolutely necessary to obtain that which is required.

I beg leave also to recommend to you, as much as possible, a constant personal intercourse with the ministers of Ragojee Bhoonslah's durbar, instead of communicating by means of any Native servants. The establishment of this mode of communicating at an early period, if it does not immediately lay open to you sources of information which would otherwise be wanted, will, at least, give the government the advantage of them hereafter.

It is vain to hope that any Native, in the situation of a minister at a durbar, will ever trust another in the situation of servant to the British Resident ; and it is equally so to hope that the British Resident will ever be able to gain any useful intelligence from the ministers at any durbar, if his intercourse with them is to be a matter of state or parade, or any thing but a daily occurrence for the transaction of the daily business. I therefore most earnestly recommend it to you, to establish this intercourse with the durbar of Ragojee Bhoonslah without loss of time, as a measure from which may be derived, immediately, all the information which can be required ; and, at all events, from which the best consequences may be expected hereafter.

I request you to make me acquainted with all that occurs, and you will make your reports regularly to his Excellency the Governor-General.

206. To the Governor-General.

*A peace concluded with Scindiah, likely to last, either through his accepting a subsidiary alliance, or through our influence over his government, by the terms of the Treaty. His cessions; and why he retains land in the Deccan. Why the British Government is to provide for his sirdars; and he is not to pay extra for the subsidiary force. Arrangement as to the treaties with Rajahs tributary to him.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 30th Dec., 1803.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have this day concluded, with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signed, a treaty of peace; copies of which, in the English, Persian, and Mahratta languages, I have the honour to enclose.

This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British government and its Allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah's government; or, supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company's government, such an influence will be established in his as will render it very improbable that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to the Hon. Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are 3 pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have never been carried into the dufters under the head of lands in

Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah's house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

Besides these pergunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 7th article, are to remain in the hands of their present possessors, under the protection of the British government; and the British government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its option, to sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of 17 lacs of rupees, including the value of those jaghires to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindiah's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his armies, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries; and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah's service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your Excellency's policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah's durbar which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance. Upon the whole, therefore, I hope that your Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about 14 lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency's attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the treaty; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a sub-

sidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty.

In the course of this war, Scindiah's power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished; while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war; and I have little doubt but that the contest between those Chiefs will be revived. This would be a matter of little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavour to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival.

Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and, as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue. I was induced to make this last engagement, by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive; and that, if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is insured so far as it can be by human means.

I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue, such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him.

\* \* \* \* \*

There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th

article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah's government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the British government. From the different accounts, however, which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British government, would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Mahrattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the British government would derive no additional security. I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by which your Excellency's object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others, they are left to their fate.

#### 207. To the Governor-General.

*The Peshwah's government a name only. Wretched state of his territories. Old and capable officials imprisoned. They should be released, and employed in settling the country.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 15th Jan., 1804.

Besides this list of his own immediate dependents, to whom injuries have been done by the Peshwah, Amrut Rao gave me another list of the old servants of the Mahratta state, who had been imprisoned by his Highness's orders, and were at that moment confined in different hill forts. Amrut Rao declared that he had nothing to say about these persons, excepting that they were the old official people who had conducted the business for years, under Nana Furnavees; and he recommended that, if the British government were desirous of seeing the Peshwah's state recover, they should procure the release of these servants. I have also recommended this point to Lieut.-Col. Close's attention. In fact, my Lord, the Peshwah's government is at present only a name. His Highness has not settled even the

country along the Beemah, 5 miles from Poonah. It is at this moment a dreary waste, overrun by thieves; and his Highness is incapable of conducting his government himself: he gives no confidence or power to any body, and he has no person about him able to conduct the common business of the country.

I have called Lieut.-Col. Close's attention particularly to this point. Amrut Rao could certainly settle the government; but the Peshwah's aversion to him appears to be so rooted, that I am afraid I shall not be able to persuade his Highness to refrain from acts of open hostility; much less to receive him as a brother, and employ him in a confidential situation under the government. The only mode, therefore, that appears practicable, is to persuade his Highness to release these old servants of the state, to have them employed in the management of the revenue; to keep Amrut Rao at a distance, and at peace with the Peshwah; and to increase the power and reputation of the government as much as possible, by giving it possession of Poonadur, and the other hill forts near Poonah.

#### 208. To Major Shawe.

*Why the cessions were made to the allies generally.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 16th Jan., 1804.

2. It has also occurred to me that he may not approve of the cessions being made to the allies generally. The fact is, that if I had begun to draw up the treaty by stating the cessions to be made to each of the different powers, the vakeels would have begun intriguing with the Nizam's and the Peshwah's servants in camp respecting the cessions demanded for them, and I should never have got through the business. I might have entered in the treaty every cession as made to the British government, but this would have had the same consequences.

#### 209. To Lieutenant Frissell, Residency at Poonah.

*Universal mistrust of the Peshwah among his subjects.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 24th Jan., 1804.

It is proper that the Peshwah should be informed, that, from the highest man in his state, to the lowest, there is not one who will trust him, or who will have any connexion or communication with him, excepting through the mediation, and under the guarantee, of the British government.



## 210. To Major Shawe.

- (1) *Undue dependence of the Nizam and the Peshwah on British support; and consequent bad effects on our reputation with the natives.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 26th Jan., 1804.

I give up the notion of posting the troops upon the Godavery with great reluctance; because I want to have it understood, particularly at Hyderabad, that our troops are not to be the only support of the government; that they are to oppose foreign invaders and great rebels, but are not to be the support of the little dirty amildary exactions. It is, besides, very disadvantageous and unjust to the character of the British nation, to make the British troops the means of carrying on all the violent and unpopular acts of these Native governments, such as, for instance, the resumption of the jaghires of the Mussulmann chiefs in the Soubah's countries. It makes our cause unpopular, which it ought not to be, and would not be; and, in our present glorious situation, it is very desirable that we should avoid this unpopularity.

In respect to the Peshwah's government, I have given my opinion fully to Col. Close, that till the Peshwah organises his revenue departments, and the other departments of his state, which he cannot do without relinquishing the whole system of revenge, which is the only principle of his government at present, (excepting, indeed, jealousy of my influence,) the Colonel ought to give him no assistance whatever in settling his country. The consequence of a departure from this recommendation will be, that the troops will take mud forts, which they must garrison, and the British officers must be amildars; or the forts, after having been taken, must be abandoned to their old possessors, who, instead of being in the light of friends, as they have hitherto been, would be our worst enemies. I could settle the Peshwah's countries in a few days, if I could bring him to act rationally, or if I could inspire him with confidence in me or the British government.

- (2) *The Peshwah's bad character, and jealousy of Gen. Wellesley. Amrut Rao would be an abler administrator, but, if false to us, more dangerous.*

(Extract.)

Same date.

From many circumstances, and particularly from a letter which I have received from Mr. Frissell, a copy of which will have gone to the Governor-General, containing the Peshwah's answer to a request I made, that he would pardon 400 or 500 of his Pagah horse, who had been serving with Baba Phurkia, I am induced to believe that he is very jealous of me, and of the influence which he imagines the British government maintains through my means; notwithstanding all that I have done for him, his declared sense of it, and the confidence he has expressed. If this be the case, we shall never be able to prevail upon him to do any thing which can be beneficial, either to his own government or the common cause; and if to maintain our influence in the Mahratta Empire be an object, the sooner I withdraw from the scene, and the sooner his jealousy is allayed, the better. In fact, this influence can be maintained only by conferring benefits on the persons who are the objects of it; it is now fed and upheld by hope, but as soon as people shall find that my recommendation is the road to disgrace instead of to favour, they will not follow our fortunes much longer. I therefore think that as soon as I shall have settled every thing that I have to do, I ought to withdraw. I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion of it; and I know that since he signed the treaty of Bassein, he has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the common safety during the war.

It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in possession of that government? I answer, I have no remedy; I cannot take it for the British government, without a breach of faith and another war. I do not know whether I should mend the matter in respect to treachery, by giving him either of his brothers as a dewan; but I do know, that if I was to give the government over to Amrut Rao, I should establish there a most able fellow, who, if he should prove treacherous, would be a worse thorn in the side of the British government than the creature who is Peshwah, at present, can ever be.

## 211. To Major-General Campbell.

*Caution required in ascertaining the relative rights of the Peshwah and the Southern Jaghiredars.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

I have requested the Resident at Poonah to be very cautious respecting the rights of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of the Putwurdun, and Goklah, and other great jaghiredars in the southern districts; and to give you the most accurate information respecting the particular objects to which he will be desirous to direct your attention. I know the Peshwah and his ministers, and the character of every Mahratta amildar, sufficiently well to be very certain that they would not scruple to involve the British government in another war, were it only to get possession of, and plunder, one village. It is, therefore, very necessary that we should proceed with all this caution.

## 212. To the Governor-General.

*Nature, and relation to the Treaty with the Bonslay, of previous engagements with his dependents.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 10th Feb., 1804.

The cases of the Rajahs of Sohnpoor, Boad, and Ramghur, are similar. They have received and sent messages, they have sent vakeels, have received cowle, and written letters in general terms, but it does not appear that they have concluded engagements.

My idea of the conclusion of an engagement is, that the party should have positively agreed, at least verbally, to certain stipulations, under which it was to enjoy the benefit of the protection of the Company. It does not appear that any of these Rajahs have entered into any such agreements; although I am well convinced that, having witnessed the effects of the Company's power, and having reason to expect benefit from the protection of the British government, they will now readily enter into all the stipulations required. But that is not consistent with the letter of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, much less with my promise to the Rajah's ministers; that this article should not be made to extend farther than was necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government, or with your Excellency's policy.

It is certain, that when the party has not agreed to required stipulations, as the price of the protection offered to it, it is not necessary, for the preservation of good faith, to extend to it the British protection.

I have been very particular in stating to your Excellency all that occurs to me upon this subject, because it appears that the Commissioners in Cuttack are not aware, or not sensible, of the circumstances under which that article of the treaty was concluded, and which must be a guide in its application. They have a natural desire to extend it to as many cases as possible; because they feel that, in proportion as they can extend its benefits, they increase the chance of the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity of the people whose country is committed to their management. But these, although important objects, are not to be compared to the importance of preserving the national faith.

**213. To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.**

*Only bona fide engagements, antecedent to the peace, to be maintained.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 11th Feb., 1804.

In respect to the lists of the feudatories with whom treaties have been made, you may assure the Rajah that the delay in giving him those lists arises from my desire to include in them no person with whom an engagement had not been *bonâ fide* made, before the accounts were received of the conclusion of the peace; and a wish to break as many of those engagements as possible, consistently with the necessary attention to the preservation of the faith of the British government. The Governor-General has the same wish.

**214. To Major Malcolm.**

*The national faith endangered by the overstrained interpretation of loose engagements with zemindars, and the violation of the spirit of our treaties with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 11th Feb., 1804.

I have had a great deal of trouble with the Cuttack gentlemen. They construe general letters from zemindars about 'master's favour,' and professions of obedience to orders, into treaties; and I think that the moderation of the Governor-

General, which in any other man would pass current for ambition, induces him rather to adopt the principles of the Commissioners in Cuttack, and to increase as much as possible the limits of the province, and the number of people to enjoy the benefits of the 10th article of the treaty of peace. I have, however, written to him 2 public letters upon the subject, in which I have pointed out that the objects of the Commissioners, in claiming to enlarge their province as much as possible, however praiseworthy, are not very consistent with national good faith, of which they, very naturally, have entirely lost sight.

It is really ridiculous to read the dispatches on this subject: whole provinces must be considered to be included in Cuttack, under the 2nd article of the treaty. The 10th article must be construed to apply to many zemindars, who have only asked for 'master's favour,' and taken cowle and safeguards, and the poor national faith goes to the devil. In fact, my dear Malcolm, I see very clearly that I have made 2 very good treaties of peace, but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of their stipulations; and there is no person about the Governor-General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and to resist the importunities of the local authorities to force on the treaties a construction which will tend to the increase of their own petty power and authority.

#### 215. To Lieutenant Frissell.

*Detailed evidence of the Peshwah's falseness to the alliance, inexplicable on the assumption of mere weakness and folly.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 17th Feb., 1804.

The Peshwah's conduct appears extraordinary only to us, who, since he signed the treaty of Bassein, have trusted to his professions, notwithstanding a variety of facts of which we have a knowledge. The first of these was his telling me plainly, that he could not say whether or not he wished Scindiah to come to Poonah with his army, when I was pressing him to dispatch a letter to that Chief with orders not to advance, which letter he had promised to write.

The next fact was his contrivance to correspond with Scindiah's durbar, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty with the Company, to the very day that I ordered the dawkh to be drawn off the road.

The 3rd fact was his breach of the treaty in not sending his *quota* of troops to join the army.

The 4th fact, that he notoriously communicated with the enemy, by means of Ballojee Pundit at Poonah, during the existence of the war.

The 5th fact, that he never gave any demonstration of public satisfaction upon the occasion of the successes in the war, in which he was supposed to be the Company's ally.

The 6th fact, that since the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to this hour, he has never adopted any one measure recommended to him by the British government, either for his own benefit, or for the general benefit of the alliance. On the contrary, he has always resisted those measures, only because they were recommended by the British authorities, although he acknowledged their benefit.

The 7th fact, that he has kept at his durbar, only for the purposes of mischief, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, notwithstanding our repeated remonstrances, and his own proposal, that he should seize his person. By the by, while writing regarding this person, I may mention, that a buckshee and a body of horse, belonging to this same man, were opposed to me in the action of the 5th; whom I dare say that I shall have the pleasure of meeting, shortly, at the Peshwah's durbar, as he and his horse, after having plundered the Nizam's country, and having been employed to cut off the supplies going to the British army, have gone direct to Poonah.

The 8th fact, that the Peshwah wrote a letter to Scindiah, at the time of the negotiation with Col. Collins, to desire Scindiah to concede nothing, as he did not find the English as yet sufficiently disposed to punish the rebels. Major Malcolm has a copy of this letter, of which Amrut Rao has the original, which original I shall bring with me to Poonah. Under this head I may mention, that Amrut Rao has in his possession letters from Scindiah to the Peshwah, intercepted, as this letter was, upon the road, in which Scindiah gives the Peshwah accounts of his negotiations with Col. Collins, which, by the description of them, I judge to be far more detailed than those which the British government received from Col. Collins. I have also to mention, under this head, that Goorparah, in the course of many confidential conversations which I have had with him, told me repeatedly, that Scindiah, in his negotiation with Col. Collins, never took a step without consulting the Peshwah, and that his Highness ought, in

fact, to have been considered a party to the war on the side of the confederates.

The 9th fact, which crowns the whole, that he has communicated with Frenchmen, and has endeavoured to conceal his communications from the agents of the British government, and to screen the Frenchmen from their search.

I acknowledge that I always have been induced to view his Highness's conduct as the effect of weakness and folly; and I believed him to be sincere in his alliance with the Company; but while I encouraged this belief I shut my eyes against the facts of which I had a knowledge, and which I have above detailed; and against his Highness's notorious treachery, which was the theme of all the public dispatches, previous to his signing the treaty of Bassein; and I considered nothing but what I wished to be true, and what I knew to be the Peshwah's interests. This last act, however, has rendered it necessary that we should turn our minds seriously to the consideration of the measures to be adopted for the safety of the British government in this critical moment.

#### 216. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*The Peshwah's plan for remunerating Goklah:—inexpedient for Goklah; unjust to the Putwurduns; impolitic and dangerous for us to co-operate in. Our traditional friendship with the family; and its services to us and the Peshwah. His real object is revenge for old grievances.*

Camp, 23rd Feb., 1804.

Bappojee Gonsish Goklah called upon me yesterday afternoon, and, after some previous conversation, informed me that he had applied to the Peshwah's government to make a permanent provision for the pay and support of his troops; and that his agent at Poonah had been told by the Peshwah's ministers that the lands held by the family of Pursheram Bhow should be made over to Goklah for this purpose. Goklah said he was desirous to have my opinion upon this subject before he should send his answer to his agent at Poonah. I pointed out to Goklah that it was very improbable that the chiefs of the house of Pursheram Bhow would resign their possessions without a contest; that they were masters of some strong places, and it was probable that the contest would not be a short one; but that, whether it was long or short, the result of it would be, that the country which was to be fought for would be ruined. That, in the mean time,

it did not appear that any funds had been provided to pay Goklah's troops, who, I supposed it was intended, should fight this battle; and that certainly a ruined and exhausted country would be but an inadequate reward to them if they should be successful. I then said that it appeared to me that it would be better for Goklah to endeavour to get possession of some countries for the support of his troops, for which he would not have to fight with the most powerful family in the southern part of the Mahratta empire.

Goklah said that he felt the force and truth of every thing I had urged to him; and that he saw clearly he was not equal to a contest with the family of Pursheram Bhow, unless the English should assist him; and that, in fact, he was not desirous of having the possessions of those chiefs, or of seeing them ruined. In answer, I said that it was not necessary that I should tell him whether, in the attempt to gain those possessions, he would or would not be assisted by the British government; that to afford that assistance would not diminish the inconveniences which he would feel, in the mean time, for the want of pay for his troops, or those he would feel for the same want after he should have obtained full possession of a ruined and exhausted country.

Goklah said, that, of course, without the assistance of the British government in money, he should feel those inconveniences. In answer, I told him, that if the British government are to incur all the expense, as well as their troops to perform the service of this expedition against the family of Pursheram Bhow, it would be desirable to ascertain clearly the necessity of destroying this family before the measure should be undertaken; and that, of course, the British government would act in this instance with its usual caution and wisdom. I desired him to understand clearly, that I had given no opinion on the subject whether assistance would be afforded or not, as that was a question which must be referred to the Governor-General; but I mentioned these circumstances to him as a friend, to point out the difficulties and delays in the way of carrying this plan into execution; and as a ground for recommending that he should endeavour to obtain the grant of other lands, either not already granted, or in the possession of a family not so powerful as that of Pursheram Bhow. He said that he should follow my advice in every thing.

I have thought it proper to communicate to you this conversation much in detail, and I shall proceed to give you my opinion upon the subject in general; as the plan of the Peshwah, disclosed



in this conversation, is one of the utmost importance in every point of view, and will probably cause another war, if it is to be carried into execution.

Goklah says most truly, that it is impossible to carry it into execution without the assistance of the British government, both in money and troops; and it stands to reason, that the British government must exercise its discretion regarding the propriety of attempting it. To attempt it, unless these chiefs should be guilty of some act of infidelity towards the Peshwah's government, would be a breach of an engagement I made to those chiefs in a letter which I wrote to them during the war. But I think that reasons exist for which it should be discountenanced entirely, and that the British government should not assist in it.

The family of Pursheram Bhow are the most ancient friends that the British government have in the Mahratta Empire. Pursheram Bhow had under his command a body of British troops during the former war against Tippoo. His sons and relations, the present chiefs of that family, served in the same army, and there gained a knowledge and respect for the valour and discipline of a British army, which was the first cause of their joining me in the campaign of 1800 against Dhoondiah Waugh. The friendship then established, and the friendly terms on which I was with those chiefs in the beginning of last year, enabled me to bring them forward to Poonah to re-establish the Peshwah on his musnud, although, with or without reason, these chiefs did not wish well to his Highness's cause. This service ought never to be forgotten by the Peshwah, and probably never will be forgotten by the British government, as it is a well known fact, that if the chiefs of the Putwurdun family had done so little in the cause of his Highness, or rather had done so much against that cause at that moment, as others now enjoying his Highness's favour, the success of the march to Poonah would have been a matter of doubt, and if they had opposed the advance, it must have been relinquished under the orders of his Excellency the Governor-General. Afterwards, they did not come forward in support of the cause of the allies in the war. But when I consider the circumstances under which that war was commenced, the nature of the Mahratta character, the fact, that for a Mahratta to suppose the allies would be successful, was to relinquish every idea of national pride, and to lose the recollection of their former triumphs, I am not astonished that these chiefs should have kept

aloof. But some of the Mahrattas cordially supported the cause of the allies in the war. That cause was supported by two Mahratta chiefs of inferior rank and interest. The troops of both were paid by the British government during the war; and that of the Peshwah did not give the assistance even of the grain and cattle which it might have supplied. Neither of them was considered by the Peshwah as his servant when I marched to Poonah; neither was ordered by the Peshwah to accompany me, and both came because they had known me before, and saw a prospect of advantage.

The chiefs of the Putwurdun family were, at least, neutral in the contest; which neutrality, however, was a most important object for the Company's possessions. I cannot say this for some of the persons now in favour at the Peshwah's durbar. Under the engagement that I have made, that they shall not be attacked so long as they are the faithful servants of the Peshwah, it will certainly be necessary that the Peshwah should produce some proof of their want of fidelity to his government, before he can receive the assistance of the British government in the execution of this plan of destruction. It is probable, in the present state of the Mahratta empire, that either the refusal of these chiefs to resign their lands, or to come to Poonah without the guarantee of the British government for their personal safety, will be deemed acts of infidelity. But admitting them to be so, and that the British government is at liberty, consistently with an adherence to good faith, to act against these chiefs, I still doubt the expediency of giving British assistance to work their destruction. The Putwurdun family, connected, as I have above mentioned, as they are with the British government, are certainly the most respectable of all the Peshwah's subjects properly so called. They are the support of the system of order which exists on the Company's frontier, and on the frontiers of Mysore; and they are a check to the nest of freebooters kept by the Rajah of Kolapoor, and to the numerous polygars who inhabit the countries watered by the Kistna, Malpoorba, and Gutpurba.

If the Peshwah had the power, or had manifested an inclination to establish his government on a respectable footing, or on any footing, I should doubt the propriety of allowing him to root out this family of friends to the British government from their important position, in respect to the frontiers of Mysore and the Company's territories. But when I see that the Peshwah does nothing to settle his government; that the only system of govern-

ment is that of a robber, I cannot think it expedient to allow this family to be destroyed. In a discussion upon this subject, the motive for their destruction may be considered. It is revenge for the acts of Pursheram Bhow, during the political disputes at Poonah. If it was because these chiefs did not support the cause of the allies in the war, why are not others punished as well as the chiefs of the Putwurdun family? Why do some escape who have actually been opposed to the British troops, and others who did not assist in restoring the Peshwah to his government?

In respect to the plan itself, it will be one of great unpopularity, and of some difficulty in the execution. It is well known throughout the Mahratta Empire, that those chiefs are the ancient friends of the British government, and that they are detested by the Peshwah, for former acts which have nothing to do with the politics of the present day. The other chiefs of the Empire will, I fear, have but little reliance upon the friendship of the British government, to protect them against the effects of the known feeling in the Peshwah's character, if we should be the instruments of his revenge in this instance; and each will expect, in his turn, to become the victim of the same passion. This feeling may operate to induce them to make the defence of the possessions of the Putwurdun family a common cause; and, in that case, the attack of those possessions becomes a military operation of some magnitude and extent.

At all events, whether all the chiefs do or do not make the defence of those possessions a common cause, it is my opinion that it would not be prudent to send any part of the subsidiary force at present to the southern countries to attack them. The attack, therefore, must be made by troops brought from the frontiers of Mysore and the ceded countries: and here arises a new question of expense; another affecting the safety of the frontiers of Mysore, and the Company's territories, while these troops are to be employed in this manner; and a third, regarding the preference of this operation to others in the Company's territories, on parts of which it is absolutely necessary to take some effectual measures to establish the authority of government. Upon the whole, I think I may conclude that the Governor-General will not attend to the Peshwah's wishes upon this subject, and I have to request that, if his Highness should propose this plan to your consideration, you will not encourage it till you have taken the orders of his Excellency.

217. To Major Shawe.

*Difficulties with the Peshwah in arranging the terms of peace.  
His consent must be bought.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 7th March, 1804.

Take my word for it, that the Peshwah will come into no arrangement for the partition of the conquered countries; and that he will commence his intrigues immediately with Scindiah's durbar, respecting Jansi, Calpee, &c., which the Governor-General may have taken for the convenience of our frontier. He will grant sunnuds for them to Scindiah or Ambajee Ingolia, or he will intrigue in any other manner to distress the British government.

In order to bring the proposed partition treaty and the cession of Jansi and Calpee to a favourable conclusion, there is but one remedy, and that is to bribe the Peshwah with money; to supply him with small sums occasionally, till he shall finally have come into all the Governor-General's views, for the final settlement of the peace, and for the frontier of Bengal.

Nothing but this will answer. The Peshwah is callous to every thing but money and revenge. He will call upon the British government to gratify the latter passion; but he will make no sacrifices unless to procure money. I must see Col. Close before I give my opinion about his sincerity. I think it will be difficult to account for his having the Frenchmen concealed in Poonah for a month, and having never communicated one word to the British Resident respecting their arrival.

218. To the Governor-General.

*The Peshwah's complaints of the neglect of his interests at the peace. His vindictiveness, and shuffling apology for inaction. General Wellesley's answer and advice. General remarks on his character, views, and conduct. The settlement of the South Mahratta country, a burning question. Alternatives open to us.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Chowke, 7th March, 1804.

Shortly after my arrival at Poonah, the Peshwah's minister, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, appointed a day to meet and converse with me on the Peshwah's affairs, previous to a meeting for the

same purpose which, he said, his Highness was desirous of having with me.

There were present at the meeting, which took place on the 1st March, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, Anund Rao, and Byajee Naig. Suddasheo Munkaiseer first alluded to the fact, that peace had been made with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and he said, that his Highness the Peshwah had not been consulted on the terms of the peace, and that his orders had not been taken on many points in which his interest was concerned.

In answer, I told Suddasheo Munkaiseer, that the fact of the vakeels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar being in my camp, and treating for peace, was notorious; and that as his Highness the Peshwah had troops and a vakeel there on his part, he must have been apprised of it at a very early period after their arrival: that Scindiah's vakeels were there nearly two months, and the Rajah of Berar's nearly one month, before their negotiations were concluded by treaties of peace; and that there certainly had been many opportunities for his Highness to intimate to me his wishes regarding his objects with those Chiefs respectively. He had omitted, however, to attend to his interest upon this occasion, and the treaties of peace had been concluded. But I observed, that though they had been thus concluded, and I had not had the benefit of being made acquainted with his Highness's wishes, I hoped, when your Excellency should give orders that the treaties might be communicated to his Highness, that his Highness would find that his interests had not been neglected by me. Suddasheo Munkaiseer then adverted to the conclusion of the foreign war; but said there still remained the punishment of rebels. I begged him to name them; and he said, 'Amrut Rao and the freebooters who had been plundering on the frontiers,' and who had lately been defeated and dispersed by the British troops. He went much at large into the subject of the Peshwah's complaints against Amrut Rao; and declared that even his name was so odious to his Highness, that if it were only mentioned in his presence, it would be necessary for his Highness to perform his ablutions.

In answer to this speech, I related the progress of the British government and their armies, from the date of the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to the moment of the breaking out of the war with the confederated Mahratta chiefs. I pointed out to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had derived all the benefit of his

treaty with the Company, and that he had been restored to the exercise of the powers of his government ; but that when he was called upon to perform his part of the treaty, and to produce his army, his treasure to pay his troops, his provisions and equipments in the common cause in which the allies were subsequently engaged, he was deficient in every respect. I said that I did not mean to inquire into the causes of that deficiency. It existed at the moment of difficulty, and for what cause the inquiry was not then material ; but that as I was charged with the defence of his Highness's territories and person, it was necessary that I should take every step to preclude the possibility that his Highness should suffer from this deficiency.

On this ground, as soon as the war broke out, it had appeared important to me to secure, by a treaty of peace, one great branch of the confederated chiefs, and I had made a treaty with Amrut Rao, of which I, and of course his Highness, had received all the advantage during the war ; and I further observed that his Highness had been distinctly apprised that this measure would be adopted if he should omit to furnish his *quota* of troops, &c., for the war.

In respect to the freebooters upon the frontier, I observed, that I had beaten and dispersed them. It was true that I had not seized their persons ; but I informed Suddasheo Munkaiseer that the principal of all those persons, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, had resided at the Peshwah's durbar, where he had received marks of his Highness's favour ; that I had reason to believe that his brother, Viswaz Rao Ghautky, had fled to Wahy, after his action with me on the 5th Feb., and that he had been received into his Highness's presence ; and that certainly I thought if one freebooter deserved punishment, it was he who had been the principal, but who had received marks of his Highness's favour.

In answer, Byajee Naig denied that Sirjee Rao Ghautky had received the marks of his Highness's favour which I supposed he had. He said that Sirjee Rao had been allowed to depart, because it was not the custom of the durbar to seize the persons of those who had been allowed, or who had been encouraged, to come to Poonah to pay their respects to the Peshwah.

Munkaiseer observed, that the reason for which the Peshwah had omitted to perform his treaty was, that the Putwurdun and other principal jaghiredars of the Empire had refused to serve, and had disobeyed his Highness's orders. He said that Goklah

and Appah Dessaye had served ; and it was his Highness's wish to reward them with the lands held by the chiefs of the family of Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia ; and he asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, and of punishing those who did not, was not fair ?

I told Munkaiseer, that it was not possible for me to give any answer to a question asked in such a manner. I said that I considered the plan which he had then proposed to my consideration. viz. to destroy all the great families of the state, as one of the greatest importance, and likely to be attended with much difficulty in the execution, in the present state of the Mahratta Empire. I observed to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had not even settled the country about Poonah ; and that after having come out of a foreign war of great extent, he was about to commence a domestic one.

I then asked Munkaiseer what resources of money and troops his Highness had to carry on this war, and in what manner he proposed to proceed ? In answer, he gave me to understand, that his Highness expected the assistance of the British government ; and he gave me the choice of two plans, either to begin with the family of Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee ; and to deceive, in the mean time, that party whose destruction might be delayed.

I told Munkaiseer that his plan was impracticable : that those chiefs were not to be deceived by the Peshwah ; that the whole would join for their common defence ; that, in that case, the operations against them would become of importance ; that they could not, at all events, be undertaken without your Excellency's orders ; and that while they were carrying on, the foreign enemy might come in again, and his Highness and his territories would be involved in fresh difficulties and troubles.

I observed to Munkaiseer that, in my opinion, it would be much better for his Highness, after 7 years of difficulty and civil wars, in the course of which, nearly every man in the Empire had at some time or other been opposed to his government and armies, to endeavour, by pardon and conciliation, to settle his government and country, than to enter on any system of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and so dangerous and so imprudent.

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Although I believe that your Excellency will have had before you an account of the conference I had with the Peshwah's min-

isters on the 1st inst., I have been particular in relating it to you, as it alludes to points of great importance, and lays open, in a great degree, the views of the Peshwah's durbar. The principal object there is to procure money, not for the service of the state, nor even to gain the power of inflicting punishment on the objects of the Peshwah's hatred, but to bear the expense of the pleasures of the Court. To incur expense, or to adopt any solid mode of settling the country, is entirely out of the question. To incur expense for troops is equally out of the thoughts of the Peshwah and his ministers; and although to gratify his revenge is a great object of his government, and he really believes his personal honour involved in it, he leaves that to the British government and to the exertion of the British troops.

The question with Amrut Rao is completely settled; and Amrut Rao has proposed to go and reside at Benares, as soon as the next rains shall be over. But it is strange, that notwithstanding the Peshwah was professing such an invincible aversion to Amrut Rao, one so forcibly described by Munkaiseer, his Highness had opened a negotiation with him since my arrival at Poonah. Amrut Rao's vakeel has attributed this negotiation to the desire of the Peshwah to make for himself better terms than he supposed I should propose to him, and to keep in confinement some of Amrut Rao's servants. My opinion is, that it has been entered into in order to avoid the necessity of attending, on any subject, to the advice of an officer employed by the British government. I encouraged this negotiation as much as possible; for nothing can settle so long as the Peshwah and his brother are at variance.

Your Excellency will have observed the commencement of Munkaiseer's discourse respecting the Peshwah's wishes in the peace. In the course of the conversations which I had with his Highness and his ministers, all expressed his Highness's hopes that he should rise, and his state increase in proportion with that of the Company, accompanied by strong expressions of confidence in your Excellency's justice.

It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, that while I was at Poonah, I received intelligence from more than one quarter, that the Peshwah had determined to ask me, whether you did not propose to give up to him all the territory which his servant Scindiah had ceded by the late treaty of peace. I mention these circumstances only because they tend to elucidate the foreign policy of this Prince. In respect to his domestic policy, his chief



object is to destroy all the great families in what can be called his Empire ; and he proposes to use his alliance with the British government in effecting this object.

Besides this, his Highness encourages the Rajah of Kolapoor, a foreign prince, to invade and destroy his own territories, in the possession of the family of Pursheram Bhow. The Peshwah's ministers scarcely deny this fact, and the chiefs of Pursheram Bhow's family allege it as the reason for not serving when called for.

There is no doubt whatever that the Peshwah's government cannot exist on its present footing. Unless the British government interfere in some manner respecting the southern jaghire-dars, there will be a contest in the southern part of the Empire, which will, in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's territories. They will be obliged to interfere in the end, probably with less effect than they can at present, and in the mean time all the benefit of the services of the southern chiefs and their troops is entirely lost.

In my opinion, the first step to be taken is to give a check to the Rajah of Kolapoor. His country is the resort of all the freebooters driven from other places, and he is ready to place himself at the head of every disturbance. He has received into his territories the freebooters lately opposed to me on the Nizam's frontiers ; on which subject I propose to write to him, and it will remain with your Excellency to determine what shall be done with him hereafter.

In respect to the southern jaghiredars, the following lines of conduct may be pursued :

To concur with the Peshwah in destroying them ; to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate ; and to allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all. To interfere in a certain degree to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars ; to oblige them to afford it ; and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government ; and to guarantee to them their possessions as long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity. To make them at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government.

## 219. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

*Precariousness of the peace with Scindiah. Its permanence probably dependent on a liberal interpretation of the 9th Article of the Treaty. Summum jus he will hold to be summa injuria. Difficulties and danger which would attend the renewal of warfare, and its bad effect at home. We ought to make every sacrifice for peace compatible with honour and safety. Though I was ill informed on Gohud, our argument seems technically good, that Scindiah ought not to have it. But should we risk peace for it, or for Gwalior? Is not a compromise feasible? I do not fear war, and its success might be personally gratifying to me; but, on public grounds, I strongly prefer peace.*

Bombay, 15th March, 1804.

I send you some very interesting despatches just received from Malcolm; among others, one containing the copy of the Treaty of Defensive Alliance agreed to by Scindiah. This completes everything you wished for in this part of India.

It is proper, however, that I should inform you that my opinion is that the duration of the peace with Scindiah depends upon the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article. We must not depend at all upon the annihilation of his army and resources, or too much upon the influence we have established in his durbar. In respect to his army, the men and horses remain; and the extreme distress to which the men are reduced renders it more necessary to employ them in hostility against the Company's government.

It may appear extraordinary, but it is certainly true, that an army in the state in which Scindiah's army is described to be by Malcolm is more dangerous in the present state of the Company's power than one well paid, and in a better state of discipline, and under better command. In fact, the existence of the individuals, and of their horses (their only property), depends upon their being led into some rich provinces; and they will join any chief who will profess an intention to lead them to plunder. I have many proofs that pay is not an object to Mahratta horsemen compared with plunder; and, notwithstanding the wretchedness of Scindiah's resources at present, I have no doubt but that if he were desirous to renew the war he would not want the means of carrying his wishes into execution.

The influence established in Scindiah's *darbar* gives us a better hold of him than the state of his army. But even this must not be too much depended upon. The peace must introduce new modes of acting and of thinking upon every subject. The view from it must be tranquillity, and the hope of personal or national aggrandizement must be laid aside. But much time must elapse before the minds of any description of men can be brought cordially to adopt such a change in their situation, and to relinquish all the prospects to which they have looked forward for years. We must not expect, therefore, that the chiefs of Scindiah's *darbar* will entirely discourage the proposition to renew hostilities with the Company; founded upon the notion, whether true or false, that Scindiah has not been treated with the generosity which he expected in the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty of peace.

We must take care not to come to any conclusion respecting the sentiments of the chiefs of Scindiah's *darbar* from what we have seen of the sentiments of the persons composing the *darbars* of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah. In fact, there are no persons in the *darbars* of either of those princes who were ever of any consequence, or had any power previously to our connection with those *darbars* respectively (the Minister at Hyderabad, I believe, excepted); all the persons of the description of Gopal Bhow, and others who appear to be at the head of affairs in Scindiah's *darbar*, are either living in obscurity, or are intriguing to render themselves independent, or are gone over to the enemy.

I believe Scindiah to be disposed to preserve the peace with the Company, and to have a strong feeling of resentment against Holkar, and to know that he cannot support his power against that chief unless by the assistance of the Company's government. I believe him to have been much gratified by the manner in which the treaty of peace was negotiated; by which, after he had been humbled to the dust, his pride wounded, and his power destroyed, he was raised to a degree of power greater than that possessed by any other prince in India, notwithstanding the immense acquisitions which we have made; and the prospect of the generosity of the Company was afforded to him.

But if by the arrangements consequent to the 9th Article of the treaty he is to be deprived of a large portion of territory, which he imagined he should hold; if the arrangement is to be one consistent with justice, not generosity, and with good faith

as defined by the laws of civilized nations, and not as it is understood by these barbarians, these favourable feelings and dispositions of Scindiah's mind must be effaced by one which operates most strongly upon every native, viz. wounded pride, and the fear and shame of hearing and bearing the insults of his own followers for having sacrificed his power to the British government.

We must not depend on Scindiah's sense of his interests, although we may have found him and his ministers to know them well. None of the native princes are guided by a sense of their permanent interest, even as they understand it themselves, but in every instance by their passions, of which the strongest is pride.

Under these circumstances the arrangement under the 9th Article of the treaty of peace is a matter of great delicacy; and the peace of India in a great measure depends upon its being made in conformity with the negotiations for the treaty.

I have no fear whatever for the result of a recommencement of the war, although possibly we might not enjoy all the advantages in carrying it on which we had even in the last war. I feel confident that we must be successful upon every occasion in which we may employ the troops, and that the result of the war must be honourable to us. But we should have to encounter many difficulties, particularly in this quarter. The countries in which we should act, or through which we should have to pass, are entirely exhausted by having been the seat of the operations of the late war, and by having been plundered for years; and a scarcity of rain in the last season, combined with these causes, has produced a famine, of which the army must feel the consequences.

Supposing that we should penetrate to Hindostan, matters are there in a worse situation than they are in the Deccan, and we should experience greater difficulties.

I have frequently apprised you of circumstances respecting the Peshwah, which, if they do not prove insincerity, at least show how difficult it would be to bring his government through another war immediately; and in respect to the southern chiefs I have to observe that it is not possible to suppose but that they are aware of the Peshwah's designs against them, and that they would take the opportunity of the renewal of hostilities to force us to adopt their plans for their own independence.

We are mistaken if we suppose that the Soubah of the Deccan

will be satisfied with the portion of the conquests allotted to him, or that he will enter cordially into a new war, the cause of which will be the failure of an arrangement in which he will have no concern.

The Rajah of Berar will not remain at peace. He complains loudly of the conduct of the Soubah's servants in Berar, and he would renew hostilities if he should see a favourable opportunity.

Under these circumstances we should be obliged to make the most formidable arrangements both for offensive and defensive operations that have ever yet been made by the British government, far exceeding the scale of those made for the last war, because every point must be defended, and our operations must be most actively offensive.

In relation to the state of affairs at home, I consider the renewal of the war to be the greatest misfortune that could occur. In the eyes of those who are to judge of your conduct, it would efface the glory of the last war and of your whole administration. Believe me that neither the Court of Directors nor the King's Ministers are capable of taking an enlarged view of the present state of affairs in India. Everything has been so much altered within these last five years that I doubt very much whether there is any man in England who understands our present situation. I am certain Lord Castlereagh does not, and, as a proof of it, I enclose the copy of a letter which I have got from Mr. Duncan in confidence.

Since I have learned the real state of the case regarding the support that you are to expect in future from the Ministers, and particularly since I have perused the letter of which the enclosed is a copy, I have rejoiced at the peace as the most fortunate event that could have occurred, and equal at least to any that has occurred during your administration, both for the public interest and your reputation. But what a falling off will it be if the consequence of the peace should be a renewal of the war under circumstances of greater difficulty than have hitherto occurred! You possibly may not feel this part of the subject so strongly as I do; but I acknowledge that I cannot separate the notion of your great character with the public from the public interests in India.

If all this be true, I think there is no doubt but that any sacrifice ought to be made to preserve the peace, and that everything ought to be done to keep Scindiah's durbar in the temper in

which it was left when the peace was signed, which is not absolutely inconsistent with the public faith or the public safety.

In the negotiations of the treaty of peace I was certainly not sufficiently informed respecting the real state of Gohud. I understood that the Ranah of Gohud existed as a state in the same manner as the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor; and Scindiah's ministers encouraged that misunderstanding in order to deceive me. It appears that the Ranah of Gohud has not existed as a state for years; that the territory of Gohud has been in the possession of Scindiah; and that your object was to restore the state of the Jauts, not to preserve a state that existed already. I think there is no doubt but that the argument is on our side; and that, both from the breach of the treaty and the understanding of the persons who made it, Scindiah ought to have nothing to do with Gohud. \* But he thinks he ought; and his ministers have flattered him with the possession of this country and Gwalior, under the hope that I had been deceived, and that the words of the treaty would give him both; and in my opinion the whole question of the peace of India turns upon this point.

I am fully aware of the benefit to be derived from having forts, but I don't think that the possession of this or any other fort is worth the risk of the renewal of the war. Gwalior would be of use to us for offensive operations with Malwa, and perhaps it is absolutely necessary if we keep possession of Gohud. But it is of no use for general defensive purposes; and I know of no fort and no line of frontier excepting a navigable river that is of any use against the Mahratta armies for mere defensive purposes. But Gwalior may be of use to secure the navigation of the Jumna, an object which is of the utmost importance, although it is too distant, in my opinion, to affect that navigation in any great degree, unless it has a very large garrison.

An arrangement might be made with Scindiah which would secure the navigation of the Jumna, leaving in his hands the fort of Gwalior. Under the circumstance of his having agreed to the treaty of defensive alliance, this measure cannot be deemed a dangerous one.

I would recommend that Scindiah should be informed that under the treaty of peace he had forfeited all claim to the territory of Gohud and to the fort of Gwalior; that the object in wishing to retain those territories and the fort was to secure the navigation of the Jumna; but that provided he would come into arrangements with a view to that object, and would appoint a

person to be killadar who should be agreeable to the British government, and in consideration of the intimate alliance lately established between the two states, the British government would restore to him Gwalior and the territory of Gohud, excepting those parts of it which would be necessary to form a sufficient state for the Ranah. If territory should not be wanted for this purpose, it would be better to give him back the whole.

It is scarcely necessary that I should make any excuse for giving you my opinion upon this subject ; I should be unpardonable if I omitted it. It agrees with that of Malcolm, and I think it probable that you will adopt it when you will have before you the real state of the case. If you should not, I will enter upon the new state of things with all the zeal and ardour that is possible ; and I have no doubt whatever of success. But however I may be pleased with the prospect of that success as far as I am concerned, I should prefer the continuance of peace for the public and for you.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 220. To Major Malcolm.

*Discussion of our right to retain Gwalior ; and conclusion in the negative. To do so would also be inexpedient, as tending to impair our character for good faith, the ground of so much of our late success.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

There is one part of the question into which I have not entered in that letter very fully, that is, our right to Gwalior. This stands upon two grounds: 1st, our right under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, a treaty having been made with the Ranah of Gohud ; 2ndly, our right, under the same article, a treaty having been made with Ambajee Ingliia. I think your argument with Kavel Nyn is unanswerable, respecting the first ground. The treaty of peace mentions the Ranah of Gohud and his territory frequently ; these are the Company's boundary, &c. &c. ; and if they do not exist, one of the parties who made that treaty was guilty of a fraud, of which he has no right to the benefit. But, supposing that the Ranah of Gohud is to have territory, the question is, whether Gwalior is included in that territory ? I have not got a translation of the treaty with that chief ; but I am informed that it does not notice Gwalior. The Governor-

General claims that on the other ground, the treaty with Ambajee ; therefore the ground on which I, who made the treaty of peace, considered that we should get possession of the fort of Gwalior, entirely fails.

The fact is, that we now feel the consequences of my ignorance of the real state of affairs in Hindustan. Till I received the Governor-General's great dispatch regarding the peace, I thought that the state of the Ranah of Gohud existed ; but that dispatch for the first time informed me, that it was a state to be restored, and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to provide. There was the error ; and the same error will be found in his own treaty.

In respect to the second ground of our claim to Gwalior, viz. the treaty with Ambajee, on which alone the Governor-General rests, it fails us in two instances : 1st, Ambajee held the fort as a servant of Scindiah. The fort was Scindiah's, and Ambajee his amildar. The clause in the 9th article of the treaty will therefore deprive us of it. 2ndly, Ambajee has broken his treaty, and we have determined that he shall not enjoy any of the advantages for which he had stipulated. The Governor-General will, I know, bring forward an ingenious argument, on which he will claim the fort ; but I am afraid that it will be too ingenious, and too much abstracted from all the circumstances of the case, to elicit the other parts of the proceeding.

The question, in my opinion, stands thus. Is it consistent with good faith to insist that the stipulations in our favour shall hold good, not against Ambajee, but against Scindiah, when the ground of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, that upon which we claim the independence of the Rajahs, was the necessity of preserving the Company's faith ? Where is the necessity of preserving the Company's faith with Ambajee, who has broken his treaty ?

I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we can adhere to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the powerful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, interest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor-General's theme. But at the expense of what other party are those measures adopted ? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both. The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken is in the same state as one never made ; and, when that principle



is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom the possessions belonged before the treaty was made, and by whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by any other instrument, ought to have them.

In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honour we gained by the late war and the peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

## 221. To the Governor-General.

*British mediation essential for settling the South Mahratta country. Comparative recommendations of the alternatives previously<sup>1</sup> proposed for that purpose. The third course preferred.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

The first point which it is desirable to obtain is, the Peshwah's formal consent that the British government should interfere between his Highness and the southern jaghiredars. If this should not be effected, the settlement will be imperfect; intrigues will be carried on by the Peshwah and his ministers, to derange the settlement made; and other sirdars of the Empire, possibly some who have rendered services, and to whom the British government may wish well, will be urged to excite disturbances in the countries allotted for the payment of the troops employed by the jaghiredars. By obtaining his Highness's consent to the arrangement, persons of that description, or others, possibly really in rebellion, and not employed by him, will be deprived of the use of his Highness's name, which is the common instrument used by every freebooter in the Empire, who takes up arms against his Highness's authority, or that of the persons acting under the authority of his government.

After that is done, the best mode of settling the questions between the Peshwah and the jaghiredars is that alluded to in the third instance, in my address to your Excellency of the 7th

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 382, *ad fin.*—Ed.

inst., viz. 'to interfere in a certain degree; to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it, and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government, and to guarantee to them their possessions, so long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity.'

The modes proposed in the first and second instances, in my address of the 7th inst., viz. 'to concur with the Peshwah in destroying the southern jaghiredars,' or 'to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate, and allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all,' will infallibly occasion a contest, which will, in its consequences, affect the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

If the first mode be adopted, and the settlement of the country, after it shall have been taken from the jaghiredars, is to rest with the Peshwah's government, it will not be so advantageous to the British government as that which exists at present; and if the second mode be adopted, the contest will be long, the issue uncertain, the resources of the country will be destroyed, the communications between Mysore and the troops at Poonah interrupted, vast bodies of freebooters will be collected in the southern provinces of this empire, and the British government will at last be obliged to interfere, to provide for its own security and the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore.

The mode proposed in the fourth instance, viz. 'to make the jaghiredars at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government,' is one which would possibly provide more effectually for the security of the Hon. Company, and their allies and dependents, than any other that could be devised. But it must be founded upon the fact, that the Peshwah has broken his treaty with the Hon. Company, in instances in which it was in his power to perform it; and upon a knowledge of the personal characters and dispositions, and military resources of all the southern jaghiredars, which I am afraid we do not entirely possess.

The mode in which I have recommended to settle this question arises out of the treaty of Bassein, and the present state of his Highness's government and power. The measure is pressed upon the British government by considerations relative to the safety and peace of the Company's territories, as well as the

advantage of the Peshwah, the increase of his power, and of the means of his government to assist the British government in any future war; and it will be a preparatory step to the independence of the jaghiredars under the Company's protection, if circumstances should ever render that event necessary or desirable. I have little doubt but that the southern jaghiredars, particularly the family of Pursheram Bhow, will readily come into this arrangement; and, in my opinion, if affairs should settle to the northward, the best period to complete it would be during the rainy season.

## 222. To Major Malcolm.

*Further illustration of the injustice of sustaining the Treaties with the Rajah of Berar's feudatories; and danger of renewed war.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 30th March, 1804.

I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing the Governor-General to alter his intentions; as, by a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone, it appears that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made with the feudatories of the Rajah of Berar; some of which were signed at Cuttack, not less than 10 days after the intelligence of the treaty of peace.

I have to observe also upon those treaties, that they have been negotiated and concluded, not with the real Rajahs or feudatories, but with their rannees or ministers. The real Rajahs are, and have always been, in confinement at Nagpoor. The Governor-General has, however, offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar for the loss he will sustain by the transfer of these Rajahs from his authority. But this will not satisfy him, as I know that his object was to establish his own authority in those countries.

My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is nothing; the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us, as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty. I declare that I am

dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure ; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final ; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it.

### 223. To Major Malcolm.

*Dilemma as to giving up Asseerghur, resulting from the Gwalior question.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

I have given the Governor-General my opinion, in very strong terms, upon the consequence which I apprehend from his pushing one of his favourite projects, and I have told him that he must expect a war with Scindiah. If this war occurs, it must be carried on with disadvantage, if we have not Asseerghur ; and will not the Governor-General have some reason to complain of me, if, foreseeing that war, I should urge you to give up Asseerghur on an occasion in which you and Gen. Lake entertain doubts ? In fact, to adopt this measure is tantamount to an anticipation of his final opinion on the subject of Gwalior.

I am aware that to retain Asseerghur is a breach of treaty, and that it is a measure which will much annoy Scindiah's government. But this is as much the affair of the Commander-in-Chief and yourself as it is mine ; and where you doubt, I can have no confidence, and cannot venture to act.

These are my deliberate sentiments upon the subject. I see clearly that Asseerghur ought to be given up, but I cannot venture to give an opinion upon it.

Confound these red boxes and the gentlemen in Bengal ! The delays they occasion will send us to the devil.

### 224. To Lieutenant-Colonel Close.

*Imbecility, unpopularity, and unreasonable demands of the Peshwah. Will the Governor-General continue to support him ?*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 12th May, 1804.

It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported by a single Mahratta sirdar or horseman, that he does not enjoy any revenue, and that he has no means whatever of supporting his own authority. The records at Poonah will show that he lately applied to me to take measures to catch thieves who had taken refuge in the jungles ; and it now appears that, in order to enable the Peshwah to carry on his government at all, the

country must be conquered again by the British troops. I do not mean to urge the difficulty of this operation, but I allude to these circumstances, in order to show the possibility that the Governor-General might determine to adopt a mode of settling the question with the jaghiredars which would not occasion a necessity of employing the British troops to the southward at the present crisis.

In respect to the list of talooks, of which the Peshwah requires that the British troops should put his amildars in possession, it contains the names of all the strong forts, excepting Darwar; and of districts belonging to every chief, particularly a large tract belonging to Madhoo Rao Rastia.

In respect to Goklah, he naturally refuses to give up the districts which are to support his troops, till other means of support shall have been assigned to him, upon which subject the Peshwah will not, or has not, satisfied him. At the same time, Goklah was the only chief on whom his Highness could rely, and his the only body of troops whose services he could command, either to support the ordinary operations of his government, to overawe the southern jaghiredars, or to perform his treaty with the Company. This sirdar, and these troops, have slipped through his hands. Goklah has crossed the Kistna, and is gone to the southward; and his Highness now calls upon the British government, not only to support him against his foreign enemies, and to guard his person, but to perform these services without the assistance which he is bound to afford, to support the ordinary operations of his government, to undertake an extensive service against certain of his subjects, whose allegiance, by common management, might have been secured, and, at last, to punish and destroy the chief who has served for years with the British troops, whose conduct has always been satisfactory, and whom I left at Poonah 2 months ago in a disposition to undertake any service for the Peshwah's government, provided he should be treated with common justice.

All these facts are so strong, they prove so much incapacity in the Peshwah's government, and point out so clearly the aversion to it of all the principal chiefs, and show the probable grounds of that aversion, that I think it much to be doubted whether his Excellency the Governor-General will choose to give his support to his Highness's authority.

225. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

*Prospect of war with Holkar, which ought to be very short. Famine in the Deccan; its causes. Difference with the Governor-General on Gwalior and treaties with Berar tributaries. Danger of renewed war with the ex-Confederates. The Governor-General 'sincere in his notions,' but over ingenious, and lacks capable and independent advisers. Consensus of opinion against our right to retain Gwalior.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

I have been detained here ever since I wrote to you by Houghton, by the want of the Governor-General's answers upon a variety of points which I had referred to him at different times, and by the chance which I saw that the result of General Lake's discussions with Holkar would be the necessity of attacking that chief. Accordingly I have within these few days received the Governor-General's order to attack the possessions of Holkar in the Deccan, while General Lake will attack him in Hindostan; and I propose to join the army which is now encamped between this place and Poonah in the course of very few days.

There is at present a famine in the Deccan, which, in my opinion, will destroy half of the inhabitants. It is occasioned in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies for the last ten years, particularly by those of Holkar in the year 1802; in part by the operations of the Mahratta armies in the war, and in part by the want of rain in the last season, and by the want of arrangement and energy in the government of the Peshwah. But whatever may be its cause, I fear that it will prevent me from commencing my operations till a late period in the rainy season, when I may expect that the new grass and new crops of grain will afford some forage. In the mean time it is my opinion that if General Lake attacks Holkar with vigour, and pursues him with activity and perseverance, and above all, if Scindiah should co-operate heartily in the war, it will not last a fortnight. Holkar's power is like that of the band of freebooters whom I destroyed in the month of February last: it cannot stand a defeat of his army; and the pursuit after the defeat will make it crumble away to nothing.

Scindiah's government, although it has concluded the defen-

sive alliance, is not satisfied with us ; and the misfortune is that, between ourselves, I think we are in the wrong. The difference relates to the fort of Gwalior, which Scindiah thinks ought to belong to him, and the Governor-General will not give it up. I differ in opinion with the Governor-General both as to the right and policy of keeping this fort : I have delivered my opinion to him regarding the latter, but have said nothing upon the former, as the question turns upon a nice point of the law of nations, which the Governor-General has argued with his usual ingenuity ; but I acknowledge I differ from him entirely.

I could not make you understand this subject without writing a volume, and you will probably see the papers upon it very shortly after you will receive this letter. All I can say is, that I am convinced, and so is Malcolm, that we should have renewed the war upon this point if the Governor-General had not determined to give Scindiah the whole of the Holkar possessions ; and this concession will probably reconcile Scindiah's mind to the disappointment respecting Gwalior.

If Scindiah should not be satisfied, and should take advantage of the state of our affairs with Holkar to attack us again, the Rajah of Berar, who is equally dissatisfied, will likewise enter into the war. He also is not satisfied with the manner in which the treaty of peace has been carried into execution. The Nizam's government have pressed upon him most powerfully, and I think that the Governor-General has not treated him with liberality. I promised that the tenth article of the treaty of peace should not be applied in any instance in which it was not necessary for the preservation of the Company's faith ; and I reported this promise to the Governor-General in the letter which accompanied the treaty, and in the minute of the conferences in the negotiation. The Rajah has been called upon to confirm, under the tenth article of the treaty of peace, verbal offers (I may call them) which were scarcely accepted, and on which treaties were not concluded till ten days after Colonel Harcourt had received from Calcutta the intelligence of the peace, and nearly twenty days after he had received private intelligence of it from me. After all, the treaties were not concluded with the real feudatories, who were in confinement at Nagpoor, but with their ministers in some instances, and their wives in others. The Governor-General makes an ingenious argument to show that a verbal agreement is equally binding

with a treaty, which verbal agreement, by the bye, was never made; but supposing it had been made, let it be recollected that after I had signed a treaty of peace with an authorized vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, I refused to stop the operations: on the contrary, I continued my march towards Nagpoor till the treaty was ratified by this very Rajah of Berar, who is now told that verbal agreements must be considered as binding upon the British government.

From all this statement you will observe that the system of moderation and conciliation by which, whether it be right or wrong, I made the treaties of peace, and which has been so highly approved and extolled, is now given up. Our enemies are much disgusted, and complain loudly of our conduct and want of faith; and in truth I consider the peace to be by no means secure.

However, the Governor-General is sincere in his notions upon these subjects. He considers his decisions to be strictly correct, and he has offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar, and, as I have above told you, has adopted measures which will possibly conciliate Scindiah. But still we are all shaking again: the public interests may again be exposed to the risk of a battle, which we might have avoided by a smaller portion of ingenuity.

In fact, my dear Henry, we want at Calcutta some person who will speak his mind to the Governor-General. Since you and Malcolm have left him, there is nobody about him with capacity to understand these subjects, who has nerves to discuss them with him, and to oppose his sentiments when he is wrong. There cannot be a stronger proof of this want than the fact that Malcolm and I, and General Lake, and Mercer, and Webbe, were of opinion that we had lost Gwalior with the treaty of peace.

I wish you to consider all that I have written to you upon this subject as entirely between ourselves. I mention it to you only that you may know the real state of the case if the war should be renewed: however, I now think it possible that it will not.



226. Translation of a Mahratta letter from Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, dated 9th Suffun, answering to the 20th May, 1804.

*Advice to Scindiah on the Gohud and Gwalior question. First perform the Treaty; then remonstrate, in reliance on your close ally, the British Government.*

(Extract.)

My language to your ministers upon this subject has been uniformly the same. I said, whenever they spoke to me, that the possession of Gohud and Gwalior must depend upon the treaties which had been made with Gen. Lake; and I think I have shown you in this letter, that the treaties which affect the possession of Gohud and Gwalior ought to be confirmed under the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

Under these circumstances, you cannot suppose that the Company can or will relinquish their just demand that you should confirm the treaties which affect Gohud and Gwalior, as well as the other treaties: you are bound to confirm them by the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and, without being guilty of a breach of faith towards the Ranah of Gohud, the Company cannot avoid insisting upon your performing your engagement. I most anxiously recommend you to perform it.

This transaction may be attended with greater loss to your government than you were aware of at the time you engaged to perform it; and it may have reduced your power to a degree much lower than I contemplated when I negotiated the peace. or than the Governor-General ever intended. If you should feel the pressure of your difficulties, state them to the Resident at your durbar, and he will report them to the Governor-General; and rely upon it that the British Government will not fail to adopt every measure, which is consistent with justice and propriety, to relieve the difficulties of a state with which its interest is so closely connected. But it is necessary, in the first instance, to perform the treaty of peace.

**227. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.**

*Report of discussion with Scindiah's envoys on Gwalior, &c. Paramount necessity of conciliating the natives, and consulting their interests.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I have received a letter from Scindiah upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, to which I have written an answer, which I have given to Goorparah. I enclose the English draft and a copy of the answer. From what Goorparah said, I think that this letter will settle the question. In the argument yesterday, which followed the perusal of the letter, they gave up Gohud and Gwalior, and continued to dispute on the ground of other districts which Ambajee had ceded, and which we had made over to the Ranah. I told them that I could not go into details, as I had no information; that the decision upon every such district depended upon two points: 1st, was it to the southward of the territories of the Ranah; 2nd, had it been Scindiah's, or Serinjaumy? In summing up the result of the discussions I observed to them that they had given up Gohud and Gwalior, and directed their arguments entirely to the possession of other districts; to which they answered in the usual style, that they had done so because it was my pleasure. But the fact is, that they had nothing to answer.

I pressed them to discontinue their angry discussions, to advise Scindiah from me to bring this question to a close by confirming the treaties, and afterwards to enter into a confidential communication with you on the state of his affairs in general. The Governor-General may write what he pleases at Calcutta; we must conciliate the natives, or we shall not be able to do his business; and all his treaties, without conciliation and an endeavour to convince the Native powers that we have views besides our own interests, are so much waste paper.

**228. To Colonel Close.**

*Hurry Pursheram seeks reconciliation with the Peshwah, through the influence of the British Government. Gen. Wellesley's advice to him, and to the Resident at Poonah, on the general question of the Southern Chiefs.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that Hurry Pursheram,

commonly called Baba Saheb Putwurdun, one of the family of Pursheram Bhow, paid me a visit yesterday, in my camp at Rajahpoor, which I returned this morning on my road through Tasgaum. He took the opportunity of this visit to talk to me in private. He said that he was entirely at the mercy of the British government, and it must rest with them either to destroy him, or to allow him to retain his possessions. I desired him to explain himself; he then said he heard that the Peshwah was offended at his conduct, and that he was at the mercy of the British government. That all he was desirous of was to serve the Peshwah's government, as in former times; and that all he hoped for was the favour of his Highness and the British government, in proportion to his zeal and fidelity.

In answer, I told Baba Saheb that it was perfectly true that the Peshwah was offended with him, and that his Highness certainly had reason to complain of his conduct; however, it was possible that his Highness might be induced to forgive and forget what had passed; but that it must be in the confidence that he should have no cause to complain in future; and that that confidence must be founded on acts,—not professions of service. I therefore urged him earnestly, if he had any regard for his own honour and situation, to endeavour to reconcile himself to the Peshwah, and to serve him hereafter with zeal and fidelity. I pointed out to him the state of the Peshwah's government at the present moment; I observed that it was stronger in his Highness's own opinion, and in reality, than that of any Peshwah had ever been; and I hinted to him, that it was not to be supposed that the British government, which had done so much for the Peshwah, would cease its endeavours in his support, till his power and authority should be completely established and acknowledged in all parts of his territories. I observed that the Peshwah was not, in fact, so bent upon revenge as people supposed; that I had found him to be an indulgent master, when he had reason to believe that his servants were in earnest in their profession of repentance and future good conduct; and that he might depend upon it that there was nothing that the British government wished so much, as to see his Highness surrounded by his sirdars, and his government supported by its natural strength, and the chief men of the Empire in the enjoyment of their rights and possessions. In answer, Baba Saheb said that he wished and intended to serve the Peshwah according to ancient custom; and

I told him that I should consider what he had then said and so frequently repeated, as binding upon him in any future discussion which might take place upon this subject. I observed that I had no instructions to discuss the subject at this time, and did not know what the ancient custom was ; but that it appeared that the intention expressed by Baba Saheb was fair, and would be satisfactory.

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The circumstances that I have above detailed, which passed at the meeting with Baba Saheb, appear to hold out a favourable opportunity of settling the Peshwah's affairs with the Putwurdun family, and eventually with all the southern chiefs ; and I proceeded to give you my opinion regarding the mode in which that settlement ought to be effected. In respect to Baba Saheb, it is my opinion that, if he should open himself to you upon the subject, you ought to urge the durbar to accept his offers of service ; and if he should require that the British government shall guarantee the security of his person while he shall be at Poonah on the service of the Peshwah, and his possessions while he shall serve his Highness with fidelity, it is entirely consistent with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor-General to give that guarantee. As the arrangement which there is a prospect of making with Baba Saheb will be made in concert and communication with the Peshwah, and as his Highness is well aware that the British government will not permit him to break engagements into which he may enter with his subjects or servants, through their mediation, it is probable that he will have no objection to this guarantee, and it is desirable that it should be given with his knowledge and consent. If the arrangement should be made with Baba Saheb, as I hope it will, it is probable that offers to the same purport will be made by the other southern chiefs ; and I anxiously recommend that you should encourage them all, and urge the durbar to accept them ; and that you should give the sirdars the Company's guarantee for the security of their persons and their possessions, on the ground of their faithful services to the Peshwah's state.

229. To E. Strachey, Esq.

*The British Government to arbitrate the differences between the Peshwah and the Southern Chiefs. Nature of their relation*

*to the Peshwah. Appah Saheb to be first dealt with. Articles of agreement to be proposed to him.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804.

1. I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from his Excellency the Governor-General, from which you will observe that it is his Excellency's desire that the British government should interpose its arbitration for the purpose of settling the differences between the Peshwah and the southern jaghiredars; and that I should appoint a person to conduct the inquiries and negotiation connected with the proposed settlement.

2. I have fixed upon you for the performance of this service, and I proceed to give you my instructions.

3. The persons who are the objects of the Governor-General's orders are not properly jaghiredars. They are the serinjaumy sirdars of the Poonah state; and it is peculiarly the case with serinjaumy lands, that the possession of them may be changed annually. The chiefs in question, however, have held their lands of this description for many years; and they have other possessions under the Poonah state, some in jaghire, others in enaum, and others held only as comavisdars or amildars of the government.

4. Serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of troops employed in the service of the state, and it stands to reason that the condition of the tenure of serinjaumy lands is, that the holder should render service to the state; but the chiefs in question have long been in the habit of rendering no service to the Peshwah, under various pretences; the principal of which is, that the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked them, and has plundered their possessions; and that their troops are employed in the defence of the territories from the revenues of which they are to be supported.

\* \* \* \* \*

8. In my opinion, the best mode of arranging these affairs is, to commence settling with Appah Saheb, who is commonly supposed to be the head of the Putwurdun family. I have accordingly written to that chief, to inform him that I was desirous of communicating with him on business of importance, and had requested you to go to him; and I have desired him to write to you at Deogherry, on the Werdah, and to fix the time and place at which you will meet him.

9. I have the honour to enclose with this a letter of introduction for Appah Saheb.

\* \* \* \* \*

13. If you should find that Appah Saheb is disposed to serve the Peshwah, you will lay open the following propositions, as the articles of an agreement for settling all differences between the Peshwah and his family, and for defining their respective claims and benefits hereafter.

i. There shall be a mutual oblivion and pardon of all injuries on both sides. The British government will guarantee the security of the persons of Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, so long as they shall serve the Peshwah with fidelity, and refrain from intriguing or holding any communication with his Highness's enemies.

ii. Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, shall hold the lands of which they have possession by virtue of sunnuds, or legal grants from the state, whether as serinjaumy, or enaum, or in jaghire; and the British government will guarantee to them the possession of all those lands as long as they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully, and shall hold no communication with his Highness's enemies. In order to ascertain the lands, the possession of which the British government are to guarantee to Appah Saheb, and his brothers, relations, &c., a list of them is to be given in by Appah Saheb, which list is to be referred to his Highness the Peshwah, who will make such objections as he may think proper to Appah Saheb's retaining any particular portion of those described in the list. Appah Saheb is to reply to the Peshwah's objections to his list: and the British government is to decide between the parties. In the mean time, till the decision shall be made, Appah Saheb is to remain in possession of the lands.

iii. The condition on which the Hon. Company will guarantee to Appah Saheb, &c., the possession of their lands is, that they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully. In consideration of the injuries which the country has received from long wars, and having been frequently plundered, and lately a famine, Appah Saheb, &c., shall not be required to produce, at any time, more than two-thirds of the forces; for the support of which they will retain the serinjaumy lands. But that reduced number must be produced whenever it may be called for, otherwise the guarantee in the 2nd article shall be null and void. Also one-third of the number of the forces Appah Saheb, &c., are bound to supply, are always to be at Poonah, under the command of one of the members of the Putwurdun family. The person who shall command this force shall be under the guarantee of the

Company, in respect to the security of his person. The number of troops which Appah Sahib will have to furnish, according to this arrangement, shall be ascertained and decided by the British government, in the same manner as the quantity of lands which Appah Sahib, &c., are to hold till the decision shall be made. Appah Sahib, &c., are to supply for the Peshwah's service that body of troops which they will allege they ought to furnish according to the present arrangement.

iv. Appah Sahib, &c., are to restore to the Peshwah's government all lands, &c., &c., which they may hold, for which they have no sunnuds. In this article are included all lands of which they may be the comavisdars or amildars, unless the possession of such lands should be material to their safety, or to enable them to collect the revenues of their serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire lands: in which case, the British government will interest themselves with the Peshwah, that the comavisdars may be continued to the Putwurdun family, provided they give security that the Peshwah shall regularly receive the revenue.

#### 230. To Major Shawe.

*Strange circumstance of Scindiah's inclining to Holkar against us. He has broken the treaty of defensive alliance. But war with him would be most ill-timed. Proposed mode of dealing with him, and with Holkar.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 14th Dec., 1804.

I think it almost certain, that the accounts of the victories of the British armies of the 13th and 17th Nov. will produce an alteration in the councils of Scindiah. He will not be so ready to join himself with Meer Khan, and neither will be bold enough to venture upon an attack upon the British possessions. The facts, however, stated in Mr. Jenkins's dispatch are curious, and well deserving the attention of every European politician who has any thing to say to India. Scindiah, whose enmity to Holkar was become proverbial; who allied himself with the Company for the express purpose of defending himself against, and eventually destroying, Holkar; who rejoiced when he found that the war was determined on and inevitable; who has suffered severely in its progress by Holkar's plunder of his town of Mundleysir, and by Meer Khan's plunder of Bhilsa; and who has every thing

to hope from its successful conclusion, which the smallest exertion on his part would ensure ; instead of making that exertion against his enemy, joins his enemy, for the purpose of destroying his friend and ally.

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There can be no doubt but that Scindiah has already broken the treaty of defensive alliance.

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In the case of a breach of treaty, it certainly rests with the British government to adopt that measure which will be most convenient for its own interests. It would be fully justified in having recourse to arms, at the same time that war is not the necessary consequence of every breach of treaty. The question, therefore, is simply one of convenience ; and upon this point I have no scruple in declaring, that the present is of all others the worst time to attempt the conquest of Malwa ; which must be the object of the war, and the only one which can bring it to a conclusion. We have neither troops, money, civil servants, magazines, nor any one object which would be necessary to carry this plan into execution. There are other reasons also for delaying to attempt it, referrible to the state of affairs in England. It will not be easy hereafter for Scindiah to get any European allies ; and his armies and resources will certainly not improve during the interval in which we may think proper to leave him to himself, and to the prosecution of his own plans against Holkar.

The plan which I should recommend to the Governor-General would be to call upon Scindiah now to take measures to seize Holkar ; if he should refuse, or omit to take any measures for that purpose, I would leave him to himself. I would form the armies in Bundelcund, and in the conquered provinces, according to the plan proposed in one of my memorandums ; and the subsidiary forces with the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah on the Godavery, according to a plan proposed in one of my letters to you, and another to the Governor-General. I would then intimate to Kavel Nyn, or whoever may be the head of the English party at Scindiah's durbar, that the Governor-General had been prepared to advance money to Scindiah, and to assist him with troops in the true spirit of the defensive alliance, in order to enable him to settle a government in Malwa, but that Scindiah had broken it in all its essential articles, and that the British government would not revive it ; or would not act upon it



in any manner as long as Sirjee Rao Ghautky formed a part of the council, or remained in Scindiah's presence. At the same time, I would intimate an intention to perform every article of the treaty of peace.

This plan of conduct may revive the English party, and if it should, we may depend upon its permanence, and may act with it in the spirit of the defensive alliance; but if Ghautky should last, we may have peace with Scindiah for a time, and possibly, after the example which has been made of Holkar, for a very long time, but we cannot venture to act upon the defensive alliance.

It may be asked, what will be done with Holkar, who, I suppose, has escaped alive? I answer, he cannot now be formidable to the British government. Let him be followed, as I proposed in one of my memorandums to the Governor-General, with a reward for his apprehension. If we should take him, so much the better; if not, leave him to his contest with Scindiah, which will revive with double fury.

### 231. To Colonel Close.

*Scindiah most blameable for not punishing those concerned in the attack on Mr. Jenkins. He is probably overawed by Ghautky. Neither probably desires war with the Company, or they would have acted sooner. Difficulty of interposing to save Mr. Jenkins, and yet avoid war. To write a letter, and advance a corps near to Scindiah's army,—the safest and most pacific plan. Alternative courses likely to be adopted by Scindiah. How far each is compatible with peace.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

There can be no doubt but that the conduct of Scindiah throughout has been very improper; but not, in my opinion, in making an attack upon Bhopal or Saugur. There is no doubt but that he had a claim upon the Nabob of Bhopal, and it is more than probable that he had one upon Saugur, which, as you observe, holds but very slightly on the Peshwah; but his misbehaviour has been, in my opinion, principally towards Mr. Jenkins himself. The first attack upon Mr. Jenkins was a gross violation of the law of nations, on a point perfectly understood by the Mahrattas; and it was Scindiah's business to punish the

persons guilty of making that attack, and to take special care that it should not be repeated. The repetition of the attack adds to the enormity of the first offence, particularly as no measures have been taken to punish the persons guilty of it.

The Governor-General, in his dispatches, has decided that Scindiah shall be considered guilty of Ghautky's acts, if he retains Ghautky in his service, and does not restrain him; but the question upon this subject, is not whether Scindiah has the inclination, but whether he has the power, of restraining him.

I believe Scindiah to be very weak in intellect, although he has been known at times to assert his own power and dignity with a tolerably strong hand. But I am convinced that neither he nor his real ministers could ever have been concerned in the outrages to which I have referred. I am convinced also, that Scindiah knows that if he were to go to war with the British government, every respectable man in his state and army would leave him. It is my opinion, therefore, that he is overawed by Ghautky; that he feels the danger of endeavouring to arrest Ghautky's person, which can alone put a period to his practices; and he thinks that the measure would, in the event, leave him without resources and without army.

The result of this reasoning is, then, that we have reason to complain of Scindiah's government for acts committed by Ghautky, which, we have reason to suppose, are contrary to Scindiah's inclination, and that of his real ministers, and all his sirdars, but which he had not the power, or that he fears to punish.

It is my opinion that neither Scindiah nor Ghautky means to attack the Company. If they had intended it, they would not have lost the time before Saugur, during which Holkar and Meer Khan have been defeated; and it is to be hoped that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will have been destroyed; but they would have dashed at once at Bundelcund and upon Benares, during the time that they knew that the Commander-in-Chief and our troops were engaged with Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts. Scindiah's object is, I think, to get together a little money, and to be guided by events; and Ghautky appears to have no object at all, excepting to keep together an army of plunderers, which will give him the power over Scindiah. We must expect that the course of events will be favourable to us; and therefore it is unlucky that affairs have been brought to such a crisis,

and that it is absolutely necessary to interfere with a strong hand to save Mr. Jenkins and our honour, by which we shall again risk a war.

I do not see what plan we can adopt, in the execution of which Mr. Jenkins' life will not be in danger; and although it is an object of the first consequence to save his life, I declare that I am doubtful whether a strong measure or a moderate one is most likely to be successful. It is my opinion, that the Governor-General or you ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the enormity of the acts committed against Mr. Jenkins, who was residing with him in the quality of an ambassador; and who, therefore, by the laws of nations, as they are fully understood by the Mahrattas, was entitled to his protection; that the Governor-General was disposed to believe that these acts had been committed without Scindiah's knowledge, and against his consent; but they had passed without punishment or even notice, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to withdraw Mr. Jenkins from Scindiah's durbar, and to cease all communication with him, unless Scindiah should, immediately on the receipt of that letter, seize Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and punish him as his conduct had deserved.

But in case Scindiah should omit to punish Ghautky, and Mr. Jenkins should withdraw from his camp, Scindiah should be considered responsible for his security, till he should reach one of the posts occupied by the British army; and if, unfortunately, any accident should happen to Mr. Jenkins, Scindiah must expect the consequences of placing himself in the character of an enemy of the British government.

At the same time that this letter should be written, orders ought to be given to the Bundelcund corps, if it is supposed to be of sufficient strength, to approach towards Scindiah's position. If it should not be of sufficient strength, it ought to be strengthened, particularly in cavalry. Our troops in the Deccan cannot do anything in my opinion; excepting Wallace's corps, to seize Scindiah's possessions about Ahmednuggur, if the war should be determined upon; and Haliburton's to seize Burhampoor, and lay siege to Asseerghur.

These operations can be carried on, without impeding the arrangement detailed by me in my letters, of which I sent you copies. The only thing to take care of, is to make Wallace's corps approach Haliburton, as soon as he shall have placed the collector in possession of the countries about Ahmednuggur; in

order that he may cover Haliburton's operations, and prevent Scindiah from impeding the operations against Asseerghur, supposing that he should fly before the Bundelcund corps, and move in that direction.

When Scindiah shall have received the letter, which I have above proposed should be written to him, he will either seize Ghautky, or he will allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, with protection or without it; or he will not seize Ghautky, and will retain Mr. Jenkins. In the first case our triumph will be complete, but I fear that cannot be expected. In the second case, and the third, we shall remain at peace with Scindiah, provided Mr. Jenkins arrives in safety at one of our posts; if he should not do so, the war, in my opinion, is inevitable; and it is not impossible but that the Governor-General will go to war, at all events, for what has passed, unless Ghautky should be seized and punished: the only reason for which he may possibly not insist upon Ghautky's punishment is, that the proofs against him are not strong. In the fourth case, we must equally go to war, for we cannot submit to have our ambassador ill treated by a parcel of barbarians, without noticing the insult in the most serious manner.

There is a line of conduct which Scindiah may adopt, which may also leave peace as a possible event; it is to retain Mr. Jenkins, and to allow Ghautky to escape. When he does escape, he will be followed by all his plunderers, and will join Holkar; but this is a point of immaterial consequence, and would be the event most to be wished, next to that of his being blown from a gun. In this view of the case, the only chance of immediate war with Scindiah appears to rest on danger to Mr. Jenkins's person, or on Scindiah's retaining him in camp, contrary to the Governor-General's desire, while Ghautky shall still remain in power.

To ill-treat an ambassador is so violent a measure, one so repugnant to the feelings, even of the Mahrattas, that I acknowledge I do not imagine that Scindiah will venture upon it, although Ghautky would. The measure then to be adopted appears to be, to place a force in such a situation, when we shall communicate with Scindiah upon this subject, as shall convince him that we have the power of protecting him against Ghautky, supposing that he is inclined to be freed from his tyranny; and, at the same time, shall show Ghautky himself, that he cannot commit any act of violence against Mr. Jenkins's person with impunity.

The Bundelcund corps can easily be placed in such a position ; and if the result of the measures to be adopted should be, that Scindiah should allow Mr. Jenkins to go away, he will be able to reach that corps with facility. It is my opinion, then, that the approach of a British corps will induce all Scindiah's real ministers, and the old adherents of his family, to declare themselves against the violent measures of Ghautky.

Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that to write a letter, such as I have proposed, and to place our Bundelcund corps rather nearer to Scindiah's army, afford the best prospect of maintaining the peace with Scindiah ; which, if we can do with honour, I consider to be an object of the first importance.

### 232. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

*Choute a regular branch of revenue, and a vested interest. Its varied and intricate arrangement in the Nizam's territories. Owned by him and his allies ;—rarely by the Peshwah.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

I conclude that Appah Dessaye's claim to the choute of Aurungabad is quite clear ; and that this question is not one referrible to the arbitration of the British government. Indeed, I have reason to believe it is so, and, therefore, that Appah Dessaye ought to be paid. The fact of the matter regarding this choute is, that although originally a denomination of a portion of revenue, established by the Mahratta exactions, and in many instances a grievance upon the people, from the mode in which it is collected, it could not be entirely abolished, without making a very serious and dangerous attack upon property.

In some instances that I know of, the Nizam and his Mussulmann sirdars have the choute of Mahratta districts, which, of course, was originally exacted by the head of the Mahratta government ; and, by subsequent arrangements, has been ceded to the Nizam, and granted by him to his servants. In many instances the choute is arranged by the grant of a few villages in a district in lieu of it ; in others, the quarter of the district is in the possession of a choutear, in lieu of his claim to a quarter of the actual revenue realized from the whole district ; and in others, by a more complicated arrangement, the choutear has a certain number of villages, and the sircar besides pays him the

sum in which the rent of these villages is deficient, to make up the quarter of the revenue of the district.

In almost every instance that I have seen, the right of the choute exists in some individual who resides in the country, and who is but little more attached to the government of the Peshwah than he is to that of the Nizam, if at all attached to the former; and in but very few instances does it belong to the Peshwah's government. This very claim of Appah Dessaye's is one attached to his office of sirlushkur, and every person holding the office before him has enjoyed it. It is my opinion, therefore, generally, that the question for arbitration by the British government is, whether the Soubah shall pay to the Peshwah the choute of Beeder, which is a question depending upon treaties, and not whether his territories shall be exempt from the payment of that portion of revenue called choute, which has always been paid by them. This choute, to which I have referred, is entirely distinct from that general kind of indiscriminate plunder, to which the Mahrattas lay claim all over India. This is a right of the sword, which, of course, ceases when the sword is no longer in their hand; and the Soubah has a right to be exempt from it, excepting in instances in which he has bound himself by acknowledged treaties to pay it.

### 233. To Major Shawo.

*War with Scindiah to be carefully avoided now. We are in no condition for it.*

Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.

I sent you yesterday the copy of a letter which I had written to Col. Close, on the subject of the late events in Scindiah's camp, the greatest part of which was written before I had received your letter of the 18th Feb. I hope to God we shall be able to avoid a war with Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not now in a state to attempt the conquest of Malwa; an operation which, under other circumstances, would be a mere joke. The army to whose share it would naturally fall is now drawn to the Jumna, by the Commander-in-Chief; there is not a sepoy at Bombay, and very few sepoys and not 200 Europeans in Guzerat. The Peshwah's subsidiary force is not yet efficient; and if it were, neither that corps nor the Soubah's subsidiary force could be moved from the Deccan with safety.

You see the time and lives that have been spent in the attempts to subdue the Rajah of Bhurtpoor; and you will see that the army of Bengal will not be clear of that country before the season comes round, in which it will be necessary for them to go into cantonments. I therefore most anxiously hope that all that can be done with honour, will be done to preserve peace with Scindiah as long as possible.

**234. To Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm.**

*Sentiments on the final arrangements with Scindiah and Holkar.  
Strong feeling in England in favour of peace, at any price.*

Hastings, 31st July, 1806.

I have received your letters up to the 14th Jan., for which I return you many thanks. The subjects to which they relate are too large to be discussed in a letter which must go to the post this afternoon, in order to be despatched by the ships which will sail in a few days. I shall therefore satisfy myself by telling you that I consider that you have acted a part entirely consistent with your own character, and in strict conformity with my sentiments, in everything that you have done. The arrangement with Scindiah is precisely that which you and I recommended long before, and which I urged, and, I believe, was ordered when I was in Bengal in 1804. I thought also at that time, and so did you, that the Rajpoots ought to have been subjugated to the control of Scindiah's government, as the only mode of re-establishing it; the state in which it must exist, if it is to exist at all. This object might with care and justice have been effected at that time, if the state of Scindiah's government had permitted it; and I am not sufficiently acquainted with all that has passed between the Rajpoots and our government since the period of Monson's defeat, to be able to decide that we ought not to deliver them over to Scindiah, notwithstanding the favourable change which has taken place in the state and dispositions of his councils.

I regret that it has been necessary to allow Holkar to exist, and to be at large. I should be induced to suspect that he will never allow us to be at peace; and without peace we cannot reduce the debt, which must be the great object at present. However, if it was necessary to allow him to exist, I see but one

amendment which could have been made to the treaty with him ; that is, to have kept permanently Umber and Chandore in the Deccan, and some place of similar consequence in Hindustan, either in our own hands or those of our allies, as a perpetual memorial to the whole world that we had defeated him. The powers of India will not now believe that our moderation alone has occasioned the treaty which has been concluded ; and I shall not be surprised if it give ground for a belief, the most erroneous, that Holkar's power and his mode of warfare had been more destructive to us than the resources and the efficiency and discipline of the armies of the other Mahrattas.

In respect to the necessity of peace with Holkar, no man can be a judge of it who has not been in this country, who has not sat in the House of Commons, and had means of ascertaining the public opinion at its fountain head. I really believe, that in the opinion of the majority of people in this country, it would have been better to cede the whole of Oude to Holkar than to continue the war with him.

As for myself, I am here in the command of a few troops stationed in this part of the coast, the old landing place of William the Conqueror. You will have seen that I am in Parliament, and a most difficult and unpleasant game I have had to play in the present extraordinary state of parties. I have desired Sydenham to send you a copy of a speech which I made upon the budget.

I have seen your brothers, Pulteney and Charles, both well. The former is in the *Donegal*, off Brest ; the other unemployed in London. But Sir Thomas, whom I saw likewise, expects to be able to get a ship for Charles soon. God bless you, my dear Malcolm ; don't stay too long in India.

P.S. Pray remember me most kindly to Wilks and all friends in Seringapatam.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.



## 5. WAR WITH HOLKAR.

## 235. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*The object of the campaign is to bring Holkar to a general action, as soon as possible. This he will avoid as long as he can. His advantages over us in this respect. We cannot choose the seat of war; he can. Thus we must keep up our communications with our own country, to ensure supplies. Hence we should obtain the alliance and co-operation of the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India. Answer to political objections against such alliances. Military advantages of the connexion.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 27th Nov., 1802.

It is impossible to give a decided opinion upon the particular operations before the decided object of the Governor-General is known; but whatever may be that object, as the means of attaining it must be the defeat of the formidable body of troops collected by Holkar, time is not thrown away in considering certain subjects connected with the operations against that chieftain.

It is obvious that the intentions of the British government regarding the affairs of the Mahratta empire cannot be carried into execution unless Holkar's army is either defeated or dissipated. The object of the campaign must therefore be to bring him to a general action at as early a period as possible. This object, I have to observe, is not one of which, like the siege of Seringapatam, or the operations of a former war against Tippoo, the time it will take to attain it can be calculated. If it be our interest to bring Holkar to a general action, it is his to avoid it; and it may be depended upon that he will avoid it as long as he can.

His army is light, and chiefly composed of cavalry. The whole composition of our armies is heavy; even our cavalry, from the nature of their constitution and their equipments, and owing to the food eaten by the horses, are not able to march with greater celerity for any length of time than our infantry. His troops and his horses subsist on the grain the produce of the country. Our troops come from countries the general produce of which is rice; they, and even their followers, must have a certain quantity of that grain; and the horses of the cavalry must likewise have a grain not the general produce of the Mahratta territory, which, in addition to the inconvenience of the necessity of boiling it, must be brought from a distance.

Holkar, therefore, will have not only the inclination but the means of avoiding the result which, I take it for granted, can alone bring the war to a conclusion; and it is obvious that no man possesses a datum on which he can calculate the length of time which will elapse before he can bring the contest to that state.

Putting the European troops out of the question, the mode of equipping our Native armies, the food which they and their followers and horses are in the habit of using, will render it necessary that a large stock of provisions should be carried for their consumption. But however large that stock may be, no man can pretend to say that it will last till the general action will take place, which will alone bring the contest to a conclusion, because I have already shown that the enemy will be inclined, and will have the means of avoiding it. Therefore I conclude that, after a certain period for which our stock of provisions will have been provided, we shall be obliged to return to our own country for a fresh supply.

There are but two modes of carrying on this war by which we may avoid this disagreeable result: one is to place the seat of it in a country so near our own resources as that we shall be able with ease to command our supplies, or in one which is capable of affording us the supplies we require; the other is to keep up our communication with our own country, whatever may be the distance from it of the seat of the war. In regard to the first, viz. to command the seat of the war, I have to observe that we shall no more be able to do that than we shall to command its operations. The result is to be a general action with the enemy, and I have already shown that we must fight that action where he pleases, and therefore we cannot fix upon the seat of the war.

The second mode then is that alone by which we can succeed. By this mode we shall always supply ourselves; the enemy may protract his defeat, but sooner or later it must happen. The question is, in what manner is this desirable object to be attained?

The long operations of conquering and establishing ourselves in the countries on this side of the Kistna I put out of the question, as suitable neither to the state of our force at the present moment nor to our finances. Besides, it is probable that before we should have brought matters to that state that we should be able to commence the operations against the enemy which are to bring the war to a conclusion, other revolutions would happen in India which would entirely alter the situation of affairs.

The manner then by which I would propose to keep up the communication with our rear would be to take into our alliance and call for the co-operation of all the Mahratta chiefs on this side of India.

Upon this subject I observe that my opinion is different from yours, and I am aware that the question is political, upon which I am not called to give an opinion at all; but it is so intimately connected with the military operations that it is not possible to consider the one without considering the other.

In all cases of war, particularly with such a nation as the Mahrattas, there can be no doubt but that generally it is desirable that a part of them should be on our side; and I proceed to consider whether there is any reason which ought to induce us to reject the alliance of those Mahrattas whose services I believe we can now command. The great objection to our adopting it is the engagements by which we or the Peshwah may be fettered hereafter. I do not think it probable that we shall be under the necessity of entering into such engagements; but even if we should, the object of the contest is not territory for ourselves, but the defeat of a power from which we or our ally apprehend danger; and the question regarding the engagements must be decided by that of the value or the necessity of the assistance of those with whom they are to be entered into.

The Mahratta territory is divided among jaghiredars, all of whom have troops in the service of the state, or it belongs to Polygars, who pay a peshcush, or it is managed by the aumildars of the Sircar. But the peshcush of these Polygars, and everything collected by the aumildars, is applied to the payment of the Peshwah's troops, whose chiefs have tuncaws upon the revenues, or in payment of the debts of the state, also upon tuncaws. The Mahratta government was formerly as regularly organised as any in India, and these jaghiredars completely under the control of the Peshwah as head of the empire; but during the late troubles they have become in some degree independent of his authority, and they look to other sources besides his favour for their security. There is no doubt, however, but that all that they could claim from us in return for their assistance would be protection in the enjoyment of their jaghires, which, in case of our interference in the affairs of the empire hereafter, it is more than probable that we should afford them at all events. The promise of this protection would not prevent us from availing ourselves of any advantages to be derived here-

after from any subsidiary engagements which might be entered into with the Peshwah. The countries which it is probable we should wish to have under such an arrangement are Savanore and Darwar, on which there are no jaghires. Their revenues are applied in part to the payment of Goklah's army, being the army of the state, and in part of a debt due by the state to the family of Pursheram Bhow; and all that would be necessary would be to urge the Peshwah to make some other arrangement for the payment of this debt. Upon the whole, therefore, considering the nature of the tenures of the chiefs who command the troops in this part of the Mahratta territory, and their probable objects and ours, I cannot conceive that we can be fettered hereafter by any engagements we may enter into with them.

I now come to consider what assistance they can give us.

In the first place, the government of the countries through which the British army must pass to fight this battle is in their hands. By having them in our camps the inhabitants of these countries will be friendly to us; we shall enjoy the supplies which they can afford, and our own supplies will pass through them with comparatively small escorts. In short, we shall enjoy advantages nearly as extensive as we should supposing that the countries were in our own hands, without spending time, money, and lives to conquer them.

In the second place, we shall have the assistance of a body of cavalry amounting to not less than 20,000 men. I don't mean to hint that we shall require this assistance in the day of battle, but we shall to escort our supplies, to guard our baggage and provisions on our marches, to keep our camps quiet, to cover our forage, and save our own cavalry.

In the third place, we shall have the advantage of the best intelligence, particularly of any designs upon our rear. With such a body of cavalry in your camp, the enemy would not dare to detach small parties to your rear to distress your communications; and if he did, those parties would not remain there, as you would have the earliest intelligence of their movements, and might detach superior bodies immediately; and the fear of weakening himself too much in front of such a body of cavalry as you would have would equally prevent him from detaching a large body.

There is no doubt but that the advantages to be derived from this body of men are very great, and probably will more than

counterbalance the perils to be expected from an alliance with them ; and when it is recollected that by their assistance a prospect is afforded of keeping open our rear, and thus of bringing the contest to the only possible conclusion, I think that the necessity of encouraging them is obvious.

I have previously stated that these troops belong to the Mahratta state, for whose subsistence payment is already provided by the arrangements of that government ; therefore the employment of them will occasion no expense. They likewise and their horses, like all other Mahrattas, live upon jowarry, the grain of the country, and their consumption will not fall upon our supplies.

I have, &c.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

236. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*Expediency of direct—inexpediency of indirect—communications with Holkar.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

I am of opinion that one great fault of which we have been guilty in the negotiations to prevent the confederacy, has been that we have omitted to keep up a communication and intercourse with Holkar, whom I consider as the most formidable of the three supposed confederates. I endeavoured to remedy this fault as soon as I arrived at Poonah, and proposed to Holkar to send him a gentleman ; but he was at that time on his plundering plan in the Nizam's territories, and in his answer he pretended not to understand the meaning of my proposition. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that the sooner we remedy this fault the better ; and I should not object much to any channel by which we might obtain so desirable an object. But I don't like the communications through third persons : they never lead to any thing but inaction on our part, and give room for every kind of intrigues. If Fukker u Deen has any proposition to make of a mode by which the peace between Holkar and the Honourable Company can be preserved, he is an old servant of the Company's, and in constant communication with you, and he ought to come forward and make it, and to state his authority and his reasons for believing that the mode which he proposes will have the desired effect. On the ground of such a

communication some steps can be taken, the business can be put in some kind of shape, we can see what prospect there is of getting it forward, and its future progress; but these second and third hand communications are always intrigues, and lead to disasters.

### 237. To Lieutenant-Colonel Collins.

*General Wellesley writes to Holkar, with a copy of the Treaty.*

Camp, 16th July, 1803.

Although the Governor-General mentioned in one of his despatches that the treaty of Basscin ought to be communicated to Holkar, no orders have been sent stating by whom; and I have not observed in any of the correspondence that it has been communicated to that chief. I have long thought that it would be very desirable to open a communication with Holkar, and particularly to make known to him the treaty of Basscin. I have therefore taken the opportunity of the departure from this camp of a vakeel from Amrut Rao to show Holkar the treaty; and I have written him a letter<sup>1</sup>, of which I enclose a translation, which I send to him by a Native officer.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 238. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

*A contest with Holkar not to be precipitated.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

It is difficult to say what line Holkar will take, or what ought to be done with him. He is evidently only a freebooter, and to crush him cannot be called a war in the present state of the Company's power; but whatever may be done hereafter, I think it will be advisable not to touch him, unless he should attack the Company or their allies, till the alliance with Scindiah will be concluded. If Scindiah sees us attack Holkar, he will most probably not enter into the defensive alliance; he will attack Holkar at the same time, in order to get what he can.

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<sup>1</sup> See No. 147, p. 262.—*Ed.*

## 239. To Colonel Montresor.

*War with Holkar probably avoidable: if not, he ought to be promptly suppressed.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 26th March, 1804.

The subsidiary alliance offered to Scindiah, in the 5th article of the treaty of peace, has been concluded. The knowledge of this event will, I think, prevent the supposed contest with Holkar, which after all, in the present state of the Company's power, could not have been considered more than a Polygar war. But to say the truth, I have always considered Holkar's power to depend upon his avoiding a contest with any of the British armies, and I believe that he has been of the same opinion: there are, therefore, good grounds for thinking that we shall now have unqualified peace. Supposing that we should not, there are four or five armies ready to move upon him, and we should make a capital finishing of a Mahratta confederacy by destroying the chief who they say planned it, but who cautiously avoided activity in the execution of his own plans after the two other members had been destroyed.

## 240. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*General Lake ought to dash at Holkar at once; or postpone hostilities until he is strong enough to do so.*

Bombay, 20th April, 1804.

Malcolm's letter of the 14th is certainly very important; but I by no means think the question of peace or war decided. It will depend upon Holkar's conduct when he will find that General Lake has moved. The General's intention not to quit Hindustan, and not to follow Holkar, will be fatal. He ought to leave a corps in Hindustan for its security, and move with a light body in pursuit of Holkar, whose force will fritter away daily, whether he retreats after fighting or without fighting. If he should not pursue Holkar, the war will immediately become defensive on our part in the most important quarter, and by such operations we must lose.

Colonel Murray's offensive operations must be feeble in comparison with those of the Commander-in-Chief; indeed, I don't think that he can venture far from the Myhie. No progress, then, will be made in the war till I can reach the countries north

of Ougein ; and supposing it to be safe for me to quit the Deccan with any formidable corps of troops, I am almost certain that I shall not have it in my power to collect a sufficient quantity of provisions to subsist the troops till they would arrive in communication with the stores of Guzerat. At all events, months must elapse before I could reach those countries ; and I really think that if General Lake should push Holkar vigorously, the war ought not to last a fortnight.

If General Lake should not be sufficiently strong to carry on the war in this manner, he ought to delay its commencement till he can be reinforced, or till Scindiah's subsidiary force can be arranged. I return all your letters.

Believe me, &c.,  
ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**241. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.**

*Why the English Government ought not to support Cashee Rao Holkar.*

(Extract.) Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have always held the same opinion about Cashee Rao Holkar. He is an infamous blackguard, despised by everybody, full of prejudices, hatred, and revenge, and without one adherent or even a follower. By adopting his cause we shall burthen ourselves with the defence and support of another weak and helpless power, we shall disgust Scindiah's government, and we shall not give satisfaction to the followers and adherents of the Holkar family. The act will be abstractedly generous ; but considering that Cashee Rao was concerned in the murder of his brother, it will be to support usurpation founded on murder, and, for the reasons I have above mentioned, highly impolitic.

The question ought to be decided at the same time that the Governor-General decides that he will go into the war, and I must, of course, write to him about it ; but you ought to write likewise.

**242. To Colonel Murray.**

*Murray to march quickly into Malwa, when the war with Holkar begins.*

(Extract.) Bombay, 30th April, 1804.

At whatever period hostilities may commence with Holkar, it will be necessary that your corps should move into Malwa. You



will observe, therefore, the necessity of keeping it prepared, at least till the exact state of affairs in Hindustan shall be known; and when you break it up for the rains, you will take care to occupy such positions as will be most useful to enable you to advance with celerity into Malwa, as will at the same time cover Guzerat from invasion, and as will enable you to collect in strength whenever that may be necessary.

### 243. To Colonel Murray.

*Instructions for the conduct of the war with Holkar.*

(Extracts.)

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have the honour to inform you that I have received intimation from his Excellency the Governor-General, that he has given directions to the Commander-in-Chief to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and his Excellency has ordered me to make arrangements to co-operate with, and support the operations of, the Commander-in-Chief.

It is impossible for me to say what the operations of the Commander-in-Chief will be, but Holkar's power appears to consist principally in a considerable army in the field; and I imagine that his Excellency's operations will, in the first instance, be directed to defeat that army; or, if Holkar should avoid an action by flying, to press upon him so closely as to oblige his troops to disperse. This operation can be aided very materially from Guzerat, and I proceed to point out to you in what manner.

\* \* \* \* \*

If the operations of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief should be directed to the defeat and dispersion of Holkar's army according to the mode which I have supposed at the commencement of this letter, your object will be to post yourself in such a manner as to stop Holkar, and embarrass and impede his flight as much as possible, and if you can, to engage him.

If the Commander-in-Chief should commence his operations in a short time, it does not appear to me to be probable that Holkar, who is now, I believe, about Ajmeer, will retire to the south-westward, or towards Guzerat; but he will, probably, move towards Ougain. I have no ground, however, for this conjecture, excepting the knowledge that the rains will commence in June, and the probability that Holkar will be disinclined to trust himself in a country in that season of the year, in which his operations would

be confined by the course of the rivers, the nature of the country, &c. If he should move towards Ougein, it will be your business to join Scindiah's army at the earliest practicable period ; and at all events, to move with celerity upon Holkar, and attack him whenever you shall have an opportunity. You will take with you as large a body of the Guickwar cavalry as can be furnished to you.

\* \* \* \* \*

I understand that he has some strongholds in Malwa, particularly at Rampoorra, or Brampoorra, to which he has lately sent his infantry and guns ; but it will not be difficult to obtain possession of them, and to make a final conquest and settlement of his country, as soon as his army shall have been beaten and dispersed ; and to employ our troops in sieges till this object shall have been effected will only give Holkar leisure for his predatory operations, will enable him to distress the troops by operating on their communications during such sieges, and will delay his final defeat.

#### 244. To General Lake.

*Rapid and continuous pursuit, with corps capable of sustaining an action, the best mode of dispersing such an army as Holkar's.*

27th May, 1804.

\*\*\*\*\*<sup>1</sup> The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter ; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief : at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily ; the freebooter ends by having with him only a

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<sup>1</sup> *Sic* in Col. Gurwood's Edition.—*Ed.*

few adherents ; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages ; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate ; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Col. Murray has moved before this time.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that I shall be able to move, and to make the siege of Chandore in the course of the month of June. Every thing is ready. The troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a fall of rain to insure water.

#### 245. To Colonel Murray.

*Murray's force adequate to its requirements. Mischief of innuendos that it is not.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

You have a larger body of European soldiers than the Commander-in-Chief, or than I have ever had ; and Col. Monson has driven Holkar before him out of the territories of the Rajah of Jeypoor, of Bhoondy, and of Kota, without a single European soldier or horseman, excepting the irregular horse of the country. You will be joined by a large body of Scindiah's cavalry.

From your frequent allusions to this subject, I should be induced to believe that you do not deem your force sufficient to perform the service on which you are employed, if I was not aware of the circumstances to which I have above referred ; and it is, therefore, necessary, that I should request you to explain yourself fully to Mr. Duncan upon it. Your explanation of your sentiments ought to be full ; as, by allusions to your weakness, and

expressing your hopes that you will be reinforced, you expose the government to the severe responsibility of omitting to reinforce you on the one hand, if it should be necessary; or of reinforcing you, on the other, if it should not.

246. To Major Malcolm.

*Peril involved in the prolongation of the war. Murray and Monson both afraid of Holkar; and each justifies his retreat by that of the other.*

(Extract.)

Barrackpoor, 24th Aug., 1804.

You may depend upon it that the Commander-in-Chief will not allow me to undertake the settlement of affairs in Malwa; indeed it would be improper to propose such an arrangement to him, and unreasonable to expect that he would propose it himself.

It is now reported that Holkar is crossing the Chumbul; and if that report be well founded, the Commander-in-Chief will have a favourable opportunity of attacking him, and of bringing the war to a conclusion. If it is not soon brought to a conclusion, either in this manner or some other, it will be the most serious affair in which the British government have ever been engaged, and one which will require the exertions of all of us. In such a case, I have no objection to go back to the Deccan: but otherwise I am very desirous to avoid the journey. I shall speak to the Governor-General respecting the arrangements you propose for Close.

I have read over with the greatest attention all Monson's letters, and all the information which has arrived here respecting the late misfortunes; and I am decidedly of opinion that Monson advanced without reason, and retreated in the same manner; and that he had no intelligence of what was passing 5 miles from his camp.

It is a curious circumstance that Monson and the Commander-in-Chief should attribute their misfortunes to Murray's retreat, and that Murray should attribute his retreat to a movement of the same kind made by Monson. At all events both parties appear to have been afraid of Holkar, and both to have fled from him in different directions.

I do not think that the Commander-in-Chief and I have carried on the war so well by our deputies as we did ourselves. There is no news. The countries to the northward are in great alarm;

but it is to be hoped that the Governor-General's luck will not leave him in this crisis: and that all will be settled before the late misfortunes can have any serious effect. Would to God that I had come round here in March, and Holkar would now have been in the tomb of all the Capulets!

**247. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace.**

*Narrative of Monson's retreat. Rationale of his disasters.  
Lessons from his campaign.*

Fort William, 12th Sept., 1804.

<sup>1</sup>You will have heard reports of poor Monson's reverses, but as I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me; and as they give some important military lessons to us all, I do not regard the trouble of writing them to you. When it became necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from the grand army with 3 battalions and their guns, and a body of cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, with an army composed only of horse (and as Gen. Lake was at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa.

After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat countries depending on Agra, the first country going to the southward is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Scindiah and Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the same description; and joining to Boondy is the territory of the Rajah of Kota. These last two Rajahs had been, and are still, tributary to Scindiah; and Holkar has claims upon them which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in consequence of their conduct in the war; at all events, they were desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the demands of Holkar.

Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort called Rampoor, which, at the commencement of the war, belonged to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor. The

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<sup>1</sup> This letter is given entire, except three opening paragraphs, on personal matters.—*Ed.*

whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, which joins to the Kota territory, and which is entered through a pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between Rampoorra and Agra.

When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander-in-Chief, Col. Monson followed him successively to Boondy and Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were very desirous to have the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and promised supplies and every thing which Col. Monson could want. At the same time that Col. Monson advanced, a detachment under Col. Don, consisting of 2 battalions, was sent to take Rampoorra, of which place it got possession by storm; and this detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson's corps, which then consisted of 5 battalions.

In the month of June, the Commander-in-Chief withdrew his army into cantonments, leaving Monson's corps in the Kota country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Scindiah's, under Bappojee Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of Hinglisghur; and after this operation, he took up a position in Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota, at some distance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected to be able to communicate with Col. Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Ougein.

After his retreat in front of the Commander-in-Chief, Holkar had first threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundisoor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north-west of Ougein, and on the left of the Chumbul. Between the middle and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town; and at that time the river Chumbul was between him and Col. Monson, who was encamped about 5 coss from the river, on the right bank.

Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul with his army. Col. Monson learnt that he was doing so, and intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had

crossed the river; nearly about the same time, he understood that Col. Murray, who had made 2 marches towards Ougein from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhie; and upon the whole, Monson, having only 2 days' provisions, thought it best to retreat. Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following morning, the 8th July, I believe, towards the Muckundra ghaut; and he followed with the infantry at about 9 in the morning, meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about 17 miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard. After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse; and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the ghaut; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many passages practicable for cavalry.

On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, in 3 separate bodies, who, however, could make no impression upon him; and they were beat off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at a camp within 2 or 3 coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their guns, 175 in number; and he determined to retreat again. He accordingly marched to Kota, the Rajah of which place urged him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions; and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after he had crossed.

The rain began about the 10th July, and became incessant, and rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would otherwise have been; particularly in that country, which is a black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until he reached Rampoor. He was followed, but not much harassed, by a body of Holkar's horse, which overtook him at a nullah, which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him. On his arrival at Rampoor, Monson was joined by 2 battalions with their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he immediately began to collect provisions at Rampoor.

The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson, likewise impeded Holkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward of the Muckundra ghaut. His progress to the northward was likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and towards the 20th Aug. again approached Monson at Rampoor.

By this time, Monson had collected only about 12 days' provisions, and the Commander-in-Chief, foreseeing the difficulty in which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th Aug. to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he might be distressed for provisions.

Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within 6 coss with his whole army, and on the 21st Aug., in the evening, commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalghur, leaving Jeypoor on his left hand. He left 15 companies as a garrison in Rampoor. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found that it was full: on the 24th, in the morning, it fell, and became fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion; and between 12 and 3 o'clock, he passed over three more battalions, leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the southern bank.

Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen crossing at different fords on the right and left flank; and towards evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They attacked the piquets, but were repulsed; and the piquets and battalion took 8 guns; but afterwards our troops were overpowered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who had crossed the river and moved up its bed.

Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalghur, about 40 miles distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to make any impression upon him. He halted on the night of the 25th and the 26th at Kooshalghur, and on the 26th at night marched towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I have not received an account; but on the 30th, Monson and his detachment arrived at Agra.

The Commander-in-Chief has taken the field, and it is to be hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the disgrace which we have suffered.



It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that in future, if possible, they may be avoided.

In the 1st place, it appears that Col. Monson's corps was never so strong as to be able to engage Holkar's army, if that Chief should collect it; at least the Colonel was of that opinion. 2ndly: It appears that it had not any stock of provisions. 3rdly: That it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged its advance. 4thly: That no measures whatever were taken by British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or even at Rampoor, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a British garrison. 5thly: That the detachment was advanced to such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and nullahs, without any boats collected, or posts upon those rivers; and in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of Kota, who supplied them with his boats.

The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked them with his infantry and artillery.

In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. If he chose to retire, he ought to have supported the rear guard with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with the baggage.

When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than a night at Muckundra; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Muckundra, would also oblige him to quit that position. The difference between a good and a bad military position is nothing when the troops are starving.

The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at Rampoor, unless he intended to fight. As he had been reinforced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired. When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his baggage; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honour.

We have some important lessons from this campaign. 1st: We should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal. 2ndly: Against the Mahrattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions. 3rdly: Experience has shown us, that British troops can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a Native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in which they may want them. 4thly: When we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoorah to the northward, or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, in case of need. 5thly: When we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poonah, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick; and in all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating.

These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to reinforce the troops with you.

P.S. Of course I mean this letter<sup>1</sup> only for your own perusal, and that of your particular friends.

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<sup>1</sup> The compiler takes the liberty to add, as notes, to this and the following letter, an opinion and an illustration of them.

Sir Robert Peel, in speaking of the Duke of Wellington, said that he considered him the most powerful writer in the English language, and that the letter upon Col. Monson's retreat was the best military letter he had ever read, and quoted the line from Horace:

'Scribendi recte, sapere est et principium et fons.'

*De Arte Poetica*, l. 309.

*Extract from a letter from Major-Gen. Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., after the battle of Meeanee, dated Hyderabad, 20th Feb., 1843.*

'The Duke's letter on the retreat of Col. Monson decided me never

## 248. To Colonel Murray.

*Advice on the conduct of the war with Holkar.*

(Extract.)

Fort William, 14th Sept., 1804.

There are two modes in which the Mahrattas carry on their operations. They operate upon supplies by means of their cavalry; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can scarcely escape from them.

That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation against a Mahratta power (indeed in any military operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in your camp as will enable you to command your own movements, and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you may be employed.

The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. Experience has shown us that the Mahratta cavalry are not very formidable when opposed to our infantry; that of Holkar, in particular, made no impression upon Monson's detachment in its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is the strength of Holkar's, as it is of every other army, and to that I conceive your corps to be fully equal.

It is probable that the Commander-in-Chief will not be at Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the beginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have

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to retire before an Indian army. If I have done wrong abstractedly (for success, like charity, covers sins), the Great Master led me into it; but my own conviction is that I have done right; and that my admiration of him, and study of his words and deeds, as the great rules of war, have caused this victory.'—Col. Gurwood's note.

at least a month's provision in your camp. If he should bring his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your baggage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together.

You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Mahrattas have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure your baggage in any manner, and move out to attack them. Do not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account.

Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do not allow the enemy to lie near you with impunity, and you will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts towards Kota of your situation; and if you should hear of the infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it. In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable; and if you should support those attacks by your infantry and your cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful.

If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that Holkar's infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before you think of any thing else. If you should be obliged to draw off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the regular hours; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you can; if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, attack them with vigour. Even if you should lose a day or two by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will probably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the infantry are beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry on. But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat.

I do not know what orders you may have received from the Commander-in-Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should

act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th May. At all events, whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions in your camp, or you will not be in safety, much less be of any use to his operations.

**249. To Colonel Agnew.**

*Dangerous impression produced on the native mind by  
Monson's retreat.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 13th Jan., 1805.

After Colonel Monson's defeat I acknowledge that I considered the peace with the Mahrattas very precarious; and indeed if the success of Holkar had continued, I consider that we should have had to fight over again not only our battles with the Mahrattas, but those with all the other powers of India, whether considered as our dependants or our allies. I also believe that the Rajah of Berar in particular, and very possibly Scindiah, considered the advantages gained by Holkar to have been much greater than they really were; that they anticipated farther successes, and the former prepared to take advantage of them..

**250. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.**

*Navigable rivers the only natural barrier against Mahrattas.  
Alliances with petty Rajahs unprofitable.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 14th Jan., 1805.

I have always been of opinion that this warfare with Holkar has shown that there is no such thing in India as a frontier, properly so called, particularly against the Mahrattas. In fact, with their horse they can penetrate anywhere, excepting across a navigable river; and when once they have penetrated with their horse, they have no difficulty in making roads for their guns. I have marched with a British army through one of these impracticable countries at the rate of from sixteen to twenty miles a day.

So far for the natural frontier; but Captain Burr says that the Bheels will defend this frontier, and that by a system of connexion with Oudepoor and different other petty Rajahs, we shall have the service of all these people. This is another error which this warfare with Holkar has exposed. The British government can form no connexion with petty powers of this description in India, excepting that of subjection on their part and

government on ours. Indeed, I doubt whether that connexion can be formed; and if I were to choose whether I would connect the Company with them or leave them with the Mahrattas, I would adopt the latter. Of this I am very sure, that I should be much more certain of their assistance in the day of need by this system than by taking them under the Company.

The conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, on the frontier of the Jumna, is a strong proof of the conduct of these people. This Rajah was made independent, had additions made to his territories, and the whole guaranteed to him in the war with Scindiah, in which he served with the Commander-in-Chief's army. Notwithstanding this, *he* called in Holkar; *he* supported him upon the Jumna; *he* is the cause of the invasion of the Dooab, and of the prolongation of the contest at this moment by the support which he gives to Holkar's defeated troops by his forts on our frontier.

The Rajah of Jyenagur is another instance. His country was considered as one of the bulwarks of Bengal, yet Holkar galloped through it with his cavalry, marched his infantry through it, has communicated ever since with Malwa through it; and the Rajah, although rendered independent by the treaty of peace and called an ally of the Company, has not only never given any assistance, but is strongly suspected of having aided to distress Colonel Monson on his retreat. There are many other instances of the same kind on the frontier of Cuttack. So much for alliances with petty Rajahs.

## 251. To Colonel Malcolm.

*Assaults on Bhurtpoor mismanaged, and of dangerous consequence.*

(Extract.)

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

The 4th and 5th failures before Bhurtpoor are disastrous events, of which I apprehend the worst consequences. They must have blundered that siege terribly, for it is certain that, with adequate means, every place can be taken; and ——— having been so long before the place, adequate means must have been provided, or in his power. The fault lies therefore in the misapplication of them, or, most probably, in the omission to employ all those which were necessary to accomplish the object in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers, or the impetuosity of ———'s temper, which could not brook the necessary delay.

## VI. DEFENCE OF THE INDIAN EMPIRE.

### I. ANGLO-INDIAN ARMY.

#### 252. To Lord Clive.

*Alteration of the military system in the Company's territories desirable. There must be an active field force; and as few garrisons as possible.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have received the honour of your Lordship's letter of the 14th inst., in which you desire to have my opinion regarding the extent of the military force which will be necessary for the new territory which your Lordship informs me will be assigned by the Nizam to the exclusive management of the Company for Mysore, Malabar, Canara, and Goa. It is difficult to give an opinion regarding the new territory, of which I have but little knowledge; but as your Lordship has desired it, I shall proceed to state what has occurred to me upon the subject.

The question which your Lordship has put to me involves considerations affecting the whole of our military system in this country. When the country proposed to be ceded to the Company is likewise to be defended, its inhabitants to be kept in tranquillity, and its revenue to be realised by means of the troops, it is impossible to expect to be able to effect these objects on the system of weak and dispersed garrisons, on which we have been acting hitherto. This must be changed: neither the new territory, nor the old, can be kept in awe by troops dispersed in forts, which they cannot quit with safety; and, therefore, the system which I should recommend would be to garrison those posts only which are absolutely necessary to us, and to

have at all times in the field, and in motion, 2 or 3 regiments of Europeans, all the cavalry, and as large a body of Native infantry as can be got together. This will be a real security, not only to the new territory and to Mysore, but to the Carnatic, Malabar, and Canara, and nothing else ever will. It will appear more clearly that this system is necessary in the new territory, when the nature of its inhabitants, and the governments to which they have been accustomed, are considered.

The whole of the country to be ceded by the Nizam is inhabited by petty rajahs and polygars, who have never been entirely subdued, and have never submitted to the species of government which must be exercised by the Company's servants. They have been accustomed either to the rapacity and corruption of Tippoo's government, or to the weakness of the Nizam's; but they are entirely unacquainted with the restraint of a regular authority, constructed upon the principles adopted by the Company's government. This they will resist; and they must be kept in awe, particularly at first, by a large and an active force. For this purpose troops in garrison will never answer.

### 253. To Josiah Webbe, Esq.

*Peace in Europe no good ground for reduction of the army in India. How it may best be reduced.*

(Extract.)

Serlingapatam, 22nd March, 1802.

I am very glad to find that the King's ministers are likely again to take the power over this country into their own hands, and make use of the control which they have over the gentry in Leadenhall-street. I do not know exactly the points upon which Lord Wellesley is at issue with them, but I judge from Malcolm's account of the letters which he has received from England, that whatever they may be, he will be supported by the Board of Control, particularly as he appears disposed to make every reduction in the military expenses which is at all practicable.

I agree with you entirely about the peace. It establishes the French power over Europe, and when we shall have disarmed we shall have no security excepting in our own abject-



ness. There is a report that the finances were in a very embarrassed state, which I am afraid is true, as there could have been no other inducement to make such a peace.

I look upon the question of reduction in this country to stand upon grounds entirely independent of peace or war in Europe. We have carried on no offensive operations in this quarter, and we have long ceased to fear an attack from the French. The size of our army is to be attributed to the demands for its services existing in India, and is by no means occasioned by the war in Europe. The question is, whether those demands are likely to be lessened or to cease upon the conclusion of the peace. I rather believe that as that event will be accompanied by the return of the French and Dutch to their settlements in India, it might be concluded with more truth that the army ought to be increased rather than diminished.

The people of England, however, will not willingly hear of the existence of our large military establishments in India in time of profound peace in Europe. They will not easily believe that there is a necessity for them in India in the most peaceable times, and some reduction is therefore absolutely necessary. On this ground only does the peace influence the question of reduction. But it is very clear that the army ought to be reduced as little as possible, particularly that its effective strength ought to be kept entire.

If there is to be any reduction of numbers below what they will be after the supernumeraries are struck off, I think the best mode will undoubtedly be to decrease the number of men in each battalion, rather than to disband any of the regiments. By this mode it will be more easy at all times to increase the army to its present numbers; and as by either mode the officers must still be in the service, on the establishment, and in the receipt of their pay and batta, it will be equally economical for the present. Hereafter, however, when the number of officers will have decreased, to disband some of the regiments will be the more economical mode; but it will be attended with the disadvantage of great difficulty in increasing the numbers of the army again.

## 254. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Distribution of the military establishment required for the pacification and defence of the Madras Presidency. The conquest of foreign enemies does not alone enable us to reduce our armies. The increasing influence of the civil government may do so; and make a field force less necessary than I once thought it.*

(Extract.)

3rd July, 1804.

In respect to the general question of a military establishment, it has always appeared to me that government has made an erroneous calculation of the value of their conquests, as if they were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their external enemies; and they have imagined that, in proportion as they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particularly the error of the Court of Directors.

They have not adverted to the fact that all government in India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal government, that is to say, the power of the sword in their own provinces, by which, till this last war, they have invariably suffered; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must, bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because the government must be established in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself, from the want of troops.

This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so severely felt. For the last 5 or 6 years, great exertions have been made, and the Company's power has been vastly extended, without any very great increase of their military resources. What has been done has been by great military activity and

exertion ; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of the Company's military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis's time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, as well as to provide the means of making foreign conquests. But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the establishment of Fort St. George ; and the troops and military resources of this presidency will be applicable to the defence of the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide for the peace of the country.

I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war ; because the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in an attack on this country.

In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are in their favour ; and we have also in their favour the practical example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same system ; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in all their provinces in the Peninsula from which their troops were withdrawn were not in rebellion. It is true that the circumstances and events of the war were favourable to internal peace, and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil government lately established. But, on the other hand, a Mahratta war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely to be disturbed, as the Mahrattas have their agents and intrigue every where ; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout the late war, to something more than chance, or than to the circumstances and events of the war itself. Still, however, the sword is the main support of the government ; and it is necessary now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal tranquillity : and I have adverted particularly to the

state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought to be disposed.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to provide, on which it is most probable that the French would make an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa on the western coast, and Masulipatam and Fort St. George on the eastern, that distribution of the army which would best provide for the support of the internal government, and would preserve tranquillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject.

In the countries in which the new systems of government have been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the constant interference of the military in the support of the civil government and of the police. In those districts it will be possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or two great stations. This arrangement will be advantageous to discipline; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the coast which may be threatened or attacked; you will always have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion; and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil government, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the whole, and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold them would appear most important. But although I thus recommend the assembly of the troops in each division where the new systems of government have been established, generally in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the destruction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that subject; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, or held by small detachments made from one corps at the principal station.

In the countries in which the new system of civil government

has not been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of very evident necessity. If this principle can be carried into effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might in some degree, it will give you in each division a small disposable force. This may not be equal to all the demands which may arise, but it will give you some strength everywhere; and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, and of the Company's territories under the government of Fort St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your force in one position.

In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops constantly in the field. Both Native and European troops have their camp equipage always in readiness; and I can speak with certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of other principal stations of the army, that the time which would be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as the gram.

Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you would not give it a gram department; and, therefore, when it would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly from these great stations. The only advantage in point of equipment that the field force would have would be carriage for the sick; but even some of that is always to be procured: and it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick behind them in their station. The objections to the central field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawnpore and Futtyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this

observation. Those troops are in barracks, and the officers in bungalows; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must be left to take care of the cantonment.

But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on which the French might land, with directions to watch and circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off their communications with the country, and to prevent them from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions, &c. Supposing the landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the French should land to be as large as any they have been able to bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the eastern division of the Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. It is probable that the central field force, unless reinforced by the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal to more; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advantage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier period than they would the field force.

On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the same. The troops would collect in Malabar in their neighbourhood; they would be joined by those from Seringapatam; and they would certainly be felt before the field force could approach.

When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, such as the late war with the Mahrattas, the mere readiness of the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service. You could march the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of no use. I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon this subject: but the state of the country has altered much since I formed it; the equipments of the army have been much improved; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the real benefits of these field forces; and I acknowledge that I am sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil government have established tranquillity in the districts in which they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto existed.

## 255. To Lord W. Bentinck.

*Necessity of adding five regiments to the Madras army. Their pay has already been provided.*

Fort William, 29th Aug., 1804.

The Governor-General has desired me to inform your Lordship that it is his intention to send orders to Fort St. George, as soon as they can be prepared, to authorise you to add 5 regiments to that establishment. His Excellency, however, is desirous that no measures should be taken in consequence of this intimation of his intention till you shall hear further from him.

He intends that the troops of the government of Fort St. George should occupy the territories and posts as detailed in his notes of instructions dated the 25th May, excepting Goa, which place he intends to occupy by Bombay troops. According to this arrangement, Scindiah's subsidiary force will be permanently formed of Bengal troops.

This addition to the establishment of Fort St. George will probably appear large; but it is not so large within 4 battalions as that required by Gen. Stuart; and the establishment will not be larger than that which existed in the end of the year 1802.

After a full review of the military establishments since the year 1796, when they were first formed upon the model on which the army stands at the present moment, it appears clearly that all the additions which have been made to the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay, including this addition of 5 regiments, have been paid for by subsidies, or by revenues granted for the express purpose of supporting troops. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor-General upon this subject, which will explain fully my sentiments upon it.

It is difficult to say upon what principle the establishment of 1796 was formed. However, it was certainly not sufficient for any purpose, even in the limited state of our territories under Fort St. George at that time; as, besides the regular regiments, there were 4 extra battalions, which have since been formed into the 12th and 13th regts., and there was a Madras battalion and several corps of sebundies in the northern Circars.

Even thus increased, it was certainly not an establishment adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to

maintain internal tranquillity at the same time ; as in the first place, it is a well known fact that it was with the utmost difficulty that an army was assembled in 1798 and 1799 that could go to Seringapatam ; and in the second place, when that army was drawn together and marched into Mysore, a rebellion broke out in the provinces south of the Coleroon, and another in those north of the Kistna.

The reduction of our great Native enemy, therefore, which was the result of that war, could not be urged as a reason for the diminution of the military establishments to be stationed in the old territories, when it appeared that the moment the troops marched out of those territories, the inhabitants were in rebellion. I therefore conclude that the establishment of 1796 was adequate only to the preservation of internal tranquillity in the Carnatic ; and that when additions of territory were made, additional troops were required. But supposing the establishment of 1796 to have been an adequate peace establishment, which circumstances have proved it was not, I think the facts stated in the enclosed memorandum show that all the corps raised since (including the 5 new regiments) have been paid for by the means provided.

If the new levies had not been made, the Company's old territories would have been lost, or the Company must have failed to perform their part of the treaties, by which they have gained such large subsidies.

**256. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military establishments of India.**

*Arbitrary and inadequate provision of the Court of Directors for the military requirements of Madras and Bombay. Rapid and large expansion of those requirements since ; coincidently with, and in consequence of, the acquisition of territorial and pecuniary resources for the support of the additional troops.*

Fort William, Nov., 1804.

1. On the 11th Feb. 1801, the Court of Directors wrote orders that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist of 7 regiments of European infantry and 14 regiments of Native infantry, including 3 regiments for the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.



2. They ordered at the same time 3 European regiments and 8 regiments of Native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, under the notion that all above 4 of the latter would be paid for by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob of Surat.

3. I shall advert hereafter to the European establishment for those governments. It does not appear that the Court of Directors have had before them any detailed statements of the want of troops when they gave these orders; but they have given them in an arbitrary manner, without considering at all the circumstances of the country to which they were intended to be applied.

4. In respect to the establishment of Fort St. George, it was not increased by these orders beyond that ordered in the year 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. The establishment ordered in 1796 was 11 regiments, and one for the Nizam, if he should require one; that of 1801 was 11 regiments, and 3 for the Nizam. Yet in 1799 an addition was made to the Company's territories of Coimbatoor, of the districts bordering on the eastern ghauts (besides Canara and Soonda, for which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay establishment); and the Company engaged, in consequence of a subsidy of 7 lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to defend his territories and support his government.

5. As the Court of Directors have not condescended to particulars, it is impossible to say whether they adverted to the necessity of defending Mysore or not; but whether they did or not, 3 regiments were certainly necessary for the purposes of Mysore and Coimbatoor, in addition to the old establishment necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam's subsidiary force.

6. After the letter of Feb. 1801, was written, the treaty of 1800 was concluded with the Soubah of the Deccan, by which a large territory was ceded, in perpetuity, in commutation of subsidy. The principle on which this territory was ceded, was that the Company should receive nearly double the amount of the sum paid as subsidy, in order to defray the expense of defending and governing the territory ceded: it cannot be denied that this territory would require troops.

7. Subsequently to the dispatch of this letter from the Court of Directors, the civil government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company. The Nabob's troops were discharged, and the duty which they had performed devolved upon those

of the Company. This was a fresh demand for the services of troops, for which the advantages gained provided the means of payment.

8. These last two demands may be fairly stated to have occasioned a necessity for 2 regiments; and in this manner has the establishment of Fort St. George amounted to 19 regiments.

9. In respect to the establishment of Bombay, the Court of Directors have decided that 2 battalions in Malabar, and 2 battalions in Canara, are fully sufficient. That establishment has certainly never been sufficient, as the Court might see by referring to their records. But the Court have admitted of 8 regiments on the Bombay establishment, and fortunately it has been possible to post a large portion of the force in Malabar.

10. Since these orders have been written, the following additional demands have been made upon the establishment of Bombay: viz. 2 battalions for Goa; 4 battalions, if they should be of their present strength of 700 men, and if 1000 men, 3 battalions for the Guickwar state. Only one regiment has been raised to make up this deficiency, so that there remain 3 battalions to be provided for.

11. Besides this deficiency, the subsidiary force at Poonah is paid for, and to be supplied either by the government of Fort St. George or Bombay; and the territories ceded by the Guickwar, the Peshwah, and Scindiah in Guzerat, which altogether are of the value of 50 lacs of rupees, would appear to deserve some troops to take care of them.

12. Reckoning that these territories require only one battalion, the total deficiency of Native infantry, for the payment of which provision is made (excepting for the 2 battalions at Goa, and one in the territories in Guzerat, for which 12 lacs at Baroach may be considered a fair equivalent), will amount to 10 battalions.

13. I shall now consider the subject in reference to the detailed wants of each establishment, the only mode in which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.

14. The Guickwar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or 3 battalions of Bombay troops; there must be 2 battalions of Bombay troops at Surat; and one battalion of Bombay troops at Baroach; 6 battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah; 4 at Bombay; and 2 at Goa; making the total of Bombay troops 18 battalions, or 9 regiments.

15. The battalions of Bombay infantry ought to be 1000

men in time of war at all events. Hereafter I shall give a memorandum regarding the mode of arranging the Guickwar subsidiary force.

16. Gen. Stuart's distribution of the army at Fort St. George will require 54 battalions, from which, if 2 battalions to be posted at Goa, and to be found, according to this plan, by Bombay, are subtracted, there will remain 52 battalions. He has now 38 battalions, and if he should be authorised to raise 5 more regiments to make up for his deficiencies of Bombay troops, the deficiency in his distribution will be 4 battalions. These may be extra battalions until the orders of the Court of Directors shall have been received.

17. It is desirable that the orders for completing these 5 regiments should be given as soon as possible, as in their present state the extra battalions are useless; and in the season of operations Gen. Stuart will be deficient—in fact, all the Bombay troops which will have been relieved; and the 5 Madras battalions, still remaining at Poonah, whose return cannot be expected till the end of the year: making a total deficiency of 15 battalions in an army of 48 battalions, or nearly one third.

18. In respect to Europeans, the difference between the Court of Directors and Gen. Stuart is not very great. They have given 20 battalions, and therefore we cannot tell on what they have founded their calculation. But since they have made it, one regiment has been given to the Nizam, for which he makes provision, and the Ceded districts certainly require one, and may be fairly estimated as supplying the means of paying one. Gen. Stuart's estimate is 11 regiments, including Goa. If Goa is to be supplied by Bombay, the number demanded by Gen. Stuart is reduced to 10 regiments, which is only one regiment more than is allowed by the Court of Directors, adding one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and one for the Ceded districts, both of which are paid for.

19. The Court of Directors have fixed 3 regiments of Europeans as the establishment for Bombay, including one for Goa. There ought to be 4, of which number 2 ought to be at Bombay, one at Goa, and one to the northward.

20. In respect to cavalry at Fort St. George, the original establishment in 1796 was 4 regiments; since that time the Nizam has paid for 2 regiments, and the Peshwah for one regiment. There are now 8 regiments, so that the increase of the establish-

ment is one regiment since the year 1796. Of all the increases of establishments which have been made, and which are now necessary, this is the only one which appears to me not to have been paid for by subsidies from the Native powers, and this may be fairly counted as provided for by the revenues of Coimbatore, &c.

21. It may be urged against this statement, if no increase has been made to the army, not provided for, how came the military expenses of Fort St. George to be still such a burthen on the finances? I answer, because Fort St. George has now the burthen of defending Malabar, which Bombay formerly had.

In case this Memorandum should be approved of, it would be desirable to acquaint Mr. Duncan of the alteration of the arrangement respecting Scindiah's subsidiary force and Goa; and to adopt Gen. Stuart's distribution for the territories of Fort St. George, and to order the increase of the establishment.

**257. Memorandum on the plan proposed of an interchange of Native troops of India and the Negro Corps of the West Indies. 1805<sup>1</sup>.**

*The plan involves replacing English soldiers in India by negroes. The high qualities of the former are unique, and the foundation of our power in India. Negroes will possess no such peculiar combination of remarkable qualities; and will be a source of weakness and danger. They might with*

<sup>1</sup> This memorandum was written at sea on the voyage from St. Helena to England, in consequence of the observations contained in the following letters from Lord Castlereagh to Marquess Wellesley.—Note by His Grace, the present Duke of Wellington.

My dear Lord,

East Sheen, 21st Aug., 1804.

The extreme difficulty of raising men at home for general service has induced His Majesty's Ministers to turn their attention to foreign troops of every description. A considerable number of Europeans has already been procured, and an extensive augmentation of the black corps in the West Indies has been ordered, but still the establishment of the army will remain very far short of what the various and pressing exigencies of our situation require.

Amongst other expedients for augmenting the public force, the possibility of raising sepoy regiments for service extra India has suggested itself for consideration; but as considerable doubts are entertained here of the policy of such a measure as bearing upon the habits and feelings of our Native subjects in that part of the globe, there is a reluctance in

*less disadvantage be sent to Ceylon. Considering their inferiority, they will be more costly than European troops. The plan also contemplates sepoy replacing, in the West Indies, European as well as negro troops. Considering the general character of the defensive service required there, only a third of the Europeans could thus be replaced; and that would require twice the number of sepoy. As light troops, for offensive operations, against savages, &c., sepoy are quite unsuitable. Nor will the climate agree with them. They can only be sent as volunteers. And few will volunteer for such service. The difficulties and expense connected with their peculiar food, their attendance, and the allowances of their European officers, make the plan, on a large scale, impracticable. And it would check future recruiting in India. The King's officers might recruit in Chittagong, for partial service, as in Jamaica; but not without a tendency to increase the cost of native troops. A better plan would be, to raise Malay corps. On the whole, negroes would not suit India, nor sepoy efficiently defend the West Indies. The certain difficulties and cost overbalance the too hastily assumed advantages of both parts of the plan; and make the second, on a large scale, impossible. The previous objections also apply to sending sepoy to the Cape; but negroes might be sent thither.*

The plan of employing the negro troops in the East Indies, and the sepoy in the West Indies, ought to be considered in two views: 1st, in a view to its efficiency, supposing it to be practicable; 2ndly, in a view to its practicability, supposing it to be beneficial.

His Majesty's service to lend any countenance to such a plan unless previously fortified by your Lordship's opinion in favour of its expediency and practicability.

It will be a great satisfaction to the King's Ministers to be favoured with your Lordship's sentiments upon this subject in detail, with such suggestions as occur to you with respect to the time for which the men should be enlisted; the best mode of constituting such a force, regard being had to the importance of having a proportion of the officers conversant with the language and habits of the natives of India; and also the probable charge of raising and transporting a regiment of this description to the West Indies, to which quarter, with perhaps the addition, under peculiar circumstances, of Gibraltar and Malta, their services must be confined.

The difficulty of raising men in this prosperous country bears so

It is supposed that the negro regiments are to be substituted for European regiments in India. It cannot be intended to substitute them for sepoy battalions; as, supposing the ordinary and

much upon the security of India itself in necessarily limiting our European force, that I am confident, exclusive of the ardour with which your Lordship is naturally disposed to lend yourself to every public object, that the question now submitted to your consideration will, in this view, additionally claim your attention. There may be reasons why in prudence we should not attempt to draw from India a resource which it cannot yield without prejudice or hazard to higher and more important interests; but if from the immense population now within the limits of our Indian sovereignty (there being no longer any difficulty with respect to the recruiting of our own armies) a small proportion of force could be drawn in aid of our service in other parts of the world, it would certainly facilitate essentially the supplying India with a due proportion of European troops.

I presume if the attempt is to be made at all, it would be prudent to make a very limited experiment in the first instance; that the nature of the service should be fully explained to the men on entering, and that their return to India, after a given number of years' service, should be assured to them.

Some doubts have been suggested as to the competence of the Indian sepoy in robustness and bodily strength to cope with the European enemy to whom they would generally be opposed in the West Indies: a quality in which it is apprehended they are materially inferior as troops to the African blacks. I should be glad to receive your Lordship's opinion on this part of the subject.

Whilst I am upon the topic of African corps, I may as well mention, though I can well conceive the objections to which such a plan may be liable, an idea which has been thrown out in contemplating the difficulty of feeding India with European force, namely, whether the introduction of some regiments of a description similar to those which have been found so serviceable in the West Indies, but to the extension of which force beyond certain limits in that quarter there are serious objections, might not supply India with a description of force possessing many of the valuable qualities of European troops. I merely mention this, wishing to attract your Lordship's attention to whatever hints may lead you to a minute consideration of this subject.

I have the honour to be, with great regard, my dear Lord,

Your faithful humble servant,

CASTLEREAGH.

If I recollect right, the sepoys employed to garrison the Moluccas in the last war, were absent from the continent of India, many of them for the last five or six years of the war. If so, it may have afforded your Lord-

constant expense of both descriptions of troops to be the same, the levy and transport of negroes to India would cost considerable sums, whereas the levy of sepoy costs nothing. The

ship the means of judging how far the men can be reconciled to remote and protracted service without shaking that disposition to embark which happily has been, with good management, progressively increasing of late years amongst our Native troops, and which for our Indian interests it is essential to cultivate with the utmost care and attention.

My dear Lord,

East Sheen, 25th Aug., 1804.

Having, in my letter No. 25, adverted to the defective supply of recruits at home for general service, I think it may be satisfactory to your Lordship to receive a detailed statement of our present military force at home and abroad.

The statement enclosed is for the month of May last, but, as that for July does not exceed it in amount more than 2000 men, it will answer equally well for all the purposes of general information.

The line and militia at present amount, at home and abroad, to 241,217 effective rank and file. The deficiencies on our establishment (almost entirely confined to the line) are not less than 40,000 men. The additional force proposed to be raised under Mr. Pitt's last Bill, exclusive of the gradual conversion of the supplementary militia, as vacancies happen, into an army of reserve, may be taken at 20,000, making a gross deficiency upon our proposed military establishment of about 60,000 men.

Your Lordship will perceive that, independent of volunteers, which in the accompanying returns are stated from the effectives at the monthly inspections, and not from their nominal establishment, the regular force for home-defence is, in Great Britain, including Jersey and Guernsey, 138,000; in Ireland, 50,000 rank and file. It will require full 20,000 men more to place us at home as we wish to stand, and this before we can consider ourselves as having a force disposable for foreign service.

The demands for disposable force are at the same time very pressing, and it is impossible for us to look upon ourselves as in a situation to do justice to the interests of the country in the war in which we are engaged unless we can command the service of a corps of not less than 20,000 men for offensive operations, preserving at the same time our internal defences on that high scale which the preparations of the enemy have rendered indispensable.

Your Lordship will be able to estimate from the above sketch of our military situation the difficulties I have to contend with in attempting to procure for India the European reinforcements which I deem to be essential to our interests in that quarter; so that your Lordship must be satisfied to receive at present limited supplies, being assured that I shall seize the first moment which more exposed interests will admit of

negroes could not perform the duties of the sepoys better, or so well, as these have always performed them. It cannot be deemed necessary to send negroes to India to replace sepoys,

placing the British army in India on the most respectable footing; and I shall not cease to importune the Duke of York to allot a number of recruits, beyond the very inadequate proportion the Company have lately received from the recruiting depôt, to restore the artillery corps to its proper strength. In the mean time I trust you will avail yourself of whatever resource can be derived for the support of this most important feature of our army, either from the men volunteering from the King's regiments ordered home, or from the Company's European regiments, which are at present wholly inefficient; notwithstanding which evident truth, and the little prospect of completing them by recruits from Europe, I find either their reduction or their conversion into Native battalions much disrelished by the Court of Directors. Such of the men, however, as are fit for the artillery will, I am sure, be much more usefully employed in that service.

Having apprised your Lordship that His Majesty's Ministers are not yet satisfied with the amount of our force at home, which exceeds both in quality of troops and in numbers what the country has possessed at any former period, I think it necessary to state in explanation that the preparations of the enemy continue with unabated vigour along the whole line of their coast. Great exertions have been used in equipping and even augmenting their regular navy, and they have now, including 8 Dutch, about 45 sail of the line from Toulon to the Texel in a state to put to sea, though certainly, in many respects, little qualified to contend with our ships. But their efforts have been principally directed to the construction, equipment, and discipline, as far as that can be accomplished in their own harbours and under the protection of their batteries, of a lesser marine, which consists of four or five different classes of vessels, descending from prames, which are square-rigged and carry each about thirty heavy guns, to row-boats carrying one gun and capable of receiving about fifty men. The former are good batteries, sail reasonably well with a fair wind, and, from drawing very little water, are well calculated to cover the landing of troops.

From the best information we are in possession of, they have accumulated not less than 2000 vessels of all sorts for the purposes of descent; of these about 300 are of the class of stout gun-brigs and vessels of a higher description; the remainder are transports fitted for the reception of horses and artillery, Dutch schuyts, Greenland boats, and craft of various descriptions. They are now assembled in the ports of Boulogne, Ostend, and Flushing, the former station, with several dependent basins, having been enlarged for the reception of this flotilla, on board of which a large proportion of the army is constantly embarked,



who may be withdrawn from thence for the service of the West Indies, as hitherto there has existed no very great difficulty in raising as many sepoy for the service in India as might be thought necessary.

partly for the purpose of training and accustoming them to the management of the boats, partly as affording them more convenient accommodation than huts on shore. Making due allowance for the proportion of tonnage which must be employed in transporting artillery, stores, provisions, and horses, the above fleet may be calculated as capable of transporting on an average about sixty men each, or upon the whole 120,000 men; to which is to be added whatever may be embarked from Brest and Rochefort on the one flank, or from the Texel on the other, either on board or under the protection of their fleets.

It has been generally understood that Buonaparte's purpose has been not to attempt the descent with less than 200,000 men. Your Lordship will make your own calculation what proportion of this force is likely to penetrate the succession of defences we happily possess before the enemy can bring the contest to an issue upon land.

There are still sceptics upon the attempt being finally made. Whatever may be the result, we must clearly act as if it were inevitable; and after all that has passed, the nature of the man and the object in view compared with the risk being considered, I cannot bring myself to doubt its being hazarded, the rather as there is nothing in the state of the Continent which is likely, at least for the present year, to give him any alarm for his own security at home whilst he is employed on the expedition.

During the last three months the progress the Volunteers have made in discipline is highly satisfactory, and there prevails amongst that valuable and improving force the best possible spirit. Since encouragement was given by Parliament to their coming out upon permanent duty, there have been in Great Britain alone not less than 180,000 men who have passed from a fortnight to three weeks, at a distance from their homes, in an uninterrupted improvement of themselves in the use of arms, during which time they have been subject to the Mutiny Act and been superintended and instructed by regular officers.

In addition to our preparations in point of numbers, the whole being now brigaded under General officers, a plan is in considerable forwardness for moving with rapidity to the point of attack whatever proportion of the Volunteer force it may be expedient to bring forward in aid of the regular army; and it is hoped that it may be so arranged as to admit of the entire force (if necessary) of England being concentrated for the security of the metropolis on the ninth day, supplying a daily reinforcement of about 25,000 men to the main army advanced in front of London.

I have already said enough to justify myself, I trust, to your Lordship

The plan, therefore, must be considered as substituting negroes in India for English soldiers.

It must first be considered for what a substitute is to be found, before it is determined that it is a good one.

The English soldiers are the main foundation of the British power in Asia. They are a body with habits, manners, and qualities peculiar to them in the East Indies.

Bravery is the characteristic of the British army in all quarters of the world; but no other quarter has afforded such striking examples of the existence of this quality in the soldiers as the East Indies. An instance of their misbehaviour in the field has never been known; and particularly those who have been for

for not having obtained for India, in the course of the past season, a larger proportion of King's troops. The same considerations must also reconcile your Lordship to a disappointment with respect to the naval succours, which, upon consultation with Lord Melville, I felt myself warranted in holding out to your Lordship in my letter of May last. His Lordship desires me to express his regret that the pressing demands at home preclude him at this moment from detaching from hence the two ships then promised, and he is also unable to supply by the fleet now under despatch any number of seamen for the ships which may have been taken up in India in pursuance of the late orders from the Board of Admiralty to Admiral Rainier, there being above thirty light-armed ships, peculiarly adapted for service in the narrow seas, at this moment in the river, completely equipped and only waiting for hands. It will, however, be an early object of his Lordship's solicitude to furnish you with the means of completing the naval armament ordered in India with the least possible delay.

I cannot close this despatch without offering to your Lordship my congratulations on the truly gallant and distinguished conduct of the China fleet. The Court of Directors have liberally distributed about 50,000*l.* amongst the officers and men, which, in addition to the notice the King has taken of their services by conferring on Captain Dance, as Commodore, the honour of knighthood, cannot fail, I trust, to infuse into the Company's marine a confidence in their own strength and a determination hereafter to redeem their character, which had suffered in one or two instances towards the close of the last war. Few events have given greater satisfaction to the nation than Linois' defeat. It is a novel description of glory, and, as such, has produced a more lively impression on the public mind than a repetition of triumphs to which our navy is so well accustomed.

Believe me, my dear Lord, with great truth and respect,

Most faithfully yours,

CASTLEREAGH.

some time in that country cannot be ordered upon any service, however dangerous or arduous, that they will not effect, not only with bravery, but a degree of skill not often witnessed in persons of their description in other parts of the world.

I attribute these qualities, which are peculiar to them in the East Indies, to the distinctness of their class in that country from all others existing in it. They feel that they are a distinct and superior class to the rest of the world which surrounds them; and their actions correspond with their high notions of their own superiority. Add to these qualities that their bodies are inured to climate, hardship, and fatigue, by long residence, habit, and exercise, to such a degree, that I have seen them for years together in the field without suffering any material sickness; that I have made them march 60 miles in 30 hours, and afterwards engage the enemy; and it will not be surprising that they should be respected, as they are, throughout India. Their weaknesses and vices, however repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of the Natives, are passed over in the contemplation of their excellent qualities as soldiers, of which no nation has hitherto given such extraordinary instances. These qualities are the foundation of the British strength in Asia, and of that opinion by which it is generally supposed that the British empire has been gained and upheld. These qualities show in what manner nations, consisting of millions, are governed by 30,000 strangers.

For this body, endowed with these excellent qualities, are negroes a substitute? It does not appear that the fidelity of the negroes can be depended upon; they are prone to mutiny.

They are brave, undoubtedly; but are they unhesitatingly so as are the English soldiers?

The Native public cannot but know that they have been purchased slaves. There will be no distinction between the negroes and the lower classes of Natives; if any, unfortunately, one to the disparagement of the former, and no respect will be entertained for them.

It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen under my observation, that the Natives of India have no fear or respect for the military qualities of the soldiers of any European nation excepting the English. I had under my command for some years the Swiss regiment De Meuron, which, for good conduct, discipline, and other military qualities, was not surpassed by the English regiments. But the Natives heard that they were foreigners, that they had been bought into the

service, and they had no confidence in them. What respect or confidence could be expected from them in a band of purchased negroes?

The introduction of the negro troops in India will bring with it a new evil not hitherto known there. The government will not be able to place implicit reliance on the fidelity of its troops. Certain classes of them must be taken to watch and balance the power and strength of certain other classes, which evil in itself will obviously weaken the whole. Are the few Europeans who must still be in India to be employed to watch the negroes, or is this service to be performed by the faithful sepoys? In either case the power and strength of the government will be lessened; and yet it is well known that the only power in India is military; and that, if Great Britain should lose her military pre-eminence there, her empire will no longer exist.

Will this evil be kept a secret from the Natives? Our own subjects, nay, our sepoys, would be equally ready with our enemies to take advantage of this decided symptom of internal debility.

My opinions upon this subject are so strong, that, if it be true that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the troops found necessary to maintain its empire in Asia, I would prefer to trust the maintenance of it to a smaller and select band of English soldiers, aided by their faithful and brave companions and adherents the Company's sepoys, to the adoption of any such substitute as the negro force of the West Indies.

Let them go to Ceylon, where the establishment is less of the nature of a colony than these are on the continent of India. The climate of that island is said to be more congenial to their constitutions than it has been found to be to those either of Europeans or Natives of India. Their mutinies or misbehaviour can do no permanent mischief there, as the body required for the service of that island must always be small.

There appear few, if any, difficulties in the execution of this part of the plan, supposing that it should be determined on. The negro regiments can be sent from the West Indies to India either in transports or in Indian men-of-war, in the same manner as other troops in His Majesty's service. They can be recruited by purchases of slaves on His Majesty's account in the West Indies, on the west coast of Africa, or on the east coast of Africa, or in Madagascar, or in small numbers, possibly, in the Portuguese settlements in India. They will be expensive recruits, undoubtedly; but if the plan be necessary on account

of the difficulties in supplying English soldiers, the expense of the article must not be considered.

It is supposed that they will receive in India the same pay and provisions as the European troops in the same branch in the West Indies. But they will still be less expensive than the European troops, inasmuch as it will not be necessary that their barracks, their field equipage, their hospitals, their arrack, should be equally good and expensive as those now supplied to the European troops.

If, however, it should be intended to make up for the deficiency in quality of the negro troops, in comparison with the Europeans, by sending increased numbers to India of the former, the expense to the Company of this negro establishment will be heavier than that of the European establishment has ever been ; and, as I have before observed, the confidence in their efficiency as soldiers, whether in a view to their fidelity or to their bravery and discipline, and other military virtues, can never be so great.

I come now to consider the other branch of the plan, viz. to send the sepoy to the West Indies. First, I shall consider their probable efficiency, as soidiers, in the West Indies.

The sepoy is to be substituted for the European as well as the negro troops. There is no man who has a higher opinion, or ought to have a higher opinion, of the sepoy than I have. I have tried them on many serious occasions, and they never failed me, and always conducted themselves well. But it must be recollected that in India we never, or scarcely ever undertake any service with the aid of sepoy only. The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be made so ; and it is possible in an offensive operation to have some of the troops who are to perform it, however desperate it may be, of an inferior description. Accordingly, in proportion to the service to be performed, we have seen  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{4}$ ,  $\frac{1}{6}$ ,  $\frac{1}{10}$  of the number of the operating army English soldiers ; and it has been held by great authorities that  $\frac{1}{6}$  of the whole army in India ought to be of that description.

Since the battle of Cuddalore, in the year 1783, the sepoy have not been engaged in a regular battle with a European enemy. Upon that occasion a very large proportion, I believe half the army, was composed of European troops ; and it has always been customary in the wars in India to increase the proportion of the European troops to the Natives as the service should appear more arduous.

The services which will be required from the sepoy in the

West Indies will be generally of a defensive nature, against the best troops, excepting the English soldiers, which the world has produced. According to the Indian notion of employing sepoys, I should say that one half at least of the whole number of troops to be employed upon such an occasion ought to be English soldiers; and even upon that ground I should not think that I could save to the mother country half the soldiers required for the defence of the West India colonies. As substitutes, I could not consider less than two sepoys an equivalent for one soldier; and then there must be as many soldiers as sepoys every where. So that the most that the country could gain by this arrangement, supposing it is intended to provide fairly and upon known principles for the defence of the West Indies, would be  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the number of soldiers at present employed there. That is, supposing the number of soldiers now required for the West Indies is 15,000, it might be reduced to 10,000; and the deficiency I should consider to be made good by 10,000 sepoys.

In respect to the offensive operations in the West Indies, I mean those against Caribs, refractory negroes, brigands, &c., the sepoys are entirely unfit for them. The light troops are best adapted for these operations; and the sepoys are the worst of all troops for services of this description. The Europeans or the country troops are always employed upon services of this description in India when they occur, which is but seldom, as the country is one generally of plains, and the sepoys are not trained to them. Another reason why they will never make good light troops is, that the services of light troops naturally depend upon individual talents and exertion, and are carried on out of the sight of the officer. Those acquainted with the sepoys know well that they will do nothing against their enemy excepting led by, and in the sight of, their officers. Add to these defects, that the sepoys are very delicate troops; that their health is affected by unwholesome situations and climate, equally with the Europeans; that the service in hilly and woody countries invariably affects them, and at times sends whole battalions to the hospital; and it will appear that this branch of the plan is not less inefficient than the other, of sending the negroes to India.

The difference between them is, that the West Indies will acquire at least a harmless defence; but not so the East Indies, as I have already shown.

But the difficulties which oppose the execution of this part of the plan are much greater than those which affect the other; and

these are of a nature which, supposing it was likely to be efficient, ought in my opinion to induce government to abandon it.

In the first place, the embarkation of sepoys in India has never been otherwise, excepting on the coast of Malabar, than a voluntary service. On the coast of Malabar it has long been the practice to embark the sepoys at Bombay, and to send them to the northern or southern provinces under that government. But in the season in which those voyages are invariably undertaken the weather is always good ; the length of the voyage is known to be only a few days ; and short trips of that description are not uncommon among the inhabitants of the country.

The Bengal sepoys have never yet embarked in whole battalions. When Native troops are required for foreign service, the practice has been to call for volunteers from the whole army ; and the numbers which turn out are formed into battalions, with officers posted to them. Whole battalions have embarked upon the Madras establishment ; but it has always been a voluntary offer made by the soldiers.

The same mode of proceeding must be adopted with a view to obtain sepoys for the service in the West Indies, not only at Madras and in Bengal, but on the Bombay establishment ; as, although the sepoys belonging to the latter have been in the habit of embarking for short voyages of a few days' duration, they would be unwilling, and it might create inconvenience to make them embark for service in the West Indies.

To go on the service or not, then, must be left to the choice of the sepoys ; and if the length of the voyage, the nature of the country to which they are to be sent, and the length of time they are to be absent, are fairly described to them, I think I may venture to say that very few indeed will voluntarily offer their services.

But I will suppose that they will offer them. They must have with them a certain proportion of their women, and some of their followers. Measures must be taken to feed them, not only on the passage, but in the West Indies, with the description of grain and other food to which each class of them has been accustomed.

Then they must be sent back to India in a reasonable period of time ; suppose five years from the period of embarkation.

The European officers from the Company's service must accompany them, with their battalions, if whole battalions should volunteer their services, or taken from the regular regiments, supposing that the volunteers for the West Indies should be

taken from the whole army, and formed into separate and extra battalions. In either case the European officers must be assured that they will have in the West Indies the same allowances as in India, or it may be depended upon there will be no Native volunteers for the service. If the Company's officers are to have Indian pay in the West Indies, discontent will be created among the King's officers in the same country. If the volunteers for the West Indies are to be formed into extra battalions, to be furnished with European officers from the regular sepoy regiments, the establishment of officers in India must be increased, as it is already too small for the service.

There are numberless inconveniences of minor importance, for which remedies can be found, such as the rank to be held by the Company's officers in the West Indies, the mode of conducting Native General Courts Martial, and the authority under which they are to be held, and other matters. But those first stated appear of such monstrous expense and difficulty as to render the plan to any extent quite impracticable.

If it should be attempted in this mode, which is the only one in which it can be effectual, it must be expected that the recruiting for the sepoy regiments in India will receive a very serious blow. The families of the Natives will see with additional disquiet their relatives enlist in a service in which they will know that they are liable to be sent to an unknown country, situated in a different quarter of the globe.

If the plan went only to draw from India a certain proportion of men for service in the island of Jamaica, for instance, where particular prejudices prevail against the negroes, the best mode of proceeding would be to recruit for this number at Chittagong, in the Bay of Bengal, by means of the King's officers.

But, even according to this plan, much inconvenience would be felt by the Indian service, as the recruiting officers must either give bounty or promise additional pay, or they would get no recruits. Bounty for enlisting is unknown in India, excepting where the King's officers enlisted for the Native regiments in Ceylon, and this enlistment might introduce it. An increase of pay to the troops in India would be equally unnecessary and injurious; and yet it might be necessary to promise it in the quarter of the country in which these recruiting officers would have been.

Another plan for procuring soldiers for the West Indies from India would be to recruit from the Malay coast, opposite Prince of Wales's Island. The Malays are a hardy and brave race,



and would make better soldiers for the West Indies than the people of India Proper; and to recruit these would not be attended with any of the inconveniences expected from the recruiting in India.

Upon the whole, I do not conceive that this plan would give to India a force which it is suitable to British India to have, or to the West Indies a force which would be efficient for their defence. On the other hand, the difficulties and expense attending the execution of both branches of the plan are such as must tend greatly to overbalance the advantages expected by the more sanguine, but which I am convinced would never be found to exist. Those, in particular, attending the execution of that part of the plan which sends sepoys to the West Indies, must prevent it from being carried to any useful extent, supposing it could be useful at all.

All the arguments upon sending sepoys to the West Indies apply to sending them to the Cape, with the difference only of distance, which, in such distances as either is from India, the sepoys would be unable to appreciate. But if troops are wanted at the Cape, why not send negroes there, and leave India to its old means, viz. English soldiers and sepoys.

## 2. SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE SYSTEM; AND THE 'ARMIES OF NATIVE STATES.

### 258. To Major Munro.

*Scindiah's overweening influence at Poonah threatens our tranquillity. Perils attending the extension of our own power and influence.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hoobly, 20th Aug., 1800.

My ideas of the nature of the Indian governments, of their decline and fall, agree fully with yours; and I acknowledge that I think it probable that we shall not be able to establish a strong government on this frontier. Scindiah's influence at Poonah is too great for us; and I see plainly, that, if Col. Palmer remains there, we shall not be able to curb him without going to war. There was never such an opportunity for it as the present moment; and probably by bringing forward, and by establishing in their ancient possessions, the Bhow's family, under our protection, we should counterbalance Scindiah, and

secure our own tranquillity for a great length of time. But I despair of it; and I am afraid that we shall be reduced to the alternative of allowing Scindiah to be our neighbour upon our old frontier; or of taking this country ourselves. If we allow Scindiah to be our neighbour; or, if the country goes to any other through his influence, we must expect worse than what has passed, thieves of all kinds, new Dhoondiahs, and probably Dhoondiah himself again. If we take the country ourselves, I do not expect much tranquillity.

In my opinion, the extension of our territory and influence has been greater than our means. Besides, we have added to the number and the description of our enemies, by depriving of employment those who heretofore found it in the service of Tippoo, and of the Nizam. Wherever we spread ourselves, particularly if we aggrandise ourselves at the expense of the Mah-rattas, we increase this evil. We throw out of employment, and of means of subsistence, all who have hitherto managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies, or have plundered the country. These people become additional enemies: at the same time that, by the extension of our territory, our means of supporting our government, and of defending ourselves, are proportionably decreased. Upon all questions of increase of territory, these considerations have much weight with me, and I am in general inclined to decide that we have enough; as much, at least, if not more, than we can defend.

I agree with you that we ought to settle this Mahratta business, and the Malabar Rajahs, before the French return to India: but I am afraid that to extend ourselves will rather tend to delay, than accelerate, the settlements; and that we shall thereby increase, rather than diminish, the number of our enemies. As for the wishes of the people, particularly in this country, I put them out of the question. They are the only philosophers about their governors that ever I met with, if indifference constitutes that character.

#### 259. To Major Shawe.

*The good and the evil of subsidiary alliances; and the necessity of modifying them according to special circumstances.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 14th Jan., 1804.

In answer to the latter part of your letter of the 11th Dec., upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you

that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of them have been, that in this war with the Mahrattas, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company's territories have not been invaded; and the evils of war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and our power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which could be enumerated as benefits resulting from those alliances, would be sufficient to justify them. But they undoubtedly have a tendency to reduce the strength of the powers with which we are connected; and this is an evil, the growth and inconvenience of which daily increase. The memorandum to Malcolm will show the great evils which will attend Scindiah's discharging his military establishments; and the present states of the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah show the consequences of their discharging those formerly in their service.

The question is exactly this: Is it necessary for the general tranquillity and security of the British government that the banditti who infest those countries should be put down? and that the governments of the Peshwah and the Nizam should be established in their territories respectively? If so, it is absolutely necessary that those powers should be obliged to keep up some military force for the purposes of their own government; or, if they refuse to keep up their military establishments, and the *onus* is to fall upon the British troops, their numbers must be doubled, or even trebled; for it stands to reason that they are not now sufficiently strong to preserve order in countries of such vast extent.

I do not object to the subsidiary alliances, but I do to forming them all upon the Hyderabad model. The circumstances at other durbars are entirely different; and it is obvious that to form the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah upon that model would be attended with risk. In respect to my saying that the establishments must be increased to the full amount of the subsidiary forces, if established at the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, I meant that the same number of troops would still be necessary to support the authority of government in their own provinces and immediate dependencies.

In the provinces depending upon Bengal, there is a civil government, and some strength, besides that of the sword; but in the territories depending upon the subordinate governments, there is no other power; and the moment that is weakened, the people rise in rebellion. I think, therefore, that the same

number of troops will still be necessary, at least for some time, to support the authority of government in our own provinces.

### 280. To Major Shawe.

*The subsidiary alliances, on their present footing, are inadequate to secure the tranquillity of the Native States, or, ultimately, of the Company's territories. We are threatened with a vast development of the free-booting system, which our great and rapid expansion tends to promote. The appropriate remedy is to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency. This will not make them dangerous to us, but the reverse. The freebooters would be powerful instruments in their hands against us.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 26th Feb., 1804.

You will have observed that I agree in opinion with the Governor-General regarding the resumption of the jaghires. It is a measure which must be attended by great unpopularity, and ought not to be adopted, excepting in a case of very evident necessity; and even in such a case the British government ought not to appear in it, unless it should be necessary in order to carry the measure into execution. This, I am afraid, would be necessary; and you will see that I dislike the whole proceeding, and have pointed out to Heshmut other funds from which he may draw the supplies of money which may be necessary in the reform of the army.

The reform of the army is the point upon which I am not of the same opinion with the Governor-General, and I think it very possible that my opinion may be biassed by the inconveniences which I have experienced during the war from the extreme weakness of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. However, on the other hand, I do not think that sufficient weight is given in Bengal to the necessity that the army should be employed in all these Native governments, in the administration of the civil government and in the collection of the revenue.

Bengal, 'the paradise of nations,' enjoys the advantage of a civil government, and requires its military force only for its protection against foreign enemies. All the other barbarous establishments called governments, without excepting even that of Fort St. George, have no power beyond that of the sword. Take from them the exercise of that power, and they have no other; and can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can

exercise no government. The Native governments, I mean those of the Nizam and the Peshwah, are 50 times worse than ours in this respect. They do not choose to keep armies themselves, their territories are overrun by a race of armed men, who are ready to enlist with any body who will lead them to plunder; and there is no power in the country to support the government and give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, excepting the British troops.

Upon this subject two questions occur for consideration : one is, whether the subsidiary British troops, now with the Peshwah and the Nizam, are sufficiently strong to be able to give the requisite support to the civil government in all parts. As far as I am able to form a judgment, I am of opinion that they are not; and that if the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are not to entertain armies for the support of their own authority, the number of troops supplied to each ought to be doubled. I am clearly of opinion that each force is fully equal to any particular service in which they may be employed; but their services are required in so many places at the same time, in these extensive countries, that the number of troops is not sufficient for the demands upon them.

The next question is, whether the Soubah of the Deccan or the Peshwah will pay for an increase of the forces subsidized. It must not be expected that the Soubah of the Deccan will do any such thing. The Peshwah, indeed, may be induced to grant lands in Bundelcund, or in any other province of which he has not possession, to increase his subsidiary force, if at any time he should be disappointed in the execution of any favourite plan, from its weakness; but not otherwise. In fact, excepting in Bundelcund, the Peshwah has nothing to give; and the Soubah of the Deccan will not give any thing.

I have no apprehension of any future foreign wars. Indeed no foreign powers now remain; even if Scindiah should not come into the defensive alliance, we have got such a hold in his durbar, by the treaty of peace, that if ever he goes to war with the Company, one half of his chiefs and of his army will be on our side. But I think that we run a great risk from the free-booter system. It is not known to the Governor-General, and you can have no idea of the extent to which it has gone; and it increases daily. I could state facts on this subject, which would prove the extraordinary weakness of the allied governments, and would show the necessity of strengthening them. But a letter

is not the proper place for them. Conceive a country, in every village of which there are from 20 to 30 horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no means of living excepting by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government, and no army to keep these plunderers in order; and no revenue can be collected; indeed no inhabitant can, nor will remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village. This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwah and the Nizam.

The extension of our arms and influence certainly increases this evil; because, wherever we go, it is soon found out that we are always ready and willing to fight; money is always wanted for the expenses of luxury and debauchery, and armies are discharged to procure it. The danger of the evil is also increased by the extension of our arms, our influence, and our protection: first, by the increase of the number of the people, who must and will subsist by plunder; secondly, by narrowing the scene in which the freebooters may plunder with impunity.

The first requires no illustration. In respect to the second, I have to observe that, after having stood still nearly 40 years (with the exception of the small acquisitions made by Lord Cornwallis from Tippoo), we have, within the last 5 years, extended ourselves by our policy and our bravery over the whole of India, excepting the territories of Holkar and the Rajah of Berar; supposing that Scindiah should come into the defensive alliance. In this vast extent of country, in which the numbers of the people, with arms in their hands, who have no means of living excepting by plunder, are so much increased, no man can venture to plunder without incurring the risk, at least, of being destroyed by a British army. Habits of industry are out of the question; they must plunder for subsistence, or be destroyed, or starve, or be taken into the service of some of the allied powers. As we have now narrowed the scene so much, we must not expect that our own territories will be entirely free from their depredations. In fact, if they are to meet the Company's troops in all countries, they have no choice excepting the richest and best cultivated, and those in which they are likely to meet the smallest number of these formidable troops. The Company's territories answer the description in every respect; and there, I think, is the danger of our present exalted situation.

The Governor-General has never had this picture before him.

No man has ever had so many opportunities of contemplating the subject in all its parts as I have ; and possibly no man has ever adverted to it. The remedy is clear, viz. to force the allies to keep up their military establishments. This is the first step ; I would then give them no assistance in carrying on their internal government, excepting to oppose formidable rebellions. After this is done, by degrees a regulation may be introduced, which I recommended in 1800, in Mysore, viz. that no horse be kept that is not registered, and that no horseman should be allowed to travel through the country without a passport from the government. In this manner the breed will, by degrees, be diminished. But Mr. Edmonstone says, in his dispatch, that to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency is inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which all the treaties of defensive alliance have been framed, which were to make the powers dependent upon the British government.

In the 1st place, the military establishments can never be made so efficient as to place the Native powers in any other excepting a state of dependence on the British government, in respect to all their foreign concerns.

In the 2nd place, the measure which I propose goes no further than to insist upon having that body of troops really, which the treaties require they should have.

In the 3rd place, if, after all that has happened, I could suppose it possible that any of our allies would rebel against us (for I think that the breach of the defensive alliance ought with propriety to be called rebellion), I should say that they have in their hands at this moment a most formidable weapon against us, in the numerous horse which reside in their countries ; every one of whom would join their standard, if it were raised to collect a body for the invasion of the Company's territories, by any chief, no matter by whom. This weapon, the strength of which my system would go to destroy, is far more formidable in the hands of any one of them than the regular military establishments of all of them put together.

I see clearly that the Governor-General has never contemplated this state of the question ; indeed he could not contemplate it, for it has never been brought before him in any shape. The gentlemen at the Residencies see nothing excepting what passes in the durbars, and therefore could not report it ; and it could not reach the Governor-General in any other mannner. I have had many opportunities of seeing and feeling the effects of the

evil. Scindiah's and Ragojee Bhoonslah's armies were composed of horse drawn from the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah, and from Mysore. The freebooters whom I destroyed the other day, and who had become amazingly numerous, were, first of all, 500 horse belonging to Scindiah, who escaped from Ahmed-nuggur the day the pettah was taken; about 100 belonging to Ragojee Bhoonslah's amildar of Neemgaum; and about 300 brought from Scindiah's army by Viswaz Rao Ghautky. When I destroyed them they were a very formidable body, which nothing but British troops could venture to oppose; and they were composed of horsemen collected from Poonah and from the districts of Bheer, Perinda, Dharore, Beeder, Puttun, &c. I mention this as a fact, which I know from information collected on the spot.

**261. Memorandum submitted to the Governor-General by Major-Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Freebooter system in India.**

Fort William, 2nd Nov., 1804.

The letters which have been already laid before the Governor-General have apprised him of the extent and danger of the freebooter system in India, and of the causes of the evil. The remedy would appear to be to find some employment for the numerous military classes in India. It is not reasonable to expect that persons of that description will adopt habits of industry; and unless they have some military employment, they must remain a burthen upon the public. They will not enter into the Company's service, as the system of restraint necessary for our discipline and subordination is equally irksome to them with the habits of industry required for their subsistence in a civil capacity.

The only remedy therefore is to find for them employment, in the present system of India, of the same description which they have had heretofore; and of this remedy it may be said, that it will cure the evil by two modes. 1st; By giving employment to a number of persons, who must otherwise prey upon the public, as these persons will certainly render some service, particularly against troops of the same description with themselves. 2ndly; By giving strength to the governments in alliance with or depending upon the Company.

These governments are the Soubah of the Deccan, the Peshwah,



Scindiah, the Guickwar state, the King. In respect to the Soubah of the Deccan, it is my opinion that, in consideration of the advantages which he gained by the last war, he ought to be required to support a body of silladar horse, which should be gradually increased to the full number he is required by treaty to furnish to co-operate with the Company's troops in war. He will naturally object to the measure, and will propose that, in order to carry it into execution, he may be assisted to confiscate jaghires, &c.

But it may be observed to him that a body of troops of this description, which will strengthen his government so effectually, must prevent the disorders which have either really caused the diminution of his revenues, or have afforded to his aumils motives for withholding payment; that he will be able to curb his aumils and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar dues; and that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own expenses. At all events, the Soubah of the Deccan ought to be obliged to have some silladar horse supported by the state, and paid with regularity; and the number might be increased in proportion as the benefits of the measure could be felt.

The Peshwah cannot afford to keep any troops himself, but the measures already in progress under Mr. Strachey's charge will support a large body of troops of this description in his Highness's territories. As soon as the war with Holkar shall be concluded, the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ought to be moved to the southward to enforce these measures, and in order to force the Rajah of Kolapoor to a settlement.

The memorandum given to the Governor-General this day respecting Scindiah's government, points out a mode of giving employment and subsistence to troops of this description. Besides this, Scindiah ought to be urged constantly to keep up the number of troops required by treaty.

The finances of the Guickwar state are so deranged, that I fear they cannot afford to keep any troops. However, Mr. Duncan's attention ought to be drawn to this object, and he should be desired to fix, in concert with Major Walker, the military establishments which the Guickwar should support hereafter. A part of the sum of money to be allotted for the support of the King ought to be laid out for the support of a body of troops, and these ought to be silladar horse. Besides these measures, which will provide for the subsistence of 30,000 or 40,000 men, and which will give a disposable force of those

numbers to act against persons of a similar description, who are now living by plunder, others may be adopted in the Company's territories, to . . . .

[The remaining part of this Memorandum is wanting, it having been mislaid in the Political Department at Fort William, as appears by a letter from Major Shawe.—Col. Gurwood's note.]

## 262. To Major Shawe.

*Vital importance of compelling our allies to maintain an adequate force for the suppression of rebels and plunderers. They are too weak to be made responsible for the misdeeds of their lawless subjects.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 27th Dec., 1804.

Our policy and our arms have reduced all the powers in India to the state of mere cyphers; at the same time that their intriguing, discontented, and rebellious followers still remain, with increased causes of discontent, diminished sources of profit, and field for speculation and plunder. Nothing can keep these people in order excepting the Company's arms, or a complete state of defence on all points which they can reach.

The Company's arms cannot be every where; at this moment we have 6 disposable battalions in the Deccan: and because the allies do not choose to defend themselves or their territories, their services are required on the frontiers of Candeish; on the frontier of Berar; at Manik Droog; on the Nizam's western frontier, between the Godavery, Ahmednuggur, and Poonah; and upon the Kistna. There remains then only to force the allies to take some measures to defend themselves; and upon this point I have already written volumes.

All that I can say upon the subject is, that it is not in the power of the troops to march over the ground, much less to do all that is required from them at this moment; and we must either alter our system in respect to our allies, or we must double or treble the subsidiary force with each, or our Empire must crumble to pieces from its size, and the inefficiency of the measures adopted for its defence and preservation.

There is another supposed remedy, viz., to make the Rajah of Berar in this instance, and other hostile powers in similar instances, responsible for the acts of those who sally out from their countries on these plundering expeditions. That would do very well in Europe; and if the Governor-General is prepared

to take possession of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, what has happened at Manik Droog affords a good pretence. But I say that neither the Nizam, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, nor the Guickwar, have the power of controlling their own servants, from causes which it is not necessary now to canvass ; and therefore I think that it would not be quite just to punish any of those powers for acts for which they cannot be responsible.

### 263. To Colonel Close.

*The same subject.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 27th Dec., 1804.

There is no longer any power in any of the governments to restrain the rebellious and discontented spirits, and we must expect that they will fly out whenever they see a weak or undefended point. The only remedy is, to be guarded every where, and to force our allies to keep up troops for their own defence. Till that is effected, our system is rotten to the core, and our empire must crumble to atoms by the operations of its size and weakness.

### 3. NORTH-WEST FRONTIER.

#### 264. Memorandum on the Defences of Oude.

[Forwarded to the Governor-General.]

*Advantages of small fortified posts, especially against cavalry.*

*Sir F. Craig to be consulted on the defence of the N. W. frontier. Dépôts to be formed at Allahabad and Futtyghur ; and carriage bullocks systematically provided. The Nabob of Oude to regulate or diminish his force : new regiments to be raised. Suggestions on a plan of operations for the defensive army.*

I send a memorial, which I have received from Colonel Kydd, upon the defences of Oude, which, I believe, is the only paper which exists upon that subject. The plan appears to be well calculated to answer the purposes for which it is intended, and the principal part of it has been already put in execution : I mean that we have obtained possession of Allahabad and the fort at Futtyghur, and that a plan has been formed for

strengthening both those posts. It requires a local knowledge of the country lying between the Jumna and the Ganges, and of the positions at Calpee, Etawa, and Anopsheer, to be able to decide whether the part of the memorial which relates to them be as well grounded as the first part. As, however, the attack which is to be apprehended is from cavalry, generally speaking, there is no method of annoying them and of preventing them from doing mischief so effectual as the establishment of the small fortified posts which Kydd recommends. I don't mean that they should be made so strong as to stand a siege, or in case of our omitting to occupy them, or if we should lose any of them, that we should find any difficulty in retaking them; but that they should be of the nature of the mud forts in the Carnatic, which afford protection to a small body of infantry against a large one of cavalry, and enable officers proceeding with convoys to put them in security almost every night. As an attack upon the north-western frontier may be looked for, and as it appears that nobody has any notion of acting either upon the offensive or defensive in that quarter, I recommend that your attention and that of the principal officers of the army should be turned towards it immediately; that Sir James Craig, in particular, should be called upon for his ideas upon the subject.

In the mean time Allahabad should be filled with stores and grain. Some of both should be thrown into the fort at Futtyghur. Kydd says that Allahabad can now defend itself, and the proposed alterations will make it very strong indeed. The post will not be weakened while they are making. A plan should be devised for procuring carriage-bullocks.

The Nabob of Oude ought to be called upon either to regulate or dismiss his force.

If three regiments are sent into the Carnatic, or, indeed, if only two are sent there, one or two regiments must be raised here. The reduction of the Nabob of Oude's army will supply the funds; but, whether it is reduced or not, the measure is equally urgent. I do not conceive, however, that it presses upon you immediately. There are two events which are not impossible, either of which will make it necessary immediately. One of them is the certainty of the war with Tippoo: this will oblige you to send a force into the Carnatic, which must be replaced immediately. The other is the advance of Zemaun Shah, which, although it would not oblige you to

strengthen yourself here if it stood alone, as it will certainly encourage Tippoo to go to, will oblige you to detach to the Carnatic, and the detached force must be replaced.

As there is not much money in the treasury, unless the Vizier can be brought to disband his force, I think it will be prudent not to raise any force until towards November, when you will be able to decide as to the necessity of sending a force to the Carnatic, or as to the probability of Zemaun Shah's invasion. Without a greater knowledge of the country than I have, it is impossible to pretend to point out any plan of operations. I may, however, venture to say generally that the British army must be kept together in one body, providing garrisons only for Allahabad and the fort at Futtyghur; that the Nabob's troops ought to occupy the inferior posts; that the main object should be to keep the enemy from Lucknow. As I want local information, I can't tell whether it would be possible, by moving forwards, to place the army in such a situation as that an action must be fought with it before the enemy can cross the Jumna.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**265. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.**

*The line of the Jumna probably preferable for the defence of the North-West frontier. A corps de réserve to be formed near Chunar.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 10th Nov., 1798.

So little is known of the north-west frontier, notwithstanding that it has been so long in our hands, that it is impossible to give even a general opinion of what line it would be best to pursue; whether to confine ourselves to the defence of Lucknow and Allahabad, or to prevent the enemy from crossing the Jumna. I should prefer the latter as the most certain method of defence; and it must be recollected that Abdallah beat the Mahrattas by driving them from the Dooab over the Jumna. It is a most fertile spot, and ought not to be given up in a hurry.

Whatever plan is followed, Allahabad must be secured, and quantities of stores and grain must be thrown into it. If the passage of the Jumna be prevented, as long as the Ganges is navigable the army in the Dooab can be supplied with ease from thence by means of boats.

A corps de réserve, ought to be formed somewhere about Chunar,—I don't mean to weaken Sir James Craig's army, but in case Zemaun Shah advances, all the corps and force in the lower provinces should rendezvous thereabouts; and in case of accidents, which may happen, they will be ready to apply the remedy. In case of insurrection or rebellion by any of the great jaghiredars in Oude, they will be of great use.

Besides, an army of cavalry acting against infantry in an extended country is so likely to give its adversary the slip and get to his rear, that I should not think Benares and our own provinces secure from plunder, if there were not a good corps de réserve somewhere in the Zemindary.

#### 286. Memorandum on Oude.

*The control of Oude naturally coveted by the rulers of Bengal and Bahar, for defensive purposes. Character and ulterior tendency of the connexion of the Company with the Nabob. Inevitable depression of the native State, and interference of our Government with its internal economy.*

(Undated.)

The province of Oude is situated to the north-west of the provinces of Bengal and Bahar, which are under the Bengal government. It is bounded to the northward by impassable mountains, which separate it from the country of Thibet, the river Ganges forming its western boundary. As the Ganges and Jumna run through it, part of it is on the same side of the former as Bengal and Bahar. To the south-west are Corah, Allahabad, and the Jumna; and to the south the province of Bundelcund, which was possessed by a race of petty Rajahs.

Rohilcund, which lies on the left or east of the Ganges, was not at that period in the possession of the Nabobs of Oude, nor were Corah and Allahabad, commonly called the Dooab, and lying between the Jumna and the Ganges. Benares, however, was tributary to Oude, which province is also situated east, or on the left of the Ganges.

Oude is a fertile country, was at that time well cultivated, and is peopled by a hardy race, who have for a great length of time supplied soldiers to all the states of India.

In this situation it is obvious that the government of Oude must always have been an object of jealousy to that power which possessed the provinces of Bahar and Bengal, which are situated

lower down upon the Ganges. In fact, these provinces had no natural barrier against an invasion from Oude, and depended for their security upon their own artificial means of defence.

This was the case not only in respect to the state of Oude itself, but in respect to the Rohillas; to the King, who was at that period of time in some degree of strength; and to the Mahrattas; each of which powers might have found an easy and convenient passage through Oude to an invasion of the Company's provinces of Bahar and Bengal.

On the other hand, by the possession of the provinces under the government of Oude, or an intimate union with the government, a barrier was immediately provided for the provinces under the Bengal government. Nothing remained on the left or east of the Ganges besides the Nabob of Oude and the Company excepting the Rohillas, and this river afforded a strong natural barrier against all invaders. Besides this object, the seat of war, in consequence of the alliance with or possession of Oude, was removed from the Company's provinces, the source of all the means of carrying on war, to those of the enemy, if it should have been practicable to carry on offensive war; or at all events to those of the Nabob, if such supposed war should have been reduced to the defensive.

By the first treaty with the Nabobs of Oude, the Company were bound to assist the Nabob with their troops, on the condition of receiving payment for their expenses. The adoption of this system of alliance is always to be attributed to the weakness of the state which receives the assistance, and the remedy generally aggravates that evil. It is usually attended by a stipulation that the subsidy should be paid in equal monthly instalments; and as this subsidy is generally the whole or nearly the whole disposable resource of the state, it is not easy to produce it at the stipulated moment. The tributary government is then reduced to borrow at usurious interest, to grant tuncaws upon the land for repayment, to take advances from aumildars, to sell the office of aumildar, and to adopt all the measures which it may be supposed distress on the one hand and avarice and extortion on the other can invent to procure the money necessary to provide for the payment of the stipulated subsidies.

As soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its more powerful ally, or rather protector; and from that moment the respect, duty,

and loyalty of its subjects have been weakened, and it has become more difficult to realize the resources of the state. To this evil must be added those of the same kind arising from oppression by aumildars, who have paid largely for their situations, and must remunerate themselves in the course of one year for what they have advanced from those holding tuncaws and other claimants upon the soil on account of loans to government, and the result is an increasing deficiency in the regular resources of the state.

But these financial difficulties, created by weakness and increased by oppression, and which are attended by a long train of disorders throughout the country, must attract the attention of the protecting government, and then these last are obliged to interfere in the internal administration in order to save the resources of the state and to preclude the necessity of employing the troops in quelling internal rebellion and disorder, which were intended to resist the foreign enemy.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

267. To the Right Hon. H. Dundas.

*Plan for defending India against a Franco-Russian invasion. The enemy should be met on the Indus, though that is a weak barrier. The main British army to be cantoned on the Ganges and Jumna, near Delhi: supplies to be collected gradually: native light troops engaged to join when wanted. A strong corps to cover Delhi and the cantonments; and to act promptly on the enemy's advance, supported by the main army. Position of reserves and subsidiary forces. A flotilla useless. The pirates to be encouraged to defend the Lower Indus.*

Dublin Castle, 20th April, 1808.

I have perused with great attention the paper which you enclosed with your letter of the 15th. My opinion is, that you ought to make an effort to meet the enemy, if possible, upon the Indus; although that opinion is much qualified by a variety of considerations which I shall now suggest to you.

1st. The art of crossing rivers is now so well understood, and has been so frequently practised, and so invariably, I believe, with success, in the late wars in Europe, that we cannot hope to defend the Indus, as a barrier. It is true that the enemy will not be in possession of the resources and means which they could apply to such an operation on a river in Italy or in Germany; but they will experience no want of such resources as that



country will afford; and I have made as good a bridge with the basket boats (which are described in Cæsar, and are in use all over India, the materials for which are to be found every where) as I could have made of the best pontoons. I acknowledge, therefore, that although, in this impending war, I should seize Attock at an early period, and should endeavour to make the Indus the seat of its operations; I have no great reliance upon that river as the barrier to India.

2ndly. If it be true that we cannot rely upon the defence of the Indus, although it is desirable to try it, and to carry the war into the countries on its banks, the question is, what preparatory steps ought to be ordered from hence? We must look to the state of the finances, to the fears and jealousies which will be excited throughout India by a very large early preparation, to a corresponding preparation by those in whom those fears and jealousies will be excited, to the state of inefficiency and apathy in which an army becomes in that country when long assembled in preparation and does not act.

The measures which I should recommend would be founded, 1st, upon the conviction that the Indus cannot be completely defended, do what you will; and, 2ndly, upon the considerations above referred to, of the inconvenience and evils resulting from a large early preparation to meet the enemy on that river.

I shall not now enter into a detailed consideration of all the points to which I have above referred. I shall only tell you that experience has convinced me, and, I believe, the late Lord Lake, that active operations are not to be carried on in those countries without the assistance of large bodies of the *country light troops*. In this supposed war they would be absolutely necessary, to enable us to cope at all with the same description of troops which will be brought from the northern parts of Asia by our enemies; and I leave you to judge of the extent of abuse and expense which will attend the employment of troops of this description before the period of their active operations will arrive.

The measure which I should recommend to you would be to assemble your British army in the cantonments upon the Ganges and the Jumna, and in the neighbourhood of Delhi; to form your magazines for its support; to adopt all the preparatory measures for its taking the field at the shortest notice which do not create large expense, and even those which do create a large

expense, the completion of which would require much time; to form arrangements with the chiefs and leaders of the country light troops for their junction with the British army, when their services should be called for.

Then I should assemble in the field in front of Delhi a large corps consisting of from 6000 to 10,000 men, including a good proportion of the British cavalry and a body of from 2000 to 3000 of country light troops, and provided with a small battering train, the object of which should be to cover the cantonments of the army, and to be in readiness to move with rapidity and seize —, as soon as intelligence should be received of the intended advance of the enemy. The main body of your army would follow and support this corps, and either the defence of the Indus might be undertaken, or any other measure might be adopted which would appear most advisable at the time.

If the battle is to be fought upon the Indus, it will be absolutely necessary to station reserves upon the Bundelcund frontier, on the Jumna, and one in the country of the Seiks. But I do not now propose to enter so much into detail upon this subject as to point out the situation of these reserves. The station for the Bombay troops in Guzerat ought to depend upon the temper and inclinations of Scindiah and Holkar. If all is right in these quarters, the Bombay troops might be assembled at Ahmedabad, from whence they would threaten the enemy's right flank; if not, I am afraid it would be necessary to move them towards Dohud. It is certain, however, that the enemy cannot spread in the direction of Guzerat; and indeed the Bombay troops would not find it an easy matter to move northward, excepting in the winter, from Ahmedabad, on account of the difficulty of the Desert, and of the Ajmeer and Oudepooor countries.

Before I left India I gave in a plan for the positions of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Nizam, which, however, I am afraid that they have never been able to carry into execution. It went to the establishment of these corps upon the river Godavery, in communication with each other. If this plan had been adopted, no foreigners could enter the Deccan. Even as it is, not a shot has been fired in the Deccan since the year 1803. But if this great attack should be made upon Hindustan, the subsidiary forces must be moved up to the northern frontier, towards the Taptee. If Scindiah should misbehave, one of them should move across the Taptee

and Nerbudda, and co-operate with the Bombay troops against him; and this corps ought to be replaced in the Peshwah's territories by the advance of a corps of the same strength from Mysore. Then you ought to have on the frontier of Mysore a reserve in the field.

In respect to the flotilla, the expense of it will be enormous, and the utility very doubtful. The enemy cannot spread to the Lower Indus; if they could, they would then fall in with the pirates, who would stop them, or they must subdue the pirates. If we send a flotilla to the Lower Indus, we must begin by subduing the pirates, and, when we shall have effected that object, as we cannot afford a sufficient army to protect ourselves there, we shall have deprived ourselves of our best barrier in that quarter, for the enemy would not be able to do more than drive the pirates from their establishments on the continent, considering the naval means which the latter have.

My opinion therefore is, that, instead of forming a large flotilla, we should encourage the pirates in the mouths of the Indus and in the Gulf to defend themselves; and that we should aid them to that end as far as may be in our power. However, I may be mistaken upon this point, for I do not exactly recollect all that bears upon it, and I am writing to you without either paper or a map to refer to.

P.S. I sail to-night, and hope to be in London on Monday.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

#### 4. MISCELLANEOUS.

##### 268. To the Earl of Mornington.

*The retention of Mauritius by the French dangerous to our Indian Empire. Tippoo's alleged military preparations—a constant bugbear at Madras. Zemaun Shah's expected movements, and probable designs.*

(Extract.)

Fort William, 12th July, 1797.

The destruction of Batavia would ruin the Dutch; but it may be a question whether it would be right completely to annihilate them, and it is probably that consideration which has prevented us from attacking them at this moment. Mauritius ought to be taken. As long as the French have an establishment there,

Great Britain cannot call herself safe in India. They must be particularly guarded against after the war, as it may be depended upon that swarms of them (aristocrats, democrats, modérés, &c. &c.) will come here to seek service in the armies of the Native princes, and all Frenchmen in such a situation are equally dangerous. They would shortly discipline their numerous armies in the new mode which they have adopted in Europe, than which nothing can be more formidable to the small body of fighting men of which the Company's armies in general consist; and in the end they would force us to increase our armies and of course our expense to such a degree, that the country could not be kept, or indeed would not be worth keeping. At present the country powers are quiet. People say that Tippoo Sahib has an army on foot, which I don't believe, as I have observed since my arrival here that he is a constant object of fear to the English, and whenever they want to add a little colouring to a statement of danger, they find out that he has an army in motion. I make no doubt but that if the Nizam had died at the close of last year, and a detachment from Bengal had not been sent into the Circars and part of it to Hyderabad, he would have taken advantage of the threatened invasion of Zemaun Shah, of the disturbed state of the Mahratta government, of the dissensions in the Bengal army, and of the weakness of that in the Carnatic, and would have attacked us either there or in the Circars; but now from what I can learn all is safe, and certainly if it is not, Lord Hobart is not very justifiable in sending six thousand men upon an expedition to the eastward. They likewise say that Zemaun Shah will attack Hindustan in the next season; but that I equally disbelieve, from a conviction of its difficulties, and of its inutility even if it should succeed. There is no plunder to be got now; and as to a permanent establishment in India, he can expect to make it only in the Punjab or the Delhi countries after a severe contest with the Seiks and Mahrattas; and after success he will have a ruined country in lieu of his present possessions, which are rich, of which he would undoubtedly be deprived. I don't doubt but that he will again get Lahore, and occupy it in strength; but that only with a view of driving the Seiks (the worst of neighbours) farther from him, and of getting an additional barrier to his present territories. There is nothing to induce him to advance any farther.

**269. To Sir Ralph Abercromby.***Prospect of success in the Red Sea Expedition.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 6th April, 1801.

The operations proposed by Mr. Secretary Dundas for the troops in the Red Sea are, to get possession of Suez and Cosseir and any port which the French may have on its shores, to encourage the Mamelukes and natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke, to commence hostilities against them, to assist these natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them if that should appear practicable or likely to be of advantage. As much of the season for sailing up the Red Sea has unavoidably elapsed, it is probable that it will not be possible for the troops under the command of Major-General Baird to reach Suez. It is probable, however, that Admiral Blankett, who sailed from hence in December with an intention to destroy Suez, will have succeeded in that object. The General's first operations, therefore, will be directed against Cosseir, and there is every reason to hope that they will succeed. He is likely to be at Cosseir in the middle of May.

Measures have been already taken to open a communication with the principal Mamelukes and natives of Upper Egypt, and to urge them to commence hostilities against the French; and, considering the former enmity between them and the French, the instability of their present connection with them, and the distrust which has been manifested by both parties, I have very little doubt of their success, particularly if your first operations are successful. If General Baird should succeed in rousing the Mamelukes of Upper Egypt, he proposes, I imagine, to cross the Desert from Cosseir to Ghennah on the Nile, and to join his force with theirs. The difficulty of this operation is certainly great, but I apprehend is not insurmountable, if the Mamelukes are forward in Upper Egypt, and if they are not adverse to its execution; but if they should not come forward, or if they should be adverse to its execution, I fear that the difficulties are of such a nature as to render the attempt not justifiable even if the execution should be practicable.

## 270. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*The Bombay pioneer corps to be maintained, for service in Malabar.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 9th July, 1802.

I have received a letter from Major Macleod, in which he proposes to reduce half the corps of Bombay pioneers. I believe that corps was raised when you were in Malabar, and you will recollect the inconvenience which was felt for want of them. In fact, people for common work are not to be procured in Malabar, as in other parts of the country, and when wanted, they are sent for at great expense to Bombay and Paulghautcherry.

But there are in Malabar works of the greatest importance, which require the constant employment of such a body of men. The communications with this country through the Ghauts and the roads leading to them require repair annually after the rains, and it is necessary that the roads in Cotiote and those leading from the northern to the southern parts of the province, which were made with a view to the subjection of the Pyche Rajah, should be kept open. This can be done only by the labour of men at the conclusion of the rains annually. It may be said that men may be hired for these services when they are required, and that this mode will be cheaper than to keep in constant pay a corps of pioneers; but I doubt whether men can be hired for these or any other services at all in Malabar, and even if they can and are cheaper, it is worth while to pay the difference of expense in order to have always at command for all services a body of men so useful as this is.

## 271. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*Relations of the Government to the Commander-in-Chief. Desirableness of magnifying his office, in order to obviate the defects, and promote the efficiency, of the army.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 11th June, 1803.

I am not acquainted with your Commander-in-Chief, or with his character; but it appears to me that he has been very ill treated by the government at home, and that he has been sent to conduct the duties of a very arduous situation, which has been clipped of its honours and of its substantial power (to say nothing

of its emoluments). There is no man in the army who is not aware of this, and it is not possible that, under such circumstances, General Nicholls can command either their respect or their ready obedience.

It is my opinion that an officer who is sent to command troops in this country, particularly the Bombay army, ought to be in the very highest situation under the government, and at all events ought to be known to possess their full confidence in all matters relating to his own profession. If the gentlemen at home do not feel this truth, or, feeling it, do not act accordingly merely to save a little money, that is no reason for which you should not, as far as depends upon you, remedy their errors.

You can do this by placing the fullest confidence in the Commander-in-Chief of your troops (supposing him always to deserve it), and by upholding his authority and opinion upon all occasions.

With this view I would recommend it to you, whenever you have determined upon the political expediency of any military measure, to acquaint your Commander-in-Chief with your sentiments forthwith, and call upon him to give his opinion in detail regarding the force which will be required, the mode of collecting that force, and its operations, in order to carry your object into execution. He ought also to acquaint you with the nature and extent of the equipments, provisions, supplies, &c., of different kinds which the troops will want upon the proposed service. After having done this it will remain with you to give your own orders regarding the different objects suggested by him, recollecting always that he or any other military man has no right, such as the Military Board now claims, to make contracts for furnishing supplies independent of the power of government. I mention this subject not from any desire to push forward General Nicholls, with whom I have no acquaintance, or any desire but the good of the service.

It is easy to foresee that with your territory and your connections to the northward, and with the establishment of the subsidiary force at Poonah, your military operations will increase vastly. I don't like the mode in which they go on now. Every thing appears to be a scramble for money, nobody is responsible, and the Commander-in-Chief is indifferent.

It is not possible that you can have a knowledge of all the details into which it is necessary to enter to equip a body of troops properly for the field in this country, or that, having that

knowledge, you should have time to enter into them. What is the consequence? Your troops take the field without the common necessities for the service, they become sickly, a vast expense is incurred, and nothing is done. Introduce your Commander-in-Chief into your military affairs, make him give his opinion, throw the details into his hands, and make him responsible for them, and if your military operations do not go on as they ought, you know who to blame.

On the other hand, if your officers of supply do not do their duty, for his own sake he will apprise you of their neglect. By these means not only your military operations will be effectual, but you will raise to his proper situation the gentleman who is at the head of your army, and you will relieve yourself from a detail of business which must embarrass you.

You see that I have written my opinion with great freedom. I hope that you will attribute it to my real motive, a wish that the service may go on well, and that you will excuse it.

**272. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.**

*We should not exact tribute from wild tribes; and can do so only to the injury of our military reputation.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 5th Nov., 1803.

10. If the country should remain in the hands of the British government, the revenue payable by the Bheels becomes an object of greater consequence. But even in this case, the first question that occurs is, whether this war was undertaken to obtain an increase of revenue, and whether it is an object to obtain such military advantage as the possession of the defiles in the countries of the Bheels, and the assistance of these people, even at the expense of the remission of the tribute which they paid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before we obtained possession of the country?

11. But even if, as is supposed, we continue to enjoy the advantages which we at present possess in the countries of the Bheels, without a remission of the tribute, I doubt the policy of obliging them to continue to pay: experience teaches us that tribute of this description cannot be collected from the inhabitants of the hilly and jungly tracts of India, without frequent appeals to arms. I have but little doubt the Company would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military



reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and that the power of government would have been greater, if all tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally remitted.

12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of government should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in hostilities such as those above described : their operations are very difficult and uncertain ; they require large bodies of the best troops, numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The government have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel Rajahs ; and it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India.

### 273. To Major Malcolm.

*Impolicy of over-weakening Scindiah, and of raising small powers to independence.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 9th April, 1804.

Powar is a Mahratta chief, of the same nominal rank in the Empire as Scindiah and Holkar ; but he is not so powerful as either, and latterly he appears to have considered himself as inferior to the former, and served in Scindiah's army at the battle of Assye. After that battle he fled to Dhar, and opened a friendly communication with Major Walker, and since the peace he has come to Baroda without leave.

We have no right to interfere in favour of Powar under the 9th article of the treaty of peace ; and in your letter to Mr. Duncan you have pointed out clearly the inutility of attempting it under the 10th article.

If we are not to interfere in favour of Powar in consequence of either the 9th or 10th article of the treaty of peace, the question is whether we ought to interfere on any other ground more general.

I have always been of opinion that we have weakened Scindiah more than is politic ; and that we shall repent having established such a number of these little independent powers in India, every one of whom will require the support of the British government, which will occasion a constant demand of employment of troops, a loss of officers and men, and a claim of money.

In respect to Powar, he is naturally, and in consequence of the local situation of his capital in the neighbourhood of both Holkar and Scindiah, the weakest of the weak. For that reason I objected to making a treaty with him; because I knew he would render us no service in the war adequate to the expense of supporting him in a state of independence in peace, which operation would have required an army. That opinion is not changed by his having gone to Baroda; and all that I can recommend for Powar is, that if Scindiah's durbar should be brought into tolerable temper, a general recommendation of this chief should be given in by the Resident, founded upon his connexion with the Guickwar, with whom the British government is so closely allied.

In respect to the idea of supporting Powar's independence, as a member of the Mahratta Empire, that in my opinion is equally absurd with taking up the cause of Cashee Rao Holkar.

## VII. TRADE, AGRICULTURE, AND FAMINE.

### 274. Memorandum on Pulo Penang.

*The Company trade at a loss, except with China. This results from their political character and obligations. Objects subserved by their Indian trade. They have almost an European monopoly of the China trade.*

(Extract.)

[1797.]

By the papers which have been published at different times by the East India Company, it appears that as a trading company they are losers upon their whole concern with India (excepting always that with China) to a very considerable degree ; that if they did not possess their immense territories in Bengal, &c., and if it

were not possible for them as merchants to carry on their trade at a cheaper rate, they would do better not to carry it on at all. This arises not from the nature of the trade itself, but from their double character of merchants and governors, together with that of their political character at home, which cause considerable unnecessary expense and extravagance in their mode of conducting their mercantile transactions. The surplus of the revenues over the necessary expenditure, and the profits of the trade with China, however, enable them to pay the expenses attending their government and management at home, their dividend, and the share which Government claims out of the surplus revenues. The Indian trade is carried on with a view to render more easy the transmission of the surplus revenue to Europe, without draining Bengal of its specie, and in order to give that country a market for its manufactured produce, which as its sovereigns the Company are bound to do. The China trade then, and that to the eastward, are those upon which the Company and the nation principally depend; the Company for carrying home the revenue, and the nation for that large sum in Customs which is annually paid by the Company. Owing to the advantages which the East India Company have had in the China market by means of the territorial revenues, and to other causes incidental to them, they have nearly monopolized the trade with China. They supply nearly all Europe with the produce of that country and of India, and thus Great Britain enjoys the advantage of the consumption, not only of its own inhabitants, but of those of the other nations in Europe, the English East India Company having driven them nearly all out of the Chinese and Indian markets.

#### 275. Memorandum on Bengal.

*The agriculture of Bengal is not more heavily taxed by the British, than by previous native rulers; and is more encouraged by the Permanent Settlement. Sanitary and political objections against permitting Europeans to colonize, and purchase, land. Agriculture might be fostered by markets, and improved communications by land and water. Bengal has free trade with India and the Eastern seas. The Company, though monopolists of the more valuable home traffic, trade at a loss. The cost of freight is almost prohibitive of private trade with England; (in spite of the recent regulation). This private trade therefore goes mostly to the foreigner. Bengal loses the*

*English market: but England suffers equally. The price of freight should be lowered. This will probably destroy the Company's commerce: but that would be no great evil. The salt and opium monopolies produce a surplus, which is drawn away in trade. But this is better for Bengal, than if it were dissipated on the Zemindars, as, if remitted, it probably would be. England is entitled to levy a tribute on Bengal; and to protect West Indian sugars, at the expense of East Indian. The vested interests of West India proprietors should be considered. The political importance of those Islands, and their superior facilities as a school for seamen. Other Indian articles saddled with heavy duties to promote the general diffusion of English trade, and prevent our depending too much on so distant a market as the East. General conclusions.*

In the 'Remarks upon the Present State of the Husbandry and Commerce of Bengal,' several circumstances are adduced in order to prove that that country loses by its connection with Great Britain, as that connection at present exists, through the medium of an exclusive commercial Company.

The grievances principally complained of are the want of due encouragement to the cultivation of its valuable produce; the commercial monopoly of the Company, which, as it raises the price of freight, precludes the possibility of transporting that produce to a valuable market; and the proportion of the revenues of the country which is drawn from it as a tribute to the Company and to the British Government.

Another circumstance of which complaint is made, but which is totally distinct from the abuses of the management of an exclusive Company, is the want of encouragement at home to the raw and to some of the manufactured produce of Bengal, such as sugar, tobacco, raw silk, &c., &c. I shall consider each of these with that impartiality which should always reign in discussions upon subjects of this nature.

The productions of India are grain, indigo, raw silk, tobacco, sugar. It has often been a question whether the total rent which is paid by the inhabitants of Bengal is greater at present than it was during the dynasty of the Moguls or the subsequent government of the native princes; it however seems now to be understood that it is about equal to what it was at those times, and I shall take that for granted.

The sum which is paid to the Government is about equal to that which was paid to the Government of the Moguls, and which appears to have been divided into two parts: the one was applied to pay the expenses of the government in Bengal, the other was sent to the treasury in Delhi. The expenses of the collection of those revenues were about equal to what they are at this moment, and therefore the zemindar or landholder, or under whatever title he might have been known, retained no more of the rent than he does at this moment under the British Government. If the profits of the zemindar are small now, they were equally so formerly, which, in addition to its being a proof that there were formerly no landlords in Bengal, or, in other words, that the zemindars were not proprietors, is a proof that the British Government gives as much encouragement to the cultivation and improvement of land as was given during the time of the best of the native governors.

But the British Government not only have not taken more rent than the native governments, but they have made an engagement that they will not take more than they do at present, by making a permanent settlement, and by giving to the zemindars the property of the soil. Therefore, as far as security and permanency give encouragement to agriculture, more encouragement has been given by the British Government than by the natives.

It seems, however, that there are certain articles which are produced in Bengal which require a superior cultivation and a greater expense, which neither the tenants nor the landholders are enabled to advance. Among these, indigo, sugar, tobacco, and silk are enumerated.

In order that these articles may receive the cultivation which they require, and in order that there may be a body of landholders capable of bearing the expense of giving it to them, it is proposed that Europeans should be allowed to purchase and to become proprietors in India.

The first question is, whether the cultivation would be mended by their interference. The husbandry in India is said to be very defective. The simplicity with which all its complex operations are performed is not supposed to be advantageous to it, and it is therefore imagined that superior ingenuity and management would give a larger product at a cheaper rate, and that, in time, the example set by skilful Europeans would be followed throughout the country. Notwithstanding the objections which the

Hindoos have to alter any institution which has been handed down to them by their ancestors, many of which are reckoned sacred, it is believed that if the advantages of European or British management could be made clear to them, it would, in time, be universally adopted. It is also true that the expense of clearing and stocking a farm as it ought to be cannot be borne excepting by an European, and therefore the Europeans ought to be allowed to purchase, if it is wished that the agriculture of the country should be much improved. There are, however, objections to that measure, which arise partly from the character of the natives, and partly from the effect which the climate has upon European constitutions. The natives hold every European in the greatest awe, and therefore it is imagined that, if these were allowed to settle in such parts of the country as they might think fit, they might be induced to tyrannise over the former, who would fear to complain, and thus the British name and character would become an object of detestation to the Hindoos. However, regulations might be adopted to prevent this evil, of which the natives might be made acquainted; and as they have had many opportunities of witnessing the rigour of British justice, even upon British subjects, when they deserve it, it is believed that they would not fear to complain in case of receiving an injury. The climate is a great objection to suffering the unconstrained resort of British subjects to India. Those who have not been in Bengal are not aware of the effects which its climate has upon the European constitution; but they are so great, and those who have been there for any length of time become so enervated, that it is doubted whether those benefits which are expected would result from their residence. A European cannot with safety expose himself to the sun: how then can he hope to superintend the various operations of husbandry with success? His generation, even supposing him to be married to a European woman, dwindles and falls off to such a degree that the third generation from the original settler is but little removed, in manners and disposition, from the old inhabitants of the country; and therefore, excepting by a constant drain from the mother country, the full benefits of this colonization cannot be expected.

The policy of the Company's Government has hitherto been to prevent, as much as possible, the residence of Europeans in India; and it has been grounded upon the necessity of preserving in the minds of the natives a respect for the British name and cha-

racter, which, it is feared, an unrestrained intercourse would tend to remove, as well as upon the danger which would result were they to become acquainted with the language and character of the natives in their territories, and then to enter into the service of the native princes. If an unrestrained intercourse hitherto would have produced either of these effects, it is equally dangerous at the present moment, even although every British subject should become a proprietor; and from some events which have taken place lately, from the language which has been held in the 'Remarks,' it is more than ever necessary for the Company to prevent the resort of Europeans to Bengal. The circumstance which tended most in the course of the last year to preserve the allegiance of the army to the Company's Government was the desire which every individual had to return to Great Britain, and the certainty that if the violent measures proposed were adopted, or that if encouragement were given to proceed to extremities, the door to his return was shut for ever. To this no individual, particularly none of those who have fortunes sufficiently large to maintain them, could make their minds up; and the consequence was that, at the moment when everything appeared most desperate, all subsided. If Europeans had been settled with their families in India; if these men had, or could have had, their homes in that country, the Company would have lost it, and nothing could ever have regained it.

By the violence of the language and of the sentiments which are held forth in the 'Remarks,' by the bitter complaints which are made of the British Government and connection, the sentiments of the Company's civil servants and of those who reside in India by the Company's licence are very apparent: how much more violent would they be if they were proprietors of a soil for the commercial advantages of whose inhabitants they now so violently contend! It is to be expected that they would likewise make India their home; and thus Great Britain would lose its strongest hold upon their allegiance, their desire to return to their native country. However desirable, therefore, it may be that the natives of India should obtain the advantage of British skill and management in agriculture, it is not advisable that the Company should suffer its servants or those who reside in India by its licence, to become proprietors of land.

There are other measures, which, although they might not be equally efficacious, might still tend considerably to the prosperity of Bengal, as far as that is connected with its agriculture. Markets

might be established throughout the country, which would enable the cultivator at all times to sell his produce without the difficulty and expense attending upon a long carriage. These would likewise insure a uniformity in price, which, above all things, has been found in other countries the most favourable to agriculture; and by enabling one district to profit by the plenty of another, they would insure all parts of Bengal from that worst of evils, with which it has been so frequently afflicted,—a famine.

Good roads should likewise be made at first from the principal place in each district to those in its neighbourhood. These ought to be kept in repair. The inland navigation ought to be encouraged, and every measure ought to be adopted, which, by rendering its use more easy, will make more perfect the communication from one part of this country to the other.

If these measures were adopted, the agriculture of Bengal would not require the assistance of Europeans, in order that it might be brought to a very sufficient state of perfection.

The commerce of Bengal consists at present in an unrestrained intercourse with all parts of India and the Eastern Seas; in the commerce carried on by the Company, and in its intercourse with Europe and America by means of foreign nations, and clandestine trade carried on by the persons resident in India under the Company's licence and by Americans, and likewise the inland trade with the northern parts of India and the Deccan by the water-carriage, caravans, &c. &c. The amount of the whole is four millions and a half.

The freedom of the trade which is carried on with the different parts of India is highly to the honour of the Company; it has more than trebled since the peace of '83. It has suffered in some degree for want of naval protection in the course of this war; but a peace will re-establish it again upon its old footing, and it is probable that, with the same freedom, it will increase in a greater proportion than it has hitherto.

The commerce which the Company carries on with Bengal by means of its monopoly is so little productive, that were it not for the necessity of bringing home the surplus of the revenues through the medium of trade, lest Bengal should be entirely drained of the precious metals, it would be better for them as a commercial body to give up the trade entirely. However, that trade at present amounts to above a million sterling. It consists chiefly in piece goods and saltpetre, and some indigo; but the price of the Company's freight is so high, that the other



articles which are produced in India, and which are marketable in Europe, cannot be carried, as their bulk is too great in comparison with their value. Thus, then, the commerce which the Company carries on with Bengal is disadvantageous to itself, and does not tend so much to the advantage of that country as it might were it differently managed, and did the price of freight come more nearly to what it is really worth.

The price which it is fixed the private traders are to pay for the freight they occupy in the Company's ships is 5*l.* per ton out and 15*l.* per ton home, which is liable to an addition in time of war. The Company aver, and it is believed, with some truth, that their freight costs them more; but what article, besides the expense of insurance, can repay that price? It is certain that the Company have monopolized the exportation of the most valuable articles; but still they are losers; and how much greater must be the loss of the private traders to whom is left the trade in gross produce, and the raw materials of manufacture alone! A considerable trade has long been carried on with Europe from Bengal by American and foreign vessels, and some clandestine trade.

The majority of these American and foreign vessels have belonged to British subjects resident in India, who thus supply Europe with the produce of Bengal without submitting themselves to the control of the Company, and without paying any duties in London. The amount of this trade is supposed to be one million four hundred thousand pounds<sup>1</sup>.

In order that Government might obtain a control over this trade, that London might become its emporium, and that Great Britain might have the advantage of levying a duty upon the consumption of Europe of Indian articles, the Company were obliged to give 3000 tons, to be increased, when necessary, to the private trade; but the price fixed for that tonnage is very high, because the Company have retained the monopoly of those articles which by their value were most likely to pay the tonnage; and as shipping could be procured at a rate infinitely lower, the foreign or clandestine trade exists to as great a degree at present as it did at the time when the regulation was adopted that the Company should furnish a proportion of tonnage to private traders. These insist that tonnage might be

|                                     |   |   |   |        |
|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|--------|
| <sup>1</sup> Number of ships, about | . | . | . | 30     |
| Tonnage                             | . | . | . | 13,000 |

procured at 3*l.* per ton out, and 3*l.* per ton home. However, it seems certain that tonnage can be procured at a much cheaper rate than that at which the Company supply it; and although it may still be necessary that the trade with Bengal should be carried on through the medium of an exclusive Company, there is no good reason why the people of Great Britain should pay the extravagant price of this tonnage for the Indian goods they consume. in addition to the price they pay for the mismanagement natural to an exclusive Company in all its commercial concerns.

Bengal and Great Britain both suffer from the high price of this freight: Bengal, as it is deprived of the British market for much of its produce; and Great Britain, as it pays a high price for all the Indian commodities which it consumes, and as it is deprived of much of the Bengal produce which would be useful in its manufactures, but which, on account of the high price of freight, cannot be transported with any reasonable prospect of profit. Therefore, as far as this high price of freight tends to deprive Bengal of a market for its produce, the inhabitants have reason to complain of want of encouragement in their agriculture; but they have not more reason to complain than the people of Great Britain, who, from the same arrangements, suffer both as consumers and as merchants and manufacturers.

Without at present entering into the question whether it would be advisable or otherwise to lay open the trade entirely, or whether it would be advisable to suffer an unrestrained intercourse between Great Britain and India, it may be said that policy as well as justice requires that shipping should be found at the lowest rate, in order that due encouragement may be given to the agriculture and commerce of Bengal, and that the private trade should be left as free as the nature of the Company's government at home and abroad will permit it. If measures are not adopted having these objects in view, it is not to be expected that the clandestine and the foreign trade will not increase; and thus Great Britain will lose not only the advantage of being the carriers of Indian produce for all Europe, but likewise the duties which she would be enabled to levy upon the consumption of Europe upon Indian articles in their transit.

Measures having lowness of freight and freedom of trade in view may be adopted upon two principles: either the commerce with India may be laid open to all England from the port of London, and every man who pleases may adventure thither, or

the Company may be the medium of export as well as import. If the former be adopted, the unrestrained resort of British subjects to India must be the consequence, which in another part of this paper I have objected to, and therefore that measure ought to be laid aside; if the latter be adopted, the Company ought to be obliged to find freight at the lowest rate to as great an extent as private merchants might think fit to call for it. These ought to be confined as to the time of calling for it, and they ought to pay for all they call for, even if it is not used. The exportation of British manufactures, excepting of military stores, ought to be free, and private merchants ought to have it in their option to import whatever they might think fit (subject always to the British revenue laws), and all merchandise ought, as at present, to pay the Company's duty, and be exposed to sale at the India House. These regulations would give perfect freedom to the private trade, with cheapness of freight, at the same time that the commerce of Great Britain and Bengal would be under the control of Government. The consequence would probably be the annihilation of the Company's commerce; but as it has been already said that the Company lose by their connection with Bengal, considering it as a commercial concern, no great evil will arise from that circumstance. The Company will be freed from a considerable expense of establishments both at home and abroad, which is incurred at present merely for their commercial concerns; but when the commerce falls into the hands of individuals, and nothing remains to the Company excepting the government, the expenses of the former will be separate from those of the latter, and both will be better and more cheaply carried on.

It has been already said that the Company neither receive more rent from the lands of Bengal, nor do the occupiers pay more under the Company's Government, than the old Governments received, or than the occupiers then paid; but the Company's Government, by taking into their own hands the monopolies of salt and of opium, have raised the revenues upwards of a million sterling, and out of that arises the surplus by means of which the Government are enabled to bring anything home to Europe.

In order to ascertain whether the natives of Bengal have any reason to complain that the surplus of the revenues over the expense is carried to a distant country, it is first necessary to ascertain what proportion is applied to purposes in India, in

which Bengal has an immediate concern, and next what proportion goes home ; and then the question will arise whether the withdrawing these sums from Bengal through the medium of commerce is unfavourable to that country.

The amount of the revenue received under all heads is £5,033,000  
 The charges in Bengal amount to . . . . 3,127,000

Surplus . . £1,906,000

It cannot be contested but that the establishments at Madras and Bombay, Bencoolen and Prince of Wales Island, are essentially necessary to Bengal ; and even if there were no connection between Great Britain and that country, they ought to be supported. The interest of the debts contracted at Madras and Bombay, as they must be supposed to have been contracted in wars in support of the chief establishment, it ought likewise to pay ; and therefore the supplies to those settlements, and the interest of their debts, may be fairly chargeable to Bengal itself, and not to its connection with Great Britain.

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| The surplus, as already stated, is . . . . | £1,906,000 |
| Deduct supplies to Madras and Bombay       | £350,000   |
| „ Prince of Wales Island and               |            |
| Bencoolen . . . .                          | 50,000     |
| Interest of debts in India . . . .         | 561,923    |
|  | <hr/>      |
|  | 961,923    |

The surplus will then be reduced to . . . . £944,077

But it appears that the gross amount of the revenue is made up of sums received upon bills and certificates, and of sums received for sales of goods in Bengal, in addition to the land revenue, the customs, the opium, and salt monopolies. The former, as they may be fairly stated to be received for a value given, ought to be deducted from the amount of the claim, and the account will stand as follows :

|                                |          |
|--------------------------------|----------|
| Surplus as above . . . .       | £944,077 |
| Amount of sales . . . .        | £350,000 |
| Bills and certificates . . . . | 126,461  |
|                                | <hr/>    |
|                                | 476,461  |

Remaining surplus . . . . £467,616  
 K k

The amount of sales ought not to be deducted, as it is not included in the gross amount of the revenue :

|                               |          |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| Surplus as stated . . . . .   | £467,616 |
| Add amount of sales . . . . . | 350,000  |
| Actual surplus . . . . .      | £817,616 |

Thus then the sum which Great Britain draws from Bengal is 817,616*l.*, and this is drawn away in trade.

If the question were, whether the people of Bengal would not be more happy and comfortable if they did not pay more revenue than is necessary to defray the expenses of their establishments, there could be no doubt upon the subject ; and if their own comfort were alone to be considered, the surplus revenue ought to be remitted to them as soon as possible. But, as I shall show hereafter, Great Britain has a right to expect this tribute from them, it is impossible to devise means by which a revenue can be drawn from a people so little to their injury, as that which Great Britain draws is injurious to the natives of Bengal.

If specie were not essentially necessary for all the purposes of commerce, and if a drain to the amount of the surplus above stated would not be felt severely in all transactions of barter and exchange in the country, there would be no harm in sending this revenue home in money. The amount of the demand in Europe of Indian articles remaining the same, the exports from Bengal, the quantity of surplus produce for export, would be precisely equal to what they are at present ; with this difference, that they would be paid for in the manufactures or money of Great Britain, instead of in the money raised from the country. As the case stands at present, there is a large revenue raised from this people : it is spent in the first instance in defending them, and in paying the usual expenses of government ; in the next, in paying the expenses of their dependencies, which may be called their defence ; in the third, in paying the interest of debts contracted for their defence and security ; and in the fourth, in a tribute to Great Britain. The three last may be stated to be laid out in the country in encouragement of agriculture and manufactures. Supposing the sums laid out for the support of Madras, Bombay, &c., for the interest of debts, or for the tribute, were remitted in the revenue, and that the tenantry still continue to pay the same sums as at present, which is more

than probable, it is doubted whether the proprietors of land, into whose hands they would go, would encourage the agriculture and manufactures of the country to the degree that they are at present encouraged by the present application of the revenue ; and in that case if the demand for the produce of Bengal, upon the coast, &c., and in England were to cease, the country would indeed be in a ruinous condition.

Therefore, upon the whole, although the peasants may complain of the amount of what they pay, and that so little is left to them, they have no reason to complain of the manner in which what is taken from them is applied. There is another question upon this part of the subject which has been treated with a considerable degree of asperity in the 'Remarks;' it is whether it is just or right for Great Britain to take any tribute whatever from Bengal? The first question ought to be, whether it is just or right for one country to conquer another? and when the circumstances under which the conquest of Bengal was made are considered, the rights of Great Britain to have made that conquest are very apparent. After a conquest has been made, and the Government is in the possession of the conqueror, it is said in the 'Remarks' he has no right to any advantage but the Government. That would be true in some instances, but otherwise in many others.

Some nations when they have made a conquest gain a barrier to their former dominions, as the French did in their conquests of Alsace, &c., towards the Rhine, and there they have no right to claim any further advantages. Others gain a monopoly of commerce, as all nations in Europe do in the conquest of West India islands, and there likewise they have no right to tribute : others, again, gain the advantage of men and provisions for their armies and fleets, the advantage that the country in question is not connected with another power, such as Great Britain enjoys in her connection with Ireland, from which country, although she defends it, she has no claim to tribute : others get corn at a cheap rate, as Rome did from Egypt, from which country she received no other tribute. But I cannot perceive either a barrier, a useful or necessary monopoly in trade, a connection which gives Great Britain men or provisions for her fleets and armies, or grain at a cheap rate, in Bengal ; and therefore I conclude that in return for the protection which that country undoubtedly receives, Great Britain has some right to expect remuneration. In fact, all conquered countries give the conquerors an advan-

tage in some point of view ; and Bengal gives none to Great Britain, excepting in tribute, which therefore the latter ought to take.

In the 'Remarks' much is said upon the subject of sugars ; great complaints are made that Great Britain, by the high duties she lays upon the importation of sugars from the East Indies, gives an undue preference to the West Indies, to the injury of the former. If the question were abstractedly whether it is proper to pay dearer for a certain commodity when you can get it cheaper, there would be no doubt upon this subject ; and there is no doubt but that the preference given to the West India sugars raises a great tax upon the people of Great Britain, and is highly injurious to the natives of Bengal, who undoubtedly deserve every encouragement that can be given to them. But the subject involves questions of greater magnitude than the authors of the 'Remarks' are aware of, and requires the cool and candid judgment of an unbiassed mind to decide upon it, instead of that of persons who may be fairly stated to be interested in the event.

One leading fact is stated, upon which the whole question turns. It is this : that if the East Indian sugars were admitted at the same rate of duty as the West Indian, even at the present high rate of freight, they would undersell them ; nay, it may be stated that, owing to the disastrous war which has desolated the West India Islands for the last                      years, the price of sugars has been raised so considerably, that the Company have found it expedient to import sugars from Bengal, paying the advanced duty and the high freight.

These circumstances being considered, the avowed consequence of admitting Bengal sugars at an equal duty must be the annihilation of the West India Islands.

Before any measures are taken which can have that effect, it will be wise to ascertain the nature and the quantity of property there is in those islands belonging to British subjects there residing, as well as to those who reside in England, all of whom or whose ancestors have purchased, or otherwise obtained and hold them, under the implied faith of the nation that they were to be supported in them at all times during war, and that the commercial policy of the nation in peace was likewise to be directed towards their support.

It will likewise be wise to ascertain what quantity of property and what quantity of shipping are embarked in this trade

under the same faith ; and after these circumstances will have been nicely ascertained, and that the nation has determined to make good all reasonable losses which individuals may sustain by this change of its commercial policy, it may deliberate upon this question, whether it be more for the advantage of Great Britain to pay this advanced price for the sugars it consumes, and that the natives of Bengal should wait their market for that article ; or that it should make compensation to all individuals concerned in the West Indies or in the trade to the islands, for their losses.

Combined with this question there will be others which will claim the consideration of those who are to decide upon the subject. Their attention will be claimed by the importance of the islands in the hands of other powers of Europe at enmity with Great Britain, the importance of the trade to them as a nursery for seamen, and a certain resource to the nation at the commencement of a war. In those points of view, even supposing that the pecuniary considerations were out of the question, they are of the utmost consequence. I have not materials to form a judgment of their political importance to Great Britain supposing them in the hands of other European powers, but as a nursery for seamen, a few facts will show their consequence.

It has been said that the climate of the West Indies is so unwholesome that a residence in it is fatal to most of those who go there.

Without disputing that fact, I may safely assert that it is not more unwholesome or unfavourable to European constitutions than the climate of Bengal. Generally speaking all tropical climates are equally so, and that alone which makes one preferable to another is the difference of the conveniences and luxuries which are in use by the inhabitants to render the climate more bearable. Bengal is more favourable to the higher class of Europeans than other climates, because it is the custom and the fashion there for them to take more care of themselves ; but it is not more so to the lower orders of people than other places situated in the tropics, as they have not more means of taking care of themselves, more luxuries and conveniences there, than they have elsewhere. Therefore upon the whole it may be safely said that Great Britain does not lose more seamen in the one country than in the other, considering the proportion of the numbers employed in each.

But the advantage which the West India trade has over



that of the East is, that the seamen are a shorter time absent from their own country in the former than they are in the latter. A voyage to the West Indies may be stated at six months, during half of which time only can it be stated that the men are in a bad climate; whereas a voyage to the East Indies always lasts eighteen months, generally two years, and four-fifths of that time are spent in a climate avowedly unfavourable to European constitutions. Therefore supposing the numbers employed in each were the same, it may be concluded that the loss of lives would be greatest in that in which they remained longest. But there is another reason why the West India trade is a preferable employment for seamen. The voyage is so quickly performed that the nation has them always in her power; the fleets can be manned from them in a short space of time: whereas if the seamen from the East India fleet were the only or principal dependence for manning the navy, weeks and months might elapse after a declaration of war before the fleets could put to sea, and the disadvantages thereof might have the most fatal consequences. The seamen employed in the West India trade are generally more expert than those employed in the trade to the East Indies. They navigate seas in which there is a greater diversity of weather than there is in a voyage to the East Indies, during which, if it is commenced at the proper season, there will probably be no occasion to alter the sails once, however long it may be.

Upon the whole, therefore, the West India trade may be stated to be the best school for seamen, and their importance to the welfare, even to the existence of Great Britain, should induce the Legislature to adopt with great caution any measure which can diminish the West India trade in order to give a preference to that with the East.

It is to be observed upon this part of the subject, that it has no relation to the existence of the Company's exclusive privileges of commerce. It is a subject for the consideration of Parliament, entirely distinct from that of their monopoly. The other articles which are stated in the 'Remarks' to labour under the same inconveniences, such as silk, tobacco, &c., as being loaded with high duties on their importation from India, in order that they may not come in competition with similar articles the produce of foreign European nations or of America, must likewise be considered in the same point of view. The necessity of a naval defence for Great Britain causes the necessity of

encouraging commerce with all parts of the globe, particularly with those parts which are most contiguous to it. If the commerce of Great Britain were confined to one quarter alone, its sources of wealth might be stopped ; the efforts of its enemies, by being directed against that quarter, might at all events do the country the greatest injury in time of war, and in the event of success the country would be entirely ruined. As long as its commerce is directed to all quarters, it must flourish ; one source may be cut off, but others will be found.

Having considered the whole of this subject, I conclude, first, that agriculture is considerably encouraged under the administration of the British government in Bengal ; that the measures recommended in the 'Remarks,' viz. to allow Europeans to become purchasers, are impolitic, and ought not to be adopted ; but that other measures might be adopted which would give to agriculture all the encouragement it could require.

2. I conclude that it is not advisable to throw open the trade, but that the Company ought to be obliged to furnish private traders with the quantity of tonnage they might require at the lowest rate at which it could be got. That the import of Bengal articles ought to be as free for private traders as for the Company, and the export of British produce (military stores excepted) ought to be the same.

3. That the tribute is not so prejudicial to Bengal as it is stated, and that it is a matter of right, founded upon the policy usually adopted by modern and ancient nations in regard to conquered countries.

4. I conclude that the protection given to West India sugars, and to other articles the produce of Europe and America, to the prejudice of the same produced in Bengal, is necessary on account of the want of seamen for the British navy.

ARTHUR WESLEY.

#### 276. On Dearth in India.<sup>1</sup>

*Occasion of the discussion. Personal experience of the calamity which suggested it. The discussion falls under three heads.*

1. *Different modes of cultivation ; and effect upon them of deficient rainfall. Area watered by the two monsoons respectively. Speaking generally, the natives avail themselves of one monsoon only, in each place. The cultivation is either*

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<sup>1</sup> Written on the voyage home from India.—Ed.

*of wet or of dry lands; the former mostly producing rice. Rice lands are watered by either (1) rain, (2) canals from rivers, (3) tanks filled directly by rain, or by canals supplied from monsoon floods, or (4) by wells, filled by rain. How these methods of irrigation are carried out; and their comparative dependence upon the monsoons. Limited extent of the rice-producing country. The dry lands are watered by the western rains. The produce throughout, of both kinds of lands, ultimately depends mainly on the timely arrival and extent of the periodical rains. To improve the cultivation of either kind of lands, so as to supersede this dependence, seems not very feasible<sup>1</sup>.*

I read lately in a Bombay newspaper a statement of a speech made by Sir James Macintosh, the Recorder of Bombay, to the Grand Jury of that settlement, in the course of which, after having adverted to the charitable disposition manifested by its inhabitants to the famished Natives of the neighbouring continent, and the efforts made by the government of Bombay to provide for the relief of those who had come to that island, in search of food, he observes upon the frequent occurrence of dearth in India, and upon the more fatal effects produced by it in that part of the world, in comparison with those produced by the occurrence of a similar calamity in other regions. He particularly points out these two evils as subjects deserving investigation, into which he proposes to inquire, and to which he will draw the attention of his hearers at a future period.

I happened to be in the Deccan in the years 1803 and 1804, during the time this dearth existed, and the calamities occurred which have drawn the attention of Sir James Macintosh, and have excited the charitable feelings of all the inhabitants of Bombay; and as I have had opportunities which few others have, of viewing the Natives of India in their various relations with each other, when concerned with Europeans, as I particularly saw the cause and progress of the evil which every man must lament, and had occasion to advert to the modes which were practicable of alleviating it, I will enter into a consideration of the general subject, which, I hope, will not be deemed entirely useless.

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<sup>1</sup> The paper appears to be unfinished, the second and third heads being omitted. But see, in the Appendix, an extract from Dr. Hunter's *Annals of Rural Bengal*.—Ed.

The dearth and consequent famine which occurred in the Decan in 1803 and 1804, was to be attributed principally to the dry season of 1803. Those who are not acquainted with the systems of government and the customs of the inhabitants of India, or with the nature of the climate, will be of opinion that the recurrence of the dearth might be prevented by a better system of cultivation, or that the pernicious effects of the dearth of the grain in any particular part, viz. famine, and the mortality of its inhabitants, might be prevented by measures of the government.

In order to clear the subject of all difficulty, it is necessary, 1st, to consider generally the different modes of cultivating the land in practice throughout India, and in what manner these modes are affected by a wet or a dry season; 2ndly, to consider in what manner the deficiency produced by the seasons in any particular part could be remedied by the government in that part; and, 3rdly, what are the physical or moral causes which prevent the application of those remedies.

It is well known that the rains in India, which are the great source of all the cultivation, are periodical; and that the whole of the continent does not enjoy the benefit of them at the same time of the year. The western rains, or those which set in in the month of June, with what is called the S.W. monsoon, have by far the greatest influence. They prevail in the whole of Hindustan, including the provinces of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa, all along the western coast of the peninsula, from Surat to Cape Comorin, and across the peninsula, as far as the eastern mountains, commonly called the range of Eastern ghauts. Even the countries to the eastward of this eastern range, the Carnatic and the Northern Circars, are not entirely exempt from their influence, as the rain falls heavily at times in those countries in the months of June, July, and August, the season of the westerly rains; but not in sufficient quantities, in those parts of India, to induce the inhabitants to take advantage of it for the purposes of cultivation.

The countries on the eastern coast of the peninsula, extending from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, and inland as far as the eastern mountains, have the advantage of the eastern rains for the cultivation of their lands; and these begin generally in October, with the N.E. monsoon, and last till towards the end of December.

The rain which falls at this season reaches the other parts of

India, as well as the provinces situated on the Bay of Bengal; but it is very partial, and very much in proportion to their neighbourhood to the eastern mountains; and it does not appear that the inhabitants of any of the countries to the west of those mountains take advantage of the easterly rains for the purposes of cultivation, excepting in Mysore.

It follows, then, from this account, that, although the whole of India may be watered in some degree by rains which fall at two different seasons, in June and in October, the inhabitants of Hindustan, of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa; of the coast of Malabar, from Surat to Cape Comorin; and of the whole peninsula of India, from the Western sea to the Eastern ghauts, take advantage of the western rains only for the cultivation of their lands; and that the inhabitants of the countries situated on the Bay of Bengal, as far as the eastern range of mountains, take advantage of the eastern rains for the same purposes.

To this statement the Mysore country is an exception. The eastern rains fall heavily, particularly in the eastern parts of that country, and advantage is taken of them in cultivation; and it will appear presently, when I come to consider the different species of cultivation, that the inhabitants of some countries in the Carnatic, through which rivers run which rise in the Western ghauts, and empty themselves in the Bay of Bengal, have likewise the advantage of the western rains in their cultivation; as the rivers which supply them with water are filled by the western rains.

It is well known that the cultivation in India is either of wet land or of dry. The great produce of what is called wet land is rice, excepting in some very particular spots, on which the produce is occasionally wheat, sugar, or Indian corn. But these three last ought more properly to be termed exceptions from the general rule, and do not deserve consideration in a discussion respecting the causes or the consequences of dearth.

In the cultivation of rice the land is watered either, 1st, directly by the fall of the rain; or, 2ndly, by artificial canals made by the embankments of rivers; or, 3rdly, by tanks filled by the rains, or by the overflow of rivers, or torrents, the water running into them by canals; or, 4thly, by wells filled by the rain, from which the water is drawn by manual labour or that of cattle.

The greatest part of the cultivation of the wet lands in the province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, is carried on by the first mode; and, of course, the produce must depend entirely upon the critical arrival of the rains, and upon

the quantity of the rain that falls. This quantity generally overflows the whole country ; and in Bengal, particularly, the crop is reaped in boats.

The fall of the water in many of the rivers in India is very great, so much so as to render the rivers torrents in the season of the rains ; and the banks of some of these are low. In these cases dams are thrown across the rivers ; by which means the water is diverted from the principal channel into others for the purposes of cultivation. It frequently happens that the fall of the principal river is so great, and the dam is so well constructed, as to throw water into the inferior channels for the purposes of cultivation, even at the season in which the river is not full. The produce of the lands through which these rivers run, particularly those from which water can be drawn when the river is not quite full, is far less precarious than of those lands which depend solely upon the rains. Of this description are all the lands upon the river Cauvery, from its rise in the western mountains, in all its progress through Mysore, and the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, till it falls into the sea. Innumerable canals are cut from it ; and these happy countries are certain of a crop, whether the rains are abundant or otherwise. In some instances these canals, after watering a great extent of country, fall again into the river ; in others they are led to great tanks, which afford a constant supply of water for the cultivation of the land in the neighbourhood ; and in every case the cultivation of the country is independent of the rains.

I did not see any river in India of which so much advantage was taken in this way as of the Cauvery ; as none that I saw had such a fall, or banks equally low.

The greatest part of Mysore and nearly the whole of the Carnatic, excepting the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, receive the water for the purposes of the cultivation of their wet lands from tanks. These are filled either by the periodical rains, the water which falls in their neighbourhood running into them and being retained by their banks, or by the overflow of some of the rivers, or rather torrents, which are filled by the eastern rains. Canals are cut from these, which conduct the waters into the tanks.

The beds of these torrents are dry during the whole year, excepting in the season of the rains, and in some instances banks have been built across them at different distances to retain the water. In this manner a river will appear to be a chain of tanks.

Although the countries watered by these tanks, whether filled by the rains, or by the overflow of the torrents, are more certain of a crop than those which depend solely upon the fall of the rain in their field, they are not in so good a situation as those watered by such a river as the Cauvery. I know of no tanks or canals in any part of India excepting in the Company's territories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore and in the Carnatic.

Wells for the purposes of cultivation are filled either by the fall of the rain into them, or by a canal cut from a river. The water is drawn from them by manual labour; but they are little used for the purposes of wet cultivation, excepting in parts of the Northern Circars, and in the Company's territories in Benares and Oude, and generally throughout India, for watering wheat fields, sugar cane, Indian corn, and gardens. I am informed that the whole country of Benares is watered by wells; but those which I have seen in other parts have done little more than afford water to the garden grounds or sugar cane.

A country watered by wells is less dependent for its crop upon the periodical rains than one which receives the water immediately from the heavens into its fields; but such a country is less certain of a sufficient supply of water than one which receives what it requires from tanks or canals.

What I have above written applies solely to the cultivation of wet lands, the produce of which is properly rice. But rice, as the produce of wet lands, is the food of but a very small proportion of the inhabitants of India. This grain is eaten generally in the province of Bengal, along the coasts of India from Orissa and Cape Comorin, and from Cape Comorin to Surat; but it is not the food of the people of the upper countries, that is, of those who inhabit the countries between the eastern and western range of mountains in the peninsula, of the inhabitants of Hindustan those of Oude, Benares, or Bahar. In the greatest part of this immense tract of country the soil is of a black garden mould which would not produce rice; and in Mysore, parts of which do produce great quantities of that grain, it is not the food of the common people, but is used as an article of commerce with the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. The inhabitants of all these countries subsist upon what are called dry grains, or the produce of the dry lands; and the nature of the cultivation of these lands of course requires the attention of the person who considers this subject. As the countries which are watered by the eastern

rains produce rice, and that is the common food of their people, those who depend upon the produce of the dry lands for their food are the inhabitants of the countries which are watered by the western rains.

They depend for their crop greatly upon the rain which falls on the land which they cultivate ; they plough the land and sow the seed with the first rains, and they reap it in the months of December and January. If the rain fails they lose it entirely.

In some parts of India they have small spots of ground watered by wells, which are ploughed early in the season, and produce an early crop. But these appear to be cultivated principally for fodder for the cattle ; and at all events, whatever may be the intention, the produce from these small spots of ground must be so small, as to afford subsistence to their cultivators for a very short space of time.

The produce of the land, therefore, and the subsistence of the people throughout India, depend entirely upon the critical arrival and the quantity of the periodical rains ; and if these should fail in any particular part of the country, the people of that part must want subsistence.

It does not appear that it would be very possible to improve this system of cultivation either of wet or of dry lands. The rains which fall in the province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, are generally so heavy, and the countries are so flat and so completely overflowed, as to preclude the possibility of constructing the works, and canals and tanks, which insure the rice crop in parts of Mysore and the Carnatic, and render it less uncertain in others.

The cultivation of dry lands appears equally incapable of improvement. If more wells were dug, the dependence upon the rain would not be quite so absolute ; but the number to be dug, in order to produce any effect upon the cultivation and produce of the land, must be very great, and the work would be exceedingly expensive. In a year of famine, the grain produced by the land watered by a well would pay the expense of constructing it ; but in the years in which the fall of rain would be plentiful, the well would not be used.

It remains, then, to be considered whether any means can be adopted, either to make the superfluity of one year supply the want of another, or the superfluity of one country provide for the wants of that not so well provided.



## VIII. PERSONAL HISTORY.

## 1. LORD CLIVE.

## 277. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Colonel Wellesley explains the Governor-General's policy and proposed measures. Lord Clive's character and bearing.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 15th Sept., 1798.

I have had a long conversation with General Harris. He has kept me in Fort St. George in order, as he says, to co-operate with him in keeping Lord Clive in the right road. I think that we shall succeed in that object. He has already stated his determination to enter into no discussions with your Government.

I was with him for five hours this morning. We read over first your private letter to General Harris, and I explained all those parts which had any reference to your plans at Hyderabad and Poonah, and those which you have for the defence of the Carnatic in future. We then read over those parts of the instructions to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah which explain the connection between the negotiations there and the offers from Tippoo; and I took much pains to make him understand the reasons why it was necessary that the negotiation at the one Court should be known by, approved of, and go hand in hand with, that at the other. When I left him he was strongly impressed, first, with the necessity which existed of taking the steps which have been taken to drive the French party out of the Deccan; secondly, equally so of that of forcing Scindiah back into Hindustan; and thirdly, he is perfectly reconciled to the measure of weakening the army in the centre division, in order to insure the first, and to enable the Resident at Poonah to proceed with the second. He is convinced that these measures could not have been taken without assembling an army in the Carnatic; and he sees clearly that it is not your intention to precipitate the country into a war; but that even after you will have obtained the objects at Hyderabad and Poonah, the question of war or peace with Tippoo will depend upon your state of preparation, his state of preparation, the

state of your finances, and the other considerations which must ever have weight in such decisions. He was very anxious to know what your plan of operation for the Bombay army was; what for that in the Carnatic; the strength of the detachment you intended to send from Bengal; when it was to march, and when likely to arrive; what money he was to expect. I could give him no certain information upon any of these points. I told him generally that your idea was, that the Bombay army should begin by an attack upon Mangalore, and afterwards proceed up the Ghauts; that for the present the operations of the army in the Carnatic were to be merely defensive, and as such must depend upon the nature of the attack; that I believed you intended two regiments of infantry for the service of this Government, and that they were to march through Berar from the north-west frontier towards November, and that it was supposed they might arrive here by the end of January. I told him that you intended to send him money as soon as you knew what were his monthly expenses. I have requested him to send you a copy of a memorandum he has received from Colonel Close upon these subjects, upon which I shall make no remark, excepting that you will perceive it is written upon a very erroneous notion, as he presumes that the necessity of chastising Tippoo is more urgent than that which exists of sending the detachment to the Nizam. In some other points it is remarkably well done, and worthy of your attention.

I think that some pains had been taken to mislead Lord Clive and to frighten him. He is a mild, moderate man, remarkably reserved, having a bad delivery, and apparently a heavy understanding. He certainly has been unaccustomed to consider questions of the magnitude of that now before him, but I doubt whether he is so dull as he appears, or as people here imagine he is. He communicated with me very freely upon all these points, but he did not say one word about any of the persons who are about him. I can see plainly that they have magnified the difficulties of the undertaking to him, and so I told him. As he is convinced of the necessity of the measures in which you are embarked, and as he will soon be so of the exaggerated style in which everything has been stated to him, I shall have an advantage over them of which I shall not fail to profit; at all events, you may be convinced that he will give you no trouble. I encouraged him to open his mind to you without reserve.

**278. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.**

*Lord Clive's disposition. The Governor-General should treat him with forbearance and confidence.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 19th Oct., 1798.

Lord C. opens his mind to me very freely upon all subjects. I give him my opinion, and talk as I would to M. The truth is, he does not want talents, but he is very diffident of himself; and now that he has begun to find out that there is no conjuration in transacting the business of Government, he improves daily, takes more upon himself, and will very shortly have less confidence and reliance than he must have at present upon the opinions and abilities of those who have long done the business of the country. A violent or harsh letter from Fort William would spoil all. The conduct which I recommend is, perfect confidence with him upon all subjects, and I would extend it even to his government when it is safe to do so. There should be no jealousy, as there is really no danger, of an interference in the duties or prerogatives of the Supreme Government; and if by chance either should be assumed by this Government, upon an occasion not very material, it would be better to pass it over, and not to notice any excepting upon an occasion when the invasion of either may prove detrimental to the service. My idea in this is to avoid disputes upon petty subjects, which have one effect only, that of erecting little men, such as —, who are to manage them, into great ones. Small faults and omissions in the obedience to the orders of the Supreme Government, provided they do not lead to bad consequences, ought, for the same reason, to be passed over. It may be depended upon that perfect confidence, refraining from noticing faults such as I have mentioned, and from naming or alluding to the persons whom M. thinks adverse to him, will have the best effects.

**279. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.**

*Lord Clive is only unfamiliar with official routine, not hostile to the Governor-General. A private letter from Lord Mornington would set him right.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 26th Nov., 1798.

I hope that this letter will arrive before Mornington will have written to Lord Clive, after the perusal of the general letter which

you mention. It is of the utmost consequence to the success of all his measures that they should remain upon good terms, and that Mornington, in conformity to his own determination, should refrain from all discussions with this Government : those alone can occasion any unpleasant difference, the inevitable consequence of which must be to bring into notice and increase the influence of — and others, who must manage the discussion on this side ; as, whatever I may think of Lord Clive's abilities, I don't deem him equal to cope with Mornington. He will, therefore, call in the assistance of those who[m] he thinks most able, and thus will his dependence upon and confidence in them be increased.

My opinion is, that when Lord Clive was signing the general letter, he did not know whether everything was put into its proper department ; nor did he know that it was not his duty to sign to every part of the letter. This is to be attributed to his inexperience in business, and not to opinions which he may be supposed to have formed inimical to the measures of the Supreme Government ; as, notwithstanding his extreme reserve and caution in delivering his opinions, I have got out of him what he thinks of the measures of that Government, and he has unequivocally stated it as his opinion that Mornington could not do otherwise than he has done, both with respect to the Allies and to the enemy. Indeed this opinion is very general in the settlement. If he has done an improper thing in writing in the public department upon a subject which had been before the Council in the secret department ; if, contrary to the usual forms of office, business which ought to have remained for some time longer in the latter was improperly removed to the former, I think that it would be advisable that Mornington should write him a private letter about it, and warn him of the bad consequences of such a departure from the rules of office.

**280. To Josiah Webb, Esq.**

*Corrupt and mischievous interference of the Directors in the patronage of the Madras Government.*

Serlingapatam, 21st Oct., 1801.

I had heard a report of the circumstance which you have communicated to me, but I had not an idea of the extent of the intended changes, and I could not believe, till I received your letter, that it was really intended to remove you from your office.

I agree entirely in opinion with you regarding the effects which, it is pretty clear, it is meant should be produced by the proposed alterations. There is another effect to which you have not adverted, and that is, that they will infallibly drive out of the country every man who wishes well to the public cause, and who prizes his character. As soon as the old system of rapacity in the provinces is revived, and not only countenanced, but encouraged by the government, which will be the consequence of these changes, the greediness of the public servants will be as odious to the government as their dishonesty is at this moment; and those who have always resisted rapacity, and who do not feel inclined to be rapacious, will become the objects of public censure. As for my part, I have determined that as soon as these changes take place, and that I find that it is intended to introduce the new system of dubashery and rapacity into this country, I shall withdraw, and I believe every honest man who is not obliged to stay will do the same.

I cannot conceive what can have produced these changes in England. Surely Lord Wellesley's friends and Lord Hobart could have prevented the effects of any violent calumny against your character. It cannot be possible that the new Board of Control have thrown themselves into the hands of the Directors, and all the jobbers that have gone from this country from time to time; but certainly these last arrangements have all the appearance of the neglect of Indian affairs by those who wish well to the public cause, and of the triumph of those of a different description. At all events I think that you cannot stay if you lose your office; and Lord Clive cannot stay if a secretary is to be forced upon him with a view to an alteration in the system of his government against his inclination. I don't know in what manner Lord Wellesley could interfere to stop these arrangements: his presence at Madras would probably prevent the consequences to be apprehended from a change of men for a time; but as soon as he would return to his own government, or as he should go to England, Lord Clive, supposing him to remain, would not have strength to stem the system of rapacity; and, supposing that he should be withdrawn, it becomes established at once. Upon the whole, therefore, I see no remedy for the evils which will be the undoubted consequence of this change of men.

I wish now for your own sake that you had gone to Poonah.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

281. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*The same subject.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 5th Nov., 1801.

You will have heard of the late dismissals and changes at Madras. All of them are known to be extremely disagreeable to the Governor-General, and many of them are, I believe, in direct contradiction to his express recommendation. The case of Mr. Oakes is a very strong one; he had been appointed first member of the Board of Revenue by the Court of Directors, but went home upon finding that he had no chance of getting the appointment, as government were determined not to make a vacancy. Immediately after his departure a vacancy was made, and Lord Wellesley appointed Mr. Cockburn to fill it; since that period I am informed that Lord W. has repeatedly recommended that Mr. Oakes should not be sent out at least to that situation, and he has lately taken a very strong measure in favour of Mr. Cockburn, in order to induce him to remain in India to carry into execution the plans in contemplation for establishing the judicial system in the territories under the government of Fort St. George. All these arrangements, &c., are at an end by the fresh appointment by the Court of Directors of Mr. Oakes to be first member of the Board of Revenue. This is a subject which it is impossible for any man with any feeling to pass over.

The dismissal of Webbe and the disapprobation expressed of almost all the measures of this government, which I believe have been approved of by Lord Wellesley, are still more unpleasant, and render it more impossible for Lord Wellesley to carry on his government, although, probably, it might not be so necessary to notice these acts as it is to notice those regarding Mr. Cockburn and Mr. Oakes. You are, of course, acquainted with Lord Clive's character, and the dependence which Lord Wellesley has placed in Mr. Webbe to carry on this government, and you will conceive in what manner he will feel what has been done regarding this gentleman. As for Lord Clive, I don't see how it is possible for him to remain one hour after he will have an opportunity of going away; and of this I am very certain, that after what has passed, if he does manifest so little feeling as to stay in India, he will be turned out as soon as this

his intention shall be known in London. So that I think there is some reason to believe that the Governor-General is not very popular at the India House.

282. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*The same subject. Members of Council incited to oppose their Governors.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 4th June, 1802.

We hear nothing yet of a successor to Lord Clive. His Lordship certainly informed the Court of Directors that he would not hold the government longer than January, 1803; and not even so long, unless certain points were explained to his satisfaction. The points on which he and the Court are at issue are the interference of the Court in the appointments to offices under this government, the sending back to India persons sent home for their crimes, and the encouragement given by the Court of Directors to a spirit of controversy and opposition in the Councils. The Court of Directors have appointed persons to the office of Chief Secretary of Government, to situations in the Boards of Revenue and Trade, and to the principal commercial residencies under this government. The selections for these offices have not only been made without the consent or recommendation of Lord Clive, but have been from persons of whose conduct his Lordship has disapproved publicly, and from others whom he or his predecessors have sent home for their misdemeanours.

They have sent back to India with appointments to offices, or with strong recommendations, many persons who have been sent home; among others, one young gentleman who was convicted, and did not even deny that he had taken a bribe to make a judicial decision.

They have in a manner ordered their councillors to oppose their Governors; and the consequence is, that the greatest part of the time of the Governor is now employed in answering the opposition of the members of his Council. In my opinion, the interference of the government at home in the disposal of the patronage of the governments abroad, and the encouragement given to controversy and opposition in the Councils, are directly contrary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the Act of Parliament. At all events, these acts are in direct contradiction to

the principles upon which we are taught to believe the Act of Parliament was framed, and it is very obvious that a continuance of them will soon settle all questions of British power in India.

We are well aware of the manner in which persons sent home for their crimes obtain the consent of the Court of Directors to come out again, and others obtain their orders to the governments abroad to appoint them to offices for which they may have been deemed entirely unfit. These modes of obtaining the favour and recommendation of the government at home may be highly profitable to those who are concerned in them; but they won't answer for a foreign and distant government, particularly not for the British government in India. Upon the whole, I cannot but applaud Lord Clive's determination to bring these subjects before the public if such an explanation be not given of them as will enable him or any person of character to hold the government hereafter.

## 2. MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

### 283. To Major Malcolm.

*The Madras permanent settlement well carried out by Malcolm. Corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall Street in the operations of Lord Wellesley's government, incompatible with his retention of office; and ruinous in tendency to British power in India.*

(Extract.)

Serlingapatam, 20th April, 1802.

The arrangements made by you at Madras must have been very satisfactory to Lord Wellesley. They have secured the accomplishment of an important measure, the permanent settlement of the revenue in the territories under the government of Fort St. George, and the cordiality and co-operation of that government with the Supreme government at the present crisis. If the permanent settlement of the revenue had been left to the present board of Revenue, that measure would never have been effected; and if Lord Clive had gone to England, the government which would have succeeded to him would have quarrelled with the Supreme government, and, under the spurious names of reform of military expenditure and increase of investment, would have been guilty of every enormity that has lately met with the



approbation and patronage of the Court of Directors. The merit of the arrangements which have prevented these evils depends upon the characters of the individuals affected by them ; and the degree of approbation which will be given to them at home will be in proportion to the knowledge which people have of the characters of the leading men in India, particularly of those of the favourites of the Court of Directors. I hope, therefore, that Lord W. has taken care in his despatches to bring a few facts to the knowledge of his friends in England. I rejoice to hear that he intends to go home, if justice is not done to him by the Court of Directors ; and if the ministers do not give him security that he shall not be again liable to the corrupt and vulgar interference of Leadenhall street in the operations of his government. Their appointment to all the principal offices at Fort St. George, and the encouragement which I understand they have given to their councils to oppose the acts of their governors, are inconsistent with the spirit of, if not directly contrary to, the law ; and their sending out to India all those who have been sent home for misbehaviour must, if not prevented in future, end in the annihilation of all British power in India. All these measures are aimed directly at Lord Wellesley, and he cannot remain in the government, and no *gentleman* can succeed to him, if means are not taken to prevent them in future.

#### 284. To Major Malcolm.

*Lord Wellesley justified in suspending the execution of the Court's orders for abolishing the College. The question of his resignation not affected by those orders.*

Seringapatam, 12th July, 1802.

I am very much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th June, which, with its enclosure, fully explains the College question, and the conduct of the Governor-General in regard to the orders which he has received. It appears that he has taken the only ground that it was possible for him to take ; and he is fully justified in the delay to abolish the institution, by the approbation which the Court of Directors have given to it, which would have induced them to continue it, if the Company had not laboured, as they imagined, under financial embarrassments ; by the fact that those embarrassments no longer exist ; and by the circumstances of the persons belonging to the in-

stitution, who, if it was suddenly abolished, would be deprived of bread.

I think that the question, whether Lord Wellesley should go home or not, now stands precisely where it did before he received these orders. He had no reason to expect any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, till his appeal to the King's ministers should have been received, and till they could have acted in consequence. If the grounds were good on which he determined to remain in India another year, and if the Court of Directors should desire it, and recall some of their offensive orders, and should promise support in future, and if the ministers should engage for that support,—they are equally good at present. He expected injury when he was induced to come to this determination; and, now that it has been received, he ought not to alter it. In fact, if the Court of Directors and the ministers should act as Lord Wellesley has required, the College question, as well as all others, will be given up to him; the government at home will approve of the delay in the execution of the orders recently received, and finally, of that institution.

In what I have above written, I have not considered whether the Indian ministers have the power, the ability, or the inclination, to force the Court of Directors to act as Lord Wellesley requires; or whether, if they have, the Court of Directors will be sincere and cordial in the support which they may engage to give. These questions, I conclude, were maturely considered when Lord Wellesley determined to remain in India another year, on certain conditions; and they are not affected by the orders to abolish the College, and ought not now to be taken into consideration.

I think that affairs in Europe are in a curious state. I wish that you would send me one set of newspapers from the 1st Jan. last.

**285. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.**

*The Ministers have broken faith with, and are not prepared to support, you; nor are they properly alive to the value of your services. You are in danger of being dismissed; which would be a great evil on public grounds, as well as injurious to your character. You should therefore fix, and announce to the Directors, the earliest convenient time for your departure, i.e. the 1st of October. Were the war not at an end, I*

*should have recommended an earlier time. For you could not then have wound up affairs, as you may now do by October.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 31st Jan., 1804.

I received last night the duplicate of your letter of the 6th, and your letter of the 9th instant, and I am rejoiced to find that you approve of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar.

I have considered Henry's letter of the 31st August with all the attention which the subject deserves, and I shall now give you my unreserved opinion upon it. It appears that the King's Ministers say that they are fully aware of the magnitude of your services in this country, and are sensible of the necessity that Great Britain should continue to enjoy the advantage of them; but they are not sufficiently strong, or they do not choose to incur the risk of supporting you against the attacks of the Court of Directors: that is to say, in other words, 'we enjoy a great benefit, and we wish to continue to enjoy it, but we won't pay the price which it must cost us; a price which, by the by, common justice to a man whom we have placed, and upon whom we have prevailed to remain, in an arduous situation, ought to induce us to pay at any rate.' In addition to this, the Prime Minister, the man who ought to be most anxious to secure these services for the nation, says that, as your private friend, he cannot advise you to remain in India beyond the last year; and he says this almost in the same breath with a declaration of the magnitude and importance of the continuance of your services, and a dissertation upon certain circumstances respecting your successor, which render him not so fit a person for the office of Governor-General as might be wished.

The first observation that occurs upon this subject is, that the Ministers are guilty of a breach of faith. They promised you their support, and now they refuse to give it. Another observation is, that they are not so sensible of the magnitude and importance of your services as they tell you and your friends they are; and that in fact they are indifferent whether the nation continues to have the benefit of them, and that they prefer losing them to taking the trouble of giving you the support which is necessary in order that you may continue in your office; in other words, the vote of Mr. Tierney or of Mr. Fonblanque is of greater importance than the continuance of your services as Governor-General.

On this ground I have not the smallest hesitation in saying

that you should not delay your departure from India one moment beyond that on which you will have completely executed all the measures which are in course at this moment. When I say completely executed, I don't mean that you should stay till all your views and plans for the peace and prosperity of India will have been carried into effect, because that may yet take time, possibly more than the Court of Directors or the King's Ministers will allow you to hold your office. But I would recommend that you should fix a time in which you might possibly complete every thing, and on no account whatever ought you to stay beyond that time.

There is no doubt that you cannot go in March. It is probable that you will not have received the treaty of peace with Scindiah till late in this month, and one month will not be sufficient for executing all the arrangements connected with and depending on that treaty; but the beginning of October is a good season for sailing to England, particularly from Bengal, and in my opinion you ought to go then, whatever may be the state of our affairs.

You ought to take the earliest opportunity of apprising the Court of Directors of this your determination; and if the King's Ministers should make you acquainted with this new intention not to support you, or if you should think the report made by Henry of his conversation with Mr. Addington sufficient authority, you ought to inform the Ministers of the reasons for which you had come to this determination, and that you would have departed at an earlier period if the season had permitted it.

It may be said that there is but little difference between the beginning of October and the month of December, and that you will have more time for your business, and a better season for your voyage, if you should sail in December: in fact there is but little difference; but in my opinion there is great danger of your being dismissed from your office, and I need not point out the bad effects which that will have in this country. It is probable that the Ministers might be induced to resist this measure, if they saw that you had determined to go home upon the first opportunity that the season would afford; but they would not do so if they should find that you delayed your departure beyond the first opportunity after you received the intimation of their determination not to give you the support which you have required.

I therefore most anxiously recommend you to fix the 1st of

October for the period of your departure, and to take the earliest opportunity of informing the Court of Directors thereof.

You will observe that the opinion I have given you answers your four questions. I am convinced that you will receive orders to resign the government to Sir George Barlow, if you don't announce your determination to go away when the season will permit. These orders will, in my opinion, be more fatal to the public interests in this country, to your character, and to the power which you now possess of forwarding the interests of this empire in England, than the failure of all the plans which you have in contemplation for the public benefit by your leaving the execution of them to Sir George Barlow, even supposing that failure to be certain.

But much time remains between this and the month of October, and much may be done; and it is more than probable that Sir George Barlow will be inclined to adhere to your principles, and to carry your plans strictly into execution. I declare that, if the war still existed, I should have recommended you to go away in March, for the same reason that I now recommend you to go in October. You could not foresee the conclusion of the war, and you would have every reason to expect a recall, which would be more fatal to the public interests than the failure of all your plans for carrying on the war, or for the re-establishment of peace. Besides, in that case your remaining in India after being informed that you were not to receive the support which you had always declared to be necessary to induce you to remain, would have appeared like an adhesion to the office.

Under present circumstances you remain for a certain time, in order, as far as is possible in that time, to conclude certain arrangements, the issue of which is not so uncertain as the operations of a war must be, and at the expiration of that time you announce your determination to go, whether those arrangements are concluded or not.

## 286. To Colonel Malcolm.

*Is not the appointment of Lord Cornwallis intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley?*

(Extract.)

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

You will have been astonished to hear of Lord Cornwallis's appointment to succeed to Lord Wellesley. There are letters here for the latter from Lady Wellesley, which I believe were dispatched from England in November, from which circumstance I judge that he was expected to return before it was determined to appoint Lord Cornwallis. But you know well that I expected that some measures would be adopted to force Lord Wellesley to quit his situation, if he delayed to resign it; and that I informed him of this opinion and the grounds on which I had formed it. Mr. Pitt's appointment to office made some alteration in these grounds, but not a very essential one. I believe that Mr. Pitt has been known to interfere but little in the departments of government, of which he trusts the management to others, and that he refrains particularly from all interference in the affairs of India. If this should be the case, the administration of India is the same now as it was in the time of Mr. Addington; and the only difference in respect to Lord Wellesley is the greater degree of intimacy subsisting between him and Mr. Pitt, and the greater degree of reluctance which ———— would feel in proposing his removal to Mr. Pitt than to Mr. Addington.

I acknowledge that I am of opinion that this arrangement is intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley, which opinion is founded upon a variety of circumstances which came to my knowledge before I quitted India, with which you are well acquainted. I can see nothing in the papers to the end of February to lead my judgment on this subject; and there is, against the opinion that I have formed, a report in circulation here that Lord Wellesley is to be appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, upon his arrival in England, — holding the office only during his absence.

## 3. SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 287. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Relations of Colonel Wellesley to the Governor-General.*

(Extract.)

Fort William, 27th July, 1797.

I shall be happy to be of service to you in your Government; but such are the rules respecting the disposal of all patronage in this country, that I can't expect to derive any advantage from it which I should not obtain if any other person were Governor-General. You may nevertheless be certain that I shall do everything in my power to serve you. I have written you several letters, in all of which I have delivered opinions upon military and political subjects as they occurred to me: probably upon reconsidering some of them I should not think them well founded, but in general I believe they are so. As I am going to Manilla, I probably shall not hear of your appointment as Governor-General as soon as it takes place; but as soon as I do hear of it I will write you a letter, which will be delivered to you upon your arrival, in which you shall have my opinion of the principal men in this country, as far as from the short acquaintance with them I have been able to form it. At present, to leave it here would betray your secret, which I shall take care to avoid; and to write you a letter upon that subject to England would be useless, as probably you will sail before it would reach you. If you should not have sailed before this reaches you, I shall have returned from the expedition before your arrival, in which case I shall be able to give you opinions in person better founded of course than those I have now upon the different subjects which you have desired me to consider.

## 288. To his Excellency the Marquess Wellesley.

*The circumstances connected with Colonel Wellesley's supersession contribute to make that step an injustice, and a slur on his military character.*

Bombay, 16th April, 1801.

The letters which I have written to you lately will have shown you that nothing could be more agreeable to me than the permission which I received yesterday to return to the Mysore

country. But the first paragraph of the letter contains a reason for my original removal from thence, and my appointment to the chief command of the troops assembled at Ceylon, which indeed I read once before in the despatch to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and I wish to trouble you with a few lines upon it.

To avail yourself of my knowledge and experience in the equipment of the expedition to be employed on the shores of the Red Sea, is said to have been your inducement to call me away from Mysore; but, if this were the case, it was never so stated to me, and, if it had been, I should have requested you to employ in the drudgery that person who it was intended should reap all the honour of the service; and at least I should have refrained from incurring expense, and from taking officers from their situations to put them under the command of a man they all dislike.

The fact was, that in the month of October you were carried away, by some fortunate circumstances that had occurred, and by your partiality for me, to appoint me to the chief command of the troops to be employed at the Mauritius, in the Red Sea, or, eventually, in India, and the governments were ordered to furnish me with any additional troops that I might require. On the 21st December you first announce your intention to appoint Sir James Craig or General Baird to the command. I don't deny that I conceive that they had reason to complain when I was appointed to this command, and I believe they did complain; but, in order to do justice to them, why should a greater injury and injustice than they complained of be done to me, and why should reasons for my appointment be publicly given to the whole world, which at least tend to show that you conceived I was fit for the equipment of the expedition, but not to conduct it after it was equipped?

You have repeatedly stated to me an opinion directly the contrary. But the reason of the change stands now publicly unexplained, excepting in the manner above mentioned (I don't know what is the reason of it, excepting it be that you thought you had done an injustice to General Baird, and were desirous to repair it); and as your success in this country, and your character, must give to your opinions the fullest weight, I stand publicly convicted of incapacity to conduct more of a service than its equipment. I need not represent how injurious that opinion must be to my future prospects; particularly so as the public in general, and those who are to judge of my conduct,



know well that your partiality to me would have induced you to refrain from delivering it, if the incapacity had not been manifest upon experiment.

If the change in the command were made only because I had not sufficient rank, and because others had the rank required, and complained of the preference shown to me at that time, it would have been fair towards me to state it (although, by the bye, I don't conceive those to be any good reasons for superseding a man when he has been appointed to a command). The next best thing would have been to give no reason at all for my appointment or my supersession. In either of these cases I should have lamented only that the impropriety of the appointment had not been found out before it was made, the expense which I had unnecessarily incurred, and that I had been induced to remove officers from a situation which they did like to one they do not. But I have a right to complain when I am superseded, and the reason stated for the supersession amounts to a charge of incapacity.

I don't want to trouble you with my private feelings or concerns, when I know that you have enough to think of; and, whatever I might have felt, I should never have said or written another word upon the subject if I had not received yesterday your letter of the 28th March.

The supersession has astonished, and is the conversation of, the whole army and of all India, and numbers of my friends have urged and written to me to request that I would have it explained. Let Henry ask any indifferent man what is his opinion of it.<sup>1</sup> After all this, if the same circumstances could have happened under any other government, although I am fully aware of the right of government to change officers as they may think proper, I should certainly have asked whether any misconduct or incapacity of mine had occasioned my supersession.

<sup>1</sup> In a letter to his brother, dated Fort William, 22nd April, 1801, Mr. Henry Wellesley says, 'I cannot think, my dear Arthur, that you have suffered in the slightest degree in your reputation in consequence of your being superseded in this command. You are still at the top of the tree as to character, and I declare to you (and I can have no wish to flatter you) that I never heard any man so highly spoken of, nor do I know any person so generally looked up to. Your campaign against Dhoondiah is surely sufficient to establish your character as a soldier beyond the reach of malice or detraction of any kind.'—*Ed.*

The admiral arrived yesterday, and I shall take an opportunity of talking to him respecting your views upon the Mauritius and Batavia.

I had two fits of fever upon the return of the spring-tides, and I therefore propose to quit this place as soon as I can.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**289. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.**

*Desire to serve under General Stuart in the Mahratta War; or to command, if General Stuart does not take the field.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Hoonelly, 3rd March, 1803.

If you should take the command of it yourself, I hope you will do me the favour to allow me to accompany you in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that country and its inhabitants, in a military point of view, was learned when I was in it; and I shall do every thing in my power to make myself useful to you. If you should not think proper to take the command of this detachment yourself, and, in consideration of the information which I have had opportunities of gaining of that country and its inhabitants, and the communications which I have constantly held with its chiefs, you should be pleased to intrust it to me, I shall be infinitely gratified, and shall do every thing in my power to forward your views.

**290. Reply of Major-General Wellesley to the Address of the British Inhabitants of Bombay.**

[March, 1804.]

The approbation of this Settlement is a distinction which will afford a permanent source of gratification to my mind; and I receive, with a high sense of respect, the honour conveyed to me by your Address.

The events which preceded the war are of a nature to demonstrate the justice of our cause; while the forbearance with which the British government refrained from the contest is calculated to manifest that the efficient state of our military equipment was directed to the preservation of peace, and consistent with the principles of our defensive policy. The comprehensive plan of

operations for the conduct of the war was equalled by the extent of our resources, and supported by the concentrated power of the empire. The conflict in which the British armies were in consequence engaged presented a theatre capable of displaying at once the most splendid objects of military glory, and substantial proofs of the pervading wisdom of the British councils. To be engaged in such a scene was an object worthy of the highest ambition ; and the contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the established discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in the uniform effects of our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of our national reputation in India.

Under the effects of those certain causes, the troops under my command were enabled to give that support which they were destined by the Governor-General to afford to the operations of the Commander-in-Chief. And, while the grand army, under his Excellency's immediate command, decided the war in Hindustan, by the most rapid career of brilliant victories, the army of the Deccan, emulating that noble example, contributed to elevate the fame and power of Great Britain in India, to a height unrivalled in the annals of Asia.

In concluding the peace (a duty imposed on me by the local situation of the respective armies) I was enabled, under the immediate orders and instructions of the Governor-General, to manifest a practical example of the moderation of the British councils, which arrested the progress of our arms in the hour of victory ; to fix the tranquillity of India on the foundations of that enlarged policy ; and to receive the best assurances of the continuance of peace from the confidence reposed by the states lately confederated against us, in the generosity, honour, and justice of the British government.

In reviewing the consequences of our success, it is with unfeigned satisfaction that I perceive the increasing channels of wealth which have been opened to this opulent settlement ; and it is peculiarly gratifying to my feelings, that I should have been instrumental in renewing the benefits of peace to a settlement, from the resources and public spirit of which, the detachments under my command have derived the most essential aids during the prosecution of the war.

The occasion which it has pleased you to choose of uniting

my name with that of the Governor-General has excited the warmest affections of my heart, together with the highest sentiments of public respect; at the same time, therefore, that I receive, with peculiar gratitude, this mark of your kindness, I cannot discharge the obligations you have imposed on me, in a manner more conformable to my sense of the honour and welfare of this settlement, or of the reputation and interests of the empire, than by expressing my confidence of your cherishing those principles of loyalty, subordination, and government, which have raised and finally established the British Empire in India on the extensive foundations of its present security, prosperity, dignity, and renown.

**291. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.**

*Testimony to Lieut.-General Stuart's merits, as Sir Arthur's  
(Presidential) Commander-in-Chief.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 7th April, 1804.

In the course of the operations intrusted to me, I certainly had difficulties to encounter which are inseparable from all military service in this country, but I enjoyed an advantage which but few have had in a similar situation. I served under the immediate orders of an officer, who was fully aware of the nature of the operations to be performed; and who, after considering all that was to be done, gave me his full confidence and support in carrying into execution the measures which the exigency of the service might require. Under these circumstances I was enabled to undertake every thing with confidence; and if I failed, I was certain it would be considered with indulgence. I declare that I cannot reflect upon the events of the last year without feeling for you the strongest sentiments of gratitude, respect, and attachment; and to have received these marks of approbation has given me more real satisfaction than all that I have received from other quarters.

**292. To Lieutenant-General Lake.**

*Equivocal treatment at Head Quarters; and application  
for leave to go home.*

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

It is with great reluctance that, at a time like the present, I trouble you upon a subject relating only to myself; but I hope

that the extraordinary circumstances which have induced me to trouble you will be my excuse.

Above a year and a half have now elapsed since my promotion to the rank of Major-General was announced in India, and since Lieut.-Gen. Stuart, unsolicited by me, in a manner most gratifying to my feelings, recommended to the government of Fort St. George, that I should be appointed to the staff of that Presidency. Since that period accounts have reached England that I had been appointed to the staff in the manner to which I have above alluded, and that I had the command of a body of troops employed in this country. From recent appointments made, I judge that the staff in India must have been under discussion lately, and that my appointment must have drawn the attention of H. R. H. the Commander-in-Chief, and of His Majesty; but I find that no confirmation has been made or notice taken of this appointment.

Under these circumstances, however flattering in other respects, it has become of an ambiguous nature; there is reason to doubt whether it meets with the approbation of H. R. H. the Commander-in-Chief; and it is not impossible but that his Royal Highness may appoint another officer to the situation which I fill; and, at all events, I do not conceive it to be creditable, and I am not desirous, to remain in a military situation in His Majesty's service, my appointment to which has not been approved by his Royal Highness and by His Majesty. I am therefore upon the whole very anxious to return to Europe; and I have to request your Excellency's permission to do so. If I should obtain it, I propose to resign the appointments which I hold under the Government of Fort St. George, when an opportunity shall offer for my return.

Upon the occasion of making this request, I beg to assure your Excellency that, in case you should grant it, I do not intend to avail myself of your leave as long as I can be of the smallest service to your Excellency's operations, or as I can forward the objects of the Governor-General's policy in this country; unless I shall find an officer has actually been appointed to fill the situation which I hold upon the staff.

## 293. To Major Shawe.

*Additional reasons for wishing to return to England, subject to the Governor-General's pleasure and need of his services.*

Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

I wish you to take an opportunity of mentioning to the Governor-General, that, having a very strong desire to return to Europe, I applied lately to the Commander-in-Chief for leave to quit this country when circumstances will permit it ; and Gen. Lake has given me his permission to go whenever I may think proper.

My principal reason for wishing to go is, that I think I have served as long in India as any man ought, who can serve any where else ; and I think that there appears a prospect of service in Europe, in which I should be more likely to get forward. Another reason is, that I have been a good deal annoyed by the rheumatism in my back, for which living in a tent during another monsoon is not a very good remedy ; and a third is, that I do not think I have been very well treated by the King's government.

It is now about 2 years since I have been a Major-General, and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George, by Gen. Stuart. Since that time, it has been perfectly well known that I have led a body of British troops into the Mahratta territories ; and supposing that I had no other pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected a confirmation of Gen. Stuart's act, under those circumstances. The staff in India had been under consideration, and another officer had been appointed to it. This last reason for wishing to go to Europe is the only one which I have stated to Gen. Lake, although it is the least strong ; as I am very certain that I shall have been appointed to the staff, as soon as it was known in England that I had reached Poonah with the army ; and Gen. Lake has consented to my departure.

If the war with Holkar had not broken out, there would have been no difficulty in the business ; and I should have been able to go in October, being the first period at which I could sail. As affairs are situated, I think it probable that the Governor-General will have no objection to my departure, and this is the principal reason for which I trouble you. In the present state of affairs, I can do but little in the Deccan, and that little may

as well be done by any body else. The siege of Chandore, when it can be undertaken, is a military operation of but little importance; and the operations of the troops from Guzerat are already beyond my guidance.

Under these circumstances, I wish that the Governor-General would allow me to relinquish the command in the Deccan. If I should be able to go to England in October, it must be supposed that I have money matters to arrange in Mysore, and at Madras; particularly at the latter. My accounts of the late war, although sent up regularly every month, have not yet been passed. I am, therefore, very anxious to receive your answer to this letter, at an early period, in order that I may arrive at Madras, if possible, early in September. I need scarcely add, that, if the Governor-General should have any desire that I should remain in this country, or should think that I can be of the smallest use to his plans, I shall remain with pleasure.

#### 294. To Major Shawe.

*Public reasons do not require his remaining in India. On private grounds he wishes to go home. His treatment by the Directors, in spite of unique services, and by the King's Ministers, is discouraging. The public interest claims his presence in England.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 4th Jan., 1805.

Upon the whole, therefore, I conceive that I am justified in not going into the Deccan, by the accomplishment of one object in view in sending me there; by a concurrence of circumstances, which render another impracticable, useless, and dangerous; and by the sentiments of the Governor-General. I acknowledge, however, that I have determined not to go into the Deccan not without a considerable degree of doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes of the people look up to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. I also know that my presence there would be useful in the settlement of many points which remain unsettled, and which probably will require time and peace to bring to a conclusion. But these circumstances are not momentary; whenever I should depart, the same inconveniences would be felt even in an increased degree, and very possibly the same state of affairs which now renders my presence in the Deccan desirable, will

exist for the next seven years. I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan; and I should not think it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than the Governor-General should stay in India. I conclude that he intends to go in February, as he proposed when I left Calcutta, in case Holkar should be defeated, and the peace should be certain; and upon this point, having considered whether my presence in the Deccan for 1, 2, or 3 months would answer any purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not.

In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King's ministers have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do any thing so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the Political Residents, and many civil authorities; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted.

The King's ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Directors. I am not very ambitious; and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the Staff in India; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of Gen. Fraser, Gen. Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British Empire, or to insure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence, in a particular quarter, may be attended with convenience. But this is not the only point in which this question ought to be viewed. I have considered whether, in the situation of affairs in India at present, my arrival in



England is not a desirable object? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the causes of the late increase of the military establishments, and to endeavour to explode some erroneous notions which have been entertained and circulated upon this subject? Are there not now a variety of subjects in discussion, relating to this country, upon which some verbal explanation is absolutely necessary? I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go into the Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity for England, I consult the public interest not less than I do my own private convenience and wishes.

## APPENDIX.

### I. GENERAL.

#### 295. To the Earl of Mornington.

*Severe estimate of native character. Two circumstances which tend to degrade it.*

(Extract.)

Fort William, 12th July, 1797.

The natives, as far as I have observed, are much misrepresented. They are the most mischievous, deceitful race of people I have seen or read of. I have not yet met with a Hindoo who had one good quality, even for the state of society in his own country; and the Mussulmans are worse than they are. Their meekness and mildness do not exist. It is true that the feats which have been performed by Europeans have made them objects of fear; but wherever the disproportion of numbers is greater than usual, they uniformly destroy them if they can, and in their dealings and conduct among themselves they are the most atrociously cruel people I ever heard of. There are two circumstances in this country which must occasion cruelty, and deceit, and falsehood wherever they exist. First, there is a contempt of death in the natives, high and low, occasioned by some of the tenets of the religion of both sects, which makes that punishment a joke, and I may say an honour, instead of what it is in our country. All our punishments almost are the same, excepting imprisonment and whipping, which occasion loss of caste, and are, therefore, reckoned too severe for the common crimes for which we inflict them at home. The punishments of the Mussulman Governments are precisely in the same state. The Hindoos don't care for them, excepting they occasion loss of caste; and the Mussulmans are now so nearly Hindoos, that they have not a better effect upon them. Secondly, there is no punishment for perjury either in the Hindoo or Mussulman law. Their learned say that God punishes that crime, and therefore man ought not; and as oaths are notwithstanding administered and believed in evidence, no man is safe in his person or property, let the Government be ever so good. The con-

sequence of all is, that there is more perjury in the town of Calcutta alone than there is in all Europe taken together, and in every other great town it is the same.

## 296. Transmitted to the Governor-General.<sup>1</sup>

*Grain depôts for the army in the Baramahal should be placed near the frontier.*

(Extract.)

18th July, 1798.

The principles which apply to the equipments, and which induce me to recommend that they should be placed in Arnee, do not apply equally to grain. The advantage of placing the grain near the frontier is certain, and I shall endeavour to show that the inconvenience which might result from it would not be very great.

If the enemy should, by a rapid movement, place himself between the army and its grain, or if the operations should be towards a quarter different from that in which the grain is stored, there will not be much difficulty nor fatal delay in drawing a fresh supply from the rear, either from the Carnatic, from Tanjore, or the seacoast. Waiting till it arrives cannot be so fatal as being deprived of your equipments. On the other hand, if the grain is not placed very forward, as an establishment of carriage-bullocks cannot be kept up, and these must be provided at the commencement of a war, which will always create a certain delay, but little advantage will be derived either from the establishment of the depôt or from storing the grain at all. If the grain is stored at Arnee, the advantage gained will be just the difference of time between that which is necessary for procuring draught-bullocks and carriage-bullocks and grain, and that for procuring carriage-bullocks only; and as I believe that the three operations might be performed at the same time, the advantage in point of time would be very small.

## 297. To Major-General Baird.

*Personal explanation to General Baird à propos of the Red Sea Expedition.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 9th April, 1801.

I will freely acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accompanying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me; and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived, regarding going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what they are at this moment. I need not enter further upon this subject, than to entreat you will not attribute my

<sup>1</sup> Accidentally omitted in No. 2, p. 43.—Ed.

stay to any other motive than that to which I have above assigned it; and to inform you, that, as I know what has been said and expected by the world in general, I propose, as well for my own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have behaved towards me, but the causes which have prevented my demonstrating my gratitude, by giving you every assistance in the arduous service which you have to conduct. I shall stay here as long as the season will permit, and then I propose to go round to Madras; and if I cannot get well, I believe I must try a cold climate.

## 298. Memorandum on the operations in the Red Sea.

[Enclosed by Col. Wellesley to Major-Gen. Baird.]

*Proposed objects of the expedition. Cosseir should be gained. Morad Bey, apparently, the head of the Mamelukes, and formerly reputed to have been friendly to us. He has made peace with the French, who have ceded to him Upper Egypt. But neither party trusts the other; and Sir R. Abercromby's operations will leave him free to consult his own interest. He will probably be induced to join us for the expulsion of his present allies. This he ought to be promptly urged to do, by a full explanation of their critical position, and by an offer of arms, ammunition, and an auxiliary force. Our possession of Cosseir will tell strongly to the same effect. Neither the expeditionary force, nor a detachment of it, ought to cross the Desert (though that, however difficult, is feasible) unless assured of being joined by a body of natives at the Nile. For otherwise, the army will starve, as efficient means of transport for adequate supplies cannot be provided. And to cross the Desert without them will only expose our weakness, and incline the natives to side with the enemy. Arrangements recommended, in case the Mamelukes are heartily with us. The French may annoy us in the passage of the Desert. Arms, &c., should be promised, not given, till native co-operation is certain; then furnished liberally.*

The objects proposed by Mr. Dundas, and by the Governor-General, in the expedition to the Red sea, are:

1st. To get possession of the forts and ports which the French may have on its shores.

2ndly. To urge and encourage the natives of Upper Egypt (Mamelukes and Arabs) to commence operations against them.

3rdly. To assist the operations of the natives by giving them arms and ammunition; or by a junction with them, either of a part, or of the whole, of the force.

The advanced state of the season renders it probable that it will be so difficult to reach Suez, that the object is not attainable. It is possible, however, that the force which left Bombay in December last,

under the orders of Adm. Blanquet, may have succeeded in effecting the objects in view, when it was fitted out, as far as they relate to Suez. Cosseir will then be the first object of attention, and the operations of the army ought to be directed, in the first instance, to gain possession of that place.

The General is already acquainted with the measures which have been taken to facilitate these operations, and it is needless to enumerate them here; and I shall now proceed to the second object of the expedition, viz. to encourage the natives of Upper Egypt to shake off the French yoke and to act on our side. The success of this measure, it is evident, will operate most forcibly in favour of Sir R. Abercromby, and it appears to me to be the principal object of the expedition.

From the intelligence lately received from the Red Sea, I am induced to believe that, after the Turkish army was beaten by Gen. Kleber, in March last, and after Col. Murray had evacuated Suez, Morad Bey made peace with the French, and that the latter ceded to him all Upper Egypt. He is now stationed there, and, from the accounts and distribution of the French force in Egypt which I have occasionally seen, I am induced to believe that they have no troops in Upper Egypt, excepting such as are necessary to watch Morad Bey, who are encamped with him, and such as are necessary to keep up the communication with their post at Cosseir. It is probable that, when Sir R. Abercromby commences his operations, they will draw to Lower Egypt all the troops not absolutely necessary for their safety in Upper Egypt; and thus they will leave to Morad Bey the power of acting as his sense of his own interests may point out.

I have always understood this man to be the head of the Mamelukes; and certainly, until the French made peace with him, he was supposed to be a friend of the English; and showed his power of doing injury to the French by keeping in constant employment a large part of their army, under Gen. Dessaix, in pursuit of him.

It is very probable that he does not deem his tenure in Upper Egypt very secure. He must be aware that, as soon as the French gain quiet possession of Lower Egypt, they will have the power to break their engagement with him; and, from his own experience of their fidelity in adhering to treaties, he must expect that they will use that power to his disadvantage. Indeed, the fact, that the French have found it necessary to have a body of their troops encamped with Morad Bey's army, is a clear proof that they do not place much faith in him; and as he must know that he is suspected and watched, he has still stronger reason to expect that, as soon as the French have the power, they will not fail to exert it, to get rid of a neighbour and an ally in whom they have so little confidence.

Without being too sanguine, we may expect, then, that, as soon as Morad Bey shall perceive a prospect of driving the French from Egypt,

he will co-operate and join with those employed in that object. For this reason, the very first opportunity ought to be taken to open a communication with him; his situation and his prospects, if the French should remain in Egypt, ought to be clearly pointed out to him; and he ought to be urged, in the strongest manner, to exert himself to shake off the yoke. The power of the armies employed on the side of Lower Egypt ought to be made known to him; their prospects of success, founded as well on their own strength, as on the impossibility that the French should receive assistance, ought to be stated to him; and, finally, an offer ought to be made to supply him with arms and ammunition, and even to join him with a part or the whole of the army in the Red sea, in order to ensure the speedy success of the objects which he, as well as the English, must have in view.

The possession of the port of Cosseir, and of the navigation of the Red sea, will be a strong inducement to Morad Bey, as the Governor of Upper Egypt, to be favourable to the English.

The trade in corn is carried on by this port to Jedda in Arabia; and this trade is such an object both to Upper Egypt and Arabia, and to Mecca in particular, that it may be expected that the Governor of Upper Egypt will not be disinclined towards those who will have it so much in their power to annoy him. Having now stated the reasons which induce me to believe that it will not be difficult to urge the head of the Mamelukes to shake off the French yoke, I proceed to the consideration of the third object of the expedition, viz. to assist the natives with arms and ammunition, and even to join them with a part or the whole of the army.

The first question which I shall consider, and which will lay the grounds for a consideration of, and decision upon others, is, whether it would be practicable, or even desirable, to cross the Desert from Cosseir at all, if that operation is not performed in concert and co-operation with a body of the natives posted upon the Nile.

It is needless to enter into a statement of the difficulties to be apprehended in crossing the Desert: they are certainly great, but I imagine not insurmountable. But, if it is not certain that the army, or detachment which may cross the Desert, will partake of the plenty of the banks of the Nile, when they reach them; if they should be certain of having water only, and such forage as their cattle should be able to pick up, I apprehend that the difficulty will become so great, that the operation ought not to be attempted.

It is impossible that the Mamelukes in Upper Egypt can be neutral in the contest in contemplation: they must take part with the French or with us. If they take part with the French, the army will be in the situation in which I have above described it, enjoying no advantage from having reached the banks of the Nile, excepting water, and pro-

bably no forage; and it is needless to point out that, if the Desert is to be crossed under these circumstances, care must be taken not only to send, with the body of troops which may cross, a very large proportion of provisions, but means must be adopted to add to them, until the operations of this body shall have given them such a hold of the country, as to leave no doubt of their steady supply of provisions. It is obvious that this will require a great number of cattle; a number much greater than the government of India, with all the zealous exercise of their power and means, can supply; but there is another consideration connected with this subject, besides the supply of cattle; and that is, the means of feeding them when landed from the ships.

Upon this point, I need only call to the General's recollection the difficulties to which he has been a witness in moving large supplies of stores and provisions, even in fertile, cultivated, and inhabited countries, plentifully supplied with well water, and every other advantage of arrangement in the supply, distribution, care, and food of the cattle; and draw a comparison between such difficulties, and those to be expected in a march through a desert. But this is not the worst that is to be apprehended: the cattle will, of course, land in weak condition, in a desert; and it must be expected that even those which survive the voyage will starve, or at least be in such a state, before they commence their march, as to render it very probable that they will not carry their loads to the end of it. Upon the whole, then, I am decidedly of opinion that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, no attempt ought to be made to cross the Desert.

This opinion, the General will observe, is by no means founded on the impracticability of crossing with troops, because I am convinced that it can be done: but it is founded upon the dagger that the troops will starve, if they do not return immediately; and upon the inutility of the measure, if they do.

It may be imagined, that, supposing the Mamelukes to be wavering, if an attempt is not made to cross the Desert, the advantage of their co-operation will be lost. Upon this point I observe, that a knowledge of our strength, not of our weakness, will induce them to come forward; and that it might be expected that the sight of our weakness, occasioned by our march over the Desert without concert with them, might induce them to take advantage of it, and to join the French.

But those who will urge this consideration must suppose it possible that the Mamelukes can be neutral for a moment; and this their history from the beginning of time, particularly since the French invasion, will show to be impossible.

I come now to consider the propriety and mode of crossing the Desert, supposing that the Mamelukes should be inclined to shake off the French yoke, and to co-operate with us.

The first point for the General to ascertain is their sincerity in the cause, of which, as I have above stated, there is every probability. As soon as he shall have ascertained this, it will be necessary that he should make arrangements with them for posting a supply of water on that part of the Desert where it is most wanted; and for having a supply of provisions ready on the Nile, that he might cross over a part of his army immediately. The first object on his arrival on the Nile should be to establish a post at Ghennah; and, if possible, another in the Desert, between that place and Cosseir, in order to ensure his communication between the sea and the Nile. At Ghennah he should make the *dépôt* of his stores, &c., which might be brought across the Desert by degrees; and then he might commence his operations against the enemy.

On the consideration of the question regarding the crossing the Desert, I have omitted to mention the interruption which may be given to that operation by the enemy; because it is entirely distinct from the difficulties which are peculiar to the operation itself. It is obvious, however, that, if the Mamelukes are not on our side, and if they should not have driven out of Upper Egypt the small French force supposed to be in that country, before the operation is attempted, that force, however small, will greatly increase the distress of the British troops who may cross the Desert.

I have not adverted to the supply of arms and ammunition to be given to the natives. As long as their co-operation is doubtful, these supplies ought to be withheld, but promised; when they have shown their sincerity in our cause, the arms may be given to almost any extent.

## 299. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

### *Prosperity of Anglo-Hindoo Mysore.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 26th May, 1801.

The Rajah's government is in the most prosperous state: the country is become a garden where it is inhabited, and the inhabitants are returning fast to those parts which the last savage had forced them to quit. The family have moved into old Mysore, where their ancient palace has been rebuilt in the same form in which it was formerly, and, I believe, on the old foundations. The whole family appear as happy as we wished they should be when this government was established. Mysore is become a large and handsome Native town, full of inhabitants: the whole country is settled and in perfect tranquillity. I believe the Rajah's treasury is rich, as he pays his kists with regularity; but Purneah, who has an eye to the future prosperity and revenue of the country, has repaired numberless tanks, particularly that large one near Milcottah; has rebuilt many towns and forts; and, I understand, encourages the



inhabitants of the country in all parts by advances of money and remissions whenever they require them.

Thus this establishment has succeeded in a manner equal to our most sanguine expectations; and there is every prospect that its prosperity will be permanent.

### 300. To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

*A receipt for health in India. Good temper rare there.*

(Extract.)

Serlingapatam, 8th July, 1801.

I know but one receipt for good health in this country, and that is to live moderately, to drink little or no wine, to use exercise, to keep the mind employed, and, if possible, to keep in good humour with the world. The last is the most difficult, for, as you have often observed, there is scarcely a good tempered man in India.

### 301. To Jonathan Duncan, Esq.

*Projected abolition of the Government of Bombay.*

(Extract.)

Serlingapatam, 24th Aug., 1801.

If I could give you any certain information upon the subject of Bombay, I would do so with the greatest pleasure. The Governor-General's first notion was, I believe, to abolish the government of Bombay, to place the territories which had been under its management under that of the government of Madras, and that the settlement itself, the arsenal, Surat, and the inferior residencies should come under the government of Bengal, and be governed as Prince of Wales's Island and Bencoolen are. It appears that the Court of Directors have adopted only half the plan.

The principle of the Governor-General's plan was economy as well as the supposed expediency of submitting to the government of Fort St. George the territories in the Peninsula, which joined so well with those already under its government or influence. The economical part of the plan has not been adopted, and it is not improbable but that the Governor-General may have urged it again, and pressed it particularly in that point of view on the attention of the Court of Directors, and that eventually it may be adopted. I know that the whole of the Governor-General's first plan had been approved of by the King's ministers, and that everything had been settled to bring it before Parliament; and it was not brought forward because the Court of Directors objected to it, and probably would have opposed it in the House of Commons. As the expenses in India have lately grown to a great degree, and as there has been a general distress for money in all

the settlements, it is not improbable but that the Directors may have been shaken in their first opinion ; or that even if they should still retain it, the King's ministers may be determined to carry this plan through notwithstanding their opposition.

I don't think there is any reason to believe that the Governor-General has altered his notions, although I have more than once stated to him my sense of the inconveniences which would be the result of the abolition of the government of Bombay ; and if he still retains his opinions, it is almost certain that he will have pressed them again upon the Court of Directors.

### 302. To His Highness the Nizam.<sup>1</sup>

*Courtly letter to the Nizam.*

21st Sept., 1802.

After the assurance of devoted submission, the representative of the sincere well wisher, Colonel Wellesley, has the honour to state to the attendants on the Presence, the treasury of bounty, of the unsullied Nabob of exalted titles, whose turrets are the heavens, and whose origin is celestial, (be his dignified shade extended !) that two purses, containing the illustrious enayetnamahs, replete with kindness, the one vouchsafing the acknowledgment of the Maumyah trees, and the other communicating the extensive benefit which had been effected by it, with an order for the transmission of some bark from the trunks of both the trees, sealed, and under the charge of the camel hircarrahs of the prosperous Sircar, honoured and elevated me by the grandeur of their approach and the dignity of their arrival.

On learning the circumstances of the benefit which had been experienced by the brilliant constitution, from the attendants on the Presence, from the application of the aforesaid bark, I derived the utmost happiness.

In compliance with the exalted order, two bundles of the desired bark, the one from the trunk of the tree at Chinroyapatam, and the other from the trunk of that at the village of Kope, have been delivered, sealed, to the camel hircarrahs of the Sircar, abounding in kindness, and are despatched to the exalted Presence. They will pass, no doubt, under the noble inspection.

In consequence of the length of the journey from Seringapatam to the village of Kope, which is situated at the distance of 400 miles, and of the incessant rain in the vicinity of Nuggur, the passing and repassing on the road is very dilatory and difficult, and the procrastination and delay of some days have, therefore, occurred in obeying the orders of the unsullied Presence. I hope that the medicine which is transmitted,

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<sup>1</sup> Translated from a letter in Persian, on the records of the Residency at Hyderabad.

having attained the honour of application, may be beneficial in its effects on the constitution, replete with purity.

The desire of my heart, the seat of constancy, is that the exalted attendant will confidently regard and esteem the aforesaid bark as a memorable instance of the loyalty of the well wisher, and as a testimony of the anxiety of British officers to effect all arrangements which may be desired by, or beneficial to, the noble Presence.

May the God of his slaves grant that the orb of your Prosperity may shine and glitter from the eternal horizon, like the sun in the zenith!

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 303. To

*Diagnosis of corrupt overtures, and of their reception.*

Serlingapatam, 20th Jan., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 15th this day, and I lose no time in replying to that part of it, in which you inform me that the Rajah, or Dessaye, of Kittoor has expressed a wish to be taken under the protection of the British government, and has offered to pay a tribute to the Company, and to give you a bribe of 4000 pagodas, and me one of 10,000 pagodas, provided this point is arranged according to his wishes. I cannot conceive what could have induced the Rajah of Kittoor to imagine that I was capable of receiving that, or any other sum of money, as an inducement to do that which he must think improper, or he would not have offered it. But I shall advert to that point more particularly presently.

The Rajah of Kittoor is a tributary of the Mahratta government, the head of which is an ally, by treaty, of the Honourable Company. It would be, therefore, to the full as proper that any officer in command of a post within the Company's territories should listen to, and enter into, a plan for seizing part of the Mahratta territories, as it is for you to listen to, and encourage, an offer from the Rajah of Kittoor to accept the protection of, and transfer his allegiance and tribute to, the Honourable Company's government. In case you should hear any thing further upon this subject from the Rajah of Kittoor, or in future from any of the chiefs of the Mahrattas on the frontier, I desire that you will tell them, what is the fact, that you have no authority whatever to listen to such proposals; that you have orders only to keep up with them the usual intercourse of civility and friendship; and that, if they have any proposals of that kind to make, they must be made in a proper manner to our superiors. You may, at the same time, inform them that you have my authority to say that the British government is very little likely to take advantage of the mis-

fortunes of its ally, to deprive him either of his territories, or of the allegiance or tribute due to him by his tributaries.

In respect to the bribe offered to you and myself, I am surprised that any man, in the character of a British officer, should not have given the Rajah to understand that the offer would be considered as an insult; and that he should not rather have forbidden its renewal than that he should have encouraged it, and even have offered to receive a quarter of the sum proposed to be given to him for prompt payment. I can attribute your conduct upon this occasion to nothing excepting the most inconsiderate indiscretion, and to a wish to benefit yourself, which got the better of your prudence. I desire, however, that you will refrain from a renewal of the subject with the Rajah of Kittoor at all; and that, if he should renew it, you will inform him that I and all British officers consider such offers as insults on the part of those by whom they are made. You shall hear from me to-morrow regarding the Store establishment of Hullihall. The battalion under your command is not destined for field service at present.

### 304. To the Governor-General.

*Holkar's plunder of Aurungabad to be condoned.*

(Extract.)

Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

In case Holkar should be considered in the light of a power in India, his conduct at Aurungabad affords ample ground for hostilities against him: but upon the whole, considering that the Mahrattas have long been in the habit of plundering the Nizam's territories; that his Highness' government omit to take any measures for their defence; and that, in this particular instance, they were aware of the combination between their own servant and a Mahratta chief, and they were afraid to take the most obvious steps to frustrate their designs, I think that, if all parties acquiesce peaceably in the arrangements of the treaty of Bassein, it will not be worth while to commence a chase after Holkar to recover the plunder of Aurungabad.

### 305. To Colonel Murray.

*Why Residents at Native Courts should have authority over the military force.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th Oct., 1803.

It is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the Native Princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword; and it follows, that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever. The Natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their

influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military Commanding officer ought to be the Resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is, that the British government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

### 306. To the Governor-General.

*Mr. Elphinstone's experience, acquirements, and services.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec., 1803.

Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Mahratta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

### 307. To Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

*Pacificatory letter after the conquest of the Confederates.*

5th Jan., 1804.

I wrote you a letter on the 16th July last, which I hope you have received; but lest you should not, I now send a duplicate of it.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have concluded treaties of peace between the Hon. Company and their allies, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Senah Sahel Ragojee Bhoonslah respectively; and I take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the restoration of peace in Hindustan and in the Deccan. During the existence of the late war, your conduct has been most wise and politic, and has been perfectly satisfactory to me; and I repeat to you, upon this occasion, the assurance which I have frequently given you, that so long as you refrain from attacking the Hon. Company and their allies, the British government will not interfere with you.

This will be forwarded to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman who is going to reside with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the part of the British

government. He will receive from you any communication you may be desirous of making to the British government or to me, and will communicate with you on any point that you may consider likely to forward your interests, or to promote the friendship between the Hon. Company and you.

### 308. To Marquess Wellesley.

*Why General Wellesley writes to Major Shawe. Ludicrous scene at Scindiah's Durbar.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have generally written to Major Shawe for two reasons<sup>1</sup>: 1st; because it was probable I should get an answer from him: 2ndly; it was probable that this answer would contain intelligence of matters in Bengal which it was desirable that I should have.

P. S. Malcolm writes from Scindiah's Camp, that at the first meeting Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained violently; and an officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman, (a nephew of old Bective's by-the-by,) sat under a flat part of the tent which received a great part of the rain that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, and was discovered after some time by an '*Oh Jusus!*' and an hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the others present; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot; after which they all parted upon the best terms.

### 309. •To the Governor-General.

*Forced march, and summary chastisement of Marauders.*

Camp at Munkaiseer, 5th Feb. 1804.

After I had crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches to the southward, I agreed to give cowle to the chiefs who commanded the bands of freebooters who had carried on the operations on the western frontier of the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the condition of their dismissing their troops, and coming into my camp within 5 days, and I had some reason to believe that they would act as I had desired; but, upon the expiration of the term fixed for their arrival in my camp, viz. the 2nd inst., finding that they had not come in, and that their troops were still assembled in the Soubah's territories, between Perinda and Toljapoor, I determined to endeavour to cut them off. They were at the

<sup>1</sup> P.S. of the Governor General's letter, 23rd Dec. 1803: 'I do not know why you address your private letters to the private secretary, and not to me; consult, however, your private convenience. W.'

distance of 80 miles from my camp, and there was some reason to hope that I might surprise them by making forced marches.

I began my march on the 4th, in the morning, with the British cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 500 men belonging to the other Native corps in my camp, and the Mysore and Mahratta cavalry. On my arrival at Sailgaon, near Perinda, after a march of 20 miles, I learnt that the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and were come nearer Perinda, and that at that time they were not farther from me than 24 miles. I therefore marched again last night with an intention to attack their camp at daylight this morning.

Unfortunately, the road was very bad, and we did not arrive here till 9 in the morning. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach, and I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe that they received it from persons in my own camp: their camp was struck, and they had begun their march to their rear when I arrived. I followed them, however, with the British cavalry, in one column, acting upon the right of their rear, while the Mysore and Mahratta cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, Goklah, and Appah Dessaye, pursued the centre and left. The enemy formed a large body of cavalry, apparently with an intention to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, which were falling into our hands, and I formed the British cavalry into two lines to attack them. I followed them in this order from height to height, as long as I could see any of them collected. In this advance, some horse and infantry were cut up, and the whole of the enemy's guns, ammunition, bazaars, and baggage, fell into our hands.

The Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, and the Mahratta cavalry under Goklah, were engaged with the enemy on the right of the British cavalry, and killed great numbers of them, and these troops also followed them as long as they could see any collected. Upon the whole, although I have reason to believe that the chiefs have escaped, the result of this day is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken. I do not think that they will venture, or indeed that they can collect again, as they have lost every thing which could enable them to subsist when collected. The troops bear with the utmost cheerfulness the extraordinary fatigue of this short, but active expedition<sup>1</sup>. The infantry under Major Swinton, of the 74th regt., arrived at the point of attack at the same time with the cavalry; but from the nature of the action, they could not co-operate further in it than by moving into the enemy's former camp, which they did with great regularity.

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<sup>1</sup> This expedition has often been remarked by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest march he ever made.—*Col. Gurwood's note.*

The advance of the British cavalry, when formed, was in the best order, and very rapid, notwithstanding the fatigue to which both men and horses had been exposed for the last 24 hours. Our loss, of which I enclose a return, is but small. I have given the 4 guns which we have taken to the killadar of Perinda, who lost them about 6 weeks ago.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the troops under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the action near Munkaiseer, on the 5th Feb. 1804.

|                           |         | Jemidar. | R. and F. | Hors |
|---------------------------|---------|----------|-----------|------|
| H. M.'s 19th lt. dragoons | wounded | —        | 2         | 3    |
| 4th regt. Native cavalry  | wounded | 1        | —         | 1    |
| 5th do.                   | killed  | —        | 1         | —    |
| 7th do.                   | killed  | —        | —         | 1    |
| Total                     |         |          |           |      |

### 310. To Major Graham.

#### *Measures for providing against the effects of famine.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

The delivery of the provisions *gratis* is, in my opinion, a very defective mode of providing against the effects of famine. It is liable to abuses in all parts of the world, but particularly in India; and at Ahmednuggur, the consequence of its adoption would be, that crowds of people would be drawn there from other parts of the country, in which the distress is equally felt; and they would increase the distress at Ahmednuggur to such a degree as to render all the efforts to remove it from its immediate inhabitants entirely fruitless; and it might at last reach our own troops and establishments. The principle, therefore, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants is not to give grain or money in charity.

Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two classes; those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women; who, from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labour, and are weakened by the effects of famine.

The former, viz. those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed by the public; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what manner paid. The latter, viz. those who cannot work, ought to be taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at the expense of the public. According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred; and above all it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be



willing to work for his subsistence; that none will apply, who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by their labour, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

### 311. To Lord W. Bentinck, Governor of Fort St. George.

*The project of raising money at Poonah, for the service of the Madras government, inexpedient, because (1) it is not likely to succeed at present; (2) it will embarrass the Bombay government. The inadequate resources of Bombay are eked out by bills on Bengal, negotiated largely, through the soucars, at Poonah. The exchange on Bengal has lately fallen very low. Causes of the fall. This has led me to refrain from drawing on Calcutta, (while I depend much on Bombay); as the competition of my bills and those of the Bombay government would tend to depreciate the value of both. Why the plan is not likely to produce much money. Publication of the tenders of the Fort St. George government, therefore, suspended. Why I have been unable to avoid charging that government with the payment of the subsidiary force.*

Chowke, 18th May, 1804.

The Accountant Gen. at Fort St. George has lately forwarded to the Resident at Poonah a plan, according to which he is desirous that money should be raised at Poonah for the service of your Lordship's government, upon which I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship.

Since I have conducted a service on the western side of India, I have been obliged to depend, in a great measure, upon the resources of the government of Bombay for the extraordinary supplies required to carry on that service. The nature of those resources has become an object of my particular attention; and it occurs to me that the plan of the Accountant Gen., as detailed in his letter to the Resident at Poonah, of the 28th April, will not raise any money at Poonah at the present moment; at the same time that the introduction of the bills drawn by your Lordship on Bengal and England, and the loans of the government of Fort St. George, at Poonah, will materially impede the financial operations of the government of Bombay.

The expenses of the government of Bombay far exceed the means afforded by their revenue of defraying it; and the deficiency is made up principally by money procured by bills drawn upon Bengal. It does not appear that the trade, by means of which these bills are negotiated, is carried on by sea, from port to port; on the contrary, as the money received by the government of Bombay for bills comes from the soucars, and the bills are negotiated through the means of their connexions with Poonah, Nagpoor, and other great cities in Hindustan, Benares, Luck-

now and Calcutta, it is to be supposed that these operations are supported by the inland trade. But if this were not sufficient to prove that the inland trade was the support of these operations, it might be proved by the state of the trade of the port of Calcutta with the ports of Bombay, Surat, &c., on the western coast.

Till within little more than a year, the government of Bombay drew upon Bengal to great advantage. They generally received 107 and 108 Bombay rupees at Bombay for a bill for 100 sicca rupees. Since the last year, from a variety of causes, the exchange has fallen. One of these causes has been the increasing disturbances in the Mahratta Empire; another was the great fire at Bombay; a third was the late war, which for a moment interrupted the commercial intercourse between the provinces under the government of Fort William, and the great cities in the Mahratta Empire; and a fourth was, that in consequence of the authority which I received from the Governor-General, I drew bills upon Bengal which were negotiated at Poonah; and although endeavours were made to draw those bills at the same rate of exchange with the bills drawn by the government of Bombay, the fact that bills of exchange were to be procured from two quarters, instead of from one, had a tendency to depreciate the value of the bills of both, and to expose the drawers to the effects of a combination among the soucars, all of whom are connected by caste, if not in trade, and thus, to lower the rate of exchange. The knowledge, that by drawing bills at Poonah, notwithstanding the utmost care of the Resident, by whom the transaction was managed, we should always be liable to these evils, had induced me to determine to grant no more bills upon the government of Bengal till I should be obliged by necessity to adopt this measure. Notwithstanding these causes tending to produce a depreciation of the value of bills by exchange drawn by the government of Bombay, they have not yet fallen below *par*; and there was reason to hope that, as soon as the drain of money to Guzerat for the purposes of the cotton trade should have ceased, and the soucars should have seen that they had no chance of procuring bills at Poonah, the exchange would have risen.

Upon a calculation made of the value of Arcot rupees, in respect to Chandore rupees, the currency at Poonah, and the rate at which the latter are issued to the troops, it appears that the terms upon which your Lordship proposes to draw upon Calcutta are less favourable to the money holders by one *per cent.* than the bills now granted by the government of Bombay. It is therefore probable that your Lordship's bills would not be taken, particularly as the holder of the money must wait about a month after he shall have paid his money into the Poonah treasury, before he will receive his bills from Madras. If, however, we should be able to raise the value of the bills drawn by the government of Bombay one *per cent.* above *par*, those drawn by your Lordship will immediately

come in competition with them. The difference between the two will be in favour of the Bombay bills, from the disadvantage of waiting for a month for those drawn by your Lordship, which may be reckoned at about one *per cent.*; so that if your Lordship's bills on Calcutta should be introduced into the market at Poonah, the utmost advantage that can be expected at Bombay in the drawing of bills upon Bengal will be one *per cent.*, instead of 7 or 8 *per cent.*, as it was 2 years ago.

Besides this inconvenience at Poonah, the negotiation of your Lordship's bills upon Calcutta may affect the state of the exchange between Bombay and Poonah, which is now at par, and will possibly rise in favour of Bombay.

Your Lordship's bills upon the Court of Directors are upon more favourable terms to the money holders than those granted by the government of Bombay, but it is not probable that they will produce any money. First, because a month must elapse after the money is paid at Poonah before the bill can be returned from Madras; and next, because the gentlemen at Bombay who might have money to dispose of in that manner must employ agents both at Poonah and at Madras: at the former, to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah; at the latter, to produce that certificate of the payment of the money, and receive the bill at the office of the Accountant Gen. of Fort St. George. The loan will not, in my opinion, produce any money from the settlement of Bombay, because the government paper of Bombay can be purchased at a cheaper rate. To allow money to be received by the Resident at Poonah, on account of bills upon the Court of Directors, or of this loan, may be advantageous to those of the officers of the army serving in this country who may have any money to dispose of in such a manner; but this advantage must be deemed only a private one at best: it is very improbable that it will be enjoyed by many, and will bring but a small sum of money into the treasury; and will not compensate for the evil of introducing the financial plans of the government of Fort St. George, in places in which those of the government of Bombay alone have been hitherto in operation.

From what I have above stated, it will appear to your Lordship that the plan, however well intended, is likely to create competition between the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to be attended by all the effects of competition between borrowers, viz. to increase the demand of those who have any thing to lend. It will not affect your Lordship's financial arrangements, as those are founded upon large revenues and resources, and framed upon principles entirely different from those of the government of Bombay; and they are independent of the expected supplies of money at Poonah; but it will affect the financial arrangements of the government of Bombay, and, through them, those of the Indian empire; and therefore I conclude the plan ought to be

relinquished. Under these circumstances, I have taken the liberty of requesting the Resident at Poonah to suspend the publication of the advertisements forwarded to him by Mr. Smith till he shall have received your Lordship's further orders.

When at Bombay, I gave much attention to the mode of supplying the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah with money hereafter, in consequence of orders which I received from Lieut. Gen. Stuart ; and I had much conversation upon the subject with the mercantile gentlemen there, particularly with Mr. Forbes, a gentleman of great respectability, who is at the head of one of the principal houses, and who has frequently come forward in aid of government when his assistance has been required. I should have been able to arrange the supply of the funds for the support of the subsidiary force, so as to have precluded the necessity of sending money from the territories under your Lordship's government, if I could have stated precisely the monthly demand of cash at Poonah for the public service ; but, in the present state of affairs, the demand is very uncertain, and no private merchant could have ventured to contract to supply an uncertain amount. On the other hand, no merchant would undertake to supply a part of the funds required at Poonah. He must supply the whole sum required at that place, or he is liable to a competition with government in procuring the funds, in which competition he must be a loser. However, I have no doubt whatever but that, when affairs shall become more settled, and the amount of the demand upon the British government, payable at Poonah, shall have been defined, the government of Bombay will experience no difficulty in arranging with the merchants there a mode of defraying the expense more consistent with the general advantage than to draw the specie from the provinces under your Lordship's government.

### 312. G. O.

#### *Farewell address to the Deccan army.*

Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24th June, 1804.

The following corps, &c., are to compose the subsidiary force serving with His Highness the Peshwah, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace :

5th and 7th regts. Native cavalry.  
 Detachments of Madras and Bombay artillery.  
 H. M. 74th and 78th regts.  
 1st batt. 2nd regt. Madras N. I.  
 2nd batt. 3rd do do.  
 1st batt. 8th do do.  
 2nd batt. 18th do do.

Lieutenant-Colonel Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force

serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, will each place themselves under the authority of the Resident at the durbar of the powers in whose service the troops under their command are employed, according to the orders and regulations of government upon this subject. Colonel Murray and the troops in Malwa will receive further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay.

Upon the occasion of quitting the army, in consequence of the orders of the Governor-General, Major-General Wellesley once more returns his thanks to the officers and troops for their uniform good conduct since he has had the honour of commanding them. In the space of little more than a year, those in this quarter in particular, now composing the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and those which are under orders to march to the southward, have been tried in every mode in which it is possible to try troops, and have uniformly manifested that patience under fatigues and severity of climate, that activity and perseverance in labour, and bravery and discipline in action, which are the characteristic qualities of the best soldiers: their success, and the honour which the troops have acquired, are proportionate to the good qualities which they have displayed: on which qualities Major-General Wellesley has always had the fullest reliance in every emergency of the service. He now recommends to them an adherence to the principles which have brought them with honour through so many difficulties, as the certain pledge of future success.

Major-General Wellesley has frequently reported the good conduct of the troops to the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General, and has recommended them to the notice of their Excellencies. He will not fail to recommend individuals who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, whenever an occasion may offer; and he assures all that he shall ever remember and reflect with satisfaction on their conduct and services, and that in every situation in which he may be placed he will be happy to forward their views.

Major-General Wellesley has delayed to give orders for the division of the property captured during the war, according to the instructions of the Governor-General, only till he receives all the prize rolls: he expects those of the 11th regiment from Berar in the course of a few days, when orders will be sent on that subject and regarding the batta for the officers.

Major-General Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the government of Bombay in Guzerat during the late war.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 313. To the Governor-General.

*Present amount and proposed reduction of the Rajah's cavalry. His gross revenue; the result of Poorneah's good management. Expenses regulated by the fixed condition of laying by an annual surplus to provide a fund for meeting extraordinary calls by the British government, for military assistance. Detail of peace establishment. Composition, pay, and service, of the Candachar peons. Composition, pay, armament, command, and discipline, of the regular infantry. The Dewan's zeal and efficiency in supplying the Deccan army, during the Mahratta war; and in maintaining troops for the defence of the Mysore frontier. General success of the plan for settling the Rajah's government.*

Seringsapatam, 18th July, 1804.

1. On my journey from Poonah, in obedience to your Excellency's orders, I have passed by this place, in order that I might have a personal communication with the Dewan and the acting Resident, regarding the distribution of the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, which have been serving under my command.

2. The total number of cavalry in the service of the Rajah is now 4000, of which 3000 have been with me; the original number of 2000 having been reinforced at the commencement of the late war. The result of long discussions regarding the disposal of this body of troops has at last been, that their number shall be gradually reduced to 2000; and that one year shall elapse before those to be discharged shall be dismissed from the service.

3. As I had experienced the benefits to be derived from these troops in the service of the Rajah, I was desirous that some mode should be adopted of retaining the whole; I found that the Rajah could not maintain a greater number than 2000, without breaking through the rules of economy, which have been laid down by the Dewan, with a view to enable the Rajah's government to afford the assistance which the British government may demand from the Rajah in time of war, under the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, or without applying to the payment of the troops those funds which have hitherto been employed by the Dewan, in the construction and repair of tanks, water courses, roads, bridges, and other works, which will tend to the improvement and increase of the agriculture and resources of the country.

4. The number of 4000 horse will therefore be reduced to 2000 in the course of one year; and this number is 500 more than the ordinary peace establishment of the Rajah's government.

5. As your Excellency will probably be desirous to take into your consideration the situation of the Rajah's government, and to ascertain how far that government has performed the stipulations of the 3rd article of

the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, I proceed to give your Excellency an account of the ordinary resources and expenses of that government, and the extraordinary expenses it incurred during the war; with such other information regarding it, as may be useful to enable your Excellency to review its situation. I have had a full communication upon the whole of this subject with the Dewan and the acting Resident, and I write from authentic documents.

6. It appears the Rajah's gross revenue is about 24 lacs of canterai pagodas. It has been raised to this sum by the superior management of the Dewan, by his attention to the repair of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges; by the encouragement which he has given to strangers to resort to and settle in Mysore; and by his general endeavours to improve the agriculture of the country, and the situation of the people under the government of the Rajah.

7. The expenses for the repairs of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges; for the public buildings for the Rajah's accommodation, and other public works; the remissions for unfavourable seasons, and the military and civil expenses of the government, are liable to fluctuation. But the Dewan, at an early period of his administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rajah's government to comply with any requisition which the British government might make for assistance in war, under the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore; and he has saved annually a sum of money amounting to one lac of star pagodas. He has made this saving the criterion, by which he has endeavoured to regulate his disbursements, and he has considered the sum resulting from that saving to constitute the fund for answering any eventual demand under the 3rd article of the treaty.

8. The peace establishment of Mysore, at the end of 1802, consisted of 1500 cavalry, 3000 regular infantry, in battalions, (to which number 1000 were added during the war,) 2500 peons in constant pay, at 2 canterai pagodas each, per month, (to which number 400 were added during the war,) and 12,000 Candachar peons, liable to do duty at their respective villages (to which number 1000 were added and called out during the war).

9. The Candachar peons constituted the ancient military force of the country; and the necessity of providing against their becoming the instruments of commotion compelled the Dewan, in the first year of his government, to entertain so large a number as 20,000, which has been gradually reduced on better information and improved arrangement.

10. They receive a village pay of from 2 to 3 rupees per month, according to local circumstances, half in money, and half in lands; and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  rupees in addition, when called out from their respective villages within the limits of Mysore; with batta when sent on foreign service.

11. The present establishment is fixed on the principle of having, at least, one individual of every family of the ancient military class in the pay of

the state; and the family is permitted to relieve this individual according to its convenience. This arrangement appears well calculated to insure the allegiance of the whole; and in case of emergency, 20,000 men of this irregular description of force might be assembled at a few day's notice.

12. As every Candachar peon is a cultivator, the Dewan is anxious to limit their services to local duty; which consists in being ready to obey the call of the officers of police, and take their tour of duty in the village fort to which they are attached.

13. The 2500 peons, kept in constant pay, do duty with the regular infantry in the more important forts and stations, or in the personal guard of the Rajah, the Dewan, or the principal officers of the government; they are select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are considered to be entirely trustworthy. They also are occasionally indulged with the privilege of relief, according to their domestic convenience.

14. The regular infantry are composed of the sepoys, who were formerly in the service of Tippoo Sultaun; they are paid at the same rates, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the Company's Native infantry; they are commanded by the sirdars of the state, and are a regular, orderly, and obedient body, and their discipline of a description to render them useful on service, in aid of the Company's troops.

15. I have the honour to enclose a detailed account of the extraordinary war. This account, together with the preceding detail of the Rajah's expenses<sup>1</sup> incurred by the government of Mysore, occasioned by the late resources, and his ordinary expenses, will enable your Excellency to form a judgment, whether the government of the Rajah of Mysore has complied with the stipulation of the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore.

16. Till the late treaties of peace shall have had their full effect, and the Mahratta Empire shall have recovered its tranquillity, after the long and violent convulsions by which it has been disturbed, particularly until the Deccan shall have recovered in some degree from the effect of the existing famine, the Dewan proposes that the peace establishment of Mysore shall be 2000 horse, 4000 regular infantry in battalions, 2500 peons in constant pay, and 12,000 Candachar peons; being an increase, beyond the peace establishment of 1802, of 500 horse, and 1000 regular infantry.

17. Upon the occasion of bringing under your Excellency's review the state of the Mysore government, and of the expenses it incurred in the late war, I cannot avoid adverting to the material assistance it afforded upon that occasion. In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements

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<sup>1</sup> This account was afterwards corrected by Major Wilks, the acting Resident, and transmitted, together with his report.—*Note in Colonel Gurwood's Edition.* Ed.



of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, and of the department of the army, or for the large quantities of grain required by the cavalry and by the brinjarries, &c. All these supplies, which amounted to about 60,000 bullock loads of grain, principally rice, 60,000 head of sheep, &c., were furnished with a facility hitherto unknown in this part of India. The Dewan has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major Gen. Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain into Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah.

18. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have frequently drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier, from the time I marched from the Toombuddra till I returned, which he commanded in person as long as the war lasted; and a detachment of those troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves in the destruction of a band of freebooters, who had assembled in Savanore, and threatened Mysore.

19. I now take the liberty of congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures respecting the government of Mysore, and upon the practical benefits which the British government has derived from its establishments. I cannot avoid, at the same time, expressing an anxious hope, that the principles on which that government was established, and has been conducted and supported, will be strengthened and rendered permanent.

### 314. **General Orders by the Governor in Council at Madras.**

#### *Official recognition of General Wellesley's services.*

28th July, 1804.

The government of Fort St. George have repeatedly had occasion to express their high approbation of the distinguished services performed by Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley.

The conduct of Major-General Wellesley during the campaign against Seringapatam, in the operations against Dhoondiah Waugh, and in the expeditions necessary to establish the tranquillity of Mysore, afforded the **most** honourable and decisive testimonies of his talents, energy, and zeal; but a wider field was furnished for the exercise of those eminent qualifications by the subsequent events in the Mahratta empire.

The rapid and judicious movements of Major-General Wellesley which produced the retreat of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preserved the capital of the Mahratta empire, and restored the Peshwah to the musnud of Poonah; his success in securing the means of subsistence and movement for the army under his command in countries remote from the sources of supply, and exhausted by the depredations of the Mahratta troops; the victories which he achieved at Assye and Argaum over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; the conquest of the fortresses of Ahmednughur, Asseerghur, and Gawilghur; the general conduct of the war, and the conditions of the treaties of peace arranged by him with the confederate Mahratta chiefs, entitle Major-General Wellesley to be classed with the most illustrious British commanders, and to receive the approbation and gratitude of his country.

These services have already been appreciated and acknowledged by the highest authority in India; but the Right Honourable the Governor in Council cannot deny himself the gratification of publishing to this army, on the occasion of Major-General Wellesley's departure for Bengal, the high sense entertained by his Lordship of the extensive ability, military science, and political knowledge manifested by Major-General Wellesley during the period while he commanded in the Deccan, and of the eminent services which he has rendered to the interests of this government, of the empire in India, and the British nation.

### 315. To the Magistrate at Seringapatam.

*Provision for Dhoondiah Waugh's son.*

Fort St. George, 28th Feb., 1805.

SIR,

I herewith enclose a bond, No. 2713, of 1804-5, for the amount of one thousand star pagodas.

I wish to place this sum of money in the charge of the Court of Seringapatam for the benefit of Salabut Khan, the son, or the adopted son, of the late Dhoondiah Waugh.

I am desirous that the Court should be his guardian, and should superintend his education, the expense of which will be defrayed out of the interest of this sum, and a sum of two hundred pagodas already in the hands of Lieutenant-Colonel Symons, and allotted by me for his support, which Lieutenant-Colonel Symons has been requested to pay into the Court.

I am desirous that, if not absolutely necessary for his advancement, the principal of one thousand star pagodas should never be given to Salabut Khan; but the interest is to be applied to pay the expense of his education, and to be given to himself when he will arrive at years of discretion, and will be no longer under the guardianship of the Court.

This money is to revert to me in case Salabut Khan should die without heirs.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**316. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.**

*Sir Arthur Wellesley proposes to wait upon the Directors.*

19th Sept., 1805.

Sir Arthur Wellesley presents his compliments to the Chairman of the Court of Directors. He has had the honour of serving the East India Company for many years, but has never had an opportunity of paying his respects to the Court of Directors; and he will be much obliged to the Chairman if he will make known to the Honourable Court Sir Arthur Wellesley's anxious wish to have the honour of waiting upon them at any time the Court may think proper to appoint.

**317. [The Chairman to Sir Arthur Wellesley.]**

*A diplomatic answer.*

India House, 23rd Sept., 1805.

The Chairman has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note addressed to him by General Wellesley under date the 19th instant, and it is his intention to lay it before the Court of Directors. He would be glad, however, if he could previously be favoured with a short interview with General Wellesley, and regrets he was not so fortunate as to find him at home when he went to pay his respects to him on the morning of the 19th, before he knew of the note in question, as he probably would then have heard of the intention of writing it, and might have made the observation which it is still his wish to offer.

**318. To the Chairman of the Court of Directors.**

*Sir Arthur Wellesley will wait on the Chairman.*

SIR,

No. 18, Conduit Street, 24th Sept., 1805.

I had the honour of receiving last night on my return to town your note of the 23rd. As my only object in expressing a wish to wait upon the Court of Directors was to mark my respect for the East India Company, whom I have served for some years, I beg that you will not communicate it to the Court if you should see any reason for which it should be withheld, until I can have the honour of seeing you.

I propose to wait upon you this day before twelve o'clock; but if it should be inconvenient to you to see me at that hour, I will call upon you at any hour in the course of to-morrow that you may appoint.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 319. . To the Earl of Mornington.

*Report of communications with Pitt, Castlereagh, and other statesmen as to Lord Wellesley's administration, and political course on his return to England. Sir Arthur's view on the latter subject. His own treatment by the Commander-in-Chief and the Directors.*

MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

Deal, 21st Dec., 1805.

I am just about to make a second attempt to reach the river Weser with a body of troops, to which I am attached as a Major-General; but before I depart I wish to make you acquainted with all that has passed between your friends and the ministers and me respecting yourself, as far as I may be able in a letter.

I arrived in England about the 10th of September, and I was received by Lord Castlereagh with great kindness and cordiality. I had several different discussions with him on the subject of recent transactions in India, in all of which he appeared to maintain the opinions given in the 'Observations on Mahratta Affairs.'<sup>1</sup> He admitted, however, that you had done as you ought in not carrying into execution the orders which had been sent to you founded upon the principles laid down in that paper, as the war and the treaties of peace had entirely altered the circumstances which, it was supposed here, existed, or might exist when those orders should reach India. As I found that Lord Castlereagh still adhered to the notions which he had formed when he wrote the 'Observations,' which were certainly erroneous, I thought it best to communicate to him the memorandum which I had written upon those Observations, of which you had approved. After he had read this paper I had another opportunity of discussing the subject with him. His objections to the treaty of Bassein upon that occasion were confined to one specific point, viz. that it had been framed too much in imitation of the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam. To this I answered that it certainly would have been possible to frame a treaty with the Peshwah in different words, which should have bound both parties to the same specific stipulations; but I said that I was entitled by experience to assert that nothing short of the treaty of Bassein would have answered at all. I then recapitulated the arguments upon this part of the subject contained in my memorandum.

Lord Castlereagh in answer said that what he would have wished would have been some middle line between that of leaving the Peshwah entirely at the mercy of the Mahrattas and taking him out of their hands and into ours, from which supposed project I could never drive him. When I pressed him by a detail of the situation of the different parties in the empire, and their different political objects, and urged the impossi-

<sup>1</sup> See the Editor's Selections from Marquess Wellesley's Despatches, page 249.

bility of reconciling those objects either with our interests or any pacific system, he either gave me no answer or flew off to some other part of the subject or to one entirely unconnected with it.

One of these was the great extension of our political system as laid down in your instructions to General Lake and myself of June, 1803, which was carried into execution by the treaties of peace ; upon which he urged all the topics which have repeatedly been brought forward upon the same subject. In answer I told him that when you found that your system was not likely to meet with the approbation and support at home which you had thought it deserved, and, above all, when you had experience of the treachery of the Rajpoots and others in their conduct towards Monson's detachment, and upon other occasions, you had determined to narrow the system in such a manner as I thought would be satisfactory to him. I then explained the nature of the arrangement which you had proposed to make with a view to the settlement of Scindiah's government, by which I pointed out to him that we should have nothing beyond the Jumna excepting what was absolutely necessary to secure the navigation of that river, and our possessions in Bundelcund.

In all our discussions upon this subject Lord Castlereagh always spoke with the greatest deference and respect for you. He lamented that he had differed in opinion with you, and particularly that you should have imagined, as he supposed you did, that he had altered his opinion of the treaty of Bassein as soon as he found that it was likely to be followed by war. He told me that he had written you a letter upon that subject, which he intended to send to St. Helena to meet you, and which he said he would show me ; but I have never seen it.

He lamented in strong terms your differences with the Court of Directors, and entered with some detail upon the causes of them. These were principally the old story, disobedience of their orders, contempt of their authority, neglect to write to them to inform them of the most important events, and declared dislike of their persons ; add to all this a confirmed belief in the Court, founded upon the indiscretion of some persons who had returned from India and were attached to you, that it was your fixed resolution to exert all the means in your power to overturn the authority of the Company upon your return to England.

Shortly after my arrival in England I went to Cheltenham, and Lord Castlereagh sent after me a very long despatch, No. 128, which had been sent up from the Court of Directors to the Board of Control. I never saw such a paper in my life. In this the Court entered into a discussion of all the measures of your government since the settlement of Mysore, excepting the treaty of Arcot, each of which they censured in the grossest and the least candid terms. I wrote to Lord Castlereagh upon the subject of this despatch a letter, of which I enclose

you a copy, and the consequence was that he refused to allow the despatch to be sent out to India, as it contained reflections which were unjust and injurious upon the governments abroad; and he ordered that they should write another upon the points which were called constitutional, of which he transmitted them a draft. In this draft he has discussed and disapproved of three practices of the Supreme government in the conduct of the public business: first, the separate correspondence; secondly, the practice of issuing orders in the name and by the authority of the Governor-General alone when he is at Calcutta; and, thirdly, the practice of recording minutes at councils at which the Governor-General does not preside, and at periods subsequent to the arrangement of the transactions to which they relate. This letter does not contain any injurious or disrespectful reflections, but positive orders to discontinue the practices which it decidedly disapproves. You will observe in my letter that I had urged Lord C. not to send any orders upon these subjects to India till he should have seen and conversed with you; and I urged the same again in conversation.

At the same time that this draft was sent down to the Court, another was sent to the Secret Committee, in which the Governor-General is ordered to narrow his system in India nearly according to the plan which you had proposed when you had in contemplation the arrangements for Scindiah's government. It is written in general terms, and contains an approbation of the conduct of the Governor-General in delaying to carry into execution the orders which he received at the same time with the anonymous 'Observations.'

Lord C. lately took an opportunity of showing the Chairman that paragraph of one of your late letters to him in which you disclaim all plans to overturn the Company's authority. The Chairman said that he was glad to see it, but that you must have altered your mind upon that subject, as he had reason to believe that you had entertained such a project.

Pitt was at Weymouth when I arrived in England, and I did not see him till the day before I left town to go to Cheltenham. I had met Lord Camden at East Sheen a day or two before, and had some conversation with him respecting you. I told him that you were but little annoyed by the insolence and vulgarity of the Court of Directors, but you felt extremely the neglect of your friends, and that you had had reason to apprehend till very lately that Pitt had not approved of any part of your administration. That the ground of that apprehension was that he had never said a word in parliament upon the subject till upon a late occasion, but that I was convinced you would feel more satisfied when you would hear of the handsome manner in which he had spoken of your administration, when he had defended you from the attacks made upon you by Francis and some of the Directors, than you could be by any event that could occur. In answer, Lord Camden told me that Pitt

certainly felt towards you as warmly as ever, and that he was determined to support you. He said that, in fact, no serious attack had ever been made upon your administration, or was likely to be made; but in order to prove to me how much in earnest Pitt was in his determination to give you all the support which he was capable of giving, he mentioned in confidence that upon one occasion, when there was a probability that a serious attack would be made upon you, Pitt had determined to send to Lord Grenville to consult with him regarding the mode in which each should defend you in the Houses of Lords and Commons, although he had not had any communication with Lord Grenville for several months before.

I desired Lord Camden to tell Pitt what I had said, which I believe he did, as on the next day I received a message from him to desire that I would call upon him. Instead of calling upon him, I rode with him from Wimbledon Common to London. We rode very slowly, and I had a full opportunity of discussing with him and explaining all the points in our late system in India, to which objections had been made, which were likely to make any impression upon him. These were principally the probability of future wars arising out of that system, in which we should be obliged to interfere; the increased demand for European troops; the increased expenses, which would swallow up our increased resources. Upon all these his mind appeared to be satisfied. I explained to him, as I had done to Lord Camden, how much you had felt his silence upon all the events of your administration, and your apprehension that its general tenor had not been approved by him; and I told him that I was convinced that you would receive the greatest satisfaction when you would read the account of the handsome manner in which he had spoken of you in a late debate. He then spoke of you in the strongest and handsomest terms, and said that till the late opportunity, of which he had availed himself, none had offered in which he could have spoken.

I told him that you were naturally most anxious that a parliamentary decision should be given upon the war; upon which he said that upon his first coming into office he had not been able to turn his mind to the subject as he had wished; that afterwards, when he had been able to read the papers, he had been so much pressed by different questions in parliament that he could not bring it forward, more particularly as he would not conceal from me that many of his friends entertained doubts upon that subject, which it was not very easy to remove. He said, however, that he wished you might arrive before the parliament should meet, in order that he might have an opportunity of talking over with you the whole subject, and of arranging in what manner it should be brought forward. I have seen Pitt several times since; he has always been very civil to me, and has mentioned you in the most affectionate terms.

Lord Grenville has been out of town ever since I arrived in England;

but I went to Stowe on my way to Cheltenham, where I underwent a bore for two days. Bucky is very anxious that you should belong to the opposition. He urged every argument to induce me to inflame your mind against Pitt, particularly that he had not given you the Garter. He told me that you might depend upon the cordial and active support of himself, his brothers, his son, and all his friends; that they had stipulated with Fox that they were to give you this support in any question that might arise on your administration; but he expressed a hope that you would not at once throw yourself into the arms of Pitt, forgetting your old friends and connexions. I told him that I was convinced you would follow the wise advice given to you by Lord Grenville, which was to come home and look about you, and settle all the questions relating to your Indian government before you should take any part in politics or belong to any party. He then pointed out the inducements which Pitt would hold out to you, all of them in his opinion strong; but they were office, power, and the means of revenging the injuries you have received from the Court of Directors, about which body I suppose you will never think after you will arrive in England. On the other hand, he urged that to join the opposition was the best political game of the day; and this notion was founded upon the difference of the age of the King and the Prince of Wales.

I was with Lord Bathurst at Cirencester, and had some conversation with him respecting you. He said that although, of course, he was desirous of renewing his old habits with you, and that you should be with Pitt, it was his opinion that you ought not to take any decided part in party politics immediately upon your arrival, or till your Indian questions should have been settled. Lord Buckinghamshire, with whom also I had a conversation very lately upon the same subject, is of the same opinion.

As for my part, I have no doubt upon the subject; and I strongly recommend it to you to remain neutral for some time, and observe the course of events. The Court of Directors by their conduct have left you in an awkward predicament regarding several acts of your administration; but, excepting the Mahratta war, upon which I am inclined to believe that there must be a parliamentary decision, I rather think that the remainder may as well be left alone. The real truth is that the public mind cannot be brought to attend to an Indian subject. It appears to me that people in general were much prejudiced against the whole system of Mahratta politics, because it was necessary to attack Holkar, because Monson was defeated, and because Lord Lake failed before Bhurtpoor; and you cannot bring their attention to the subject sufficiently to enable them to understand you, and to prove to them that those events which all must lament had nothing to do with the system of Mahratta politics which occasioned the treaty of Bassein.



In the same way the treaty of Oude and other measures are equally misunderstood, and it is equally difficult to make people sufficiently attentive to be able to understand them. For this reason I would stand upon the defensive: keep Pitt well charged with information, and prepared in the House of Commons, and yourself in the House of Lords; and whenever an attack is made, lay forth all your strength upon the particular point to which it may be directed. Henry and William are both of the same opinion.

In regard to myself, I have to tell you that I have seen the Duke of York but once, upon my arrival in England. He was very civil, and said he should be happy to avail himself of an opportunity to employ me. I rather think that upon the whole they have not treated me very well in not giving me a regiment. Bucky tried to inflame me upon this point; but of course I have said, and shall say, nothing upon the subject.

The Court of Directors invited me to one of their Wednesday dinners, at which they were personally civil to me; and I believe that I stand well with that august body. But upon my arrival I proposed to wait upon them by desire of Lord Castlereagh, and the Chairman recommended that I should withdraw my proposition because it had no precedent. The real reason, however, for which they refused to receive me was, that they were apprehensive lest by any mark of personal attention to me they should afford ground for a belief that they approved of any of the measures in the transaction of which I had been concerned. Lord Castlereagh told me this, but I don't wish that it should be mentioned to him again.

By-the-bye, now that I think of it, I mention that I don't believe that Lord C. knows that it was Pitt's intention to consult with Lord Grenville about the mode of defending you in parliament.

I will not enter into the particulars of our late unfortunate attempt to reach the Weser: you will see it all in the papers; and I only hope the next attempt will be more fortunate, but it does not now promise very well. I will write to you from the Continent when I shall hear of your arrival in England.

I cannot conclude this letter without congratulating you upon the state in which you will find your children. I saw Richard in London before I went to Cheltenham, and I think him one of the finest young men I ever met with. I called upon him afterwards at Oxford upon my return from Cheltenham, but he was with his mother at Brighton; and he afterwards went to Oxford, where he has remained ever since. The two other boys are also very fine fellows, and the girls (particularly the youngest) are very handsome and accomplished. This is some consolation, even if your services should not have been considered and treated as they deserve. But you have this additional consolation in the reflection that by your firmness and decision you have not only saved but

enlarged and secured the invaluable empire intrusted to your government at a time when everything else was a wreck, and the existence even of Great Britain was problematical.

### 320. To Viscount Melville, President of the Board of Control.

*European troops in India should be the King's; native troops the Company's; so long as the Company exercises sovereign rights. The Presidential armies should be distinct. Suggestions for subordinating the military to the civil power. Discipline should be in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. How military patronage should be adjusted between the Governor and him.*

Elvas, 12th March, 1812.

I received only the day before yesterday your letter of the 10th Feb., and head quarters have been marching ever since, and I shall not have time to peruse Gen. Maitland's paper before the post will go out.

As, however, it is probable that you will decide upon your measure before the next mail shall reach England, I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my opinion :

1st ; That the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King's.

2dly ; That the 3 armies ought to continue separate and distinct.

3dly ; That the Native army ought to be the Company's if the Company should continue to be the sovereign of the territory. It would be impossible to separate this army from the sovereignty ; and indeed the great difficulty of transferring the Native army to the Crown, and that the Crown would find in keeping it officered, as it must be, by persons exclusively belonging to the Native service, have always appeared to me the greatest in the way of the transfer of the sovereignty, or, more properly speaking, of the exercise of the sovereignty, to the Crown.

4thly ; It is my opinion that the Crown should name both the Governors and Commanders in Chief at all the settlements, and should have a very efficient control over the nomination of members of Council. If the Crown do not appoint the Governor, the Crown should not appoint the Commander in Chief. I have not time now to enter into a detail of all my reasons for entertaining this opinion. They are referable principally to the experience I acquired in witnessing, and sometimes being the mediator and reconciler of disputes between the Governor and Commander in Chief. If the latter were appointed by the Crown and the former by the Company, the Commander in Chief would be too strong for the Governor.

5thly ; It is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested by the law in the Governor in Council. The law must recognise no other authority in the state. The Company may and ought to instruct

the Governor in Council, 1st; to leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the Commander in Chief, and to interfere in them in no manner, excepting when the safety of the state should require it. 2dly; that all recommendations to military appointments, such as the staff officers of the army to commissions, promotions in the army of persons, civil or military, to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should be made by the Commander in Chief to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his reasons for dissent. 3rdly; the recommendations to superior commands, such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander in Chief, when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or political function; and that in the case of a nomination to a higher command being vested exclusively in the Governor in Council, without the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with the Commander in Chief in making the selection.

It would be very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor in Council to promote officers for meritorious services, at the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, out of the usual and regular routine, as well as to pass over officers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers, by brevet, in the first instance, who should succeed to the first vacancies in the rank to which they should have been promoted in the regiment to which they should belong.

In regard to other points, I concur entirely with you. The Court of Directors must be prevented from meddling with or peddling in the discipline of the army. It is a matter of too serious consequence to be allowed to be jobbed at the India House. You will be the best judge whether this can be effected by the authority of the control of the Crown, or whether the authority of Parliament is necessary.

P.S. I have omitted to mention that in whatever way the Commander in Chief is appointed a member of Council, he should have the same power of voting, &c., as other members of Council on all questions.

### 321. To the Right Hon. George Canning

*The Subsidiary System, as distinct from looser alliances, should not be extended to other Powers than the Peshwah and the Nizam. And they should be urged to maintain efficient cavalry, according to their Treaties with us.*

MY DEAR SIR,

London, 11th Aug., 1816.

Upon passing over in my mind the conversation I had with you the other day, it occurs to me that I may have stated my opinion against further alliances in India too strongly. I object to the extension of the subsidiary system further than to the great Powers, that is to say, the

Peshwah and the Nizam. I think it very possible, however, that in order to form an efficient system against Meer Khan and his Pindarries, it may be necessary to form alliances with others, either temporary or permanent, or applicable to that object, or for general objects, according to circumstances, to which you could not have an objection. But it is very desirable that we should not take upon ourselves the defence of any more Powers in India, and that we should endeavour to prevail upon the governments of the Peshwah and of the Nizam to maintain at all times such a body of horse as they are respectively bound to maintain by their treaties with us.

### 322. Memorandum on the Deccan Prize Money.

*In preferring an exclusive claim to prize taken at Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour, Sir T. Hislop and the Deccan Army were wrong both in their main fact, and their reasonings. They urge that (1) There was no previous concert or association between them and Lord Hastings and the Grand Army, in the operations against the Mahratta Powers. But Lord Hastings did anticipate the fact, though not the circumstances, of the Mahratta rising; and his appointment of Sir T. Hislop, with special powers in the Deccan, proved this, and met the occasion. (2) There was no actual co-operation on the part of the Grand Army. But it kept Scindiah and Meer Khan from interposing in the Deccan. Thus it co-operated politically at Poonah; and in a military way at Nagpour; and more completely and extensively at Mahidpour. (3) Sir T. Hislop's was a separate command. It was, in no sense, intended to be so, after he should have crossed the Nerbuddah. And, throughout, Lord Hastings did not, and could not, renounce his authority as Commander-in-Chief; though he might issue his orders through Sir T. Hislop. His words prove that he deemed the Deccan army part of his own. (4) He commanded Sir T. Hislop only as Governor-General, in a political, not military, manner. This is untrue; though, combining the two functions, he exercised also the political authority, which all Governors-General have over the army. As to the original fact:—the spoils of Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour, had been already handed over to the prize agents. The sum in question was a later acquisition, the result of the general war, and of the exertions of the united armies.*

10th Sept., 1825.

When the Deccan Prize Case was under the consideration of the Lords of the Treasury in the year 1823, it was stated by one party and not disputed by the other, and understood by their Lordships, that

there was a very large booty at the disposition of his Majesty, taken by the troops at Poonah, at Nagpour, and Mahidpour.

The one party before their Lordships, Sir Thomas Hislop and the Army of the Deccan, claimed the exclusive right to have this booty distributed among them; the other party, Lord Hastings and the Grand Army, claimed to participate in this advantage.

The first mentioned party contended that there was no *previous concert* or legal association in the operations by which the booty in question was acquired and placed at the disposition of his Majesty; nor any *co-operation* in those operations on the part of Lord Hastings, or of the Grand Army, such as it is understood the law requires, in order to give a party a right to share which claims on the score of co-operation. That the Army of the Deccan was a separate army, exclusively under the military command in chief of Sir Thomas Hislop. That he alone and exclusively ordered the operations of that army. That Lord Hastings, in his capacity of Commander-in Chief, had never given any command to Sir Thomas Hislop, and that all the orders conveyed to Sir Thomas Hislop by his Lordship were given in the exercise of his political powers as Governor-General.

It is not necessary to examine on which of these grounds the decision of the Treasury, 1823, was founded. It might have been founded upon none of them. It is quite clear, however, that the parties were mistaken; the one in their statements, and the other in their admissions of the existence of this booty, and of the sources from which, and the mode in which such booty had been captured.

It will be stated in this paper what booty really does exist at the disposition of the Crown in consequence of the operations of the war in India in 1817 and 1818; but in the mean time it is desirable to consider of the statements and arguments above referred to, in order to apply them to the booty which is really at the disposition of the Crown at the present moment.

The first point is, that there was no *previous concert* or *association* in the operations against the *Mahratta Powers*, as distinguished from the *Pindarries*.

It is asserted that Lord Hastings did not expect the hostilities which subsequently took place on the part of the Peshwah, the Rajah of Nagpour, or of Holkar, and this assertion is founded not upon Lord Hastings' acts, or upon his omissions, or upon the general tenour of what he wrote upon this subject, but upon a few selected phrases found in different parts of his correspondence, expressing his surprise rather at the mode in which the treachery had been carried into execution than that it existed.

Lord Hastings was aware in what light the Pindarries had been considered, and to what degree they had been encouraged by all the

Mahratta powers to undertake their operations in preceding years in the Company's territories, and he could not believe that he could effectually put down the predatory system without exciting the jealousy, the animosity, and eventually the hostility of these powers, if they should consider it possible to manifest such hostility with advantage or without danger to themselves. Lord Hastings did not, nor could not, foresee in what manner, at what time, or under what circumstances this hostility would be manifested, and he adopted every measure in his power to frustrate and render such hostility harmless by the display and employment of the largest and most efficient force which the resources of his government would supply.

But there is one measure adopted by Lord Hastings which manifests in the clearest manner that he did expect these hostilities on the part of the Mahratta powers, and that was the nomination of Sir Thomas Hislop to command the troops in the Deccan. Those troops consisted of as follows:—the Nagpore subsidiary force under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams; the Hyderabad subsidiary force under Colonel Doveton; the Poonah subsidiary force, under Colonel Smith; the Mysore Horse; the Hyderabad and Poonah Infantry and other irregular troops; all of them doing duty, or they might have been appointed to do duty, with one or other of the subsidised corps of regular troops; and, lastly, a body of troops of the army of Fort St. George, detached from the territories under the government of Fort St. George.

These last might have been organised under the command of any officer whom his Lordship might have selected for such command, and the whole of the troops above mentioned might have moved to the Nerbuddah in separate bodies under the command of their several commanders acting under instructions from Lord Hastings, with equal, if not with greater facility than they did move by the intervention of the command of Sir Thomas Hislop in his capacity newly conferred upon him by the Governor-General in Council, of Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the Deccan.

But Lord Hastings saw that possibly, nay probably, it would be necessary to carry on operations with those troops previously to their arrival upon the Nerbuddah, and to the period at which they should be in immediate and direct communication with himself, and with the divisions of the Grand Army. He could not foresee what would be the nature or the period of those operations, and he therefore did that which, as a statesman and a general, he ought to have done; he appointed an officer to command the whole, and endowed him with full military and political powers, and instructions to act as circumstances might require. His Lordship manifested his foresight as well as his wisdom in this arrangement, and, in point of fact, it occurred that Sir Thomas Hislop was under the necessity of using his military as well

as his political powers in the three only instances in which they could by possibility be used in the interval between his march from the Company's territories and his communication with Lord Hastings after his arrival at the rendezvous upon the Nerbuddah. It is to be hoped then that we shall hear no more of the want of foresight, and of previous concert and association. The fact is that everything was foreseen, and we enjoy the fruits of this foresight, as the only measures which could be an adequate remedy for the evils which might occur in the execution if this great and necessary enterprise were adopted. Secondly, in respect to co-operation. I am one of those too much accustomed to estimate the value of real military co-operation to allow any exaggeration upon this subject to enter my mind. I besides draw a distinction between political and military co-operation, and, as I understand the law, which, however, I apprehend has been laid down only in reference to naval operations, it is military co-operation alone which can give a party a claim to be considered as a joint captor. I object to military co-operation being admitted only in cases in which the claimant has been in sight, as in cases of naval co-operation, but I assert that there must be an actual co-operation in the action.

The existence of previous concert and association, provided nothing intervened to prevent the co-operation, would render the proof of such co-operation unnecessary, and it is quite obvious from what has been above stated that previous *concert* and *association* existed in the operations at Poonah, Nagpour, and Mahidpour.

But if that principle should be denied, or the fact denied, we must then consider the cases.

The position of the Grand Army undoubtedly prevented Scindiah and Meer Khan from moving; and it is certain that the movement of either of these chiefs would have had great influence over the result of affairs in the Deccan. But there was no military co-operation in the action at Poonah, and this co-operation would be merely political.

In the case of Nagpour there was positive military co-operation by the troops of the Grand Army under Brigadier-General Hardyman.

The case of Mahidpour was the strongest of all. The march of the first and third divisions of the army had been delayed by the illness of Sir Thomas Hislop, and by the badness of the weather.

What was the meaning of the delay of the operations against the Pindarries till these troops should arrive at the rendezvous upon the Nerbuddah?

Was it for the purpose of inquiry after the General's health, or any other act of courtesy?

It was solely for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan laid down according to previous *concert* and *association*.

Accordingly from the moment of the passage of the Nerbuddah,

Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams with the third and fifth divisions of the Army of the Deccan, were in daily and hourly communication with General Marshall's division of the Grand Army, and of course with the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Hastings.

In the course of these operations it was found that Holkar acted exactly as had been foreseen by Lord Hastings; and Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop, according to the instructions which he had received from his Lordship, declared Holkar in a state of war with the British Government, and attacked his army as he would have done a Pindarry force. Not only was General Marshall's division co-operating upon this occasion, but likewise General Donkin's, and General Brown's and Sir W. Keir's.

It was no trifling act of co-operation to have enabled Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop to force Holkar to an action.

An attentive perusal of the papers and a knowledge of the parties will show that this was effected by two modes. First, by the movement of General Malcolm to form a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop; and secondly, by the position of the divisions of Sir W. Keir, General Donkin, General Brown, General Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Adams in different parts of the country which rendered the retreat of Holkar impossible. Here was no chance, but clear previous concert and military co-operation, not for the purpose of obtaining booty, but for a better purpose, that of attaining a great and glorious public advantage.

It is not disputed that there was distinct military co-operation among all the troops on the right of the Nerbuddah acting against the Pindarries; but it is disputed that in the war with Holkar, an event foreseen and clearly provided for in the instructions to Sir Thomas Hislop as likely to be the consequence of the operations against the Pindarries, there was the same co-operation, the different divisions of both armies being in fact in the same scene of action, and in the same relative position towards each other, and in the same habits of communication.

The next assertion is, that the Army of the Deccan was a separate army exclusively under the command-in-chief of Sir Thomas Hislop; that he exclusively ordered its operations; that Lord Hastings as Commander-in-Chief in India had never given any orders to Sir Thomas Hislop or the troops under his command, and that the military orders given by his Lordship to Sir Thomas Hislop, although military in themselves, were given in the exercise of his Lordship's political power as Governor-General.

The most extensive powers, political as well as military, were confided to Sir Thomas Hislop, of which the only limit was to be found in his instructions, and that he was to obey the orders of the Governor-General, or of the Governor-General in Council; and that he was to



be 'subject to the control eventually in the conduct of operations in the field to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief in India, Lord Hastings.'

For the purpose of this cause then it is to be supposed that Lord Hastings, a military officer of high rank and great reputation, having Sir Thomas Hislop undoubtedly under the control of his authority as Commander-in-Chief, abandoned his duty as an officer, for it was his duty as an officer to command Sir Thomas Hislop, and that he preferred to send him military orders in virtue of the political superiority vested in his Lordship, instead of in the exercise of the military command and control which he undoubtedly had on this service.

The words above recited conveying the authority conferred upon Sir Thomas Hislop, and stating its limitations will show how little there is in all the arguments to prove that he was a commander-in-chief of a separate independent army, and that in that capacity he could be under no control. He was under the control specifically of the commander-in-chief *eventually*, and the event in contemplation occurred as soon as he came within reach of his Lordship, and was in communication with his Lordship; that is, as soon as one of the divisions of the Army of the Deccan crossed the Nerbuddah.

This is the difference between Sir Thomas Hislop's case and mine. I never was in communication or co-operated with Lord Lake. Sir Thomas Hislop was in communication with Lord Hastings from the moment his troops crossed the Nerbuddah. From that moment a union of operation was necessary, and a unity of command alone could insure it.

Lord Hastings, in whom the chief command of the operations was vested, could not do otherwise than exercise that command. His Lordship might choose, as he did choose generally but not invariably, to issue his orders to the divisions of the army of the Deccan through their Commander-in-Chief Sir Thomas Hislop, and he might choose to write them himself in official or in private letters, either upon the military subject alone, or mixed up with other matter, or he might issue them if he should think proper through his adjutant-general, or his quartermaster-general, or his secretary, or his aide-de-camp. They were equally his orders, and Sir Thomas Hislop was responsible as a military officer to obey these orders.

I assert this principle: no officer in command of an army is bound to issue his orders in any particular mode or channel. Provided those who receive those orders are certain that they proceed from him, they are bound to obey them; and these very papers afford an instance of two different modes of issuing orders to armies upon the same subjects.

Lord Hastings issued his orders regarding the movements of the troops sometimes through his adjutant-general, Lieutenant-Colonel

Nicoll, sometimes by his own letters official or private. Sir Thomas Hislop issued his orders upon the same subject through Lieutenant-Colonel Blacker, the quartermaster-general, and there are not two commanders-in-chief of British armies who have issued such orders in the same precise channel.

But it is stated that these orders, though undeniably issued by Lord Hastings the Commander-in-Chief, and having for their objects detailed movements and manœuvres, were issued in the exercise of his political power as Governor-General.

I will just inquire what Lord Hastings meant by the words *my army*, frequently used in the letters conveying these orders. Did he mean that he was the sovereign whose army it was, or was he the Governor-General commanding the army, or the Commander-in-Chief commanding the army? Upon that point there can be no doubt; and these very words are sufficient to fix the real character of the letters in question.

It is true that Sir Thomas Hislop refers himself to Lord Hastings as *Governor-General*, on some points which are considered elsewhere as military, but which in India are exclusively civil. One of these is the appointment of Colonel Walker, and afterwards that of Colonel Scott to be a brigadier-general. But it must be observed that each of these appointments was an augmentation of the staff of his army; and the officer of the pay-department of the army must have declined to pay the brigadier unless the appointment were sanctioned by the Governor-General, or by the Governor-General in Council.

Lord Hastings filled two offices, that of Governor-General and that of Commander-in-Chief, both of them having distinct duties to perform in the government of the affairs of the Presidency of Fort William.

All the acts of that government are done by law in the name and by the authority of the Governor-General in Council.

But there are several acts which must be recommended to the Governor-General in Council by the Commander-in-Chief under different orders and instructions from the Court of Directors.

The distinct duties of the two offices are clear enough when they are filled by different persons, but they require in their management the official machinery which may be observed in these papers when both are filled by one person, in order to keep the military business in its proper channel.

But it is quite clear that Lord Hastings was the Commander-in-Chief on this service, and that he acted as the Commander-in-Chief in reference to the military body called the Army of the Deccan, by giving to the officer immediately in command orders for its movements, which nobody on the spot was authorised to issue excepting his Lordship, after the *event* occurred which rendered an exact unity of operations necessary between the two armies.

- I will now consider the nature of the booty realised and at the disposition of his Majesty, and will apply the facts and reasoning in this paper to the consideration of the question, to what parts of the army ought that booty to be distributed?

In the letter from the Trustees to the Treasury of 22nd June, 1825, an opinion is stated that the order of their Lordships in their minute of the <sup>1</sup> February, 1823, could not be carried into execution; and it is recommended that the booty realised should be divided among the commander-in-chief, officers, and troops of the Army of the Deccan. When that letter was written the proceedings before their Lordships and the arguments of counsel had not been brought under the view of the Trustees. If they had been such an opinion could not have been formed.

It now appears that there was no prize or booty taken at Poonah, Nagpour, or Mahidpour, which is not included in the sum of about £150,000 sterling in the whole, realised by the officers appointed to appraise and sell booty captured, and that the remainder of the sum at his Majesty's disposition consists in the value of jewels abandoned by the Peshwah, but concealed at Nassuck in his flight through that town in February and March, 1818, and found in Nassuck in May, 1818, above a month after the Army of the Deccan had been broken up; of deposits made by the Peshwah in the hands of certain individuals for services, which services were never performed, and the individuals in question had been called upon in July, 1818, to refund the sums deposited, and had since refunded; of debts due to the Peshwah, whether on account of tribute, of arrears of revenue, &c., &c.; all discovered since the Army of the Deccan was broken up in March, 1818, and generally since the Peshwah delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm in June, 1818.

These sums have been claimed on the part of the Crown as booty obtained by the East India Company's officers in consequence of the operations of the war, and have been delivered over as such by the East India Company. But it is obvious from the nature of the sources from which they came, and the period at which possession of them was obtained, that their realisation has been the consequence of all the operations, and not of any part, however important.

Whatever may be deemed to be the state of the case regarding *previous concert and association* or of actual *co-operation* on the part of the troops of the Grand Army, or even of those of the first, second, third, and fifth, and reserve divisions of the Army of the Deccan, with the fourth division in the capture of Poonah, it is quite clear that if the Pindarries, and Holkar, and the Rajah of Nagpour had not been destroyed we should never have heard of the Nassuck jewels, nor of deposits made by, nor of debts due to the Peshwah.

<sup>1</sup> Blank in M.S.

Indeed we did not hear of the two latter till after the Peshwah had delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm.

But let us trace the operations which ended in that event, and we shall see how the whole were linked together.

The Peshwah early in the year 1818 was driven from the neighbourhood of the River Kistna by the fourth and reserve divisions under Generals Smith, Munro, and Pritzler. He passed through Nassuck into Candeish, from whence he was driven in February by the troops which had been sent across the Nerbuddah and Taptee under Sir Thomas Hislop by Lord Hastings, and by those of the second division of the Army of the Deccan under General Doveton. He then turned to the south-west, towards the head of the Wurda River, into the territories of the Rajah of Nagpour, and those of the Nizam, where he was met again by the troops of the fifth division under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, and defeated by them in April. The second division under General Doveton was again co-operating.

The Peshwah then fled to the neighbourhood of Asseergur, between the Taptee and the Nerbuddah, where on the 3rd of June, 1818, he delivered himself up to Sir John Malcolm, who had put in movement all the troops, even to Delhi, to stop the Peshwah in case he should pass the Nerbuddah. All those in the Rajah of Nagpour's territories, Bopaul, Bundelcund, &c., had been put in movement in April, to stop the Peshwah when he was endeavouring to pass through the Nagpour territories.

For all these troops there is a clear case of *concert* and *association*, and for most, of direct military co-operation.

They would include nearly the whole of both armies, even if it could be doubted that, as the war with the Peshwah was occasioned by the just and necessary design to put down the Pindarries, so the surrender of the Peshwah was the consequence of the previous operations against those freebooters, and could not have occurred if these, in which all without exception were engaged, had not been successful.

WELLINGTON.

### 323. Memorandum on Mutiny at Barrackpoor.

*Summary of the conduct of the mutineers. The Commander-in-Chief did his duty in compelling them to lay down their arms, before he would consider their demands. The Committee find that the mutiny arose from :—(1) antipathy to the scene—and (2) to the character—of the war. This is true. But government could not yield to such antipathy. (3) Dislike to serving on board ship. This (they had reason to know) was an ungrounded fear. (4) Want of baggage cattle. Why the sepais require this. The government, and the commanding officer, did their*

*best to supply the want. (5) The exactions of those engaged in this service. But the service was occasional, as contrasted with (6) The alleged inadequate pay of the sepoys. Besides permanent employment, they have batta, pensions, &c. It is not unjust to exact a premium, when they are paid in Sicca rupees. Nor is their pay, judged by the price of food, really inadequate. (7) The want of knapsacks, for which they were charged. No fair cause, though the charge should have been postponed. (8) The undue influence of two native officers. Their influence was for good, not harm.*

*The indiscipline and bad feeling of the Bengal army are naturally accountable for by the detachment, from regimental duty, of a large, and the better, part of the European officers; and by the little interest taken by those who remain (including, on this occasion, the staff officers, adjutant, and quartermaster) in the wants and proceedings of the sepoys. General conclusion:—The government not to blame. Real rationale of the mutiny. Its vigorous suppression was salutary, not censurable.*

10th Oct., 1825.

I have perused with great attention the proceedings of the committee of officers in Bengal on the mutiny at Barrackpore in October and November last; their general observations, and the letter from the Governor-General in Council to the Court of Directors of the 30th of March last.

These proceedings refer only to the transactions up to the 1st of November.

It appears from them, however, that the 47th Native Regiment, after various acts of insubordination on preceding days, refused to march on the 1st of November; that a considerable body of that corps drove from the parade on that morning 180 men there assembled with the European and Native officers for the purpose of commencing the march, and seized the colours of the regiment; and remained throughout that day in a state of mutiny in their lines in the cantonment at Barrackpore; the European and Native officers, and non-commissioned officers having been obliged to withdraw themselves from the men of the regiment.

It appears that meetings had been held near a tank in front of the cantonments on different nights previous to the 1st of November, between the men of the 47th Regiment and those of the 26th and 62nd, two other Native regiments ordered likewise to march, and to follow the 47th Regiment; and it is a fact that considerable bodies of both these regiments joined the 47th in the night of the 1st November with their colours, which they had seized.

It likewise appears by the proceedings of the committee, that Major-General Dalzell, commanding in the cantonment at Barrackpore, had on the 1st of November, after the mutiny of the 47th Regiment, ordered

a Court of Enquiry to assemble to investigate the alleged grievances and claims of the sepoys, and the causes for which they had refused to march. The mutineers were informed of the assembly of this Court by Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, their commanding officer, and were desired to send two sepoys at a time of each company to attend the Court to state their complaints. The mutineers refused, as they said that these sepoys would not be allowed to return to them in safety. Upon this statement, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright made the offer to remain upon the parade with the mutineers as hostage, till all the separate detachments of sepoys sent to attend the Court should return.

The mutineers refused to accept this offer; and, in fact, the Court of Enquiry was under the necessity of adjourning without proceeding on the intended enquiry.

From these facts it is obvious that the mutineers of the 47th Regiment felt considerable confidence in their security from their numbers, the connivance of their Native officers, and the promised support of other corps; and it was not without reason that his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief required on the following morning that the mutineers of the three corps assembled should lay down their arms, before his Excellency should proceed to take into consideration the demands contained in a petition in the Persian language, which they had conveyed to his Excellency.

If his Excellency had adopted any other course, he would have been guilty of a gross violation of his duty to the government and to his employers.

The supposed causes of this mutiny are stated in the observations of the committee to have been, first, 'The general dislike to proceeding to the unhealthy country into which our military operations were to be carried.'

Secondly, 'The state of public feeling as to the nature and character of the war; and the difficulties they expected to meet in its progress.'

These were indeed the real causes of the mutiny. The sepoys serving under the presidency of Fort William are in general levied in Benares and Oude; and they dislike at all times to serve in the lower provinces, particularly in that of Bengal, on account of the nature of the climate, the food, and the supposed difference of pay, which will be discussed presently. They dislike still more to serve on the eastern frontier; and above all to pass that frontier into Assam.

But it is obvious that such objections could not induce the government to countermand the march of these corps. The State was at war, and required all its troops; and it would not do to excuse any on account of their dislike of the particular service; provided that to employ them in such service was not inconsistent with the engagement under which the troops had enlisted, or the customs which had usually prevailed in employing them.

The third cause of the mutiny stated is, 'The aversion to being employed on board ship.' If such an intention on the part of the government existed, it would have been a breach of engagement, and of the practice of the service.

But all these troops were repeatedly assured by General Dalzell, by Colonel Cartwright, by those of their European officers in whom they felt confidence, and by their Native officers, that there was no such intention; and they must have known from experience that no native troops had ever been embarked, excepting as volunteers, and by their own consent. The suspicion of such an intention on the part of the government must have been excited by those who fomented this mutiny.

The fourth cause stated for this mutiny is, 'The want of a proper provision of cattle for the conveyance of the baggage of the sepoys.'

The sepoys in the service of the government of Bengal are nearly all men of the highest caste of Hindoos; and the ceremonies of their religion and the duties of their caste require that each of them should possess for his own use certain cooking utensils and other conveniences in camp and on service, which are of a bulk and weight to render it impossible for him to carry them on his back in the same manner as other soldiers do those applied to a similar purpose.

For this reason, the sepoys are allowed to hire at their own expense cattle to carry these articles; which cattle are usually hired for them by the interference of the magistrates in the different parts of the country.

It appears that notwithstanding that the commanding officer of the 47th, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, applied to the magistrate as early as July to have the bullocks for the service of his corps hired, and repeated his application again on the 13th of October, the magistrate could find no bullocks for hire in the country, on account of the want of these animals for the general service of the army, and of the unwillingness of those who usually hired bullocks to proceed on service to that part of the country.

Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright urged the sepoys to buy bullocks to carry their baggage, and actually advanced money to the non-commissioned officers to make the necessary purchases; but the sepoys refused to purchase, and insisted upon having them for hire as usual. The commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, then advanced three thousand rupees (about four hundred pounds) out of his own pocket to purchase bullocks for the sepoys; and the government, upon the representation of the Commander-in-Chief, directed that 4000 rupees, or about five hundred pounds, should be advanced to the commanding officer of each of the corps going upon the service, to purchase bullocks to carry the baggage of the sepoys.

I certainly think that the sepoys in the service of Bengal, having been

in the habit of hiring bullocks to carry their baggage, and this accommodation being necessary for the particular description of men of whom those regiments were composed, and the assistance of the civil magistrates to obtain what they required having been usually given, and being necessary, it was the duty of the government to adopt measures to give them the accommodation of the necessary number of bullocks in some other manner, when it was found that they could not be obtained in the country for hire. Accordingly, it appears that the government and the commanding officer of the regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, performed this duty by the 47th, and ten bullocks for each company were in camp on the night of the 31st October, the night before the mutiny.

There is a difference of opinion respecting the quality of these bullocks, whether they were sufficient in number, &c. But it must be observed that the sepoy had been desired to leave behind them, or to dispose of everything which it was not necessary for them to take with them, which order was not only reasonable, but under the circumstances a proper order to give out.

It likewise appears that a building in the cantonment had been allotted to receive the baggage which the sepoys should leave behind.

But no imputation can be cast upon the government whether the bullocks were or not sufficient in number, or their quality good. They manifested their desire to provide for this service by the advance of the money; and it was the duty of others to superintend and take care of all the details of the execution of the intentions of the government, whether in regard to the carriage of the baggage of the sepoys, the care of their baggage if left behind, and all other details.

The fifth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, 'The effect produced by the enormous wages extorted from the public, and from individuals, by all classes of persons whose services were wanted on this occasion.'

This cause of discontent was made known to Lieut.-Colonel Cartwright, who very properly explained to the sepoys the difference between their situation and that of the persons referred to.

They, the sepoys, were permanently in the service, and enjoyed many advantages, besides their monthly pay, such as their batta on a march, their pensions when unable to serve any longer, &c.; whereas the persons in question were hired only for the occasion, and when the occasion should no longer exist, their pay would cease. This want of an increase of pay, however, it appears was stated by the sepoys as one of the causes of the mutiny to the last moment, and they peremptorily demanded an addition of half the pay they already received as a condition of their return to their duty.

This whole question of pay deserves consideration, as it is a point upon which the committee have gone much at length in their observations.



The first complaint is that the pay of the sepoy is calculated in Sonat rupees, in which coin they are paid in Benares and Oude, but that they are paid in Sicca rupees in Bahar and Bengal, upon which coin a premium is taken from them of about  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. Sonat rupees are the coin in general currency throughout Hindostan. Having been coined in all parts of the country, they are very old, much worn, and defaced; and one hundred, upon an average, are calculated not to be worth more than 95 or  $95\frac{1}{2}$  of the standard Sicca rupees. The standard Sicca rupees are coined by the Company in their mint; and when the troops are paid in this coin it is the common practice to deduct the overplus of the value compared with Sonat rupees, in which the pay of all ranks is calculated.

In stating the complaints of this arrangement, the committee do not mention that the sepoy do not change a single Sonat rupee in the bazaars of Hindostan, without paying something to the Shroff, or money changer. The Sicca rupee will invariably change for its standard value in other coins. What is the remedy for the evil stated by the committee? Is it to pay the troops in Bahar and Bengal without deducting the difference of value in Sicca rupees, continuing to pay those in Benares and Oude their old pay in Sonat rupees? This arrangement would be neither more nor less than to increase the pay of the troops in Bahar and Bengal; and I beg to observe that the troops in those provinces have always been supposed to be in peace cantonments, whereas those in Benares and Oude are in camp or in war cantonments.

The next claim would be to add to the pay of the troops employed in Benares and Oude  $4\frac{1}{2}$  or 5 per cent. to make their pay equal in reality to that of the troops employed in Bahar and Bengal.

It would be impossible to pay all the troops in Sicca rupees, on account of the difficulty, expense, and delay of transporting those rupees from the mint to the stations in Benares and Oude; and equally impossible to pay all the troops in Bahar and Bengal in Sonat rupees without giving circulation within the Company's territories to a base and depreciated currency. It is clear, then, that there is no remedy for this inconvenience, which in some shape or other must exist, and which, after all, is exaggerated by the committee, as well as by the sepoy.

But there is still behind a question connected with this subject, and that is, the sufficiency or the insufficiency of the pay of the sepoy in Bengal.

The pay of a sepoy is seven rupees a month, or seventeen shillings and sixpence, deducting therefrom 5 per cent., or say ninepence. Let that sum be compared with the price of labour and of food in the country, and with the pay of soldiers, the price of labour and of food in any part of the world, and it will be found ample, even after making allowance for all the deductions stated in the observations.

Suppose a sepoy eats one seer, or two pounds, of rice in a day; and I have known thousands of them live and serve upon half a seer, or a pound a day, and the Bengal sepoys never have more than two pounds when on service; the average price of rice being about twenty seers for a rupee, the sepoy would have  $5\frac{1}{2}$  rupees of his seven in every month for his other expenses.

But besides this pay, the sepoy has at all times when in Oude, and when he marches or is on service elsewhere, an allowance called *batta* of about twopence a day, which, in fact, is intended to defray, and does defray, the expense of his food. Seven rupees a month, then, is a fair allowance of pay; and in Bengal it is known that they are satisfied with that amount, and so well satisfied as that the ranks are always complete with men of the highest caste. When not in Bengal, the sepoys eat wheaten flour, which is cheaper food than rice is. But the price of rice is lower in Bengal than that above stated.

The seventh cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, 'The want of knapsacks, for which the sepoys had been put under stoppages.'

This cannot fairly be deemed a cause for mutiny. Indeed, it was scarcely stated by the troops; and those who did state the grievance, were satisfied with the answer that the knapsacks had been embarked in boats on the river at Futty Ghur, and were expected from thence. However, there is no doubt that it would have been better if the charge had not been made for the knapsacks till the troops should have received them.

The eighth cause stated by the committee for the mutiny is, 'The undue influence of the Subadar Major and Havildar Major of the 47th Regiment.' These men appear to have conducted themselves meritoriously, particularly during these discontents, and therefore they are complained of. They rendered themselves very useful to the commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, who attended to them accordingly. But it does not appear in any part of the proceedings that injustice was done to anybody in consequence of their influence. As connected with this part of the subject, I will now advert to the observations of the committee upon the native troops in Bengal. I have known these troops long enough to have heard many similar complaints of their having fallen off in discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service; but I have seen these troops perform the best service at the moment when these complaints have been loudest.

About thirty years ago, that is in the year 1796, a great change was made in the Company's service in India, particularly in the Native service, which I don't think was fully considered at the time; and it certainly has not tended to improve the qualities of the Native troops. But whether that alteration was right or wrong, no change can now be made; and we must endeavour to rectify the defects which are apparent upon the proceedings of this committee.

Of all the armies in the world, the Native army in India is that one of which the Staff officers should not be effective in its ranks. But on the contrary, the European officers with the Native troops should always be kept effective. Yet in this army, it appears that by far the majority of the officers of the regiments, and of course the best officers, those who best understand the language, manners, and customs of the natives, those most capable of preventing such a catastrophe as happened at Barrackpore, are employed in civil and diplomatic situations on the Staff of the army, in the Commissariat, in command, or to officer provisional and local, or irregular corps of cavalry and infantry; some even in the service of the allies of the British government. This being the case, it cannot be matter of surprise to find it recorded on these proceedings, not only that the European officers of the 47th Regiment had no influence in preventing this mutiny, but that they had no knowledge, some till the 31st October, others not till the 1st November, of the discontents which existed, and irregularities committed by the sepoys in their companies many days previous to the mutiny, or till long after those discontents and irregularities were known to the General Officer commanding in the cantonments, and even to the Commander-in-Chief.

It appears that these European officers never attended the roll-calls of their companies, and but seldom the regimental parades. That they were not acquainted with the sepoys of their companies, did not know their names, and never spoke to them or communicated with them, excepting through the Native officers, or non-commissioned officers, nearly all of whom, it appears, encouraged the sepoys to mutiny.

The European officers knew nothing of the orders issued by the commanding officer, did not take measures to see them executed, or take any part in the command or discipline of the corps.

It appears that the European Staff officers did not know of the irregularities of which the sepoys were guilty till the morning of the 31st October, although they were days before known to the commanding officer, and to the General, and Commander-in-Chief, and did not know or perform more of their duty than the officers in command of and attached to the companies.

It appears that the adjutant, when he gave out the orders of the commanding officer, did not consider it his duty to see them carried into execution; and as for the quartermaster, he knew nothing, and did not consider it his duty to know anything about the clothing or equipment of the troops; and when the government had taken the trouble, and had incurred the expense of 4000 rupees to purchase bullocks to carry the baggage of the sepoys of this corps, and the quartermaster might have known how important it was that this supply should not be lost or rendered useless for want of care, he did not consider it his duty to take any steps whatever to have care taken of these animals.

It is not necessary to seek for curious reasons for the falling off in the discipline, efficiency, and attachment to the service of the Native army in Bengal, when such a state of things exists among the European officers in one of the favourite corps of the service, the 47th Regiment.

I have come from the perusal of these proceedings with a firm conviction upon my mind that neither the acts nor the omissions of the government caused the discontent, much less the mutiny. The discontent was caused by the necessity of employing the sepoy on the Eastern frontier instead of in their own country, *Oude*; and the mutiny because the Native officers connived at the conduct of the mutineers, and the European officers knew nothing about that, or anything else which it was their duty to know, excepting the commanding officer, Colonel Cartwright, who appears to me to have done everything in his power, as well to allay the discontents, as to prevent the mutiny, and afterwards to get the better of it; excepting that he did not force the European officers to perform their duty, or bring them to trial for a neglect of it. The sepoy, then, finding that their conduct was thus connived at, or not checked by those who ought to have controlled it, and feeling themselves strong in numbers, and supported by other regiments in the same cantonments, broke out into open mutiny.

It is a curious fact that the committee have taken no notice of and made no observation upon their declining to attend the committee ordered on the 1st November to hear and investigate their complaints. But having so declined, the Commander-in-Chief had but one line to follow, and that was to force them to lay down their arms before he should consider of their complaints.

I entreat my colleagues, before they decide upon these questions, to consider well what would have been the consequences of any weakness or want of decision in the settlement of this question upon the spot, or in the punishment of those since tried by a court-martial composed of *Native* officers, and condemned to work upon the roads for this crime.

Let them recollect the impressions upon their own minds when they first heard of this mutiny; and I beg them when the danger is over not to judge too severely the conduct of those who got the better of it, probably by the promptitude and vigour of the very measures upon which it is now attempted to cast blame.

WELLINGTON.

### 323. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

*Terms of peace to be concluded with Ava.*

MY DEAR WYNN,

Stratfield Saye, 18th January, 1826.

I return the box with the papers on the negotiations for the peace, which are become much more difficult in consequence of the duration of

the war. It will not answer *now* to make peace without requiring some sacrifices on the part of the enemy, whether to inspire a salutary terror in Ava, to serve as an example to the Native Powers in India, or to prevent them from entertaining the notion that we have not been so successful in this war as we have represented, and that this war has been excessively troublesome and expensive to us. We may rely upon it that if these notions should be entertained, and the Burmese should not be made to feel permanently the effects of their hostility, the King of Ava will become a part of the political system of India; and probably to us the most troublesome and inconvenient part.

I conceive, then, that you must take something from him. I would take as much money as I could get. Those upon the spot would be the best judges of the sum which the King could pay in a reasonably short space of time; say two years. I would then take the whole of Arracan, and the Islands of Ramre, &c., upon that coast; more particularly if it should be found that there is a tolerable communication by land or water from Arracan or the Islands, which I suspect there is, with the valley of the Irrawaddy. I suspect that the islands of Ramre have been formed by the river flowing from the mountains which divide the valley of the Irrawaddy from the sea.

If this be true, Arracan will possess the following military advantages. It will protect your position in Chittagong. It will give you the facility of attacking the King of Ava in the heart of his dominions whenever you think proper. It can with ease be relieved and supported by sea. From the accounts which I have seen of the country, I believe it is not unhealthy; and at all events the most healthy part of the coast. Arracan should be kept by the British government at all events, whatever might be the disposition made of the territory. • But I must observe to you, that however low the King of Ava and his Burmese are in our estimation as a military power, they have raised themselves vastly in the estimation of the natives of that part of the world by their contest with us. We can dispose of territory then (which it is important to us to keep out of the hands of the Burmese) to other Powers, such as Mughls, Siamese, and Peguers, only by guaranteeing to them the possession, and protecting them in it. I should think then that we ought to keep Arracan to ourselves. I would give as much more as could be got to the Mughls, the Siamese, the Peguers, the Rajahs of Munneepoor, Cachar, &c., but upon the clear understanding that they were not to expect our protection in the maintenance of their possession.

In respect to the stipulation that there is to be no communication with European or American Powers, it has been common in all treaties with the Native Powers in India; and, considering the character and the physical powers of the Burmese, I should consider it more important to prevent the communication between them and European Powers than any

Natives in India. I suspect that if they had been well armed and well supplied with ammunition and stores the contest with them would have been much more difficult and disastrous; and the object of this stipulation is to prevent the importation into Ava of arms and ammunition, with which our good friends in Europe and America, and even in London, will certainly supply them if the treaty of peace should not contain such a stipulation, whether patent or secret. But it may be a question whether in time of peace we can propose such a stipulation consistently with all that we are doing elsewhere.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

### 324. To the Duke of Newcastle.

*Lord Combermere's capture of Bhurtpoor. The Duke declines to put himself in a false position.*

(Extract.)

Stratfield Saye, 5th Nov., 1826.

In respect to the service performed by Lord Combermere, I must beg leave to recommend to you to leave out of the consideration of that point all reference to or comparison with the services of others. I could easily show your Grace the difference between this service and those of Lord Lake, and the difference between this particular siege and the attacks made by Lord Lake upon the same fort. But there is nothing so invidious as such comparisons; and they answer no purpose excepting to irritate the friends of both the parties whose services are compared.

Having said thus much respecting the service comparatively with those performed by Lord Lake or others, I must add this, that I conceive Lord Combermere to have acted as became his character in going up the country by *dawk* and alone, immediately upon his arrival, to take the command of the army then about to take the field upon this service; that he conducted this service with all the promptitude, vigour, prudence, and ability that any officer could have applied to it; that it was a service in which success, and that not procrastinated or doubtful, was of the utmost importance to the peace of India and to the political situation of the British government, on account of the former failures of Lord Lake in his attempts to take this fort by storm and not by regular siege, and of the hopes of some and apprehensions of other of the natives of India that we had at last found a fort which was impregnable by our arms; rather than on account of the political command of the fort or of the persons, political or military, who held it, or of the strength of the position itself. The proof of the truth of these opinions is to be found in the facts that the fall of this fortress gave peace to India; that after this siege there was an end to the campaign; and that Lord Combermere

did not find it necessary to occupy and strengthen this position ; but he destroyed all vestige of the fort.

I have nothing, and have never had anything, to say to the distribution of the rewards of government to his Majesty's officers ; nor do I know in which way those view this service whose duty it is to advise his Majesty upon these points. But this I must say, that if I were Lord Combermere I should never forgive the person who should interfere to obtain for me a reward which, on account of that very interference, would be no longer the spontaneous act of his Majesty advised by his servants on a fair and impartial view of the nature and importance of the service performed. In giving this opinion I can only assure your Grace that it is in exact conformity with my own conduct. I have received more rewards for military services than any man that serves, or than any who ever served this country. But I never solicited one ; and if any man had ever interfered between the government and me by such solicitation, or even suggestion, I should not have considered that man my friend.

### 325. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

*Importance of retaining Arracan and Tenasserim ; and of discouraging European colonization.*

MY DEAR WYNN,

London, 11th November, 1826.

I have perused with attention the papers in the box which will carry this letter to you.

In respect to the provinces of Arracan, I entertain no doubt that you ought to retain them, more particularly as it appears that there is a practicable road from the city of Arracan into the valley of the Irrawaddy, or the heart of the Burmese territories. Upon this point I will communicate to you a military principle, which is I believe admitted now by the best authorities.

There is no really good defensive position which does not afford the means of making an attack upon its assailants. This principle is equally applicable to a fortress, to a military position for an army, and to a frontier. The Bengal frontier towards Ava, as I understand it, is excellent ; but it becomes improved, for it cannot be attacked with any security if you keep in your hands the means of entering the valley of the Irrawaddy with an army. This advantage, together with that of the power of attacking Rangoon with your naval force, which operation you must observe will not only be facilitated but rendered efficient at small expense and in a short space of time by your possession of the provinces of Arracan, will really give you a decided influence over the future conduct of the Burmese government.

I have no maps and but little information on the other cessions made by the Burmese, and I don't like to give an opinion when not sufficiently informed. It appears, however, that Martaban particularly would be an useful settlement in reference to military and political objects in relation to Ava and Siam; and Mergui in respect to naval and European warfare. All these settlements are situated in important points in the view of commerce—I mean of the good old regular sort which enriched men and States in time, and which was supported by intelligence, industry, and honesty! I do not counsel the cession; but I am very well convinced that the cession of these points to several of certain States in Europe would be considered as making their commercial fortune! and I cannot consider that that which it would be good for such States to obtain is not or may not be good for us to keep.

I would therefore recommend you to keep them as we have got them, and to keep them upon the lowest possible scale of civil and military expense till you can see what their real capacity and worth is. I entertain no doubt that, under the British government, they will increase in population and revenue so as very shortly to pay the expense of keeping them, if they should not do so by good management immediately.

I believe that all these should be put under the government of Fort George or of Prince of Wales's Island; the former preferably. Arracan should be under the government of Bengal, and a good paved road broad enough for two cannon should be made from Chittagong to Arracan.

There is one point adverted to in Mr. Bayley's minute and Dr. Phillimore's memorandum, upon which I cannot avoid saying one word, and that is, the colonization of these settlements by Europeans.

I am not astonished that the latter should have recommended this scheme; but I am that it should ever have occurred to a man who, like Mr. Bayley, must have resided for some years in India.

You are not aware here of the inferiority of the European (particularly British) character and of its consequences in all the relations of life. Look at the accounts of the manners and conduct of those British subjects, not Company's servants, who some time ago carried on indigo plantations and manufactories. Yet observe, these men were not *colonists*. They had no right to reside in the country, which I may say was the scene of their depredations and plunder, excepting under the Company's licence, which might have been withdrawn at any time.

Observe that when you send a man to colonize in one of these settlements, you do not send him to a desert, as in Africa, America, or Australasia, but you must send him to a country peopled more or less, and more or less civilized. He goes there enriched with the character of his country, of which advantage he soon becomes aware; and he



uses it and all the other advantages which the absence of law would give him for the basest of purposes, the gratification of all his own base passions. All respect for the character of the country would become lost, and with its character we should lose our settlements. Rely upon it that with all our civilization and advantages, we are the nation in Europe the least disciplined and the least to be trusted in a situation in which we are not controlled by the strong arm of authority and law.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

You will have seen that throughout this contest Munro's opinion and mine have not been far different. I enclose you a letter which I received from him some time ago, from which you may conclude what his opinion is upon this subject.

Pray return Munro's letter, which you will see is for yourself alone.

### 326. To Lord Combermere.

#### *Danger of disputes between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General.*

(Extract.)

Sudbourne, 22nd December, 1826.

I have had a good deal of experience in Indian governments and in the mode of conducting public affairs in that country, and I confess I was concerned to peruse more than one Minute of yours, differing with the Governor-General upon points purely political, and those most of them bygone transactions. I will not write much upon this subject, nor enter into a discussion whether you or the Governor-General were right. But of this I am certain that any public and continued difference of opinion between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief is prejudicial to the public interests, and cannot be allowed to exist. It is prejudicial for this reason. It shakes the authority of government to its very foundations, and while such difference continues, every little man who takes part with either one or the other becomes of importance. The interests of the party are the great object. Those of the public are laid aside and forgotten, and even injured with impunity.

God forbid that I should desire you to approve of measures of which you disapprove, or withhold from the Governor-General your real opinions. But let them be your own opinions. Discuss them with him in private fairly and candidly before you do so upon record, and avoid to record your difference of opinion by Minute if it should be possible. The Commander-in-Chief is the first executive servant of the government. He is the right hand of the Governor-General, and he must be his friend and support his authority, or one or both must be recalled.

Rely upon it that in this country of law and civil government the military authority, in such a contest, will go to the wall. I entreat you to attend to this letter, and let no man persuade you that your honour or interest is involved in a contest by Minute with the Governor-General.

**327. To Lord Ellenborough.**

*How we may help the Shah and Pacha of Bagdad.*

(Extract.)

Middleton, 9th October, 1828.

It is very desirable to encourage both the King of Persia and the Pacha of Bagdad to improve their military resources; and this not so much with a view to the employment of these establishments, which we should form for those governments against the Emperor of Russia, as for the settlement and security of their own authority. A very small body of well disciplined and obedient troops will keep in order a very extensive country at a very little expense, comparatively. The government enjoys its resources, and commands its military means; and can employ them against the enemy.

Without such aid, the first sound of foreign war occasions insurrection and disorder, and expense everywhere. The resources of the country are cut off from the government; and it is deprived of the service of the armies which such countries would furnish against the foreign enemy if a better order of things existed. Then it must be reckoned upon that insurrection always follows foreign war, if it does not precede and accompany it; and the government, after having made peace with the foreign enemy, is obliged to reconquer its own territories.

We ought to encourage and assist these governments, then, in forming an efficient and obedient force. But they should pay the whole expense.

You will observe that every officer lent to these Powers is taken away from the service of the army; and aggravates the inconvenience of the Staff in the regiments.

If this is to be, as it must be, an additional expense to the East India Company, it is quite right that it should be defrayed by those for whose benefit it is incurred.

I should likewise say that we must take care that, in aiding to form military establishments of this description, it is done in situations in which they cannot be used against ourselves.

The King of Persia and the Pacha of Bagdad cannot come into contest with us. But I do not see for what the latter can want armed ships in the Persian gulf, excepting for the attainment of objects in that gulf or the Indian seas.

## 328. To the Right Hon. J. W. Croker.

*Why Col. Wellesley was preferred to General Baird as commandant of Seringapatam.*

MY DEAR CROKER,

London, 24th January, 1831.

I have received your note, and shall be happy to see you on the day that you have fixed.

I have often heard of Sir D. Baird's dissatisfaction on my appointment to take the command at Seringapatam when he had commanded the successful storm of the town, on which I was not even employed, having been appointed to command the reserve in the trenches. Of course I had nothing, I could have nothing to say to the selection of myself, as I was in the trenches, or rather in the town, when I received the order to take the command of it, and instructions to endeavour to restore order.

Baird was a gallant, hard-headed, lion-hearted officer, but he had no talent, no *tact*; had strong prejudices against the natives; and he was peculiarly disqualified from his manners, habits, &c., and it was supposed his temper, for the management of them. He had been Tippoo's prisoner for years. He had a strong feeling of the bad usage which he had received during his captivity, and it is not impossible that the knowledge of this feeling might have induced Lord Harris, and those who advised his Lordship, to lay him aside.

However, of course I never inquired the reason, of my appointment, or of Baird being laid aside. There were many other candidates besides Baird and myself, all senior to me, some to Baird. But I must say that I was the *fit person* to be selected. I had commanded the Nizam's army during the campaign, and had given universal satisfaction. I was liked by the natives.

It is certainly true that this command afforded me the opportunities for distinction, and thus opened the road to fame, which poor Baird always thought was, by the same act, closed upon him. Notwithstanding this, he and I were always on the best terms, and I don't believe that there was any man who rejoiced more sincerely than he did in my success.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

## II. MILITARY.

### I. ORGANIZATION.

#### 329. To Major-General St. Leger.

*Suggestions on the proposed introduction of 'galloper guns.'*

(Extracts.)

Fort William, 11th April, 1797.

There are certain principles in artillery, the truth of which is undeniable in all countries, and which the light artillery would bring into effect in this. One of these is, that the more speedily and the greater ease with which the gun is transported the better, provided there is equal weight of metal and equal strength of carriage.

The want of speed in the artillery of this country has been the cause that many advantages have been missed, many opportunities of bringing the enemy to action have not been taken because the artillery could not be brought up in time; and, for some unaccountable reason, the Native armies, having had better draught-bullocks and larger establishments, have been able to draw off their artillery when that of the British army could not be moved. The only objection to light artillery is the scarcity of horses in India. I put the expense out of the question, as, if the establishment is necessary, the expense of it is not to be considered. I am afraid that scarcity will be fatal to what is proposed in the memorial, although I think that an establishment adopting some of its great principles may be had without difficulty and at a trifling expense, and that it will render as effectual service in this country as that proposed, which, I think, must be rejected on account of the want of the necessary supply of horses.

Everybody is aware of the difficulty which attends the movement of artillery by means of horses. even in Europe, where the roads are comparatively excellent, where forage is comparatively plentiful, and the climate so favourable to them. The largest establishment of horses that can be supposed necessary for a park of artillery is never equal to transporting it for any length of time or distance, and the only method of supply that can be adopted is that of pressing horses from the country in proportion as it is found that those belonging to the artillery are knocked up.

That is the universal practice in all the armies in Europe, and, however improper, it cannot be dispensed with.

[During the Mysore war, I am informed that Lord Cornwallis had

some light guns drawn by horses; but I believe before—I am sure very shortly after he ascended the Ghauts—long before he was near the enemy, the horses were knocked up and the guns were drawn by bullocks.]

Recourse cannot be had to such a measure in India; and, therefore, supposing that it was possible to establish a train of light artillery drawn by horses, which would be attended with some difficulty, the want of the supply of horses in the countries in which it is intended it would be used is an objection to the establishment which must be fatal.

However, to have some artillery which can be moved with celerity will be attended with such advantages, that I cannot readily give up the idea merely because there is a difficulty attending the original purchase of horses, and because their future supply would be impracticable. I should therefore propose that there should be an establishment of horses for eight guns and four howitzers, with harness, &c., at all times ready at the Park, in addition to their usual establishment of bullocks, &c. &c. It is unnecessary at present to enter into a detail of all that would be necessary for such an establishment; but my idea is that the horses should never be used excepting when it is desirable, on account of being near an enemy, to move the artillery at a quick rate; and that all the ordinary duties of transport should be done as usual by the bullocks.

I likewise think that the artillerymen might ride upon the horses and upon the carriage of the guns. I am aware that the latter is liable to objections, but, in my opinion, not to those to which it is liable in Europe, as it is not intended that the artillerymen should be upon the carriage for a greater length of time than during that which the horses are drawing it, and it cannot therefore be supposed that they will strain it to the same degree as it is strained in Europe, where the horses being at all times to the gun, and generally going at an advanced rate, the artillerymen are obliged to sit upon them and upon the carriage, which by constant use becomes strained.

\* \* \* \* \*

I should propose to attach to these guns, when they are in use, a party of light dragoons; these would answer the double purpose of escort, and they could assist in holding the horses when the guns were unlimbered.

Parties of the 15th Dragoons and of Rohan's hussars attended some British light artillery for a length of time, and did besides the patrol duty of the posts to which it was attached.

I think that if more is attempted at present, all will fail; and, as I stated above, I really think that it is utterly impracticable to find horses in India to supply the loss and waste of them which would be occasioned by an establishment of light artillery.

### 330. Regimental Rank in the Army of the East-India Company.

*Why promotion was originally general. Early system of officering Sepoy corps. King's commissions given to Company's officers. Promotion still general, in each Presidency. Lord Cornwallis' plan imperfectly carried out. Present system of organizing Sepoy regiments, with European and native officers. Promotion is still not regimental. This circumstance makes the discontent at the slowness of promotion, and at the loss of old perquisites, a general grievance throughout the service. In Bengal, it also seriously impairs discipline, by the removal of officers from corps to corps : less so in Madras, where such removal is rare. And it greatly increases the cost of the Bengal army.*

[1798.]

The Company's army was formerly but small ; it consisted of but few corps, and it was therefore perhaps necessary that all the officers belonging to it should be liable to be removed from one to the other as the service might require ; and that the promotion of each should not be confined to one corps only, but be general throughout the whole of their service. This was perhaps the more necessary, as the establishments at the different Presidencies were subject to great variations at different times ; and, if the promotion of the officers upon each establishment had not been general, individuals would have suffered considerably.

In the process of time, and in consequence of the acquisition of extensive dominions by the Company, and of the improvements in the discipline of the armies of the Native powers, larger establishments have become necessary, and there is at present at each of the three settlements a very large army. These have required a different organization. At first, the European battalions only were organized as the King's regiments are : the Native corps were commanded by captains or by majors, assisted by an adjutant and about ten subalterns ; and several (five or six) of these corps were put in a brigade commanded by a colonel and other field-officers. Still, the promotion of these officers continued to be general.

In consequence of the representations made by several officers of the Company's army, subsequent to the peace of '83, of the grievances under which they laboured from serving with the King's regiments in India, such as, that the Company's officers of each rank were commanded by those in the King's service of the corresponding rank, notwithstanding that the dates of the commissions of the latter might be subsequent to those of the former, it was agreed to give to every officer holding a commission under the Company on the day of the cessation of hostilities at Cuddalore, a similar commission from the King, dated on that day ; and upon the promotion or appointment of any officer in future,

a commission from the King of the same date as that which he received from the Company. It was likewise promised to them that the King would not grant to any officer in his army brevet commissions *for India only*; and that such officers who then held them, and who should refuse to give them up, should be ordered home. The army still remained organized as before, and the promotion general instead of regimental.

The last war with Tippoo Sahib proved, that notwithstanding what had been done for the army at different times by the Company, and immediately previous to it by the King, the officers in the Company's service, in proportion to the length of time they had served, were, comparatively with those in the King's service, in a very inferior situation; and the justice of Lord Cornwallis induced him to form a plan for their relief, and to take the opinion of different officers at the head of the Madras and of the Bengal armies respecting its efficacy and propriety.

It is needless to enter into a statement of what that plan was, or to notice all the improper and unnecessary violence to which it gave rise. In my opinion it would have been more advantageous to the Company's army than the present arrangement, which, after the discussion of two years, has been adopted. The Company's infantry are now organized as the King's are, with this difference only: that a Native regiment, consisting of two battalions (2000 men), has the same number of European officers only that one battalion of Europeans has; but the former has, in addition thereto, its Native officers.

This has occasioned a considerable promotion to the higher ranks, and to that of captain. Besides this promotion, the officers of the Company's army are included in the brevets which are granted to those in the King's. The rank of captain has likewise been given to all those who were in the army previous to January '81, who have not been promoted in consequence of the new regulations. The most essential part, however, of those arrangements, that in which, in my opinion, the public as well as the officers are most interested, has not been adopted, as Sir Robert Abercromby gave his opinion in a minute against it: this part is, the promotion of officers in *regiments* as far as the rank of Major, instead of by seniority throughout the whole of each establishment.

Notwithstanding the liberality with which the regulations have been framed, the extensive promotion which has been given, and the great expense which has been incurred, it has been impossible to place every individual in a situation as high as from the length of his services he deserves. In all the armies several officers, with the brevet of captain, are still subalterns. In the Bengal army there are 140 or 150 subalterns of fourteen or fifteen years' standing in the service, whose prospect of promotion is very distant. This must create a certain discontent, and, in the course of a few years (particularly if the pro-

motion in the King's army should ever again be as rapid as it has been lately), it may be expected that it will again break out in the same dangerous manner that it did upon the late occasion. If the promotion by regiments were adopted, it might be expected that, as these officers would be placed as the senior subalterns of each corps, in a short time they would be promoted; but even if they were not promoted so soon as I expect, if some were unfortunately superseded by officers junior to themselves with better fortune in other corps, and that they should still remain subalterns after a length of time, the grievance would be that of an individual instead of that of a whole army: if there were more of these instances than is by any means probable, they would be of individual grievances, which would be felt by those alone whom they affected at the moment, and would not interest the army.

The fact is, that the arrangements have not given satisfaction, in Bengal particularly, and among the lower and more numerous ranks. Under the former system, the captain or major of a battalion of sepoys, by defrauding his men, and by keeping his corps incomplete, made a fortune in a few years. Every officer who was detached, in proportion to the size of his detachment made a sum of money; and these advantages, together with others which they received from the public, they have necessarily lost. The number of old officers was so great that it was impossible they should all get rank; and even those who have got rank, have lost very considerable emoluments. This must in the end create great discontent. The army at present act as one body; the benefits and grievances of one are the same to the whole, and they are irresistible: their discontents, therefore, are more dangerous than those of other armies. If they were permanently placed in regiments, every individual, instead of feeling the grievances of the whole body, would feel those only which affected his own corps, or perhaps his own person: besides that, from the size and extent of the army and of the country in which it is placed, it is reasonable to expect that, however extensive any particular grievance (such as that of want of promotion) might be, some corps would not feel it, or would enjoy other advantages to compensate for it: and even one such would be sufficient to prevent the bad effects of any discontent.

Besides this benefit, it is certain that if the officers, when once posted to regiments, knew that they were not to expect to be moved from them, the army would be better disciplined. An officer never takes pains with a corps from which he knows that he can be removed when he pleases; his credit does not depend upon the state in which it is found. The difference in the state of discipline of the army upon the coast and in that of Bengal is a strong confirmation of this fact. At Madras it is not the practice to remove officers from one corps to another, excepting when absolutely necessary, and the army is in very



high order; in Bengal, from circumstances which I shall mention hereafter, they are moved when and where they please, and there is no army that lays claim to the title of *disciplined* that is in such a bad state.

The conduct of the Coast army will illustrate another part of this subject. Although their rise is not regimental, the officers are permanently posted to corps; and notwithstanding that their grievances were heavier than those suffered by the officers in Bengal, there was not the same violence of complaint, nor any reason to fear for the consequences of discontent. The grievances were not less felt than in Bengal; but as they were regularly organized, and each corps commanded by an officer whose credit depended upon its state of discipline, and who was responsible for its allegiance, the complaints were never so loud: the army never acted as one body, as in Bengal. To their credit it may be said, that if it had been necessary, they would have gone to Bengal and quelled a mutiny for the redress of grievances, in the success of which they were more interested than those who mutinied.

From the promotion being general throughout the line in Bengal, and from the consequent practice of removing officers from one corps to another whenever they please, not only the army is not disciplined, but it is much more expensive than it would be otherwise. The infantry there consists of three regiments of Europeans, and, at present, fourteen regiments of sepoys. These are distributed almost equally in six stations; whereby three are in Bengal and Bahar, where the troops get half batta; one in Benares where they get full batta; and two in Oude, where they get double full batta. The stations in Bengal and Bahar make detachments to different places where full batta is likewise given. The staff of every army is taken indiscriminately from its line, and every corps gives a part of it. In every army each corps has a number of officers absent from ill health or on furlough, or for other causes. In the Bengal army, from the practice of removing officers from their corps when they desire it, the regiments in Bengal and Bahar have all the staff posted to them; all the sick, and all those on furlough. Those in Benares and in Oude have nearly all the effective officers of the army; even those who remain posted to a regiment within the provinces are detached; and it is not uncommon to see a regiment at one of the lower stations without an officer excepting the commanding officer, who always receives full batta, and the adjutant and quartermaster, who receive very large allowances: so that, upon the whole, it may be said, with but few exceptions, that every officer in the Company's service present in Bengal receives either full or double full batta, or is upon the staff. The expense, therefore, is enormous. If they were permanently posted to their regiments, and if the promotion were regimental, the staff, the sick, and the furlough would fall equally, or nearly so, among them all; there would be a certain number of officers present with the corps stationed within, as

well as with those stationed without the provinces; and thus not only would the army be better disciplined, but nearly one-third of the expense of batta would be saved. Two of the regiments of sepoys were detached to the Northern Circars, where they receive full batta; I believe they are lately returned.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 331. To Major-General Sydenham.

*In future Indian wars, celerity of movement will be a primary requisite. Hence the whole corps of bullock-drivers ought to be retained. Purposes to which the permanent bullock-train should be applied.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 16th Jan., 1800.

In the wars which we may expect in India in future, we must look to light and quick movements; and we ought always to be in that state to be able to strike a blow as soon as a war might become evidently necessary. There would be no difficulty in hiring bullocks (and even good ones) to draw our guns, in the same manner as was done in the commencement of last war, during the time that the other preparations might be making; but for these, as heretofore, there would be no drivers; and by the time that the army would be collected and prepared to move, the bullocks, as usual, would be either dead or unfit for service. Therefore, I insist upon it that, whether the bullocks are kept or not, the corps of bullock-drivers ought to be retained in the service in the present situation of affairs, even if to pay the expense it should be necessary to send away a regiment of Europeans or to disband one of sepoys. But the bullock-drivers make nearly the whole expense of the establishment, and, therefore, considering the small expense attending, and the great advantage of having 3500 trained cattle in good order when the army is to take the field, I would not recommend that their numbers should be at all diminished.

This number will give a sufficiency for a field train of 50 pieces of cannon, with all their stores, and will leave a large number for your provision department. It would be useless and ridiculous to think of providing for a heavy train, and it would be improper, in my opinion, to apply those bullocks to the draught of it, should one be ever necessary.

It is first to be recollected that a road must be made wherever a heavy gun goes, and that, when that is done, the number of bullocks allowed by the Company's regulations, be they ever so bad, are fully equal to drawing it as fast as it ought to go. Of this I have only to refer to the experience of the last war. It was certainly impossible to find worse bullocks than the army had, and yet there was no difficulty in getting on the guns, excepting where the road was bad. In these situations, the

best bullocks, even those we have now, would not have enabled us to make longer marches, or to move more quickly. Good and strong bullocks are essentially necessary to field-pieces, because these are always liable to be moved across the country where there is no road, and because, in fact, they can be of no use to the troops excepting they can be so moved. Therefore it is that I would have this establishment kept and applied solely to the drawing of a field-train and its stores, and of a provision department, and, perhaps, of treasure.

### 332. To Colonel Pater.

*Dealers not to be constrained by the civil government to supply the troops on march. If you pay what they ask, self-interest will induce them to sell; and competition will lower the price.*

(Extract.)

Camp 2 miles south of Cullumbella,  
1st June, 1800.

Most certainly orders have been given to permit the people of the country to sell you every thing that you may want, and that they may have, but orders have not been given to the aumildars to interfere to procure anything for you; because I am exceedingly anxious that the troops should be independent of the civil Government, from which I desire nothing more than that they will remain neuter, and I am willing and desirous that we should depend for our supplies on what alone can make them plentiful, viz. our own money and the interest which the people of the country have to dispose of the articles in their possession of which we are in want. This interest they will steadily pursue if the Government remain neuter, and that is all I desire from them; and it is all the assistance which I receive or ever have received in probably the most plentiful camps that have ever been known in this country. Under these circumstances I have to recommend to you to order the gram agents to purchase gram at any rate, and immediately to complete their bullocks, and to keep them so. You should have no nerrick for rice in your bazaar; let the bazaar people purchase it and sell it for what they can: it will be dear probably just at first, as gram will be likewise, but the high price given will occasion a desire to sell, a consequent competition among the sellers, and will lower the price.

What I have above written is the dictate of common sense proved to be true by experience, and you may depend upon it that the interests of the people are a better foundation for supplies than the exertions of any aumildar or civil Government, provided they will remain neuter.

You may ask, if the people feel this interest, and are allowed to act as it dictates, why do they refuse to sell their goods, and ask so enormous a price for them, and one so much above that which is common and natural? I answer because it is their interest. They know perfectly

well what is likely to happen, and from experience they know what they are likely to get for their goods when what they expect will happen. They therefore now ask a larger price for them than they are worth, and keep them up to get it; but give that price and you will immediately create a competition which will reduce it as low as it probably ought to be.

I have in my camp at this moment all the Company's bullocks, and my consumption of gram is probably greater than that of all the regiments of cavalry put together. I have never had any assistance whatever from any aumildar, and I have not yet heard that there has been any difficulty in procuring that or anything else, and the price is low. If it were ten times higher it must be given, and as long as the Government will not interfere I shall be well supplied.

### 333. To the Secretary of Government, Madras.

*Inefficiency of the bullock system, from the absence of the real owners of the cattle. Officers ought to be responsible for the transport of their tents; and be put on tent allowance.*

(Extracts.)

Camp at Luckmaisir. 24th July, 1800.

The bad weather, mentioned in my letter of the 20th, continued to the night of the 21st, and destroyed at that time nearly one-half of the public hired carriage cattle of the detachment.

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It is evident that upon the present bullock system a similar inconvenience is always to be expected. The detachment left Mysore with the finest bullocks that I have yet seen with troops. There has been at no time a want of forage, and the few bullocks and the cattle in the service of individuals are in high condition; but there is a want among the public hired cattle of the presence of the real owners, those who might feel for their loss, and who would take pains for their preservation. The real owners are dubashes at Seringapatam or at Madras, who employ servants as fictitious owners in camp; and it is often necessary to force them out to bring forage for the cattle to eat. The consequence is they are starved, and hard work or bad weather (of the former of which, it is to be observed, upon this occasion they have had none, and of the latter only two days) destroys them all, reduces the best troops to a critical situation, and puts an end to every intended operation.

It is impossible to alter the system at present, or probably at any time; but it would be a considerable relief to it if the tents of the officers were carried by themselves. Whenever there is a difficulty the camp equipage department suffers most, and to relieve it is attended with most inconvenience. In fact, a bullock which is not taken care of is very unequal

to carry an officer's tent, which at this season of the year is generally wet. Besides, although under the regulations a larger hire is paid for bullocks which carry tents than for others, it is by no means so profitable an employment for cattle as if they were in any other department. When cattle carry tents, it is necessary that they should all be produced every day, and that the drivers should be complete, or the officers complain. When they are employed in the carriage of grain or of stores, all, or, at least, a large proportion of the spare bullocks are employed in carrying goods for the bazaar people or individuals, from which a profit is derived. The number of drivers for these bullocks is not necessary, and is never complete. Thus, then, the employment of cattle in the camp equipage department, although highest paid by the public, is not the most lucrative to the bullock owners; and in consequence the camp equipage, instead of having the best, generally has the worst bullocks, and is most difficult to move. If the public bullocks of other departments should fail, it is always possible to find other means of carriage in an army; but tents require the cattle in the service of the public; and if these fail, it is not at all times possible to replace them. For all these reasons I take the liberty of again recommending that the officers may be put on tent allowance.

### 334. To Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister.

#### *Military corvées forbidden.*

(Extract.)

Seringapattam, 21st May, 1801.

The Resident has mentioned to me that the ryots have been forced to bring straw and gram to your camp for sale, of which they complain as an inconvenience, as it takes up much of the time of those who would otherwise be employed in the cultivation of the country. I beg leave to recal to your recollection that the Honourable Company has allowed a bullock for each horse to carry his gram, and a grass-cutter for each horse to bring in his forage, and therefore there is no reason why the ryots who have gram and straw for sale should be obliged to bring those articles to your camp. However, as there is now a larger number of horses in camp than followers and bullocks are provided for, it may be supposed that there are some grounds for requiring that gram and forage should be brought in by the ryots. But I beg to observe upon that point, that a grass-cutter can with ease bring more than one horse can consume, if straw is to be given to the horses, and the same may be said of gram in the plentiful country in which you are stationed. I therefore request that the practice of requiring that gram and straw may be brought into your camp for sale by the ryots may be discontinued entirely.

**335. To Major Paterson.***Military bazaars ; and discouragement of a disputatious spirit.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 31st July, 1801.

Government has never given any orders regarding the conduct of bazaars, but has left them entirely under the direction of the officers commanding different bodies of troops at different times, and they hold these officers responsible that their regulations shall be such as to insure to the troops a plentiful, regular, and cheap supply of provisions.

Upon the different occasions that I have had under my immediate command bodies of troops, I have always regulated the bazaars upon the principles adopted by Lord Cornwallis and General Harris. No duties have been collected excepting upon intoxicating drugs and liquors; the sale of everything else has been free. The cutwals of the regimental bazaars have been ordered to obey the commanding officers of the regiments to which they were attached, at the same time that they were under the direction of the head cutwal in camp and the officer superintending the bazaar.

This is the system which I prefer, and shall always adopt; but I don't think it proper that I should interfere so far in a business for which Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister only is responsible, as to desire that he should adopt the system which I prefer, even although that system has the sanction of Lord Cornwallis and General Harris. Under these circumstances, and as I don't see anything in the order by Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister which can tend to distress the troops for provisions, I must forbear to interfere upon this occasion.

\* \* \* \* \*

Having thus given an answer to the reference made by you, I have to request that if my answer be not satisfactory, you will be so kind as to refer the matter to the Commander-in-Chief; at the same time I recommend a system of conciliation rather than any further reference upon the subject from either side.

**336. To Lieutenant-Colonel Shce.***Eurians in European regiments.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 2nd Oct., 1801.

I wish to have your opinion upon the subject of two officers in the 33rd regiment, Lieutenants Hook and Stewart, who, I understand, are as black as my hat; at least I am told so by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, in whose garrison of Poonamallee they were quartered for some time. I am also informed that one of them, Lieutenant Hook, says that he con-

trived to avoid showing himself at the War Office or to the Duke of York ; and I am sure he must have equally avoided Lord Cornwallis. Without having any prejudice against half-caste men, who, I dare say, may be intrinsically as good as others, I have a strong objection to a black face in an European corps in this country ; and I think that, if these gentry are of the colour that I hear they are, it is not proper that they should be allowed to remain in the 33rd regiment, at least without the particular orders of the Commander-in-Chief upon the subject. My present opinion is, that they ought to be reported to the Commander-in-Chief, and that they ought to be made to show themselves at the Adjutant-General's office ; and after this inspection, if the Commander-in-Chief thinks it proper that they should continue to be officers, it is his affair, and not ours.

### 337. To Captain Wilks.

*Retiring pensions of officers in the Company's army.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam, 16th Aug., 1802.

I am still of opinion that it cannot be intended to deprive the officers of the army of the pensions upon retirement. The inconveniences attending them are obvious ; but every man who considers at all must see that they must be continued, or the old abuses abolished by the regulations of 1796 must be revived, or there can be no longer a local army in India. I believe the Court of Directors prefer keeping their army, even with this expense, to giving it up or to rendering it worse than useless by a revival of the old abuses.

Since the establishment of the pensions, the Court of Directors have been uncommonly liberal upon this subject. They have taken off many restrictions upon retirement, and they have given pensions to officers retiring at different periods of service on account of bad health. By these regulations they have undoubtedly added to the expense of the pension establishment. If they were a body capable of acting upon any systematic plan, either with a good or bad object in view, I should agree that the increase of the expense of the pension establishment has been made in order to render it more odious to the King's ministers and the public, and in order to render it more certain that it would be abolished ; but we all know, both from the constitution of the Court of Directors and from the mode in which they do business, that they are not capable of forming a systematic plan of that kind, and of waiting quietly its result. If they wanted to destroy the pension establishment, they would have dashed at it at once rather than have increased its expense as the most certain mode of increasing the number of its enemies, and of finally obtaining its abolition. I am induced, therefore, to attribute the liberal arrangements above alluded to to a spirit friendly

to the institution, founded upon a sense of its benefits to the military service, and, of course, to the power of the Company.

In all great bodies there are many who see only the inconveniences of an institution, particularly if it be attended with expense; but I can hardly believe that the Court of Directors in general are blind to the benefits of this institution, or that the King's ministers would allow them to abolish it as long as it is the policy of Great Britain to govern India through the Company, to have there a local army, and to keep the patronage out of the hands of the Crown.

### 338. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Native elephant-keepers require European superintendence.*

(Extract.)

Walwajee, 17th Sept., 1802.

I send this day to the Adjutant-General a letter from Captain Mackay upon the subject of the gun-bullocks, &c. In drawing your attention to this subject, I take the liberty of mentioning one connected therewith, for which I have to apologize, as the elephants to which it relates are no longer under my superintendence. By the tent regulations, I observe that they are attached to the European regiments, and the Military Board have lately ordered that they should be detached to the places in which the regiments are stationed.

I know the people who have charge of them perfectly well, and I assure you that they are not to be trusted in the care of these valuable animals without European superintendence. I have worked them more probably than any officer in the army, and I never saw them out of condition when they were under the eye of the agent; but whenever they have been detached they have fallen off in condition, and some have died, and frequent instances of frauds and thefts in feeding them have been discovered.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending to you that they should be placed under the immediate care of the quartermasters of the regiments, and that the attention of the commanding-officers should be called to the state of their condition. It will in some cases perhaps be impossible that they should be kept in the place with the regiment to which they are attached; but it will scarcely be necessary that they should be detached to a greater distance than twenty miles, and the quartermaster ought to see them constantly.



## 339. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*To what extent, and on what conditions, advances should be made to the brinjarries.*

(Extract.)

24th Jan., 1803.

I think that Major Munro is mistaken regarding the necessity of giving advances to the brinjarries, and that to give these advances, excepting in the manner I shall point out, would be more prejudicial than beneficial to the service. The brinjarries are merchants who trade in grain and attend armies in time of war, and trade in salt between the sea coast and the inland countries of the peninsula and carry on a small trade in time of peace. The trade which they carry on in grain in time of peace is of no great extent, because there are few species of grain which will pay the expense of a long land carriage, loaded as all grain is with duties; and the trade which they carry on in salt does not give employment to the number of cattle which they can employ in time of war. They keep these cattle, however, in time of peace, although they have no employment for them, and the whole are ready to attend armies in the field when their services are called for. As merchants, it is obvious that the brinjarries must have at all times a sufficiency of capital to provide loads for the bullocks employed in carrying on their trade in peace; indeed they must have more, as the contents of their loads being salt, are more valuable than any load of grain. The necessity of giving them advances of cash to provide loads for the cattle, therefore, if it exist at all, exists only in respect to that proportion for which they have not employment in peace. Upon this statement the first object should be to ascertain what number of their cattle have usually been employed in peace, and in what manner, and then the number of cattle belonging to each tandah for which there has been no employment. An advance might be made for each head of these last (provided it should appear that the tandah had not capital) sufficient to purchase a load for each bullock, and an engagement ought to be taken from the owner of the cattle to whom the advance should be made, to produce at a certain period for the service of the army the whole number of bullocks loaded which it might have been ascertained he had in his possession. The consequence of adopting a different line of conduct, and of giving advances (either of cash or loads of grain, which is the same thing) generally without such previous inquiry, is that the brinjarries lay out the money given to them and purchase new cattle instead of loads for those they have long had; they then find more difficulty in procuring the number of loads they require; and as they are always unwilling to move till every bullock is loaded, there is an additional delay, and the service suffers greater inconvenience.

340. Memorandum upon Forage<sup>1</sup>.

The first object to be attained is, that this necessary article should be got for the troops; the next, that the inhabitants should receive a fair value for it. Indeed the first depends much upon the last; as it is certain that unless the value is given for any article that is required for the armies, it will not long be obtained without the use of force and more trouble than it is worth.

With a view to the first object, the Rajah's government have been prevailed upon to give orders in all parts of the country through which the troops were to pass, that straw might be sold to whoever should require it. There is a portion of the straw, however, which the inhabitants will never sell, viz., that which they require for the food of their own cattle during a certain period of the year. Nothing will tempt them to part with this portion; and when they have but little more than this, they become unwilling to sell any. When the troops arrive at any camp, all their followers commonly go to the nearest village for forage; the people find difficulty in supplying all the demands with the necessary celerity, they become frightened, they fear that if they supply all the demands they will not have the quantity necessary for themselves, and they end in refusing to sell any, if they are protected by a safeguard, which it is impossible to refuse them.

It is apparent, therefore, that in order that the troops may get a sufficiency of forage, it is necessary that the villagers should not have reason to fear that they will be deprived of that which is absolutely requisite for the subsistence of their own cattle, and that with this view measures should be taken to prevent them from foraging all in the same village.

In order to effect this, the Sircar has been called upon to furnish an account of the number of villages in the neighbourhood of each ground of encampment, the distance and bearing of each from the place which gives the name to the camp, and the number of bullock loads of forage which each can afford to sell. This return is translated and, put into a form a copy of which accompanies this memorandum, is given to the quartermaster's department the day before the march, who allots to the corps and departments the different villages for forage according to their several wants.

The corps, &c., are then ordered in the General Orders to forage in certain villages by name, of which the direction from the place which gives the name of the camp is inserted. My orders of this day will show the mode in which this is arranged.

The quartermaster ascertains the wants of each corps or department called for from heads of corps or departments, and from individuals

<sup>1</sup> Enclosed in a Despatch to Lieutenant-General Stuart, dated, Camp at Benkypoor, 21st Feb, 1803.—*Ed.*

attached to head-quarters, of the number of cattle belonging to all descriptions of people attached to each. He then calculates the number of bullock loads of straw required by each corps, &c., at the rate of one bullock load for fifteen bullocks for one day. This is a large proportion; but as the people are obliged to pay for what they get, they will not take more than they want, and by this calculation there can be no disappointment.

The regiments of cavalry are not allowed to have straw for their horses, excepting for the number for which there are no grass-cutters. No country can afford to supply forage for our armies if the means allowed by the Company to supply the regiments of cavalry with green forage are not faithfully applied to that purpose. They get straw, however, for all the bullocks attached to them, of which there are considerable numbers, and for the horses for which there are no grass-cutters. The place which gives the name to the camp is never allotted to any corps, as the Sircar have always prepared and allotted the straw at that place to the Company's gun bullocks.

According to this mode above 20,000 head of cattle have been foraged in this division plentifully and without trouble; besides Purneah's army, in which there are doubtless 5000 more, and above 1500 horse, all of which get straw.

When a camp is likely to remain in one place for a few days, the foraging can easily be managed by an extension of the same system. It is only to allot to corps, &c. villages at the distance of four and five coss instead of under one. Accordingly a detail will be forwarded to head-quarters of the quantity of straw in every village as far as five and six coss from Mayaconda.

In regard to the second object, it was some years ago settled that the price of straw in Mysore should be one bullock load for three silver fanams, if sent for to a village; if brought to the camp, the price of this article, like every other, ought to be allowed to find its own level; and accordingly in this camp there are people who go out to the villages, where they buy it at the regulated price, and bring it into the bazaar, where they sell it to the bazaar people whose bullocks may be more profitably employed, or to others at an advance.

This settled price, I am informed by the Dewan, is a fair equivalent for the straw. Measures ought to be taken to insure its payment. When the straw is in the neighbourhood of the camp, it is probable that nobody will venture to plunder it; but when the forage is brought from a distance, some faults of this kind may be expected. It is to be observed, however, that every village will be allotted to a particular corps; and if the criminal should escape from the villagers, it will not be difficult to find out to whom he belonged. If any one is caught, he ought to be severely punished, and one or two examples will stop this crime entirely.

## 341. To Lieutenant-Colonel Dallas.

*Unnecessary expense for forage disallowed.*

SIR,

Camp near Poonah, 24th April, 1803.

In answer to your letter of the 23rd, I have to inform you that I am perfectly aware of the necessity that the public should pay for the forage which the horses received on the 20th and 21st instant. It was necessary for the service that the cavalry should make an extraordinary forced march, on which it was not possible for their grass-cutters to follow them or to join them till late on the next day. On their arrival at Poonah forage was to be procured only by purchase; and as there is no regulated allowance for providing it, it must be an extraordinary charge of this detachment. I shall accordingly direct that this expense may be defrayed.

In respect to the expense incurred on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th, I have to observe that it stands on grounds entirely different. The grass-cutters were then arrived, and the question is whether the want of grass has been such as that they have not been able to do their duty, and that it became necessary to incur an additional expense for the horses. The object of all the regulations of government for years past has been to bring all expenses under certain heads, and to preclude the necessity of incurring extra expenses by the means of officers of the junior ranks of the army. This object is one of great importance, not only to the public, but to the officers, as every additional expense of this nature must increase their responsibility, and render them more liable to the checks of the auditor's office. Under these circumstances it is proper that I should proceed with caution in sanctioning or recommending even a momentary deviation from the established practice.

I observe that in the returns forwarded by you, the officers commanding regiments have not stated the quantity of grass brought in by the grass-cutters, excepting the officer commanding the 4th regiment; nor has any one of them declared that upon an examination of the banks of the rivers and nullahs in the neighbourhood of this camp the grass usually brought in by the grass-cutters cannot be mowed. I have reason to believe that it can.

I have also to inform you that, since I had a conversation with you upon this subject, I have made inquiries regarding it, and I find that the whole expense of forage for the horses of the country cavalry, which their chiefs also pay for, does not amount to more than about a quarter of a rupee for each horse. The average expense of forage for our troops amounts to more than that sum, even with the addition of the assistance of the grass-cutters. Upon the whole, particularly as I propose to march towards the hills on the day after to-morrow, in which plenty of grass will be procured, I am desirous to avoid introducing into the service a

deviation from the established practice, which may be attended by many public and private inconveniences; but if the officers commanding regiments should be desirous that the question should be referred to the Commander-in-Chief, I will with pleasure transmit all the papers to be laid before him.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 342. To Lieutenant-General Stuart.

*Predatory tendencies of the brinjarries. We ought not to depend on them far from their homes.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Poonah, 27th May, 1803.

I find the brinjarries, and indeed all the people of the Mysore country and the Carnatic, very averse to staying in this country. It is true that forage, and all kinds of provisions, are uncommonly dear: I therefore take the liberty of recommending to you to bring forward as many hired bullocks as possible, and to depend less upon the brinjarries for supplying your troops than I have. The more I see of them, the more I am convinced that we have entirely mistaken the character of these people: and that, unless they are permitted to plunder the country through which they pass, or to have profits such as the Native armies are able to give them from plunder, they will not follow the troops to any distance from the place at which they usually reside. I have had the greatest difficulties with them, and they have deceived me, and broken their engagements, upon every occasion. Col. Stevenson, who has another set, has been obliged to punish, and even to put some to death, for plunder in the Peshwah's country.

### 343. G. O.

*Grain to be paid for before removal.*

Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21st Nov., 1803.

Repeated orders having been given to the agent for cavalry supplies to cause payment to be made on the spot for grain taken by his servants in the villages, and complaints having been made to-day that grain so taken has not been paid for, Major-General Wellesley is pleased to publish in General Orders a general regulation, that grain taken or bargained for, in the villages, by any department belonging to the army, shall be paid for on the spot before the grain is removed; and he warns all persons concerned that any deviations from this rule will be submitted to a public inquiry.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**344. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.**

*Expediency of a provision for wounded silladars, and for the families of those killed ; and of a compensation for horses killed or wounded.*

Camp at Tiraloo, 27th June, 1804.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., upon the subject of an application from Col. Murray, that provision might be made for the silladar horse who might be wounded in the service ; and for the families of those who might be killed. It is not reasonable to expect that persons of this description, who have no means of subsistence, excepting those afforded by military service, will risk their lives, or being disabled, unless made certain of a provision hereafter. The want of this provision is the great defect of all the Native military services ; and is the cause of the frequent instances of misbehaviour before an enemy of the country troops. The truth of this observation is proved by the fact, that the troops in the service of Hyder Aly, and his son Tippoo, and those now in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, for whom provision is made, in case they should receive wounds, and for their families, in case they should be killed, have uniformly behaved better in battle than any other Native troops of whom we have a knowledge. I therefore strongly recommend to government, that the measures proposed by Col. Murray may be adopted. It would be necessary, however, in the first instance, to submit the claims of those disabled by wounds, and of the families of the horsemen who may be killed in the service, to the decision of a committee of officers, in the same manner as the claims of persons actually in the military service of the Hon. Company.

With the same view of rendering more efficient this body of cavalry attached to Col. Murray's corps, I beg leave to suggest to the Governor in Council the expediency of paying for the horses which may be killed, or rendered unfit for service by wounds received in action. This is another measure which has been practised by Hyder and Tippoo, and the present Mysore government, and with the best effects. There are two modes of paying for these horses. One, which has always been practised by the Mussulmann and Hindu government of Mysore, is to pay the horsemen 200 rupees for every horse killed or disabled, whatever may be his value : the other is, to register a description and value of the horse when the horseman is entertained ; and when the horse is killed or disabled, to pay for him at the rate at which he shall be valued in the register. I rather believe that the horsemen would prefer the latter mode, and it will, probably, prove equally cheap to the Hon. Company, as but few of their horses can be valued at a higher rate than 200 rupees.

If this measure should be adopted, a committee ought to be assembled to ascertain the claims of the horsemen. When all these measures shall be adopted, the silladar horse with Col. Murray ought to be a most efficient body.

### 345. To Sir William Clarke, Bart.

*Expediency of training infantry to work guns.*

(Extract.)

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

The government of Bombay might, I should think, afford to complete your artillery at Goa; but it is certain that the corps of artillery in all parts of India are very weak, and it is not improbable but that the authorities at Bombay may think it more important to preserve their strength entire there than to make you as strong as you wish. I therefore recommend you to have some of your infantry trained to the gun exercise, a practice which, in my opinion, ought to be adopted in all parts of India.

I don't mean to say that I prefer artillery to infantry; on the contrary, my opinion is that the main strength of our armies consists in British infantry. But I think that a soldier cannot know too much, and in a garrison one who understands the duty of an artilleryman may be so far more useful than one who knows only the duty of an infantry soldier.

The same reasoning applies to the Native infantry, and it is my opinion that some of these ought to be taught the great gun exercise; but care should be taken to select for this purpose those men who are known and distinguished for their attachment to the service.

### 346. To the Right Hon. Charles Wynn.

*Reasons against amalgamating the Presidential armies; and equalizing their pay.*

MY DEAR WYNN,

London, 6th August, 1826.

I have received your letter and the abstract of the correspondence upon the equalization of the Indian pay.

I differ from those who originally recommended the equalization of the pay. I served in the largest armies ever collected in India, composed of troops of the three Presidencies, receiving all sorts of different allowances, some of them even the famous and much envied double full batta, and these armies were placed in the most difficult circumstances, such as were calculated to aggravate all discontents, &c. But I declare I recollect having heard many more jokes than I ever did expressions of discontent respecting one set of officers and soldiers receiving more than others. The truth is, that all received more than enough for their wants; and

the envied double full batta gentlemen were only more loaded with equipages, baggage, &c., than their comrades who were less paid; and the former were supposed to be less active and energetic in the performance of their duty.\*

I don't believe the junction or neighbourhood of the armies of the three Presidencies in their cantonments in the countries of the sovereigns paying subsidies, or on the neighbouring frontiers of the Company's extended territories, could have made any difference.

The truth is, that in modern times we have a morbid inclination to seek out grievances, and even to suppose their existence, when we do not readily discover them. The natural remedy for this grievance of inequality of pay would have been to raise the pay and allowances of those who received least to the standard of the pay and allowances of those who received most; and this remedy would have been adopted, if those who discovered the grievance could have found some source from which to draw the money, excepting the Treasury, for the expenditure of which they were themselves responsible. Then came the notable resource of lowering the pay of some in order to find the means to be able to raise the pay of others; and as soon as the difficulty of this resource (and by-the-by of another, that of increasing the pay of the whole under a new name, house rent,) has been discovered, then comes a new projector D., with a grand sweeping scheme for augmenting the pay of the whole!

Now, in my opinion, the principle of the whole system is wrong. I declare it to be my opinion that it is not desirable to form into one army or to amalgamate the three armies in India, notwithstanding that the frontiers of the three Presidencies touch each other, or that the troops of the three Presidencies join in the camps or cantonments of the subsidised forces. Many events have occurred in India, and many more may occur, in which the safety of the country and its dependency on the British empire have rested ultimately upon this separation of the armies, and the effect of this separation of the armies upon the difference of the pay of the officers, as I believe there is but little in that of the soldiers.

This difference of pay creates a distinction of interest in all questions between government and army, or rather the European officers of the army, and enables the government to deal very differently with such questions than they would if they were conscious they had not such distinction of interest operating in their favour.

I admit that the difference of pay may be very troublesome to officers at the head of armies composed of detachments from the three Presidencies, who do not know how to command their armies. But these difficulties are trifles; and if my opinion had been asked at the time these changes were made I would have earnestly recommended to



government not to enter upon the subject at all. The fact is, that the pay and allowances of the officers of the army at each Presidency have been formed upon a consideration not of the wants only, but of the mode of life and its expenses of those officers; and when you give an officer of the Bombay establishment, for instance, what an officer receives in Bengal, you give him more than is necessary; and you enable him to accumulate money faster than his comrades of the Bengal or Madras army.

The only officers who have a right to complain on this subject are those of the King's troops, from whom a word has never been heard. Because they are moved from Presidency to Presidency, and having received for five years the best allowances in Bengal, are sent to Bombay to receive the worst. As for my part, I travelled through the three Presidencies.

However, the equalization having been ordered and so far carried into effect, I would recommend you to leave it where it is.

I would recommend you to give the full tent allowance to all the officers of the European troops. What Munro says is very true. This economy falls principally upon the officers of the King's regiments; and although it is very *safe* to trench upon them, it is not very generous, as it is they in fact who carry the armies through all their difficulties.

The full *batta* at Dinapoor, Burhampoor, and Barrackpoor, originated in an economical arrangement by which the Bengal army in the provinces of Oude and Hindustan was deprived of double full *batta*.

This arrangement is something of the nature of a bargain, which is a very bad thing with an army; but if once made it must be adhered to.

Although I started at first, therefore, at the notion of introducing the reduction for those who should enter the service from this date, I believe it is usual, considering the arrangement of 1801 in the nature of a bargain; and if the reduction is to be made, it must be in that manner.

But for the reasons which I have above stated I would not make the reduction at all. I would keep the Bengal Army as an army receiving *full batta*, while the others should only receive *half batta*; and I would introduce no new allowance of house rent; and my opinion upon this subject is strengthened by the necessity of making the alteration to take place only for those who should enter the service from this date.

I believe I have gone through all the points, and beg you, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

**347. Memorandum.—East India Company's Army.**

*Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field. Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions of artillery. Officers in the service of the E. I. C. in civil employments, or on the Staff, not properly attached to the army.*<sup>1</sup>

31st July, 1828.

*Brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field.*—There can be no objection to the grant of brevet promotion for distinguished services in the field against the enemy, to the officers of the army of the East India Company, in the same manner as to the officers of the King's army.

But great care must be taken in the grant of this promotion that it is not applied to gratify favourites rather than to reward real services.

The rule which I adopted was to allow General officers to recommend officers who had distinguished themselves; and I selected from the list those whom I might think proper to recommend for brevet promotion.

There was a rule that the aides-de-camp and Staff belonging or attached to General officers should not be recommended for promotion by brevet, for the reasons which are obvious; as well as because they have great advantages over the officers of the Line. But I made many exceptions to this rule.

I should say likewise that the Commander-in-Chief if not himself in the field, or the Governor-General in Council if the Commander-in-Chief should be in the field, ought, after the report of an important service in the field against the enemy, to designate the number of officers to be recommended for this brevet promotion. A larger number should be named by the Commander of the force in the field, from which number the Commander-in-Chief or the Governor-General in Council should select the names of the number designated.

It is very necessary to check this description of promotion. Otherwise it will go very far indeed. The Company's army ought to have this promotion for the siege of Bhurtpoor.

*Rank of colonel to commandants of regiments of cavalry and infantry, and of battalions of artillery.*—There is a great mistake in the reasoning upon this subject. First, the relation between the British artillery and engineers and the British cavalry and infantry is not the same as that between the Company's army and the King's army in the East Indies.

The officers of the rank of colonel of the former seldom come in competition with the cavalry and infantry. Those of the latter are in daily competition with the officers of the same rank in the King's army.

It is not true likewise that the departure from the regulation of 1796 was to be attributed to the interference of the officers of the King's army in India.

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<sup>1</sup> This summary is the Duke's own, in the body of the Memorandum. *Ed.*

The dispute originated in the East India Company's army of Fort St. George, and from thence went to the King's army.

However, it is not reasonable that the public service should suffer inconvenience on account of the private interest of individuals; and it appears quite right and proper that without retrospect the rank of colonel should now be given to every lieutenant-colonel commandant of a regiment of cavalry or infantry, or battalion of artillery, in the East India Company's service; and that in future an officer promoted to be commandant of a regiment should have the rank of colonel.

I am perfectly ready to admit that the King's army is auxiliary in the East Indies. But although it is auxiliary the King must take care that his officers are not ill-treated; and that their fair claims are not passed over in consequence of the existence of any particular circumstances attending the promotion of the army of the East India Company.

It is my opinion that whenever one of his Majesty's regiments is serving in the army of Fort William, for instance, and the lieutenant-colonel of such regiment is superseded by the promotion to the rank of colonel of a regiment of a lieutenant-colonel of the army of that Presidency, junior as a lieutenant-colonel to the lieutenant-colonel of his Majesty's regiment, his Majesty should grant to the lieutenant-colonel of his regiment a brevet of colonel in that army of the same date as that of the colonel of the army of Fort William; thus leaving both in their same relative position.

If the King's regiment should be removed to the army of any other Presidency, of course that commission will be no longer valid. But another may be granted to the colonel of his Majesty's regiment, to put him on a par, in respect to rank, with the officers of the service of the East India Company's service, referring always to the date of their respective ranks as lieutenant-colonel.

*Officers in the service of the East India Company in civil employments, or on the Staff, not properly attached to the army.*—The uniform representations from India manifest the necessity of making some improvement in the regimental system in India, so as to obtain a more constant residence with their regiment of the officers of the army, and more assiduous attention to their duty. I think, however, that those who make these complaints do not always consider that these officers are usefully employed for the service of the public, although not with their regiments; and possibly in some instances more usefully than if with their regiments. It cannot be doubted, however, that the number of European officers with several of the Native regiments is too small; that the discipline of the army has suffered by the European officers looking to these Staff employments rather than to their duty with their regiments, and by the absence of so many on these Staff employments. It is likewise true that officers who have passed much of their time in these employments are

not the most fit for regimental duty, when they think proper themselves to return to the performance of such service after passing a great portion of their lives and service in the performance of more agreeable and better paid duties. •

It is my opinion, therefore, that when an officer is required from the Line to perform the duty of a civil Staff office, he should be struck off the strength of his regiment; and that from that period he should receive no regimental pay; and an officer should be promoted in his stead.

From that period for five years such officer so employed on the Staff should have the option of returning to his regiment; and upon his return he should resume his station in the regiment, preceding the officer next in succession to him when he was ordered for employment on the Staff.

He should likewise be promoted to every step of rank at the same time with the officer next to him in his regiment, at the time he should have been removed from it to the Staff, till he should reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel.

Beyond that rank an officer employed on this civil Staff of the army ought not to rise.

He should be allowed to retire according to the usual military regulations.

If such officer should, within five years, desire to return to his regimental duty in the service, he should be permitted to do so, taking rank in the regiment in the place from which he should have been removed to the civil Staff of the army.

The regiment will then have a supernumerary officer till there will be a vacancy, which of course must not be filled up.

WELLINGTON.

## 2. OPERATIONS.

### 348. G. M. O.

#### *Instructions for troops crossing rivers.*

Camp at Hurryhur, Monday, 16th June, 18co.

Major Desse will send a return to Captain Mackay stating the number of bullock loads of tents he has to send over the river, and Captain Mackay will furnish elephants to carry them.

It is very desirable that some arrangement should be made, and as much regularity as is possible should be observed in the passage of the river. The commanding officers of corps should settle the order in which the ~~sepoys~~ and their baggage should pass, whether the battalion should go over first and then be followed by its baggage and stores, or that the baggage of each company should follow the company to which it belongs: but, at all events, it is desirable that the baggage

and sepoy should not be passed over at the same time. It is also desirable that a particular spot should be appointed at which the boats should be landed, and an officer of the corps which, or whose baggage, they may be employed in crossing, ought to be at that spot to see that they are not overloaded, and that everything is conducted with as much regularity as is practicable.

As the boats are forced by the current to a considerable distance below the place at which it may be expedient to load them, it will be necessary that a party on fatigue should be employed to draw them up the stream along shore to the spot at which they are to receive their loads. An officer ought also to be appointed to superintend the unloading of the boats on the other side of the river; and a party on fatigue ought to be employed for that purpose, as well as to draw the boats up the stream as high as possible before they are sent back to this side.

When an officer commanding a corps shall have nearly got his whole corps and his baggage over the river, and that it is probable that he will have no further occasion for the boats, he will give notice thereof to Colonel Wellesley, in order that another corps or department may receive timely orders to prepare to pass.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 349. Memorandum respecting Basket Boats.

Camp, 27th March, 1803.

1. The size best calculated for strength and use is 10 feet diameter in the clear, and 2 feet 3 inches high.

2. It is indispensable that the covering of leather should come over the gunwale of the boat, to be lashed to the framework within: most accidents that happen to this kind of boats arise from a neglect of this precaution. There ought to be a double covering of leather, to add to their security and strength; but this is of less importance than that any part of the gunwale should be left uncovered. It may be useful to notice that the hides should be sewed with leather.

3. The materials that are required for basket boats are bamboo lath: jungle wood (the best is called souri, a tough thorn); country rope; leather.

4. A framework should be made of three of these laths together, and worked with others, about 4 inches apart, in a succession of triangles, until it allows the diameter required, 10 feet. In this state it is fixed in uprights driven in a circle of 10 feet diameter, the ends bent upwards and worked close with single lath for 2 feet 3 inches, which forms the sides of the boat; the remaining ends are then twisted in with the small parts of souri, or pliable jungle wood, and this forms the gunwale, which

should be well lashed with country rope. This is the mode of making the boats, with which the Natives are as well acquainted as we are.

5. In this state it is taken from the uprights, and the centre of the boat fixed in a little mound of earth (say 6 inches), when it is lined with the toughest jungle wood that can be procured, and lashed to the frame within it; these should cross each other, so that the pressure may be equal on every part of the boat. Eight pieces are sufficient, about the thickness of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  or 3 inch rope, made long enough, with the ends pointed, to run into the bottom of the gunwale, and secured with country rope.

6. It is absolutely necessary that a frame to fit, made exactly as the bottom of the boat, should be then fixed within it, the smooth part of the bamboo uppermost. This is laid over the lining of the jungle, to which it is lashed by the same wood within to the sides of the boat.

7. This is the general mode of making boats: the great error is in preparing the lath too thick, whereas it can scarcely be made too thin. The strength of the boat depends upon the goodness of the jungle wood for lining, and its being equally crossed, in order that it may sustain an equal pressure in all its parts.

8. It is desirable that there should be a second frame, worked close in a circular manner, and lashed within; for, on the transporting of baggage, it prevents a pressure on the leather from bamboos, feet of cots, and tables, that pass through the triangle bamboo work of the boat. It preserves the leather, and adds but little to the weight.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 350. Memorandum on the manner of laying a bridge of boats across a river.<sup>1</sup>

The bank on each side, where the ends of the bridge are to be, must be made solid and firm by means of fascines, or otherwise. One end of the cable must be carried across the river, and, being fixed to a picket, or to any thing firm, must be drawn tight across where the heads of the boats are to be ranged.

The boats are to be then launched, having on board each 2 men, with the necessary ropes, &c.; and are floated down the stream, under the cable to which they are lashed endwise, by the rings and small ropes at equal distances, and about their own breadth asunder, more or less, according to the strength required.

If the river be very rapid, a second cable must be stretched across it, parallel to the first, and at the distance of the length of the boats, and to which the other ends of the boats must be lashed. The spring lines are then lashed diagonally from one boat to the other, to brace them tight;

<sup>1</sup> Enclosed in a Despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Close, dated Camp at Kowaspoor, 11th April, 1803. *Ed.*

and the anchors, if necessary, carried out up the stream, and fixed to the cable, or sheer line, across the river. One of the chesses, or planks, is then laid on the edge of the bank, at each end of the bridge, bottom up, which serves to lay the ends of the baulks or beams upon; (it appears that the beams ought to lay (*sic*) in lines across the boats, from one end of the bridge to the other, and must be bolted together in such manner as to allow of fixing them in that mode;) and as a direction for placing them at the proper distances, to fit the chesses or planks that cover the bridge.

The baulks should be then laid across the boats, and keyed together, their numbers proportioned to the strength required in the bridge. If the gang boards are laid across the heads and sterns of the boats, from one side of the river to the other, they will give the men a footing for doing the rest of the work. Across the baulks are laid the chesses, one after another, the edges to meet, (the chesses, or planks, must have laths nailed upon them, in such manner as to form 4 grooves, to receive the 4 beams on which the planks are to be laid,) and baulks running between the cross pieces on the under side of the chesses. The gang boards are then laid across the ends of the chesses, on each edge of the bridge.

### 351. G. O.

#### *Memoranda on cavalry manœuvres.*

Poonah, 23rd May, 1803.

Major-General Wellesley requests the commanding officers of the regiments of cavalry to peruse the following memoranda, and to communicate them to their adjutants and such other officers as they may think proper.

1. When corps of cavalry act together, one corps is generally appointed the leading corps, and all are to conform to the movements of that corps, unless otherwise ordered. The leading corps may be altered, and all corps are to attend and follow the movements of that newly ordered as the leading corps. The rule applies equally whether they are in line or otherwise formed; but it is not intended that when a line is to be formed from column, or to change its front, all corps are to perform that operation in the same mode; each is to perform it in that mode in which it can be done with the greatest celerity combined with the greatest accuracy.

2. When a number of regiments are in column, either with the right or left in front, the formation into line may be either to the front or rear of the column, to its proper or reverse flank, or oblique to the line of march.

3. If the column be one with the right in front, and its formation is to be made to the front, each corps disengages from the general column as soon as the nature of the ground will admit, and goes to the left of the leading corps; the same mode is practised if the line is to be formed oblique to the line of march: in both these cases the adjutants of different

regiments move out quickly as soon as they learn that the line is to be formed, and mark the ground on which the left of their corps is to stand; *vice versâ* if the column be one with the left in front.

4. If the formation from a column with the right in front is to be made to the rear, all the corps in rear of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their right; all the corps in front of that in which the line is to be formed are to lead out from the general column to their left. The adjutants of the corps in the rear are to take up the ground on which their left is to stand; those of corps in front are to take up the ground on which their right is to stand; *vice versâ* if the column has its left in front.

5. If the line is to be formed from an open column with the right in front to the reverse flank, the corps follow their leaders, each wheeling up successively as it reaches its ground, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which their left is to stand: *vice versâ* if the column is with the left in front.

6. When a column is marching upon an alignement, an object is generally given in front, on which the column is to march; the adjutants of corps are to assist in keeping the column in its true direction, by placing themselves in the line and each waiting there, till the corps to which he belongs shall have passed him. The officers leading divisions in an open column, marching on an alignement on which the line is to be formed, are to go close to the horse's head of the adjutant who is marking the ground: a regiment is not to deviate partially from the alignement marked by its adjutant because the rear division of that in front of it may have done so.

7. When the line is to change its front and a new formation is to be made, all corps are to break towards that on which the new formation is to be made: if the corps be on the right, all the corps on the left break into an open column, with the right in front, and the adjutants are to mark the ground on which the left is to stand in the new line; if the corps be on the left, all the corps on the right are to break into a column with the left in front, and the adjutant is to mark the ground on which the right is to stand.

8. The general rule is, that the corps, whether in forming line from column or in changing front from line, are to enter on the new line at the point marked for them by their adjutants, which is always where their rear will stand; but as that is the mode of forming which takes most time, the practice is for each corps to enter the new line, either where its head is to stand, or in a central spot. The commanding officers must, in that case, take care to send forward a person to mark a true point in the line, at which he will enter, and to bring up the head of his regiment square to the proposed formation.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.





lead the battalion, to which the leader will gradually alter his direction, and his steps will be strictly followed by the non-commissioned officers placed between the colours.

5. All changes of direction of a battalion marching in line, particularly if they are great changes, are equivalent to a wheel of the battalion on its centre, a movement of a very complicated nature, which requires time and great accuracy.

6. It follows, therefore, that in no case whatever must the pace of the battalion be hurried whilst the alteration of the direction is making; or that, when it becomes necessary to alter the direction to any great degree, it would be best to mark the time till the alteration is completed, and then to bring up the battalion to its place.

7. It must sometimes happen that the alteration of the direction of the march of the other battalions is so great as that it cannot be made by the wheel of the battalion each upon its centre; when the alteration of the direction of a battalion is from any cause of this magnitude, it ought to be made by the *échelon* march of divisions.

8. When the commanding officer of a battalion in line finds it necessary to alter the direction of its march, he should apprise thereof the commanding officer of the next battalion on the flank most distant from the leading battalion.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 3. DISCIPLINE.

#### 354. To Lieutenant-Colonel Monypenny.

##### *Embezzlement of Stores, and manifold rascality.*

MY DEAR COLONEL,

Seringapatam, 2nd July, 1801.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 25th June.

The curiosity of the whole army must naturally be excited by what has been passing here lately, and I have no objection to gratify your curiosity, provided that what I write is between ourselves, and not communicated to any but those who you think can be trusted. It is not because anything that has passed is a secret, but because it might not be deemed proper that I should write upon this subject, that I am induced to caution you not to make it public.

While I was absent in the month of January last (I believe), the lascars, &c., of the store department of Seringapatam wrote a petition to the Military Board and a letter to General Brathwaite, both without signature, in which they represented the existence of all kinds of enormities and bad practices in the store department, such as false

musters, stealing of stores, cheating, &c. &c. Captain ——— was at Madras at the time these papers were received, and they were communicated to him; whereupon he went off in a great hurry to stop some bandies, loaded with gun-metal, which General Brathwaite was informed were coming from Seringapatam. He did stop these bandies at Vellore, and it was found that the gun-metal belonged to General Smith; at least it was said so.

However, the Military Board and government determined to defer the inquiry till I should return, and then to order that the whole matter of the petition and letter above mentioned should be inquired into. Accordingly I received orders to institute an inquiry shortly after my return, and, of course, I determined that it should be an inquiry in earnest. I first gave orders to the Commissary to turn off his dubash, and then I assembled a large Committee, consisting of myself, all the staff of the army and garrison, and all the most respectable officers not employed upon any other duty; and indeed they were mostly the friends of the Commissary.

On the first day we went to the arsenal to inquire into the grounds of the complaints, the petition was explained to all the lascars and artificers, and they were asked particularly whether they had any grounds of complaint on the subject of each allegation. They all declared not, and appeared anxious to come forward to vindicate the Commissary and his dubash from any imputation that might have been laid upon them by the petition and letter.

However, I was not satisfied with this proceeding, and on that evening I issued a proclamation, in which I called upon the inhabitants to state who had purchased stores, and threatened punishment to those who had purchased them and concealed it.

Then came out a scene of villainy and peculation which has never been surpassed, and seldom equalled, in this country. It was proved before the Committee that Colonel ——— had sold large quantities of saltpetre, which he had stolen from the stores while he was a member of the Committee for the valuation of captured property, and that the arsenal was a public sale-shop for all kinds of military stores and ordnance, the principal agent in which transactions was the Commissary's dubash.

The artificers and lascars who had at first declared that they had no reason to complain, and knew nothing of the petition and letter to the Military Board, then came forward to testify the truth of everything, and proved particularly that false musters had been taken and sent to Madras; and that, in fact, half the people for whom pay was drawn were not employed.

When the dubash was called upon to make his defence, to the surprise of everybody, he said that he was determined to tell the truth

and to conceal nothing; and he declared that he had orders for everything that he had ever done, either from Colonel ——— or Captain ———, and that he had papers in the arsenal which would prove the truth of what he then asserted.

On account of what appeared against Captain ——— on that day, I determined to turn him out, and I did dismiss him that evening; but he went to the arsenal before he was dismissed and broke open the desk, and, as the dubash says, destroyed some of the papers which he had heard him promise to produce to the Committee.

However, he did not destroy all, and particularly not those relating to himself, which I forced him to produce; and the dubash, by means of them, has been able to prove clearly that Captain ——— had a large share of the profits resulting from the sale of ordnance and stores. In regard to Colonel ———, the proof against him was not equally clear, for want of the papers which were destroyed; but it is clearly proved against him that he sold copper bands taken from the pillars of the Mysore palace, contrary to the orders of the Military Board; that he never gave General Smith credit for above an eighth part of the money produced by the sale of guns, which he avows, and which he says belonged to General Smith, until, by the proceedings of the Committee, it appeared that he had sold guns to that amount, and there are papers still forthcoming which will prove that he had his share of the profits arising from the false musters.

Besides this, Captain ——— sent gun-locks, &c., to Madras for sale, and he knew of Colonel ———'s robbery of the saltpetre, and was concerned with him in cheating the captors and the public out of a large part of it.

All this can be proved by writings and accounts, besides by the evidence of a host of dubashes and conicopolies.

I have thus given you the outline of what has passed; but the intervals have been filled by details of scenes of villainy which would disgrace the Newgate Calendar.

Government are now deliberating upon all this, and I expect shortly to have orders which will let me know whether these gentry are to be brought to a court martial, or to be dismissed the service, or to be hanged.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 355. To the Right Hon. Lord Clive.

*Mercy seasons justice.*

MY LORD,

Seringapatam, 23rd Oct., 1801.

I take the liberty of addressing your Lordship in favour of an old man, (the late) Lieutenant-Colonel —, whom I have lately been the means of convicting of very serious crimes before a general court-martial; and I do so, not from any doubt that I entertain of the reality of his guilt, but from a conviction of his former good conduct as an officer, and of the extreme poverty and distress to which he has been reduced in consequence of the sentence of the general court-martial. I understand that when he will have paid the Company the sums which are due to them in consequence of that sentence, he will be left entirely destitute; and, without attempting to justify any part of his conduct, I may safely say that he becomes an object of charity.

Allow me, therefore, to entreat your Lordship to give him some small pension to enable him to support himself, or that you will recommend him for some provision to the Court of Directors on account of his long services and his present reduced situation.

I have, &amp;c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 356. To Major-General Baird.

*Wellington's abhorrence of corrupt practices.*

(Extract.)

Bangalore, 24th Nov., 1801.

Since I wrote to you last, my time has been most disagreeably employed in prosecuting at a general court-martial —, —, and —, for embezzling stores at Seringapatam upon the different occasions on which I was absent from that garrison in the field. The result of their trials is that they are all broke, and I believe there appeared before the general court-martial a scene of dirt and villany such as never before disgraced the character of an officer, or shocked the feelings of those who were obliged to investigate it. I have never performed so unpleasant a duty, or one which gave me so much concern and trouble; and I neither wish to do such a one again myself, nor to see it devolve upon any friend of mine.

## 357. To the Commander-in-Chief, Fort St. George.

*A low official estimate of professional character reprobated.*

(Extracts.)

Seringapatam, 12th June, 1801.

In regard to the 3rd article of the 1st charge, of which the Court Martial have found Mr. — to be guilty, but which they are of

opinion does not constitute ungentlemanlike behaviour, I must observe that Mr. ——— himself gives as a reason for beating and tying up the inhabitant, that he wanted thereby to oblige him and others to deliver straw for his horses, having already received provision for himself, his servants and his horses; for which straw and provision for himself, his servants, and his horses, thus forced from the inhabitants by tying up and beating one of them, it appears by the evidence he did not pay.

I never can agree in opinion with the Court Martial that this scandalous conduct is not unbecoming the character of a British officer and a gentleman; and I never can approve a sentence which describes it in other terms than those of the strongest reprobation.

\* \* \* \* \*

The prosecution against Mr. ——— was instituted upon the complaint of the Rajah's government, in consequence of the injury received by, and oppression upon, the inhabitants by him, on his journey from Sera to Seringapatam. Having proved before a competent Court the truth of their charges against him, they will surely expect that he will be punished. What will be the opinion of British justice, honour, and protection, if a gentleman who has been guilty, almost under the guns of this fort, of such acts of oppression as Mr. ——— has himself acknowledged, is suffered to go unpunished?

### 358. G. O.

*The same subject.*

Seringapatam, 22nd July, 1801.

Although the sentence of the court-martial is confirmed, Colonel Wellesley is concerned that he cannot approve of it. In his opinion the evidence went to convict ——— of all the articles of the charges brought against him; and that, the court-martial having found him guilty of the 3rd article of the 1st charge, viz. having caused to be tied Chinbeswah Chitty, an inhabitant of Chutter, and having flogged him, they ought to have held out that scandalous conduct to the execration of the army, by pronouncing it unbecoming the character of a British officer and a gentleman.

This sentence would have been the more proper, as ——— avows that the inhabitant was tied, and he beat him, with a view to force from the village forage for his horses; and it appears by the evidence that he had already received forage for his horses, and provisions for himself and his servants, for which, any more than for the forage thus forced from the inhabitants by tying up and beating one of them, it also appears by the evidence that they received no payment.

The court-martial, however, having pronounced that conduct only a

disobedience of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, and having delivered a sentence that ——— for that crime ought to be reprimanded, it becomes Colonel Wellesley's duty to reprimand him.

——— has been found guilty, by a general court-martial, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Saxon is president, of a disobedience of the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in tying up and beating an inhabitant of the village of Chutter, as he himself says, in order to force from the village forage for his horses. He ought to have known that he is a part of a body of troops placed in this country to protect the inhabitants, and not to oppress them: having, however, forgotten his duty in that respect, and having been found guilty of conduct very improper in a British officer, a repetition of which would be highly prejudicial to the British interests and character in this country, he is hereby publicly reprimanded.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 359. To the President of the General Court Martial.

*Witnesses before Courts Martial not to be drilled by the accused or his agents.*

SIR,

Seringapatam, 21st Sept., 1801.

In consequence of what passed at the court martial on Thursday the 17th instant, of the system which was then developed by Serjeant Halpine, of the mode of drilling witnesses which had been in use, of which system the court martial had experienced the effects in the preceding trial of Lieutenant-Colonel ———, I am induced to request you to urge the court martial to take some steps to prevent a continuance of this same evil.

I have frequently stated to the court martial that I had intelligence of the improper practices of those to be tried in regard to the witnesses; at last those practices have come regularly before them, and have been proved by the oath of a man on whom they have been attempted. Although it is true that the person of whom the complaint was made on the 17th instant is no longer under trial, there is nothing to prevent him from assisting the other officers to be tried, and from following the same system in regard to the witnesses to be produced at their trials to which it appears he adhered at his own. Under these circumstances I cannot but look to the probable event of those trials with an anxiety proportionate to the trust which has been placed in me to bring forward the evidence on the part of the prosecution, and to the risk which I feel conscious, and which it has been proved the prosecution on Lieutenant-Colonel ———'s trial incurred, in consequence of the system of which I am complaining. In fact, as long as this system exists it is impossible to be certain of the event of any trial, whatever may be the

evidence to be produced at it, or that any court, however good its intentions, can administer strict justice.

I understand the administration of justice to be the decision of a competent tribunal upon any question, after a complete knowledge of its merits, by an examination of witnesses upon oath in order to come at the truth. Truth then is the foundation upon which the whole superstructure is built; but if, by the introduction of such a system as that of which I complain, the truth cannot be attained, it is obvious that the administration of justice becomes impracticable, and is at an end.

I am aware how delicate the situation of the court martial is, and how anxious its members must be to avoid doing anything which can appear like harshness; but when the fundamentals of justice are attacked (as I believe no man will now deny), something more than appearance must be consulted; and it becomes necessary that the court martial should either put a stop to this system, or make up their minds to incur the risk of the evil to which I have above alluded.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 360. G. O.

*Intoxication most degrading to the character, and ruinous to the efficiency, of an officer.*

Seringsapatam, 17th July, 1802.

Colonel Wellesley was concerned to learn that any officer under his command had been put in arrest for 'coming to the parade of his regiment in a state of intoxication;' and although it appears, by the evidence which has been brought before the general court martial of which Lieutenant-Colonel Mackay was president, that Major Bell, the commanding officer of ———, may have been mistaken on this occasion, Colonel Wellesley is concerned to be under the necessity of observing that, if there had not been good reason to believe that ——— was in the habit of drinking intoxicating liquors at undue hours, Major Bell would not have attributed his staggering upon the parade to intoxication, but would have supposed that it was occasioned by other causes. It is not to be imagined that any officer would cast such an imputation upon another upon the first symptom of his deserving it; and the observations made by ——— in his defence, that his staggering ought to be imputed to indisposition, would be correct, if circumstances had not given too strong reason to believe that intoxication alone was the cause of it.

Colonel Wellesley therefore, in reprimanding ——— for the crimes of which he has been found guilty, cannot avoid calling his attention, and that of the troops under his command in general, to the other crime of



which he has been acquitted. It is one of the most degrading to the character of an officer, which renders him unfit for any part of his duty; and by the practice of it he fails in that most essential point, the setting an example to the soldiers under his command. Colonel Wellesley, however, has the pleasure of reflecting that this failing is rare among the officers under his command, in proportion as it is great; but he warns all against even the suspicion of it.

——— is hereby publicly reprimanded. He is released from arrest and directed to return to his duty.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 361. The D. A. G. to Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage.

*Commanding officers to communicate personally with their subordinates in garrison—not write to them.*

(Extract.)

10th Aug., 1802.

Col. Wellesley has observed that much inconvenience arises from commanding officers communicating in writing with officers under their orders, when living in the same garrison with them; and he recommends that, when you have any thing to say to officers under those circumstances, you will order them to attend you, and deliver your sentiments to them; and also that you hear their representations in the same manner, verbally; and he particularly desires that Capt. — may have a perusal of this letter, in your presence, and that nothing further may be written upon the subject.

### 362. To Mr. — — —.

*A sharp stimulant to a malingerer.*

DEAR SIR,

Seringapatam, 23th Aug., 1802.

Since I had the pleasure of hearing from you, I have made inquiries respecting you with a view to obtaining your appointment to a corps; and I am concerned to find that the commanding officer of Chingleput has thought it necessary again to report that you are unfit for the service, although he has very lately reported a number of gentlemen to be fit for it who have not been so long at Chingleput as you have.

I have not the pleasure of being acquainted with Captain Bosc, but he is well spoken of in the army; and it is not to be supposed, and will never be believed, that a person who could be capable of doing a gentleman the injustice to keep him at Chingleput under instruction, and from the service, for no reason whatever, would have been appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to the situation which he fills. It is much more consistent with probability that he detains you at that place, and does

not make a report in your favour, because you don't deserve it; and under these circumstances I shall take the liberty of writing you a few lines by way of advice. You will impute it to my respect for your father and your relations, and for the recommendation of my brother, and my sincere desire to render you service.

By coming to India as a cadet you have entered into a profession in which obedience to your superiors is essentially necessary. I am not acquainted with the system of education for the military profession adopted at Chingleput, but as I observe that gentlemen are reported to be qualified for the service in a very short time after their arrival in India, it must be confined to learning the common duties of a soldier, and the principles of subordination and obedience: these are not very difficult, and every gentleman who goes to Chingleput soon learns them, excepting yourself. Surely there must be some cause for your backwardness besides your inexperience, which I observe must operate nearly in an equal proportion against every gentleman who goes there.

I most earnestly entreat you to be obedient to the officer placed over you, attentive to the instructions which he will give you, and to conciliate him by the regularity of your conduct. Consider the impression which will be made of your character and capacity on those who are not acquainted with you, and of your want of diligence and attention on your father and those who know you, when they hear that you alone of so many have been twice reported unfit for military service in this country, from having been incapable of learning even its rudiments at Chingleput, of which all others have easily attained a competent knowledge.

I have taken measures to have you recommended to Captain Bosc, and I hope soon to hear an account of you far different from any that have yet reached me.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 363. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Mouron Bulôt.

*Abuse of invaliding. The rules of the service do not favour neat jobs.*

SIR,

Seringapatam, 1st Sept., 1802.

I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 31st of August and its enclosures.

Only two days ago you transmitted a certificate of the bad state of the health of Lieutenant Baron de Müller, which I desired might accompany the general return to head-quarters of the regiment under your command. You have now thought proper, notwithstanding the certificate that Lieutenant Baron de Müller is unfit for his duty on account of bad health, to desire that he may have an unlimited leave to remain at Madras in charge

of the regimental stores of the regiment de Meuron. I have to observe—  
 1st. That it is not usual to employ officers to take charge of stores at Madras, that duty being always performed by non-commissioned officers;  
 2ndly. That it is not usual to give officers unlimited leave of absence;  
 3rdly. That it is not usual to employ upon any duty an officer whose health is certified to be in such a state that he is unable to do duty. For all these reasons I decline to forward your application; and I beg that, if you should think proper to send it yourself, you will transmit with it a copy of this letter.

I have, &c.,  
 ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 364. G. O.

*Officers forbidden to beat natives.*

Seringapatam, 6th Sept., 1802.

Colonel Wellesley has heard with much concern that, in some instances, the officers of the army in the provinces below the Ghauts, particularly officers of the junior ranks, and who have been but a short time in the country, have beaten the Natives of the country, whether in their service or employed by them, or generally followers of the troops, or residents of the place at which such officers are stationed. The practice is very irregular and illegal, and, if not speedily put a stop to, will tend to the material inconvenience and injury of the troops. In this country, any more than in England, no man has a right to take the law into his own hand, or to punish another for an offence or injury done to himself. There are magistrates, who have full authority to decide in every case which can occur, and to whom, if necessary, complaint ought to be made. Colonel Wellesley therefore prohibits this practice entirely, and desires that the officers commanding in Malabar and Canara, and those commanding stations and corps, will report to him any instances of the kind that may occur in future.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 365. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles.

*The paymaster not to live away from head-quarters.*

(Extract.)

Seringapatam,      Sept, 1802.

I observe that Mr. Richardson resides at Tellicherry. In the constant intercourse which ought to take place between the commanding officer in Malabar and the paymaster, his residence at such a distance from head-quarters, and at a place where there are no troops nor any garrison stores, must be very inconvenient to you, to him, and to the army in general. You will therefore recommend him to move to Cannanore,

where the largest body of the troops and the head-quarters are stationed, and you will request him to make his arrangements for that purpose without loss of time.

366. G. O.

*Military insolence tested by the rules of the service.*

Serlingapatam, 10th Sept., 1802.

Colonel Wellesley has received a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, commanding at Hullihall, dated the 5th instant, upon the subject of the conduct of certain officers of the 1st battalion — Bombay regiment, regarding a baker at Hullihall, which appears to him so extraordinary as to require this public mode of expressing his sentiments upon it.

It appears that Ensign ———, of the 1st battalion — regiment, beat the baker of the place, in consequence of which Lieutenant-Colonel Brown issued an order to prohibit all officers and soldiers under his command from molesting the inhabitants of Hullihall in any manner. Colonel Wellesley entirely approves of that order issued by Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, and desires that he will see it carried into execution, and put in arrest and report to him the name of any officer who disobeys it.

In consequence of the beating given to this baker, or for some other reason, it appears that he does not choose to bake any longer at Hullihall, and that he quits the place and proceeds to Goa. Some of the officers of the 1st battalion — regiment then write letters to Lieutenant-Colonel Brown to complain that they have not bread for their breakfasts, and others wait upon him to make similar complaints, having omitted to put on their side arms.

The officers of the 1st battalion — regiment must be informed, 1st, that Lieutenant-Colonel Brown is by no means obliged to find a baker to bake bread for them; 2ndly, that, living in the same fort with their commanding officer, it is their duty to wait upon him, to make their complaints known to him, and not to write to him upon all these trifling occasions; and 3rdly, that, if they should find it necessary to wait upon him, or even to quit their quarters at all, the standing orders of this army, and the customs of every military service, require that they should wear their side arms.

Colonel Wellesley likewise calls the attention of Lieutenant-Colonel Brown to these orders; and he is astonished that Lieutenant-Colonel Brown should have passed unnoticed so extraordinary an instance of the disobedience of them as that which he reports in his letter of the 5th instant.

By the papers transmitted with Lieutenant-Colonel Brown's letter of

the 5th instant, Colonel Wellesley observes that Lieutenant —— and Ensign ——, being officers of the day, reported that the 'garrison is distressed,' and 'in great distress,' for want of bread. Colonel Wellesley desires that Lieutenant-Colonel Brown will make him acquainted with the orders for the duty of the officer of the day at Hullihall, particularly mentioning whether the state of the provisions in the bazaar of Hullihall comes under the cognizance of that officer.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**367. The D. A. G. to Major \* \* \* \*, commanding a detachment of H. M. — regt.**

*Exposition of the futility of excuses pleaded for levying purveyance in the Mysore country. Restitution required.*

7th Dec., 1802.

I have laid your letter of this date before Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding in Mysore, who desires me to inform you that he consents to your joining the part of the —— regt. stationed at Vellore; but previous to your departure the General thinks it necessary to advert to your conduct, since you came last into the Mysore country. Complaints have come from every place at which the detachment of those under your command halted on its march to Seringapatam, of improprieties committed by you: such as your obliging the bazaar people of the villages, near which you halted, to pay you certain duties and customs; and the amildars to furnish for your use certain articles, for which you never paid. These complaints having been referred to you, you have stated, in reply to them, that you were informed by persons, to whose advice you acknowledge that you would not have trusted in any other case, that you had a right to the duties, customs, and presents which you claimed; and that you never forced any thing from the amildars, or inhabitants of the villages through which you passed, but that every thing was given to you without trouble, upon your simply asking what was your right; and that your servant had orders to pay for every thing received for your use. Upon this subject Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to recall to your recollection that an officer of your rank should, in a case of this kind, refer for information upon a doubtful point, not to a person whose advice he would not take upon any other occasion, but to the Articles of War, or to his superior officers, from either of which authorities you would have found that conviction of the practices of which you have been accused costs an officer only his commission. But although you have acknowledged that you did follow bad advice upon this occasion, you also declare that you did nothing blamable; and that every thing was given to you without violence, and upon your asking simply what was your right. The General observes

upon this statement, in the first place, that the amildars of the Mysore country knew, as well as the collectors in the Company's territory, that those demands are not the right of the commanding officers of detachments, and they are full as likely to refuse to admit them : secondly, that, if they could have imagined that you had such rights, they would not have complained when you exercised them. The General rather supposes that your advisers thought it probable that the amildars in this country would so far forget their duty as to admit those demands without complaint, and therefore they were made, although no officer would have ventured to make such within the Company's territories. It may be perfectly true that the persons on whom you levied those duties and customs were no losers, because you permitted them, and they did charge prices in proportion on the goods which they sold ; but you forget the officers and men under your command, and those who follow them, who were made to pay double the price of every thing they consumed, in order that a few fanams might be put into your pocket. This conduct the General considers, upon the whole, so repugnant to every military principle, and to the customs of the service, so far as he is acquainted with them, and to the Rules and Articles of War, that he would have deemed it his duty to bring it before a General Court Martial, only that he perceives, by the G. O. 22nd Sept. 1802, the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council has taken measures to prevent the recurrence of such practices. He cannot, however, deliver his sentiments upon the subject without expressing his abhorrence of them, and his concern that an officer, particularly a field officer of the — regt., should have been accused of them. Major Gen. Wellesley further directs me to subjoin an abstract of the value of the articles received by you, and not paid for, at the several stages ; and of the taxes levied by you on the shops, including the money stopped by your servant out of the price of sheep, for whose conduct, in such cases, you are answerable ; and to inform you that the amount must be returned by you to the Mysore Circar, for the use of the inhabitants.

### 368. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.

*Subalterns not to put each other in arrest, except in case of absolute necessity.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 3rd July, 1803.

I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the practice which prevails among subaltern officers of putting each other in arrest. It originates in an indifference regarding the necessity of appearing before a court martial which prevails in all parts of the country ; indeed this feeling ought not to be called indifference, because I rather imagine that the majority of the army would prefer to appear before a court

martial, as they deem it a stage on which they can show their abilities. In my opinion it will be proper to issue a General Order to prohibit the practice of which you disapprove, and to desire that when an officer has cause to complain of the conduct of another, he shall complain to their mutual superior, if there should be one within reach, and that he shall not proceed to put another officer in arrest excepting in a case of absolute necessity, of which the proof will be required of him.

**369. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial.**

*Courts Martial ought not to give sentence of honourable acquittal 'merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt.'*

(Extract.)

Camp, 18th July, 1803.

A sentence of honourable acquittal by a general court martial may justly be deemed by an officer to be the very best testimonial of character that it is possible for him to receive in relation to the subject which has been the object of their inquiry; but in proportion as this sentence is prized by the officers of the army ought those whose duty it may be to be members of a court martial to be cautious not to pass it excepting in cases in which the innocence of the accused may be clear to the whole world. If sentences of honourable acquittal are passed merely where there is a defect of the proof of guilt, it is obvious that they must lose their force in the eyes of the world, an officer on whom such a one may be passed will still be an object of suspicion, and such sentences will lose their value.

**370. To Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor.**

*Scribendi κακότηες among officers to be checked.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 30th July, 1803.

I wish that you would give a hint to Major —— that there is no occasion for so much correspondence among officers in the same cantonment, and that I desire that he will communicate verbally with those under his command instead of in writing, excepting on occasions in which writing is absolutely necessary. These disputes in that corps would not have occurred if the art of writing had never been invented, and Captain —— and the doctor had not imagined that they possessed it.

371. To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

*The same subject.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 11th Nov., 1803,

I take the liberty \* \* to recommend as a general rule, that between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally, correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public officers who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy, those voluminous documents about nothing.

372. To Colonel Murray.

*The service not to suffer through the private quarrels of officers.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 14th Sept., 1803.

I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general referrible to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a public concern; but, in many instances, it would be much more proper, and more creditable for both parties, to settle these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public, by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court Martial. This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country; and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon, by a General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique.

I therefore most anxiously deprecate this trial; and I beg you to inform Capt. H——, that I recommend him to withdraw his letters and his charges against Lieut. Col. W——, and make that officer such an apology as will induce him to consent to his being released from arrest. I enclose you all the papers which I received upon this subject.

\* \* \* \* \*

If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable to be attacked by the enemy; and they are to remain at the place at which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.



**373. To Lieutenant-Colonel Boles, President of a General Court Martial.** •

*A private reprimand an inadequate punishment for insulting a magistrate in consequence of his acts as such.*

SIR,

Camp, 5th Oct., 1803.

I had yesterday the honour of receiving the duplicate proceedings of the general court martial on the trial of Lieutenant ———.

There does not appear to be the smallest doubt that that officer applied to Mr. Drummond for his interference as a magistrate, and that he wrote him the letter No. 3 in the proceedings because the result of that magisterial interference was not such as he wished it to be. It is not even denied by Lieutenant ——— that that letter is a very improper one, and, as expressed in the charge, it is certainly 'couched in intemperate and indecorous terms.' Lieutenant ———, therefore, is guilty of having written that letter to Mr. Drummond in consequence of his act as a magistrate.

It is immaterial whether the letter is private or public; indeed, it is difficult to draw the distinction between them. If the letter were intended to be the ground of a private quarrel and its consequences, it is still more reprehensible than if it were intended as a public offence to a public officer, as it is well known that no public officer whatever can do his duty, particularly one in a judicial capacity, if he be not protected from the insults of those who may apply to him for redress, as Lieutenant ——— did in this instance, or who may be brought before him.

I beg that the members of the general court martial will individually and collectively consider their own situation, and whether it is consistent with propriety or the common rules of justice that those who are employed to sit in judgment on the conduct of others should be liable to insult (the intention of which is in this instance avowed) for their acts; and after that I beg them to decide whether a private reprimand, which, at all events, is an improper punishment, is adequate to the offence of which Lieutenant ——— has been guilty.

I request that the sentence of this court martial may be revised.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

## 374. To Major Doolan.

*Frivolous and factious regimental quarrels highly dangerous to the public interests, especially in time of war; and to the European officers engaged in them.*

(Extracts.)

Camp, 6th Oct., 1803.

I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 26th September, and it is with concern that I observe the existence of fresh disputes and divisions in the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, under your command. I was in hopes that, after what passed upon a former similar occasion, the officers of that corps would have stifled their animosities; and, at all events, I expected that they would have been suspended in a time of war, and that their attention would have been directed to the security of the important post under their charge. Instead of that, instead of receiving from them or from you reports of their observations on the situation and designs of the Mahrattas in their neighbourhood, my attention is claimed at this interesting moment by paltry disputes about nothing, the only effect of which must be to prove the entire absence and annihilation of discipline and subordination in the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment. So trifling are these disputes, that I would not even take the trouble of writing upon the subject, did I not observe from them that the adjutant is at the head of a party in the corps formed against you, and that the influence of the European officers has been exerted in order to introduce the Native officers into the party.

This appears in the clearest manner from the sentence of the garrison court martial on the writer, John Rodriguez. The slightest knowledge of the Native character, particularly of that of the Native officers of the army, will make it clear that those who tried John Rodriguez would not have acquitted him when such evidence appeared against him, and particularly would not have used offensive terms in their sentence of acquittal when the commanding officer of their battalion and of the garrison was his prosecutor, if they had not been abetted and encouraged by the adjutant and the European officers.

This conduct is highly dangerous to the public interests, as well as to the European officers in question. They are mistaken if they suppose that they can uphold discipline and subordination among the Native troops under their command (which, in a moment of difficulty, may be essential to the safety not only of the important post of which they have charge, but of their own persons), if they don't support the authority of, and oblige the Native officers to respect, their commanding officer.

\* \* \* \* \*

In respect to Lieutenant ——'s charges against you, some of them are of a serious nature, and others are frivolous, and are to be attributed

to the dispute respecting the writer, in which Lieutenant —— was wrong. It is probable also that those of a serious nature, and which alone concern the public, viz., the 3rd and 5th charges, would not have been brought forward if it had not been for the existence of this dispute; and the whole, therefore, may be referred to private motives.

At any time I should hesitate before I should put an officer in arrest and upon his trial for the gratification of private revenge; but at the present moment, when the exertions and attention of every officer ought to be turned to the defence and protection of the rights and interests of his country, I shall certainly neither deprive your country of your services by putting you in arrest, nor take up the time and attention of other officers in trying you upon these charges.

I beg that this letter may be entered in the regimental book of the 1st battalion 5th Bombay regiment, and that you will assemble the officers under your command and read it to them; and at the same time communicate to them my anxious desire that their animosities may be buried in oblivion, and that they will direct their attention to the discipline and subordination of the troops under their command, and to the security of the important post of which they have charge.

### 375. G. A. O.

*Officers to pay ready money for shop goods.*

Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec., 1803.

The Parsee merchant has represented that Native servants come to his shop and take away goods without paying for them or giving a receipt, and sometimes without leaving their master's name, by which conduct he is in danger of being ruined. As the credit of the army, as well as its future convenience, is interested in preventing this, Major-General Wellesley requests that, when gentlemen send their servants to the Parsee's shop for goods, they will send ready money to pay for what they want, as the man has resolved not to allow any thing to be carried away by servants until paid for.

The 5th brigade to furnish a havildar's guard immediately, for the care of the Parsee merchant's property. It is to be relieved daily.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 376. To Colonel Murray.

*Military inefficiency, from improper use of men or equipments, worse than indiscipline.*

(Extract.)

Camp, 26th Jan., 1804.

I have to observe, that there is a tendency in the service in this country to admit abuses beyond any other that I have met with.

I cannot say whether this is to be attributed to former habits and example, or to the laxity which must attend all distant establishments. But of this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a commanding officer to resist every thing of the kind in a most determined manner. The want of discipline among troops is very bad, and renders them useless; but the want of efficiency, which is the result of the application to private purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as troops, or as the necessary attendants or equipments of these troops, is worse, as it may exist with a certain degree and appearance of discipline, and government may be misled by the notion that they have an army, whereas they have nothing but paper.

The troops under your command are in a distant country, and they can come but seldom under the view or inspection of the government; it is therefore particularly incumbent on you to take care that no practice or custom shall exist which may destroy their discipline or lessen their efficiency; and I beg leave to assure you, that without the most constant vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert these evils.

**377. To Lieutenant-Colonel de Meuron, commanding at Seringapatam.**

*Strong obligation of British officers to support the authority of the civil magistrate.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

As a British officer I have always considered it to be my duty, nay more, an honourable distinction to the character of a British officer, to support the laws and the authority of the magistrates who administer them. In this country in particular, in which His Majesty's European subjects are not liable to the jurisdiction of the courts of justice established by the laws of our country for the government of the Natives of India, it is more particularly incumbent on those British officers, who have a due sense of the honour of their profession and situation, to support the authority of the magistrates appointed by government to preside in those courts.

**378. To Major Symons.**

*The same subject.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

In the event of the use of improper language or of improper and contemptuous behaviour towards you by any Native officer or soldier,

or any Native of any description, you have in your hands the power of supporting and vindicating your own authority, and I desire that you will use it. It is not to be supposed that any European officer will behave improperly to a magistrate; but if there should be such a one, the principles and inclinations of my mind as a British subject, and my sense of my duty as a British officer, will induce me to take the measures which I have in my power to bring to trial and to punishment the officer who may be guilty of a contempt of the laws or the person of one of the magistrates.

### 379. To Lord Ellenborough.

*How the officers of the East India Company's army are excited to mutiny.*

(Extract.)

Stratfield Saye, 7th Sept., 1829.

Mutiny in the East India Company's army is not a novelty. In my time there have been three, of which two were of the European officers. There was another in the time of Lord Clive. There are some peculiarities in the situation of these officers; of which we must never lose sight in all discussions affecting their interests. The native army in India is and must always be, under all circumstances, a local army; and the officers belonging to it must be during their service local as well as the army to which they belong. This must be the case whatever may be the future constitution of the government, and whether the army be the King's or the Company's.

The officers of that local army are not and cannot be of the same description of men as those of the properly called British army. These are composed of all classes of the higher ranks of society, and they cannot long pursue a course that is not consistent with the public interests.

There are many excellent men among the officers of the East India Company's army. But they are all originally men without fortune. They go to India solely and exclusively that they may subsist as gentlemen; they are in general totally disconnected from any interest in their country, and their feeling for it is a desire and hope to find in it a healthy spot in which to pass the end of their lives at their ease and in comfort. They toil through the active part of their lives with no other object in view than that, and of course they become discontented and disposed to mutiny if that object is removed to a greater distance from them, or rendered more difficult to be attained.

I don't mean to assert that they are all disposed to mutiny, but among such men many so disposed will be found, and these the most active and energetic of the whole; and but little experience is required to show

that when men of this description are found to take the lead in such acts, others, however unwillingly and however lamenting every step they take, are too ready to follow the example. There are some circumstances in the times which are peculiarly calculated to excite the disposition of these officers to mutiny, and to render their perseverance in the mutiny more constant, and to increase the difficulty of overcoming it.

One of these is the hopelessness of promotion. The truth is that men live for many years after they are no longer capable of rendering service to the State, and such as these enjoy the honours and emoluments of the military profession in India as well as elsewhere, to enjoy which their juniors are eagerly and impatiently looking forward. These juniors do not reflect that their turn will eventually come. What they want, and want exclusively, is to possess riches and to enjoy honours.

Another excitement to mutiny among these officers is the absolute impossibility of their living in their own country at their ease, and in the respectable society in which they have been accustomed to live in India, upon the income which they can hope to possess upon their return to England. The increased expense of living and luxury in England is the cause of this circumstance.

Another excitement to mutiny, and I beg you to attend to it, will certainly be the colonization of India even to a moderate degree. That which brings these officers to England at the close of their service is that they cannot hope to retain their health and to educate their families in India. But if the country is colonised; if hundreds of European families established within it, exist with better or worse health as in the West Indies, rear and educate families better or worse, is it to be believed that the example will not have an effect upon the disposition of the European officers of the Native army?

Then there is another excitement to mutiny in the increasing disposition in this country to emigrate to the United States, occasioned by the glowing descriptions of that country, and of its influence and power, by all writers upon it, even our own.

The officers would naturally look to retire to the United States if their disputes with their own country should be irreconcilable, and at all events to support and assistance from the United States during their mutinous struggle with their own country. I have written thus much just to show you that we must not look lightly at a question of mutiny in the East Indies.

## 4. MISCELLANEOUS.

## 380. To the Adjutant-General, Bombay.

*All the public means ought to be applied to the public service when necessary.*

SIR,

Seringapatam, 23rd April, 1800.

I have to inform you that when I was in the province of Malabar I was desirous on many accounts that the flank companies of the 84th Regiment, which had been brought from Goa for the proposed service in Malabar, should be sent back to that place when it was determined that that service should not take place. At the request of Colonel Sartorius, part of them were taken in the *Fly*, commanded by Captain Hayes, and in a vessel belonging to Cannanore which went with her; and a letter was written to Captain Hall of the *Intrepid*, which vessel was lying at Calicut, to request that he would take to Goa those men who still remained at Cannanore. To this letter an answer was received stating that Captain Hall had no room in his ship for the men; but as I had heard that she was not so full as it would appear by this answer, I wrote to the President of the Commission, who was then at Mahé, to request that the *Intrepid* might be sent to Cannanore in order that it might be ascertained whether she could receive the men or not. The *Centurion* was at Cannanore when the *Intrepid* arrived on the 15th instant, and I hear from Colonel Sartorius that Captain Rainier having sent an officer to examine whether she was capable of receiving men, had stated that she could take some. In the mean time, however, a letter came from Admiral Rainier in which he desired that the *Centurion* might take the men, in answer to an application from Colonel Sartorius and myself; and I must also state that Captain Rainier had consented to take them before this letter arrived. The *Intrepid* in consequence received none.

As the public service has not been put to any inconvenience by this refusal by Captain Hall to give the public means under his charge to forward it, it may not appear absolutely necessary to bring this matter forward to a public investigation. I make it known to the Commander-in-Chief and to Government only to show the necessity of some reform in this branch of their service. They have a right to require from those in whose hands they place the command of their troops the most prompt and ready execution of their orders, and of those measures which the public service may require, and an attention to economy in carrying their measures forward; but I beg to observe that if all the public means are not to be applied to the public service when necessary, if they can be kept back with impunity and applied to private ends at the will of any

individual, the responsibility attending delay and expense ought not to be laid upon the commanding officers of the troops.

I have been further induced to bring this subject under the view of the Commander-in-Chief, as I have been informed by Colonel Sartorius that it is not uncommon for the gentlemen in command of the Company's cruisers to refuse their assistance when it is required for the public service on the Malabar coast; and that one of them did refuse it upon a late occasion, when Colonel Sartorius was desirous of availing himself of it to remove part of the detachment intended for field-service from Cannanore to Calicut.

In writing upon this subject, it is but justice to Captain Hayes to inform you that I found in him the greatest readiness to forward the public service, and that Colonel Sartorius speaks highly of the assistance which he has received from him.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 381. To Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick.

*The hill forts ought to be destroyed.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Chittledroog, 11th June, 1800.

Our hill forts in general are worse than useless. They are so unhealthy that it is not possible to leave a large body of people or an European officer on the hill: he consequently resides below, and sends a small guard to the top of the hill; and the whole party are at all times liable to be surprised and cut off. Under these circumstances it would appear that it would be better to withdraw our garrisons from all these places; but then they would be occupied by the Polygars by whom they were originally built, they would instantly rebel and oppose the authority of government, and it would require almost an army to retake each hill fort. If they are abandoned they must at the same time be entirely destroyed, and particularly all the means which they have of affording a supply of water must be totally destroyed.

In fact the hill forts in general are bad posts for us, and the sooner they are destroyed the better.

### 382. To Lieutenant-Colonel Spry.

*Officers who build houses on cantonment ground are entitled, strictly speaking, on selling them, to receive the price of the materials only.*

MY DEAR SIR,

Seringapatam, 5th June, 1802.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 30th May, and have taken into consideration the subject to which it relates.



My opinion is, that, when the commanding officer in Canara pointed out a piece of ground for a cantonment for the 75th regiment, he intended that it should be the spot for a cantonment for the corps which should relieve the 75th; and it stands to reason that the ground allotted to the officers was not excepted from the general rule. Accordingly, I conclude that the officers of the 75th regiment have no grant of the ground on which they built their houses, and that their right to it must have depended upon their being officers belonging to the corps which occupied the cantonment. If this be true, they can have no possible right to sell any more of their houses than the materials; indeed, a purchaser of more would throw away his money, as it would be in the power of the commanding officer in the cantonment allotted by government to his regiment to prevent any person, excepting one belonging to the regiment, from residing within his lines.

I am very far from being of opinion that an officer who succeeds to another in a cantonment ought to insist upon his selling his house for the value of the materials. In many cases the house must be worth a larger sum, and it would be for the convenience and benefit of the supposed purchaser that the materials should be allowed to stand in the shape of a house, for which benefit it is but fair that the purchaser should pay something; but, although the purchaser ought to pay some advance on the value of the materials, I am far from thinking the seller entitled to the whole sum which he would get for the house from any man in the bazaar. In short, this question, like most others, depends much upon the disposition of both parties to accommodate each other. On the one hand, the purchaser ought to give a fair price for the house, being rather more than the value of the materials, to which alone the seller can have any right; and on the other, the seller ought not to attempt to ask for it the full sum which he would get for it if he should have the power of selling it in the bazaar.

This is my private opinion upon the question which you have put to me. I observe, however, that it is one of general importance, the decision upon which may affect more corps than the 75th and 77th regiments, and I am rather desirous that it should be decided by the Commander-in-Chief. I beg, therefore, that you will write me a public letter upon the subject, which I can refer to him.

Believe me, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

**383. To the Officers commanding Chittledroog, Paughur, Nundydroog; to be communicated to those commanding Mudgherry, Mergasie, and Goorybunda.**

*Detailed information to be supplied by the commandants of forts, on occasion of their inspection by Major-General Wellesley.*

SIR,

21st Aug., 1802.

The Deputy-Adjutant-General will already have acquainted you with my intention to visit the station under your command in a short time, and he will hereafter make you acquainted with the exact period of my arrival. In the mean time there are certain points which I am about to detail regarding the situation of the fortress under your command, into which I propose to inspect minutely, and I have to request you to be prepared with all the information in your power.

First. Regarding the works of the fort, you will be prepared—

1st. With a report upon the exact state of the works of the fort under your command; distinguishing those of the upper from those of the lower fort, with a statement of the materials of which those works are constructed. To this report you will add your remarks upon the advantage or the disadvantage of the present works for the defence of the fort.

2nd. I should wish to have your opinion regarding the most practicable mode of improving the defences of the fort under your command. In giving this opinion you will attend as much as may be practicable to the following points:—1st. To reduce the works as much as possible without weakening the defences of the fort; 2ndly. To the improvement of the communication for troops, the transportation of ordnance and stores and provisions not only from one part of each line to another, but from one line to the others; 3rdly. To the remedying of such glaring defects in the fortifications, the existence of which may be dangerous to the fort; to supply the deficiencies of the means of giving flanking fire, and to obtain the necessary degree of strength and security. 4thly. I wish you to examine particularly those parts of the upper fort which are deemed inaccessible, and therefore but slenderly or not at all fortified. You will report your opinion regarding the fact whether the fort is or is not accessible at such points.

Secondly. Regarding the ordnance on the works in the fort under your command, you will be prepared—

1st. With a return stating the number, description, and state of such ordnance, and a detail stating in what places it is situated.

2ndly. I should wish to have your opinion regarding the sufficiency of that ordnance for the defence of the fort, and of its deficiency. In giving this opinion I request you to consider whether light guns may not be preferable to heavy in many situations; and you will be so kind as to

report particularly in what situations, on account of the abrupt steepness of the rock, the aid of depressing carriages would be desirable.

Thirdly. Regarding the possibility of using the fort under your command as a *depôt* of military stores and provisions, I request you to be prepared—

1st. With a report stating the number, size, description, and state of repair of the buildings in the fort under your command applicable to containing ordnance, military stores, powder, grain, and provisions respectively. In this report you will specify whether such buildings are in the upper or the lower fort; and if in the upper, you will state your opinion regarding the mode of communicating with them; whether it would be practicable to make a road to them for the use of bullocks or coolies, without injuring the strength of the work; and if that should not be practicable, whether it would be so to construct a simple machinery by means of which it would be possible to lodge and draw from such buildings the grain or stores as might be necessary. 2ndly. You will report the repairs necessary to these buildings, applicable to containing ordnance and military stores, grain, and provisions.

Fourthly. Regarding the garrison, you will be prepared with a report, stating, 1st. Your opinion regarding the number of troops necessary for the defence of the fort in case it should be attacked; 2ndly. You will report the description, state of repair, size, and number of the buildings in the fort applicable to the convenience of the troops, whether as barracks or hospital for Europeans; barracks, hospital, or place of arms for natives, garrison guard rooms, &c. &c. In this report you will specify where each building is situated. 3rdly. You will report your opinion of the repairs necessary to the buildings detailed in the second article of this fourth head.

Fifthly. Regarding the stores at present in the fort, you will be prepared—

1st. With an accurate return of the description, number, state of the ordnance, and military stores in the fort under your command on the 1st of the month in which you will give in these reports.

2ndly. With an accurate return of the grain and provisions, dry and wet, on the same day.

Sixthly. Regarding the materials for building, and those for the construction of ordnance and military stores, you will be prepared with a report—

1st. Stating the quantities of store materials in store in the fort under your command applicable to store purposes respectively.

2ndly. The nature and quantities of materials for buildings found in the neighbourhood of the fort, in old or useless buildings.

3rdly. The price of materials for the construction of buildings, ordnance and military stores at the place under your command.

4thly. The distance from the fort under your command of the place or places at which such materials are found. The mode in which they are brought from such place, and the expense attending their transportation. •

Seventhly. Regarding the workmen to be procured at the place under your command. You will be so kind as to report whether workmen can be procured there in any large numbers, the prices of their labour, distinguishing them as artificers and coolies.

Eighthly. You will be prepared with a report of the mode in which the fort is supplied with water, the number of reservoirs, where situated, and in what manner constructed, and if they contain water at all seasons.

You will be so kind as to ascertain whether all the different works in the fort under your command, such as bastions, redoubts, batteries, cavaliers, &c. &c. have names or numbers; and if they have, you will announce such names in the garrison orderly book as being the invariable names or numbers of such works. You will be so kind as to number such works as have not at present any name or number, and you will announce such number in the garrison orderly book, and you will have it marked in conspicuous figures on the work to which it will be assigned.

The magazines, the grain and provision and ordnance store-rooms, if not already named or numbered, should be numbered in like manner.

In the examination of the works, buildings, ordnance and stores, &c. &c., upon which I have above informed you that I shall require reports, I leave it to your discretion either to assemble committees to make this examination and to frame the reports, or to do it alone.

I have, &c.,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

### 384. 'To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace.

*Martial law indispensable in a lawless land.*

(Extract.)

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

The patel of Batculgaum, in the usual style of a Marhatta patel, keeps a band of plunderers for his own profit and advantage. You will inform him that if he does not pay for the horses, bullocks, and articles plundered, he shall be hanged also. You will make him acquaint his village with this determination, and allow time for the answer to return; and you will hang him if he does not pay the money at the time fixed upon. It is impossible to get on without these punishments in the Marhatta country. The Peshwah has no authority; and if he had, he would not exert it for the advantage of our troops.

**385. To Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace.***Importance to a commanding officer of habitual secrecy on public matters.*

(Extract.)

Camp at Niggerree, 28th June, 1804.

I believe that in my public despatches I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will mention to you, that is the secrecy of all your proceedings.

There is nothing more certain than that, of 100 affairs, 99 might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is that, where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view. For this reason secrecy is always best, and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the habit of never making known public business of any description, that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it is essentially necessary. Remember, that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery: in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

**386. To Lord Bathurst.***Position of officers of King's troops in India.*

(Extract.)

London, 26th Jan., 1824.

I cannot but agree \* \* that the situation of the officers of the King's troops in India is very painful. The gallant and brilliant parts of the service are performed by them. The rewards, in that country at least, are given to the officers of the local army. The King's army in the East Indies is the finest and best in the world, and I must observe that it owes part of its excellence to some of the circumstances attending their situation, of which the writer complains. It is true that they are

cut off from all social intercourse with natives or others; but the consequence of that circumstance is that they have nothing to attend to but their discipline, and they acquire military habits and a character peculiar to themselves which have enabled them to perform some glorious services.

**387. To the Right Hon. Charles W. Wynn.**

*At what age European soldiers may most safely be sent to India.*

MY DEAR WYNN,

London, 25th July, 1826.

I return Sir Herbert Taylor's letter and the Memorandum enclosed.

I have always considered that men from thirty to forty years of age, particularly if they have been soldiers till that age, are the most efficient for soldiers, particularly in warm climates. As well as I recollect, we thought them so when I served in the East Indies; and I understand that they are still thought so serviceable, as that men of the age of thirty-five are received from the King's service into that of the East India Company when the King's regiments are ordered home from India.

If I am not mistaken, you would find at the end of five years' service in the East Indies, or of ten years' service, more men alive who should commence their service at thirty or thirty-five years of age than you would of the same numbers who should have commenced their service at the ordinary age of recruits, viz., from eighteen to twenty-two or twenty-three. If I am right, it would be cheaper for the East India Company to send out the former.

Believe me, &c.,

WELLINGTON.

### III. ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTATIONS.

#### 388. *Rise and Development of the Indian Army*<sup>1</sup>.

Company's forces first raised in Madras.

THE first establishment of the Company's Indian Army may be considered to date from the year 1748, when a small body of Sepoys was raised at Madras, after the example set by the French, for the defence of that settlement, during the course of the war which had broken out, four years previously, between France and England. At the same time a small European force was raised, formed of such sailors as could be spared from the ships on the coast, and of men smuggled on board the Company's vessels in England by the crimps. An officer, Major Lawrence, was appointed by a commission from the Company to command their forces in India.

Hostilities between the English and French were terminated in the following year (1749), on the receipt of news of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; but, about the same time, the settlements of both nations began to take an active part in the politics of the peninsula, and the engagements into which the English entered with the parties whose cause they supported, led to a rapid increase of the Madras native army, stimulated further by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756.

Rise of Bengal Army.

During this time, Calcutta remained a purely commercial settlement, and the military force with which Clive retook that place, in 1757, from the Nawab of Bengal, and won the Battle of Plassey, was principally composed of Madras troops, native and European, with part of a royal regiment of foot. On the English becoming virtual masters of Bengal, Clive proceeded to raise a Sepoy force after the Madras pattern, commanded by English officers, and supplemented by a force of local European infantry and artillery. The complications which soon followed in Bengal politics, arising out of the deposition of successive Nawabs by their new masters, and the efforts of the party of

<sup>1</sup> *Indian Polity*, by Major George Chesney, 1868, pp. 275-284, 1st edition.

the Emperor to recover that country, led to a rapid augmentation of the Bengal Army, which, in 1772, consisted of 21 native battalions, 3 battalions of Europeans, and 4 companies of artillery. The native battalions were about 800 strong, and were commanded each by a captain, with a few subalterns attached; the European battalions and the artillery companies were more fully officered, but were usually very weak in men. In all, there was a nominal strength of about 3,500 Europeans and 24,000 natives, with more than 600 officers. The army was divided into seven brigades, the battalions of which remained always together. Each brigade was commanded by a field-officer, the whole army by a general officer commissioned by the Company, a charter of 1753 vesting them with authority to raise troops and appoint officers. It was with an army so constituted that the campaigns were fought which terminated in the final subjugation of Behar, and placed the Emperor and Nawab-Vizier of Oudh at the mercy of Clive, on his second return to India in 1765. The Bengal Army had previously supplied a considerable detachment to the east coast, which afforded material aid in the struggle between the French and English in the South of India, ending in the final overthrow of the former, and the capture of Pondicherry, in 1761.

With the grant of the dewanee or treasurership of Bengal, and the fall of the French power in India, all contests for the possession of that province ceased; but the English almost immediately afterwards entered into more extensive engagements. In 1773 their troops occupied Allahabad, in view to hold that place on behalf of the Emperor against the Mahrattas; in 1774 they undertook the defence of the Nawab of Oudh's dominions, and their garrisons were moved up to Cawnpore and Futtehgur; and in 1778 the Bengal Government joined in the operations then being undertaken from Bombay against the Mahrattas, and a Bengal column was despatched across India to aid the western presidency. These measures involved a considerable augmentation to the Bengal Army, which in 1786, at the time when Lord Cornwallis assumed charge of the government, consisted of 36 battalions of Sepoys, which had been formed into 18 regiments of 2 battalions each, and 6 weak battalions of Europeans; the whole organised in 6 brigades. The latter battalions were strongly officered; the native battalions were commanded by a captain, with a subaltern to each company. The organisation followed, up to this time, had thus been of the kind now popularly known as the 'irregular' system, in contradistinction to that based on the English regimental plan, the promotion of the officers running in one list for the whole army, from which they were posted to the various battalions. In all matters connected with pay, equipment, and the audit of accounts, the army administration partook of the general laxity and disorder which up to that time had pervaded every branch



of the Company's Government in India, the major part of the officers' emoluments being derived from irregular perquisites; while, as to the supposed superior morale and discipline of the early Company's army, the history of those days records a succession of mutinies, in which the black and white troops were alternately employed to coerce each other. The latter were composed of the scouring of almost every European nation, kidnapped or wheedled on board-ship by crimps; for the Company's recruiting depot was not established until 1781. The class from which the Sepoys were obtained was familiar with the scenes of turbulent violence which at that time were being enacted at every court in India. These conditions were quite incompatible with the formation of a well-disciplined or well-organised army, such as has been sometimes represented to have existed at this time. Discipline and morality were the products of a later date. The redeeming feature of the troops of all classes was the gallantry and endurance exhibited in the numerous campaigns and protracted expeditions on which they were engaged.

#### Development of Madras Army.

While the Bengal Army was thus in course of gradual development, the Madras Army also underwent a rapid augmentation. The overthrow of the French power, in 1761, left it indeed for a time without a rival; but the Madras Government had now undertaken the defence of the Carnatic on behalf of its ruler, whom it was rapidly supplanting from all but the nominal sovereignty, and the engagement involved the maintenance of a considerable garrison. In the year 1772 the Madras Army contained about 3,000 European infantry and 16,000 Sepoys, with a staff of more than 600 officers, the greater part of the cost being defrayed by the Nawab of the Carnatic. This force was shortly afterwards further augmented in consequence of the war with the Mahrattas and with Hyder Ali. The first contest with the latter, as is well known, involved a struggle for the very existence of the English settlement, Hyder extorting a peace (in 1769) from the Madras Government under the walls of Fort St. George; in the second war with him and his son Tippoo, which terminated in 1784, neither side manifested any decided superiority.

#### Bombay Army.

The Bombay Presidency during this period, and for many years afterwards, comprised no territory on the mainland of India. But a military force was maintained for its protection, which was considerably developed during the Mahratta wars. In 1772 it consisted of about 2,500 Europeans and 3,500 Sepoys, with nearly 200 officers. The expense of this army, as of the Bombay civil establishments, then and

afterwards, was defrayed from the revenues of Bengal, or by the produce of loans.

In 1773, when the first Governor-General was appointed, under the Act passed in that year, and the Crown interposed to nominate the members of the Government, the Company's army consisted nominally of about 9,000 Europeans and 45,000 natives.

#### Royal troops in India.

The first regiment of the British Army sent to India was the 39th Foot, which arrived at Madras in the year 1754. This regiment formed part of the force which went with Clive to the relief of Calcutta in 1756, and it was present at the Battle of Plassey in the following year. In 1758, it was nominally sent home, but in effect was broken up, the men being invited to volunteer into the local force, and the officers offered commissions in the Company's army. The English garrison in Bengal then consisted for a time wholly of the Company's forces. Madras remained without royal troops until 1758, when, in pursuance of the elder Pitt's vigorous plans for pressing the war against the French in every quarter of the globe, a newly-raised regiment of the line, the 79th, was sent out, followed by the 84th, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre Coote, and the 96th. In 1759, Coote's regiment was transferred to Bengal, and he was appointed by the Company Commander-in-Chief of their forces in that presidency. On the peace of 1763, the British line was again reduced to 70 regiments, and India remained without any royal troops until 1779, when the 71st [then numbered 73rd] Foot was raised and despatched to Madras. Four other new regiments followed, to aid in the war against Hyder Ali.

Lord Cornwallis, who was appointed the first Governor-General in India, after the passing of the Act of 1784, which gave that personage authority over the three presidencies, was also appointed Commander-in-Chief, and was thus vested with supreme authority over both civil and military affairs throughout India. Up to this time it had been usual to confer a step of local brevet rank on all lieutenant-colonels of the royal service, an arrangement which naturally caused great dissatisfaction among the Company's officers, whose own commissions were, moreover, often not recognised by the former as giving valid rank. The high authority conferred by the rank and military reputation of Lord Cornwallis, enabled him to procure the repeal of a regulation which was repugnant to his sense of justice. Through his representations the local brevet promotions were withdrawn in 1788, and brevet commissions in the royal service were granted by him as Commander-in-Chief to all the Company's officers, with corresponding dates to those of their substantive ones. This arrangement was continued until the abolition of the Company's government in 1858.

Gradual augmentation of native armies.

From 1772 until 1796, the strength of the Indian Army underwent a gradual increase, occasioned by the Mahratta War of 1778, and that in the Carnatic with Hyder Ali and Tippoo. These wars were, however, undertaken rather for defensive than aggressive purposes; and until the accession of Lord Mornington to the government, the policy of the English, although at times marked by great oscillation of purpose, was on the whole based on the principle of recognising the political equality with themselves of the principal native states, and maintaining the balance of power throughout India. Lord Cornwallis, indeed, when forced into hostilities with Tippoo, the ruler of Mysore, displayed a degree of decision and vigour at that time quite unusual in the conduct of the English military operations. The burden of that war, which ended in the complete humiliation of Tippoo, and the annexation of a large part of his territory, was borne principally by the Madras and Bombay Armies, which received the largest share of the augmentation rendered necessary of the aggregate military establishment.

At the commencement of Lord Cornwallis's government, the establishment of royal troops consisted of one regiment of dragoons and five battalions of foot. In 1788, four regiments of the line were raised for service in India, and thus brought up the complement to nine battalions, which remained unaltered until 1797. Of these nine battalions, only one was stationed in Bengal; two belonged to the Bombay Presidency, the remaining six, with the regiment of dragoons, to Madras. In the year 1794, the total strength of the Indian armies, including royal troops, was 70,000, of which 13,500 were Europeans. The Madras and Bengal establishments of native troops were each about 24,000 strong, the Bombay establishment about 9,000.

Reorganisation of 1796.

In 1796, the organisation of the Indian Army was entirely recast. Heretofore, the officers belonging to the establishment of each presidency had been borne on one seniority list, from which they had been distributed among the different regiments; and the proportion of junior to senior grades was exceedingly unfavourable for promotion, there being about eight subalterns to every captain. They were now divided into separate cadres, one for each native regiment of two battalions, to which henceforward the respective officers were permanently attached, their promotion up to the rank of major running in the order of regimental seniority. The lieutenant-colonels and colonels remained on separate lists for each branch of the service, to which the regimental majors were promoted in order of seniority, on succession to vacancies. The

establishment of each regiment was fixed at 1 colonel, 2 lieutenant-colonels, 2 majors, 8 captains, 22 lieutenants, and 10 ensigns, and the result was a great advancement in rank throughout the army. This system of promotion was maintained until the reorganisation of 1861. The regiments of artillery and engineers were at the same time organised on a similar footing to that of the infantry. An establishment of generals was also formed for the Company's army, the officers of which, from the power previously conferred on the Company to grant generals' commissions having been withdrawn, were not at this time eligible for promotion beyond the rank of colonel. It was also provided that a specified number of the divisional commands should be held by major-generals of the royal army. The staff was fixed at two for Bengal, and one each for Madras and Bombay; and until lately these, with a limited number of brigade commands, were the only appointments on the staff of the Indian Army which could be held by officers of the royal service.

The year 1796 was further marked by the introduction of furlough regulations, which entitled officers to visit England without quitting the army, and also to quit India on sick leave, retaining their Indian allowances and appointments during absence. The privileges conferred by these regulations were, however, partly withdrawn in 1854, and they were still further curtailed, virtually, by the operation of the amalgamation measure of 1861.

#### Subsequent increase of forces.

The Marquis Wellesley arrived in India in 1798, and immediately entered on a new line of policy, the object of which was to sweep away the appearance of equality of power between the English and the principal native states, and to establish the undisputed supremacy of the former throughout the country. The era of war and conquest which marked his tenure of office, and resulted in the advance of the British cantonments beyond Delhi in the north, and over the whole of the Deccan and the Mahratta territories, involved of course a large increase to the army. The Bengal infantry was raised from 28<sup>1</sup> to 54 battalions, that of Madras from 30 to 50 battalions, and that of Bombay from 12 to 18 battalions. A considerable augmentation was also made to the native cavalry and the Company's artillery of all kinds. The British troops in India were also largely increased; but the Company's European infantry, which had always been far below its nominal strength, was reduced to one regiment per presidency.

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<sup>1</sup> The number of battalions had been reduced in 1796 from 36 to 24, and again raised in 1797 to 28 battalions.

Indian Army in 1808.

In 1808, after the great Mahratta war had been finally brought to an end, and the military forces reduced to a permanent peace-footing, the Indian establishment was constituted as follows:—

|             | BRITISH TROOPS.        |                          | COMPANY'S TROOPS.                    |                           |                                  |                                    |
|-------------|------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|             | Regiments,<br>Cavalry. | Battalions,<br>Infantry. | Battalions,<br>European<br>Infantry. | Battalions,<br>Artillery. | Regiments,<br>Native<br>Cavalry. | Battalions,<br>Native<br>Infantry. |
| Bengal. . . | 2                      | 5                        | 1                                    | 3                         | 8                                | 54                                 |
| Madras . .  | 2                      | 8                        | 1                                    | 2                         | 8                                | 46                                 |
| Bombay . .  | —                      | 7                        | 1                                    | 1                         | —                                | 18                                 |
| Total . . . | 4                      | 20                       | 3                                    | 6                         | 16                               | 118                                |

The strength of the three armies being, in round numbers—

|                  | Europeans. | Natives. | Total.  |
|------------------|------------|----------|---------|
| Bengal . . . . . | 7,000      | 57,000   | 64,000  |
| Madras . . . . . | 11,000     | 53,000   | 64,000  |
| Bombay . . . . . | 6,500      | 20,000   | 26,500  |
| Total . . . . .  | 24,500     | 130,000  | 154,500 |

At this period, it will be noticed, the Bengal and Madras armies were nearly of equal strength, but the latter had the larger proportion of European troops. The cavalry and artillery were on a small scale in proportion to the rest of the army; but this was in accordance with the organisation adopted for the British Army at home.

In 1823 the two-battalion regiments of native infantry were divided into regiments of one battalion each. The officers of a regiment under the new organisation consisted of—

|                      |
|----------------------|
| 1 Colonel            |
| 1 Lieutenant-Colonel |
| 1 Major              |
| 5 Captains           |
| 10 Lieutenants       |
| 5 Ensigns            |
| Total . . . . .      |

23

389. Preventives of Famine<sup>1</sup>.

Before quitting the subject of dearths I wish to explain the two circumstances which regulate their intensity, and the method by which they may be counteracted. Famine in India is caused by natural scarcity, resulting from the deficiency of the crops, and more or less severe in proportion as the crops have been more or less completely destroyed. Inundations may cause temporary scarcity, but the losses of low-lying localities are usually made up by the subsequent abundance on the high grounds. On the other hand, drought, when sufficiently intense to destroy the December harvest, results in famine. The practical effects of famine depend, however, on its actual pressure as indicated by the rise in prices. Under native government and in 1770 under the Company's first attempt at administration, the actual pressure of a famine held a direct ratio to the natural scarcity. If the crops perished the people died: the actual pressure was in proportion to the natural scarcity, and the natural scarcity to the actual pressure. But the whole tendency of modern civilisation is to raise up intervening influences which render the relation of actual pressure to natural scarcity less certain and less direct, until the two terms which were once convertible come to have very little connection with each other. This is what has taken place in India during the last fifty years, as the two following examples show.

The north-western provinces of Bengal have twice been visited during that period by a season of terrible drought. On both occasions the proportion of the crops destroyed appears to have been the same, and the official estimate reports the natural scarcity as nearly equal. The first took place in 1837, the second in 1860-61. In 1837, India was on the point of being thrown unreservedly open to European enterprise, but the change had not taken place. Railways were not; roads and water-courses were scarcely more numerous than in the time of Aurungzebe; non-official English influence, and the facilities for transport that such influence everywhere procures, were confined to the immediate vicinity of the great towns; nor had that vast store of surplus capital, ever keenly on the look-out for investment, been developed, which forms so striking a feature in the mercantile economy of Bengal at the present day. In short, the breakwaters which modern civilisation raises up between natural scarcity and its actual pressure had not yet been constructed and the ancient monotonous story of starvation was repeated. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Government, then presided over by a nobleman of remarkable private humanity, the deaths rose to twelve hundred *per diem* in two of the principal towns; in the open country the people perished by villages, and nine months of famine left the whole rural

<sup>1</sup> *The Annals of Rural Bengal*, by W. W. Hunter, 1868, pp. 50-56.

system disorganized. But during the next quarter of a century India advanced towards civilisation by forced marches, and the drought of 1860 found its effects checked by a hundred counteracting influences unknown in 1837. The natural scarcity was the same, but abundance of capital existed to buy food from other provinces, and the newly constructed railways with their network of roads cheaply and rapidly effected its distribution. The Grand Trunk Road, a work of Roman solidity, is officially reported to have been worn out in fifteen days; 'every cart, bullock, camel, donkey, in short, every means of conveyance available in the country' was pressed into the service, and the principal railway stations were at length blocked-up with grain. While private enterprise thus intervened between the natural scarcity and the actual pressure, private charity provided for that section of the people whose earnings just suffice to keep them alive in seasons of ordinary fertility; a section which will always be thrown upon the public benevolence during a scarcity, as long as the present relations of labour and capital continue in Bengal.

The second example is derived from the two famines that have visited the lower provinces in 1770 and 1866. In this instance very little evidence exists for comparing the natural scarcity. But we know that in 1866 one corner of Bengal—Orissa—was, so far as the intervening influences which prevent natural scarcity passing into actual pressure, exactly in the position of the whole province in 1770. In these similarly situated parts the actual pressure, as indicated by the price of rice, was precisely the same in both famines, the maximum being fourpence and the average over twopence a pound. It should be remembered, however, that silver was dearer then than now. The proportion of the crops lost seems also to have been equal. In the districts of Orissa which suffered most in 1866 and in Rajmahal, one of the districts which suffered most in 1770, the preceding harvests were officially estimated to have yielded less than one-half their average produce, and any superiority of the early Orissa harvests in 1865 to those of Rajmahal in 1769 was more than counterbalanced by subsequent exportations from the Orissa seaboard. It may be inferred, therefore, that the natural scarcity was the same. The actual pressure happily proved very different. In 1770 the natural scarcity passed in a direct and unmitigated form into actual pressure. Before the middle of the year ten millions of the general population had perished; at the end of it, an official reports that of a certain poor class—the lime-workers—only five out of one hundred and fifty were living, and one-third of the country had returned to jungle. In 1866, roads, railways, canals, toiled day and night in bringing grain from other provinces, till at length the port at which the railway taps the river system of Lower Bengal became unable to afford accommodation for landing the unprecedented cargoes, and the Railway Company had to seek the assistance of the authorities to prevent native shipmasters

from unloading on its lines and sidings. One corner of Lower Bengal, however, continued in the same isolated state in 1866 in which the whole province found itself in 1770, and it was reserved for the unhappy people of Orissa to experience what happens when the actual pressure of a dearth is equal to the natural scarcity, and to illustrate to modern times the meaning of the ancient word famine.

The preventives of famine belong to two distinct classes; those that tend to avert natural scarcity, and those that are directed towards the development of intervening influences between natural scarcity and actual pressure. Natural scarcity may be averted either by Government undertaking works of irrigation and drainage at its own expense, or by giving the landed classes a permanent title to the soil,—thus inducing them to enter on such works by securing to them the profits. Orissa in 1866 was in this respect in the position of the whole of the province in 1770: it had neither a permanent settlement nor any adequate irrigation works maintained by the State, and it was the only part of Lower Bengal in which the scenes of 1770 were re-enacted.

The second set of preventives, those that tend to raise up breakwaters between natural scarcity and actual pressure, is a very large one. Every measure that helps towards the extension of commerce and the growth of capital, every measure that increases the facilities of transport and distribution, comes under this class. Whatever tends to develop the natural resources of a country, to call forth a spirit of enterprise among its inhabitants, to render each part less dependent on itself, and to bind up the commonwealth by the ties of mutual assistance and common interest, tends to mitigate the actual pressure of a famine. The whole list may be expressed by four words—enlightened government and modern civilisation. These are the specifics for famine. Where they exist, scarcity will never result in depopulation; where they do not, the utmost endeavours of Government may mitigate but they cannot avert. Nevertheless, the two formal specifics may be assisted by subsidiary relief efforts, such as public works and organized public charity.

Where natural scarcity passes directly into actual pressure, two exceptional measures have been employed, with various degrees of success, to take the extreme edge off famine. The one is an embargo on exportation, the other is importation at the State expense. Both are dangerous expedients, and their success (when successful) implies that the ordinary laws of political economy cannot be applied to the case; in other words, that modern civilisation and enlightened government have yet to begin their work. This was the condition of Lower Bengal in 1770 and of Orissa, its south-western corner, in 1866.



390. *Indian Sugar*<sup>1</sup>.

[Written in 1813.]

It is maintained:

1st. That it is inconsistent with the principles of sound policy to exclude by prohibitory or exorbitant duties, the importation into this country of raw sugars, the produce of any part of the British dominions, whether such sugars be required to supply the consumption of our own population, or to furnish our refiners with the raw material to enable them to supply the foreign market with the article in its manufactured state.

2nd. That the duty of thirty-seven shillings per cwt. on East India sugars, being equal to a tax of about 200 per cent. on the prime cost of the article in India, is manifestly of this description, and has not only checked the importation of the finer sugars, the produce of British India, by subjecting the importing merchant in many recent instances to a heavy loss, but has actually, in the case of the coarser sugars, operated as a prohibition, and has excluded those sugars altogether from the British market.

3rd. That it is not only inconsistent with the dictates of a wise policy to check the trade in this article from any part of the British dominions; but that to exclude the produce of a particular dependency, by the imposition of partial and unequal duties, for the sole purpose of favoring the importation of the article from some other quarter, is a manifest departure from those principles of equal justice, to the benefit of which the subjects of these realms have all an equal claim.

4th. That the additional duty of ten shillings per cwt. imposed upon East India sugars, which is further aggravated by levying upon those sugars almost indiscriminately the duty of five shillings per cwt., payable upon cloyed sugars (although it is well known that the finest sugars from British India are very inferior both in quality and value to the cloyed sugars of the West Indies), is a partial and unequal tax, intended to favor a particular interest at the expense of other important interests, and is not sanctioned by any principle of justice.

5th. That, although the British Legislature should succeed in excluding East India sugars from the British market by prohibitory duties, this exclusion would but little avail the parties whom it is intended to favor, while those sugars can find their way into the markets of Europe; since it is perfectly certain that the price of the commodity in our own market, which contains a large surplus for exportation, must be regulated, or be materially affected, by the price which the article bears in the general market of Europe; and that, consequently, while this attempt to confer a benefit on the West India interest seems little calculated to accomplish the end proposed, it is evidently calculated to alienate a valuable branch of

<sup>1</sup> *Memorials of Indian Government.* Being a Selection from the Papers of H. St. G. Tucker, edited by J. W. Kaye, 1853, pp. 178-190.

trade—to give employment to foreign in preference to British shipping—and to enable the foreign refiner, by supplying him with the raw material at a lower rate, to compete successfully with the British manufacturer.

6th. That, whether it be justifiable or not, in regulating our system of commercial policy, to make a distinction between European British subjects and the natives of India, who, by the dispensation of Providence, have been placed for more than half a century under the dominion of Great Britain,—this partial and unequal tax does unquestionably injure the property, and affect the interests of large numbers of British-born subjects, who have claims to legislative protection, upon grounds as strong and incontestible as those which have been urged, or can be urged, by the proprietors or mortgagees of estates in the West Indies, or by any other class of British subjects.

7th. That European British subjects who have invested their capital in houses, factories, and other buildings—in docks, machinery, and other immoveable property, and who can draw to this country the income of such property, and ultimately the principal itself, in no other way than by means of the produce of India, are placed in a situation perfectly analogous to that in which the proprietors and mortgagees of estates in the West Indies describe themselves; and have just ground to complain of those legislative enactments which, excluding the produce of India from the British market, virtually deprive them of the means of removing their capital to the mother country.

8th. That the income of British-born subjects from capital in India, with the annual savings of the public servants and others from professional allowances and other sources, for which a remittance to this country is required, has been estimated at the sum of three millions sterling per annum; and that, assuming this fact, which is strongly corroborated by the difference which has long existed, and which still exists, between the amount of imports and exports in the trade of India and China with Great Britain, it would appear that the value of property, and extent of interest, held by European British subjects in India, is not inferior to that held by their fellow-subjects in the West Indies.

1820.

|                            |   |   |                   |
|----------------------------|---|---|-------------------|
| Imports into Great Britain | . | . | £7,537,000        |
| Exports from ditto         | . | . | 1,998,000         |
| Excess of imports          | . | . | <u>£5,539,000</u> |

1821.

|                            |   |   |                   |
|----------------------------|---|---|-------------------|
| Imports into Great Britain | . | . | £7,562,000        |
| Exports from ditto         | . | . | 2,978,000         |
| Excess of imports          | . | . | <u>£4,584,000</u> |

9th. That the protecting duty of ten shillings per cwt., which was

imposed for the first time in the year 1813, to favor the trade of the West Indies at the expense of British India, has necessarily the effect of enhancing generally the price of all sugars in the home market; and that, consequently, as far as West India produce is in question, it imposes upon the British consumer a tax, the produce of which does not find its way to the public exchequer, but which is levied, without discrimination, not merely for the benefit of the proprietors of estates in the old colonies, who are known to be in a state of distress, but also for the benefit of Demerara, and the other newly-acquired colonies, which can neither advance the same plea of distress, nor pretend that they have acquired any peculiar rights on the ground of long possession.

10th. That this forced enhancement of price in the home market is injurious to the British refiner, and tends to prevent his obtaining the supply of the foreign market, while the drawback which is granted to compensate this disadvantage can be supplied only by means of direct contributions from the British public.

11th. That the partial and unequal tax already described, although more obviously affecting the British consumer and the capitalist who has occasion to draw his funds from India, is not less injurious to the interests of the British manufacturer, who sees within his reach an extensive market ready to receive his cottons, woollens, hardware, and other articles, but who finds it impossible to extend, or to continue, his exportation in consequence of not being permitted to import, at a fair rate of duty, the raw produce of India in return.

12th. That, all commerce resolving itself ultimately into a barter of commodities, an *import* duty may, and in certain cases must, have the effect of checking and altogether preventing *exportation*; and that the enormous and unequal duty imposed upon East India sugars, does notoriously tend to prevent that free interchange of the manufactures of Great Britain for the raw produce of her Eastern possessions, which is calculated to secure great and reciprocal advantages to the two countries.

13th. That even the agricultural interests of these islands are exposed to injury by those injudicious enactments, which tend to check the exportation of British commodities; since every measure which depresses the condition of the manufacturer, diminishes his means of consuming, and circumscribes his demand for the produce of the land.

14th. That the East India Company, who are under an obligation to furnish a remittance for a portion of the interest of the territorial debt, are liable to incur, and have actually sustained, a heavy loss in consequence of the high protecting duties levied upon East India sugars; and that this loss, which might have been avoided under a more equitable system of commercial regulation, has actually trenchd upon a capital which may be regarded as national property.

15th. That the East India Company, precluded as they have lately been from the importation of sugars to any extent, by reason of the excessive duties, have found themselves compelled to have recourse to the importation of specie and Bullion from their Eastern possessions, as the only channel of remittance which was open to them. That upon this remittance, amounting in the last year to the sum of about two millions sterling, a loss must be sustained of not less than twenty or twenty-five per cent.,—and that, if it should be found necessary to continue the importation of specie in future years, either for the purpose of enabling them to fulfil their engagements to the public creditors, or for the purpose of defraying the territorial charge incurred in this country to the amount of about one million and a half sterling per annum, the loss must become of such magnitude as to affect the profits, or dividends, of the numerous body of individuals who hold an interest in the Company's stock.

16th. That the exportation of specie from British India, a country which is not known to possess any mines of the precious metals, must, if continued upon a large scale, soon produce a scarcity of the circulating medium ; and that such a scarcity, by lowering, as it probably would do, the price of all consumable articles, the produce of the soil, must tend to create a difficulty in the realisation of the territorial revenue, and ultimately to reduce that revenue in proportion to the diminution in the value of the produce of the land.

17th. That the probability of such a result can scarcely be doubted by those who are aware that the land constitutes the chief source of revenue in India ; and that, adverting to the fact of the gross revenue of our Eastern possessions being now supposed to exceed twenty millions sterling per annum, and to have yielded in the last year, 1821-22, a net surplus of not less than two millions, it is manifestly an object of such vast national importance as to demand that it should not be placed at hazard by commercial enactments, originating in a desire to protect and favor a particular interest.

18th. That it is a solecism in political reasoning, and a proposition perfectly monstrous in a moral point of view, to maintain the right to exact the payment of a large annual tribute from a dependent territory, at the same moment that its produce and manufactures, from which alone such a tribute can be paid, are peremptorily excluded from the mother country by the imposition of prohibitory duties.

19th. That even admitting that the Government, as lords paramount of the soil, should succeed in realising the same revenue from the country, notwithstanding the fall of prices, the landholders and peasantry of our possessions in the East, who are under engagements to pay a fixed money-rent, must suffer from a diminution in the value of their raw produce ; and especially in the instance of sugar, which is represented to be one of the most profitable articles of cultivation.

20th. That admitting further, that a scarcity of the circulating medium should not take place so as to occasion a sensible fall of prices, the persons engaged in the cultivation and manufacture of sugar, and other classes of industrious individuals, must suffer from the exclusion of that article from the home market; for, although it is quite true that sugar will be grown in India while there is a demand for it in the general market of the world, it is by no means a slight injury to shut it out from that market to which it would be sent in the natural course of trade, and in which a rapid increase of consumption may be expected to take place under the influence of moderate prices.

21st. That the prosperity of the trade from India generally depends in a great degree upon the admission of sugar, since it is matter of notoriety that cotton-wool, raw silk, indigo, and other articles, constituting, as they do, a very light cargo, cannot safely be transported by sea without a certain proportion of dead weight; and that, if sugar be excluded, a portion of the tonnage of every ship carrying these light goods must either be occupied with ballast, yielding no freight, or with saltpetre, an article which cannot be imported at present without a heavy loss.

22nd. That the exclusion of East India sugars from the British market has consequently a tendency not only to divert the trade in that valuable article into a foreign channel, but also to force with it into foreign ports a portion of the cotton-wool, which forms the raw material of our most valuable manufacture.

23rd. That those deductions, which reason and theory long since suggested, have lately been made manifest by actual experience; and in no instance more remarkable than in that of coffee:—namely, that high taxes dry up the very sources of revenue, and that moderate impositions upon commerce are often more productive than the highest duties; and that, applying these premises to the case of sugar, it may fairly be pronounced that the apprehensions inculcated of a decrease of revenue being the inevitable consequence of an equalisation of the duties, are as little reconcilable with the deductions of sound reasoning, as they are with the results of actual experience.

24th. That the argument founded upon the comparative security and permanency of our possessions in the West Indies, is not entitled to more weight or attention, since it might easily be made to appear that our insular possessions in the West, situated as they are in the immediate neighbourhood of an aspiring and powerful state, are much more exposed to the attacks of a foreign enemy than our extensive continental possessions in the East; while the slave population of the former, having almost before their eyes the example of St. Domingo, are less to be depended upon, and are more likely to break out into dangerous insurrections than the free native subjects of our Indian Empire, who enjoy the in-

estimable advantages of freedom, and who have hitherto been protected in their rights (with, perhaps, the single exception of commercial restriction), with a degree of care and solicitude characteristic of a benevolent and paternal Government.

25th. That while a well-founded reliance may be placed in the stability and security of our Indian Empire so long as that vast territory shall be administered by a wise, just, and energetic Government, it is not intended, or wished, to conceal that it may be exposed to danger: that we may forfeit the attachment of the people upon which the very foundations of our empire rest: that they may be goaded by oppression, and irritated by injustice; and that it ought, consequently, to be a primary object of the British Legislature to remove all those commercial restrictions and prohibitions which are calculated to excite in the minds of our Asiatic subjects a sense of injustice—which may alienate their affections, and cause them to regard the domination of Great Britain as a calamity rather than a blessing to their country.

26th. That the East Indian interest, far from wishing to extend to their fellow-subjects those oppressive restrictions on commerce of which they themselves have so much reason to complain, are ready and willing to co-operate with the West Indian interest in soliciting from the Legislature relief from any remaining restrictions and disabilities under which they may still suffer, and which can be removed without compromising the general interests of the empire.

27th. That the East Indian interest would most cordially and zealously concur with the West Indian interest in urging upon the British Legislature the expediency, and still more the moral obligation they are under, of endeavouring, by all justifiable means, to put an end as soon as possible to that unhallowed and execrable traffic in human beings, which is still carried on by some of the nations of Europe, and which constitutes the foulest blot in the history of the civilised world.

28th. That while the East Indian interest are prepared to deny and to disprove the claims to a protecting duty set up by the West Indian interest on the ground of *prescription*, they are ready and willing to co-operate cordially with their fellow-subjects in petitioning the Legislature either to substitute a moderate *ad valorem* duty on the importation of sugar, or to reduce the duties on East and West India sugars respectively to the rates<sup>1</sup> at which they stood in the year 1803; satisfied as they feel that these duties were then regulated on juster principles, and that a recurrence to them would, without involving a sacrifice of the public revenue, afford essential relief to those who are

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<sup>1</sup> Viz.—On Muscovado . . . 20 shillings per cwt.  
 E. I. white sugars . . . 22 „ „  
 W. I. cloyed . . . 23-4 „ „

interested in the manufacture and trade in sugar, both in the West and East Indies.

29th. Finally. That with a view to these several considerations, it being apparent that the high and unequal duties at present levied on East India sugars do, in a greater or less degree, affect the interests of the British consumer—of the British manufacturer—of the agriculturist—of all those engaged in the trade and transportation of sugar, cotton, and other articles from British India—of the British capitalist who has invested his funds in India—of the land-owners and peasantry of our Eastern possessions—of the manufacturers and merchants employed in carrying on the internal trade of those provinces—of the British and Indian ship-owners—and, lastly, of the East India Company themselves, both from the large interest which they hold in the produce of the soil, and from the obligation they are under to continue the great organ of remittance from India—it is the bounden duty of the Honorable Court of Directors, of the Court of Proprietors of East India Stock, and of all others connected with, or taking an interest in, the welfare and prosperity of British India, to endeavour, by all lawful and justifiable means, to obtain the repeal of an arbitrary and oppressive tax, which is not reconcileable either with the views of an enlightened policy, or with the dictates of impartial justice.

### 391. Memorandum by the Prince Consort<sup>1</sup>.

#### *Reorganization of the Indian Army.*

‘Balmoral, 16th October, 1858.

The appeal in favour of “long-established rules” would have come with more effect if the years 1857 and 1858 had not given us melancholy proof of the result of the system on which the local Indian army had been governed by the East India Company.

Instead of the proper “chain of responsibility” which is claimed for the system, it would seem more correct to characterize the system as one of perpetual counteraction and conflicting authorities.

Can anything be more monstrous, for instance, in a military point of view, than the relative positions of the Commander-in-Chief for India, the Commanders-in-Chief for Madras and Bombay; that the latter should be perfectly independent of the former in their respective Presidencies as regards the Company’s, or local, forces, but subordinate to him as regards those of Her Majesty? And that the former, in the event of military operations near the frontiers of the different Presi-

<sup>1</sup> The Life of H. R. H. the Prince Consort by Theodore Martin, Vol. IV, p. 310-312.

dencies, should be absolutely powerless to combine his operations, as far as the co-operation of local troops is concerned, beyond the limits of Bengal, without the concurrence, previously obtained, of the Governor in Council and Commanders-in-Chief of the subordinate Presidency? Such an arrangement seems only to equal, in injury to the public service, those under which rates of pay, conditions of service, respect to caste, and the military system generally, as regards the Native troops, have varied in the different Presidencies.

The great principles on which the efficiency of the military force in any country, and under any circumstances, must depend, are, *simplicity, unity, and steadiness of system, and unity of command.*

We have hitherto had in India, not only a different system for each Presidency, and independent, or nearly independent command in each, but in each of these three independent armies, four independent kinds of force—the Queen's European, the Company's European, the regular Native, and the irregular Native armies! Under this state of things the result has been the mutiny of the whole of the Native army in one Presidency, and a state of discipline in the local European troops characterized as disgraceful by some of the most competent judges on the spot, and nothing but jealousy and animosity between the different services.

The Queen's troops have alone, after being some years in the country, preserved an efficient discipline—and over them the authority of the Commander-in-Chief extended throughout India—while he was controlled by the Commander-in-Chief at home, acting under the immediate authority of the Crown.


Here is the true "chain of responsibility," and it has to be shown that inconvenience has arisen to the service in India from that chain of responsibility, as regards the discipline and efficiency of the troops, being thus preserved in the legitimate and constitutional line, traced back to the Sovereign. Has the Governor-General or Indian Commander-in-Chief been less free to move and employ Her Majesty's troops, as the exigencies of the Indian service required, than those of the East India Company?—or have they been found wanting at any time when the others have broken down? The events of the last two years, during which the *sole* dependence has been upon Her Majesty's troops, is the answer to these questions.

The course, then, prescribed by common sense, in considering the future organisation of an army in India, would appear to be: To abandon "the long-established rules," which, in the case of the Native troops, have resulted in universal mutiny throughout Bengal, and, in that of the Company's European troops, in indiscipline and shortness of numbers (for




amongst other faults of the old system is that of never having been able to keep the European forces of the Company nearly up to their establishment), and to adopt that system which has been most successful hitherto in maintaining an efficient force, that, namely, under which Her Majesty's regular forces have been governed.

SKETCH of the ACTION near MALLAVELLY, 27<sup>th</sup> March, 1799.




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
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the Fortifications of  
**SERINGAPATAM.**




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Oct. 12, 1895.

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